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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

STATE OF BRITISH INDIA:

EMBRACING

THE SUBJECTS OF

COLONIZATION; MISSIONARIES; THE STATE OF THE PRESS; THE NEPAUL AND MAHRATTAH WARS; THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT; AND INDIAN ARMY.

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BY LIEUTENANT A. WHITE,

OF THE BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY.

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PREFACE.

The writer of these observations has passed upwards of 12 years in India; but, until the period of his embarkation for Europe, had no intention whatever of writing for the public, and had collected no materials for that purpose. A month or two prior to leaving India, circumstances threw in his way Mr. Prinsep's *Historical Narrative* of the military and political transactions of the Marquis of Hastings's administration. Entertaining different opinions from that author on this subject, he determined to amuse his leisure on board ship, by examining the system of policy pursued by that statesman in the Nepaul and Mahrattah wars; to combine this with a summary account of the two campaigns against the former pow-

er; and to conclude with some observations on the state of the press and our military establishments in India. A very tedious passage enabled the author to effect this, and afforded him time to throw out his opinions upon colonization, the progress of Christianity and European education, the character of the natives, and the nature of our civil government in India. *

At the end of the chapters on our civil government and Indian army, he has briefly exhibited the prospects of rank and emolument, which, in the present state of the service, lie open to persons adventuring to India, in the civil, military, and medical branches of it. The writer has expressed himself with freedom respecting Lord Hastings's administration. His sentiments on this subject are formed from the perusal of Mr Prinsep's work, which has been revised by Lord Hastings; and he has exhibited passages from it which, in his estimation, fully support the opinions he maintains. The Governor-general of India has in-

* It will be observed that the author has deviated from this arrangement in putting these sheets to the press.

vited the public to scrutinize his public conduct. Emboldened by this call, the author has dared to animadvert upon the policy pursued by the British government in Rajpootana. If he has asserted what is untrue, or adopted erroneous opinions respecting our Asiatic policy, it will be easy to refute him; and the wisdom of this system will be rendered still more apparent.

The political transactions of British India have generally been discussed by men intimately connected with the existing administration (who had been the principal agents in the most important events), or by individuals attached by ties of gratitude to the ruler of the day. Such has not been the case with the present writer. His time has been entirely spent in marching about with his regiment from one station to another in the Company's provinces (or sometimes beyond it), and he is unknown to persons in authority. Perhaps this may have imperceptibly biassed his opinions, and induced him to view the acts of administration too much in the spirit of a regular oppositionist; if so, the intelligent reader will make the requisite deduction from his state-

ments. But it is time that men should speak out. The English public have only been accustomed to hear what can be said on one side of the question, in regard to Indian politics, and it is but just that they should listen to the other. There are various important subjects discussed in this work, to which the writer never specially directed his attention with the view of collecting information for the public; but, at the same time, he has not been altogether negligent of them during his residence in India. The unfavourable circumstances in which he was placed, will perhaps form an apology for the imperfect view which he has given of some of them.

There are two valuable works—Mr Mill's profound *History of India*, and Mr Ward's publication on the Hindoos—which the author had not in his possession, and upon which he has animadverted with some freedom; but his opinions respecting them have been formed from a careful perusal when in India.

As regards Asiatic names, the writer has followed no regular plan, having generally written them as is customary in England, that he might be more easily understood; but, with every

Anglo-Indian, he is powerfully impressed with the superiority of Dr Borthwick Gilchrist's system of orthography; and, had he been writing for persons in India alone, would have strictly adhered to it.

In his observations upon the native character, as contrasted with that of the lower classes of European society, the writer has, in some respects, ascribed a superiority to that of the Hindoos; but perhaps the circumstances in which he has been placed, have led him to form an unfavourable estimate of his countrymen. Having left his native country at an early age, he has had no opportunity of viewing their character in its perfection in the bosom of domestic life, and has principally formed his opinions respecting them from observation of the conduct of the soldiers of the British army in India, whose moral estimation is somewhat inferior to that of the generality of the lower orders in England—many of them having been compelled to leave their native country on account of their irregularities.

August 1, 1822.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

ON COLONIZATION.

Page.

The Arguments against it examined; and the Advantages which would result from it to India and England maintained.—The State of Landed Property in India explained; and the Introduction of British Landholders recommended.—The Apprehension of danger to our Power from the Revolt of the Colonists (as exemplified in the case of America), shown to be inapplicable to Britsh India.. 1

CHAPTER II.

MISSIONARIES.

The Failure of the Missionaries in their direct attempts at Conversion arising, in some degree, from their intemperate conduct.—Their Labours highly meritorious in promoting Education amongst the Natives.—The Opinions of Learned Mahomedans and Hindoos in regard to the Christian Religion.—A Statement of the Unitarian Doctrines of Ramohun.—The Character of the Natives contrasted with that of the lower class of Europeans, and vindicated from the reproaches cast upon it by the Missionaries.—The Practice of Burning Widows compared with the European Custom of Duelling 26

CHAPTER III.

STATE OF THE PRESS.

The Liberty of the Press has never existed in India, as exercised in England.—The late Regulations of Lord Hastings have not allowed of the Liberty of the Press; on the contrary, they prohibit it.—The Reasons urged in Justification of the Restrictions on the Press examined, and their Impolicy maintained, from their tendency to prevent Government from obtaining Correct Information as to the Effects of its Political Measures, which would thus enable the Executive to guard against any Irruption of Discontent in its Subjects or Disaffection in its Soldiery.—The apprehended Danger of Free Discussion on the minds of the Natives shown to be erroneous, from their ignorance of the English language, and the peculiar stage of Civilization at which the Indian community has arrived.—The Liberty of the Press in India would perform the same service which Parliamentary Opposition effects in England, by exposing the Errors of the Administration; and thus enabling the Executive to rectify its Measures 91

CHAPTER IV.

NEPAUL WAR.

The Causes which led to the Nepaul War arising, in a great degree, from the pacific Policy of Lord Minto.—The Opinions of the Whig Statesmen of England examined in regard to our Asiatic Policy, and their Inexpediency maintained.—A Short Account of the Military Operations against the Nepaulese; and Remarks on the Peace concluded with this Power.—The Elevation of our Ally, the Nabob of Oude, to the Regal Dignity discussed; with Conjectures as to the Policy of Lord Hastings in sanctioning it..... 127

CHAPTER V.

MAHRATTAH AND PINDAREE WAR.

Page.

General Reflections on the Erroneous Opinions entertained in England respecting our Ambitious Policy in India and the General Rapacity of Europeans in the East.—The late Pindaree and Mahrattah War occasioned by the Aggressions of these States.—An Account of the Measures which were adopted for their Repression; and the Political Arrangements which have resulted from the Overthrow of these Powers.—The Conduct of Lord Hastings animadverted upon for extending our Subsidiary System to the Rajpoot States.—The General Nature of our Subsidiary Alliances examined; and their marked Injustice and Impolicy maintained.—The Personal Character and Administration of Lord Hastings contrasted with that of his predecessors, Lords Cornwallis and Wellesley 199

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Our Arrangements for the Distribution of Justice examined; and their Advantages and Disadvantages pointed out, compared with similar Institutions in England, and vindicated from the Animadversions of Mr Mill and the Edinburgh Reviewers.—Remarks on the permanent Settlement of the Revenue.—The Prospects of Writers Adventuring to India; their Allowance in the different Branches of the Service; and Chance of returning to Europe with a Fortune 261

CHAPTER VII.

INDIAN ARMY.

Numerical Amount of our Army.—Its Discipline and Constitution.—Arrangements for the Distribution of Justice, and

projected Improvements in its Organization.—The Advantages of Promotion by Brevet as compared with Seniority considered.—An Increase of European Officers recommended.—The Claims of Officers of his Majesty's Service considered.—The Prospects of Cadets and Assistant Surgeons embarking in the Indian Service, with their respective Allowances 352

ERRATA.

Page 82, line 24, *for* Muhadso *read* Muhadeo.
— 106, — 25, *for* them; only *read* them only;.
— 109, — 2, *for* inquiry *read* injury.
— 168, — 29, &c. *for* Soorugghur *read* Soorujghur.
— 179, — 26, *for* effects *read* effect.
— 181, — 15, *for* Rungoor *read* Runjoor.
— 192, — 23, *for* dark *read* dawk.

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

STATE OF BRITISH INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

COLONIZATION.

The arguments against it examined; and the advantages which would result from it to India and England maintained.—The state of landed property in India explained; and the introduction of British landholders recommended.—The apprehension of danger to our power from the revolt of the colonists (as exemplified in the case of America), shown to be inapplicable to British India.

When a small but adventurous portion of a nation highly civilized, possessing superior physical and mental vigour, has succeeded in the conquest of a vast and populous empire, inhabited by a race of men imbecile in intellect, feeble in frame, and degraded in character by the debasing operation of civil and religious tyranny,—it must strike the mind with irresistible force, that the noblest service which it can render to this oppressed people, would be to evince its entire superiority to every selfish feeling, by communicating its knowledge in science,

arts, morals, and religion, to this abject race, and thus to achieve the mighty good of rescuing a numerous portion of mankind from the misery and degradation which result from their present state of intellectual darkness. It is thus that the spirit of violence and injustice could atone to humanity for the evils it had committed, and that a necessary aggrandizement or extension of territory could be rendered useful to mankind. It was the glory of ancient Rome to diffuse the knowledge of her arts, letters, laws, and manners, amidst the conquered nations: Her power was rendered subservient to their improvement; her pride was gratified by their elevation in character and dignity. And will not a polished, an enlightened, and a Christian people aspire to imitate or surpass her in this exalted career? This is the noble destiny reserved for England in India.—The daring spirit of enterprize, the energetic valour of her sons have enabled her to obtain the mastery in this vast country: it is their task to introduce that just taste in arts and literature, that ardent love of science and rational liberty, that purer faith and loftier morality which constitute the intellectual glory of their country. It will be their duty to exalt India in the scale of social existence;—to stimulate her torpid energies into action by the stirring agency of those principles which vivify and adorn society in Europe;—to fertilize the barren waste of intellect, that it may spring forth in a rich harvest of mental improvement. Of the various means which might be employed to effect this important end, it must be obvious that colonization would prove by far the most direct and beneficial in its operation.

Scattered throughout this vast country, the settlers would practically exhibit that superiority in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, which would excite the admiration of the Hindoo community, and rouse their ambition to imitate; and this would naturally lead to the study of the language, religion, manners, and laws of a people so highly distinguished by their intellectual endowments. But this direct path to improvement has been almost closed by the restrictions imposed by the supreme authority in England on the settlement of Europeans in India. The nature of these restraints, so injurious to the interests both of India and of England, I shall now proceed to state, with the arguments by which they are supported, and the reasonings which may be urged in favour of unrestricted colonization :—

1*st*, No person is allowed to proceed to India without a special licence from the Court of Directors, or the Board of Control; and this, exclusive of their own servants, is limited to a few merchants, mariners, and practitioners of the law. Should a British subject be found without a licence in India, he is instantly liable to be sent home; and although this invidious power is no doubt seldom exercised, yet its very existence must operate as a check to a permanent residence in India.

2*d*, The next powerful check to colonization consists in a regulation of the government, prohibiting Europeans from possessing or cultivating lands.—This prohibition is not founded on an act of the legislature, but simply on an order of the Court of Directors. Thus, the principal inducement to a

permanent settlement in India is altogether removed: that power and consequence, and extensive sphere of utility which the possession of land creates, does not exist under this system.

3d, The nomination to appointments in the civil and military service in India being vested entirely in the Court of Directors, the British resident is compelled to resort to England, to afford him the means of providing for his family. Being debarred from obtaining lands in India, he has no inheritance to bequeath to his descendants. Thus situated, he feels the necessity of acquiring influence in the parent country, that he may procure appointments for his children. With this hope, he sends them to England at an early age, that they may be imbued with British habits and feelings. In the decline of life he generally retires to that country, that he may superintend their establishment in the world. Under this system it is impossible that colonization can take place: All the feelings of the European community center in England;—the annual return of its members prevents their taking root in the country. As Mr Grant eloquently expresses it,—"The link of the domestic affections attaches a European not to India, but England; and he can hardly be said even to live in the land of his residence, while the second and younger life which he enjoys in his descendants, is bound up in a distant country."

4th, Individuals are restrained, by statute, from residing in any place ten miles beyond a principal settlement, without a special license of the governor-in-council of such settlement. In practice this per-

mission is rarely refused, any person of character having free liberty to exercise his calling within the provinces.

From the operation of these causes, it must be obvious that colonization cannot take place in India; and it remains to inquire by what arguments this restrictive policy is supported. These are clearly stated by the able and eloquent advocate of the present system of Indian government, Mr R. Grant. They resolve themselves into two principal reasons: 1*st*, A regard to humanity, which induces an enlightened government to protect its native subjects from the rapacity and injustice of Europeans, and from a dread that their superior skill, intelligence, and energy of character would enable them to deprive the original inhabitants of their lands, and permanently displace the native population: 2*d*, It is apprehended, that, were colonization allowed, the Anglo-Indian community would speedily emancipate itself from the control of the mother country.

It is contended, that an Anglo-Indian public would be created, altogether different in character and spirit from that of England, and opposed in interest to that of the native community: That the feeling which would animate this mixed population towards the native inhabitants, would be eminently hostile and inimical to their prosperity: That, conscious of their superiority, they would fearlessly exercise it in acts of violence and oppression: That the administration of justice resting principally with these men, there would be every reason to apprehend an unjust partiality to the interest of their own body:

That it could not be expected that an abject Hindoo would appear before a tribunal of this kind, to confront an antagonist belonging to the master or ruling class: That thus injustice would reign triumphant through the land. It is apprehended, in short, that the character of this Anglo-Indian public would approximate to that of a West Indian colony, and its character be marked by the same profligate disregard of human feeling which is exercised towards the negroes.

Such are the reasons which are urged against colonization. At first sight there appears a marked inconsistency in these reasonings. With all this apparent regard for the interests of humanity—this repugnance to displace the native population—it is remarkable that the ruling powers in India or England have manifested no extraordinary reluctance to dethrone their sovereigns when the interest of the state required it. If the reasonings urged by Mr Grant are correct, they must apply equally to the conduct of the British government in displacing these rulers; and this policy must be condemned on the same humane principles which are urged against colonization. This, perhaps, is going farther than this gentleman intended, considering that his work is, confessedly, a panegyric upon that government.

I perfectly agree with him, that the introduction of a more enlightened system of rule has been attended with some benefit to the native population; but it is this very conviction which leads me to desire that British influence was more extensively diffused throughout the land—that it pervaded every village, instead of being confined to a few spots in

a vast empire. It is singular that this writer should suppose, that the virtues of humanity and self-restraint were solely exercised by the executive in India; as if the community from which the ruling power emanates was altogether devoid of these qualities. The government of a country is enlightened in the same proportion as its inhabitants are advanced in the scale of civilization: it reflects their vices and virtues impartially. If the British government in India is practically exercised in a spirit of justice and moderation, it is a fair presumption that the conduct of the members of the European community would be regulated by the same principles. This would be more particularly the case as applied to colonization in India, when it is taken into consideration that it is only persons of some education, skill, and capital, who could settle in that country —the extreme heat of the climate, density of the population, and consequent cheapness of labour, rendering it altogether impossible for the lower orders of Europeans to exist in India; and thus restraining a settlement to a few individuals of the middle class.

But, in the event of colonization taking place, is it at all likely that the Hindoo community should become the victim of those atrocities which are represented to be inseparable from this policy? What probability is there of the inhabitants being unjustly dispossessed of their lands? None: These possessions can only be sold by government to cover a defalcation of revenue; and then what moral crime is there in a European becoming the purchaser? Is the community likely to be injured by an improved agricultural practice which might nearly double the

produce in twenty or thirty years; and thus afford an increased sustenance to millions of human beings? Is a Hindoo or a British landholder more naturally disposed to a tyrannical exercise of power? Surely the subject of a free and enlightened state, who, as a moral and intellectual being, has been accustomed to consider himself responsible for his actions, is much more likely to exercise authority beneficially. If not, what hope is there for the human race? There can be no prospect of improvement! It would indeed be a melancholy reflection to suppose, that our superior knowledge was solely directed to the advancement of our own selfish purposes—that the light and strength of civilization was only employed in riveting the chains which bind down the human faculties in India! But, allowing it to be the case, that the exercise of power was abused by British subjects, still it must be admitted, that the subjects of a despotic state are, from the influence of circumstances, far more powerfully disposed to a tyrannical exercise of authority than the citizens of a free government. Habituated to the exercise of force, and accustomed to bend before its influence, the native of India has scarcely an idea of any other mode of government. Whoever has resided in India, and exercised power, must have felt the difficulty which he encountered in convincing natives, possessed of authority, that the powers of reason could be successfully employed as an engine of human government.

Such being the case, it seems evident, that it would be productive of the greatest advantage to British India, if an intelligent body of European landholders could be introduced, who had been accustomed to re-

spect the rights of others and to consider the interests of the different orders of the community as identified with each other. Under their control, the welfare of the peasantry would be more regarded, and their superior skill in agriculture would operate as a powerful stimulus to the productive industry of the country. It is impossible that this could be effected with violence. As, under the present system of government, all landed estates are bought and sold as in Europe, the British purchaser would come into the market upon the same footing as any other person. No native could be dispossessed of his lands, without his free consent. It is remarkable, that, whilst the Court of Directors has rigidly prohibited British-born subjects from holding lands in India, the same restriction does not extend to the country-born population or the descendants of Europeans and native women—an immunity which presents a wide field for exertion to that body, which is shut to British enterprise. It is surprising, however, that, notwithstanding this important privilege, scarcely any of the members of the country-born class have adventured in this career of industry,—an anomaly which must be ascribed to a want of enterprise or agricultural skill. This description of persons indeed appear more ambitious of obtaining rank and office under the government, instead of that wealth and influence which would render them independent of its patronage. The right of holding lands, which is granted only to this class, exhibits a marked inconsistency in the conduct of government. If British-born subjects are excluded from this privilege, from an apprehension of violence and

injustice on their part, ought not a just dread to be entertained, that the excesses of the country-born population would be greater? From the defective education of this body, their moral character* cannot be expected to rival the British, with the exception of those individuals who have received a European education. Such being the case, is it not strange that the power and influence which landed property creates should be intrusted to a race of men decidedly inferior in talents, acquirements, and probity, whilst the British are excluded? That humane regard for the interest of the natives, which is alleged to be the cause of this policy, if founded on truth, would apply much more forcibly to the country-born population than the British. There may be just reasons for restricting the judicial and revenue officers of government from holding lands, that their private interests may not interfere with their public duties; but the same cause for exclusion cannot apply to British-born subjects unemployed in the Honourable Company's service. The analogy which is drawn from the conduct of the West India colonists towards the negroes, as a justification of this restrictive policy, cannot be admitted to apply to British India.

The execrable institution of slavery does not exist to debase the character of the ruling class; every labourer is at liberty to leave the service of an oppressive master, and can call upon the law to punish

* It is not contended that there is any natural inferiority; but that circumstances will not allow the human character to rise to the same elevation which it attains under a government affording a wider scope to every intellectual energy.

any violence or injustice offered to him. A benevolent provision of the supreme government assigns him a native agent to plead his cause before the judge of the district, if unable to defray the expense of a prosecution. But, supposing this demoralized feeling to exist in India, that the British colonist regarded the native inhabitant as a being scarcely entitled to the privileges of humanity, and that this unjust opinion continually impelled him to commit acts of outrage and cruelty upon this prostrate race—still it must be obvious, that this unnatural and iniquitous abuse of power would be much more effectually checked in the East, than in the West, from the purer administration of justice which reigns in India. In the West Indies, the magistrates are selected from the great body of the planters, imbued with the same prejudices and feelings, and habitually disposed to consider the interest of the slave as entirely subordinate to that of the master.—In British India, the administration of justice devolves upon a body of men expressly educated for this purpose in England, whose habits, temper, and views would be materially opposite to those of the colonists; and whose manifest interest it would be to restrain their excesses, lest they should provoke that rebellion which might ultimately deprive them of their lucrative appointments. But, independently of this powerful check, an enlightened government exists, whose direct duty it is to protect the mass of its subjects against the violence and rapacity of individuals, and which has manifested every wish to perform this function, while it possesses every means of enforcing its de-

crees. Fortified by the rectitude of its intentions, the confidence of its subjects, and its powerful armies, is it at all likely that a few colonists would dare to risk its displeasure? In the event of a considerable increase of the creole or country-born population, it is probable that they would be called upon to assist in the distribution of justice, and might be expected to show some partiality to the interests of their own body: But the dread of this ought not to be allowed to decide the question. Allowing that some abuses were committed, it must be obvious that they would be infinitely greater under the despotic authority of native agents. And this is the point to which we must bring the decision. Possessing a superior degree of civilization, greater moral probity, subject to responsibility, the beneficial check of public opinion, and maintaining an intimate connexion with the parent country, it may fairly be presumed that the colonists would aspire to imitate the character of British justice.

It now remains to consider the argument which is deduced against colonization, from the dread which is entertained lest the settlers should emancipate themselves from British control. There exists little probability of this: There being no inducement for the labouring class to settle in British India, colonization would be confined to a few persons possessing capital; hence the numbers of this class would increase very slowly. The mixed European population increases more rapidly;—but at present this body is not estimated at more than 70,000 under the Bengal presidency, and this composed of various races, Anglo-Indian, Portuguese, Armenian;

whilst the native population cannot amount to less than 40 millions under the same government. Thus this portion of the community must ever remain an inconsiderable class amidst a vast people.

The prospect of the revolt of the Anglo-Indian community must be very distant.—The analogy which is drawn from the example of America cannot apply to British India. Circumstances are entirely dissimilar: In America, nearly an entire people was animated with one spirit against the government;—in British India, if disaffection existed in the Anglo-Indian community, it would be confined to a small number of individuals, without power or influence, and these scattered amidst a vast people well affected towards the government. In such a situation their ruin would be inevitable.

The danger to British India appears infinitely greater from the designs of Russia; or, at some distant period, from the efforts of European colonies more favourably disposed for colonization. Thus, at New South Wales and the Cape of Good Hope, where the moderate temperature of the climate and the fertility of the soil afford every encouragement to the emigration of the labouring class of the European community, the progress of population must be much more rapid.

The power and ability to throw off their allegiance would arrive much sooner to these communities than to that of the Anglo-Indian. In the event of their success, the British possessions in the East would naturally become their prey: The population of Australasia might practice the larcenous occupation of their forefathers on a bolder scale on

the plains of India. But, setting aside speculation, and admitting that colonization might possibly lead to the emancipation of India from British control, are we to lose this fair prospect of doing good, from the dread of this calamity? As moral, intellectual, and religious beings, it is unquestionably our duty to enter upon this career, whatever may be the consequences to our dominion.

It remains to consider the practical advantages which would result from this policy. Were unrestricted colonization permitted, it can scarcely be doubted, that the superior skill, intelligence, and industry of Europeans would give a powerful stimulus to the agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing interests of the country. In India, landed property is minutely subdivided. There exist no large farms as in Europe: a large estate is parceled out, in small portions of five, ten, or twenty acres, amongst the class of agricultural labourers, precisely on the same principle as is practised in Ireland at present, and the gradual alteration of which has led to the extensive emigrations from Scotland and Ireland. Under this system no capital can be created for the purposes of improvement, nor motive for its application. The experience of the individual being limited to the few acres which he possesses, he can have no information as to the nature of different soils, or knowledge of different modes of culture. His practice is marked by a uniform routine, and is generally confined to the raising a single crop. To the gradual alteration of this system, and the introduction of large farms, Adam Smith principally ascribes the great improvement in agricultural skill

throughout Europe. And, were the existing restrictions removed, which preclude British born subjects from holding lands, it appears that a similar advantage would result to British India by the introduction of an improved system of agriculture. This change would be marked by the breaking up of the present system of petty farming. The European agriculturist would require at least 3 or 400 acres to enable him to avail himself of the capacity of different soils for the purpose of improvement. At present, no skill or capital is required in the cultivation of land,—the same uniform practice being followed, without the slightest attempt to augment the produce by applying better manure, a skilful rotation of crops, or improved implements of husbandry; in a word, the intellectual talent of the Indian community never has been directed to this the noblest of the arts. It occupies no portion of the leisure of the Indian landholder: his ambition is solely limited to extracting the utmost amount of rent from the wretched peasantry. The idea of improving the welfare of his tenantry, by granting his lands on such terms as may stimulate them to lay out capital in improvement, and thereby augmenting the value of his property, is altogether unknown to him.

Now, on the other hand, the attention of the British landholder would naturally be directed to the improvement of the soil, by the introduction of European skill, its superior practice in the application of manure, draining, inclosures, and embankments. It would be manifestly his interest to improve the breed of cattle, which is altogether neglected at present; whilst a regard to his personal

gratifications would induce him to introduce the fruits and plants of Europe, which are unknown in India, and to bestow the pains and attention which are requisite for their successful cultivation. Instead of displacing the native inhabitants, it may be fairly presumed, that the energy and enterprize of the European character would be stimulated to bringing into cultivation the vast tracts of land which lie unoccupied in the plains of India. When it is considered, moreover, what has been effected in England, within the last forty years, by improvements in agriculture, is it unreasonable to suppose, that, in a country like India, possessing every variety of soil and climate, and intersected by numerous streams, affording every facility for carrying the produce to market, the amount of its agriculture would be nearly doubled within the same period, if free scope were allowed to the skill and enterprize of Europeans in stimulating its languishing industry? It may be objected, that the necessary operation of this system would be to deprive the peasantry of their lands, and thus create a great deal of misery. In reply, it can only be said, that the change would be very gradual, the number of Europeans disposed to settle being so very limited; and that it appears to me their situation would be ameliorated. The farmers of India are literally labourers; their agricultural operations are principally carried on by borrowed capital; the necessity of paying their rents monthly compels them to resort to the money lender, whose aid is likewise requisite for the maintenance of their families, until the harvest shall be reaped. The general rate of interest at which money is lent to

this class of society is not less than 36 per cent.: Thus the profits of agricultural labour are principally engrossed by the money lender. Under the depressing influence of this system, all individual energy must be extinguished: there can be no hope of improvement as long as it endures. That surplus produce which, in a more favourable state of society, is destined to reproduce wealth, and to enrich the farmer, is here altogether swallowed up by the exorbitant rate of interest which is paid to the lender for the use of his capital. Under the change of system which the existence of a body of British landholders, and the introduction of large farms would create, this description of persons would be converted into weekly labourers upon their estates. Receiving their wages weekly, the necessity of borrowing money would be removed; and thus a numerous portion of the community would be relieved from the misery and suffering which result from the present system of agricultural economy. Were care taken to preserve a small piece of ground to each labourer, the cultivation of which would amuse his leisure, and assist in the maintenance of his family (and this is easily practicable in Hindostan), it can scarcely be doubted that his general condition would be wonderfully improved. Relieved from the grievous exactions and oppression which prevail under the influence of the native landholders, he would feel a sense of security and independence under this system, which would raise him from his present state of moral and political debasement. But, supposing that no schemes of agricultural improvement were attempted, and that the

British landholder merely succeeded to the power and privileges which the native at present possesses, it can scarcely be doubted that this would be attended with considerable benefit to the cultivators of the soil. Under the present system, the principal zumeendars are mostly composed of opulent individuals residing in the capital of a province, and very often men engaged in commercial and banking transactions, and the native officers of government holding appointments in the civil courts. These persons, who rarely visit their estates, feel little or no interest in the welfare of the ryuts or cultivators—no sympathy with their wants; indeed this cannot be expected under the system which is pursued in subdividing lands. Thus, let us suppose an opulent native purchases a zumeendaree for one lac of rupees; and that this estate must pay to government an yearly revenue of 30,000*r*. allowing twelve per cent. for the interest of his money, the sum which he ought to collect from the ryuts should be 42,500*r*. The time and labour necessary to collect this sum from the ryuts would prove too much for his indolent habits, and would interfere with his other pursuits; he therefore disposes of this estate, for a certain number of years, to another person, who agrees to give him 50,000*r*. per annum,—thus he obtains 7500*r*. clear gain, without the slightest trouble to himself. This person again divides the estate between five other persons, who agree to give him 55,000*r*. per annum; thus he clears 5000*r*. by his bargain. These sub-renters dispose of the lands to the ryuts for 60,000*r*. per annum, which afford to them a profit of 5000*r*.

Thus, the original impost which the government had fixed for defraying the expenses of the state is increased 100 per cent. to the wretched cultivator; and in some districts, where this subdivision of lands prevails to a much greater extent, the advance must be considerably greater. The severe exactions which arise from this system leave but a scanty pittance to the ryut as the reward of his labour. The miseries which have resulted from the pernicious agency of middlemen in Ireland,—a counterpart of the practice in question,—are much more aggravated in India, where the difficulty of contending with a wealthy zumeendar is much greater. Were British-born subjects, however, allowed to purchase lands, a rapid improvement in the condition of the ryuts might fairly be expected. The European landholder would then feel the necessity of residing upon his estate, as the most effectual way of securing his own interest. This would not only supersede the pernicious agency of middlemen, but be mutually advantageous to the cultivator and the landlord. The ryut, moreover, would pay his rent directly to the landholder, without that heavy deduction from his profits which the agency of these under-renters of land created. The landlord, of course, would require some addition to his profits, to compensate for his personal trouble in the collection; but this would be a trifle compared with the exactions which prevail under the present system. He would perceive the advantage, too, of granting a long lease, which might induce the ryut to lay out some capital in improvement, and which would ultimately benefit the soil,—a change which

would be of immense advantage to the ryut, as at present he cannot attain more than an annual settlement from any native zumeendar. The characteristic probity of his country would also lead the British landholder to execute a regular agreement with his tenant, which might be produced against him,—a formula which, although directed by government, is generally neglected by the native zumeendar. In the event of a European landlord oppressing the ryuts, the judge of the district would be more able to sift and punish his conduct, from the superior knowledge which he would possess of the character of his countryman. The efforts of a European landlord would be directed to restrain the pernicious practice of borrowing money, a habit very destructive to the prosperity of the agricultural class in India: And where a necessity did exist for this aid, he might confer an inestimable benefit on the husbandman by lending his money at 10 or 12 per cent. which to him would be ample profit; and thus rescue his peasantry from the rapacious grasp of the usurer. That just confidence which all Asiatics repose in the superior rectitude and moral probity of the European character, would naturally lead his tenantry to seek his aid in determining their disputes; and a proper sense of the exalted duties which he had to fulfil would render him eager to afford his time for this purpose. He would aspire to imitate the aristocracy of his native land, in their unbought exertions in the cause of the public. The operation of this salutary influence would be felt in creating a greater sympathy between these divided races of mankind;—the

natives would feel practically convinced that power thus administered was a benefit, and that their interests were identified with its continuance. This may be esteemed altogether visionary: it will be said, that European farmers, indigo planters, or even landholders (who came out to India solely from interested motives), are so much occupied with their own pursuits, that they have no time to spare for these disinterested employments. This may be the case: Generally speaking, their leisure will be directed to their own amusements; but, allowing this to be so, still it may be fairly assumed, that a regard to their own interest would prompt these men to protect their ryuts from the rapacity of the native officers of government; and it cannot be doubted that they would render a signal service to the community, in bringing the misconduct of these men to the notice of the magistrate of the district. The manufacturing industry of British India does not appear susceptible of much improvement. Yet, in no branch of labour would the application of European skill and capital be productive of more extraordinary results. Since the partial opening of the trade, the British merchant has been enabled to export manufactured goods so cheap, that he has been enabled to undersell, or enter into fair competition, with the native manufacturer in several articles, the raw material of which is imported direct from India. At present, British shirting, cambrics, muslins, stockings, are purchased to a considerable amount by the European population in Bengal,—a conspicuous proof of the superiority of our machinery, skill, and capital. Such

being the case, it must be obvious, that were these advantages transferred to British India, it would be attended with marked advantage to the community; and to this there exists no obstacle. A skilful individual might import the requisite machinery, and establish a manufactory of cotton cloth on the spot. The superior cheapness of the raw material, and the low price of labour (at least three or four times less than in Europe), would enable him to drive the British manufacturer out of the market; and this superior skill would quickly be communicated to the natives.

The commercial enterprise of Europeans has hitherto scarcely been directed to the inland trade of this rich country. Were a number of enterprising merchants scattered throughout the land, it might be confidently expected that they would discover new channels for the beneficial employment of capital. There are various articles of European produce, such as cheeses, hams, oils, &c. which, from their perishable nature, cost the consumer from 2 to 500 per cent. upon the original price, which, were the attention of the British resident particularly directed to these objects, it can scarcely be doubted, could be produced infinitely cheaper in India, and nearly equal in quality. A powerful stimulus might be given to the mechanical industry of the natives, by the introduction of European implements of trade—the awkward and clumsy tools presently in use being very unfavourable to advancement in the mechanical arts.

The astonishing quantity of indigo which is annually exported from Bengal, the increased cultiva-

tion of which is entirely owing to the superior enterprise of a few British residents, affords great encouragement to adventure in other branches of industry. As yet, no European has engaged in the cultivation of cotton; and were equal attention directed to its culture and cleaning, there would be every probability of its rivalling the finest American samples of that commodity. The cultivation of the poppy, the manufacture of opium, and the production of silk, which are principally left to natives at present, are equally open to British industry. The sugars of the East are only inferior to those of the West Indies, because European skill has not been equally applied to their manufacture; the machinery for crushing the cane is extremely rude, and the process of boiling and refining very unskilful. Unquestionably this commodity might be supplied much cheaper from the East than the West Indies; but the interests of the former have been sacrificed to protect the industry of the latter. In regard to shipbuilding the same policy prevails. By an act passed in 1813, India-built ships, that may be constructed after this period, are restricted from trading direct to England, which secures a monopoly to the home shipping interest.

Such are the various ways in which colonization might benefit the natives, and promote the general interests of the European body. Were British settlers more extensively scattered throughout the land, they would render inestimable service to the government, by conveying sound information as to the interests of its subjects—an ignorance of which forms no inconsiderable source of danger to the stability of

our power; and this information the daily intercourse of the colonists with the mass of its subjects would enable them to attain correctly. At the same time, they would powerfully coöperate in carrying into execution the benevolent wishes of the government in regard to its subjects, by rescuing them from the grinding extortions of the zumeendars and native officers of government—the principal sources of oppression in India. If any notorious maladministration existed in the neighbourhood of a European landholder, it would come to his knowledge, and would speedily be conveyed to the European magistrate of the district, whose principal information at present is drawn from the reports of his native officers—the very individuals against whose oppressions redress is sought. By beneficial services of this nature, a greater sympathy would be created between the people and their rulers, and the general security of our power would be increased. The advantages which would result to England from colonization are obvious: It would open a noble field of exertion to the middle class of her population, in which their superior skill, enterprise, and industry would be advantageously displayed;—it would afford a small vent for that redundant population which has generated so much distress and misery in her domestic policy;—it would diminish the competition in various professional pursuits, and raise the rate of profit in each;—it would furnish a beneficial employment for her superabundant capital, by transferring it to India, where it is required for the purpose of improvement;—it would strengthen the security of those

rich dividends of East India stock, which remind the people of England that they have such a thing as an Indian empire. Under the powerful stimulus which European intelligence would give to the drooping industry of the country, it might fairly be expected that the national wealth would be greatly augmented;—that the tastes and habits of the Indian community would be gradually changed, by a greater intercourse with a more refined people;—and that these causes would naturally lead to a more extensive demand for European manufactures and productions.

CHAPTER II.

MISSIONARIES.

The failure of the Missionaries in their direct attempts at conversion arising, in some degree, from their intemperate conduct.—Their labours highly meritorious in promoting education amongst the natives.—The opinions of learned Mahomedans and Hindoos in regard to the Christian religion.—A statement of the unitarian doctrines of Rammohun.—The character of the natives contrasted with that of the lower class of Europeans; and vindicated from the reproaches cast upon it by the Missionaries.—The practice of burning widows compared with the European custom of duelling.

The progress of colonization would prove by far the most efficacious instrument in the propagation of Christianity. The frank and unreserved intercourse which would take place between Europeans and natives would naturally lead to inquiry as to the moral and religious belief of these dissimilar races. The greater simplicity, moral beauty, and rationality of the Christian faith,—its greater capacity of promoting human happiness, as compared with the Hindoo religion,—its entire exemption from the cruel superstitions and frivolous observances which deform the latter system,—and the purity of its doctrines, practically exemplified in the superior conduct of the European residents,—might all be expected to make some impression upon the intellectual portion of the

native community;—and this without wounding their self-love, or alarming their prejudices. The interviews which led to this beneficial interchange of sentiment being accidental, with no direct aim of conversion, would gradually enlighten their minds, without irritating their pride by asserting the falsehood of their religion,—the usual prelude to the evangelical labours of the missionary. The marked contempt and real intolerance which this conduct exhibits, revolts the feelings of the Hindoo, and indisposes his mind towards the reception of a purer faith. The progress of the Christian religion in India must naturally excite some curiosity. I regret that I possess no minute information respecting it; but I believe it may be safely asserted, that no native of character or consequence has been converted; and that the labours of the missionaries have altogether failed in the direct attempt to introduce this religion. This opinion which I have formed may be incorrect: I must confess that I never directed my attention particularly to the subject; but this I can positively declare, that, in the years 1817–18, I was stationed at the military cantonment of Barrackpoor, within half a mile of the Missionary College of Serampoor. At this post 5000 native troops were cantoned, with the usual proportion of followers. The situation afforded a favourable opportunity to the missionaries, and several native converts were often sent into the lines, with the view of circulating their tracts, and converting the seapoys. I examined one or two of these individuals, but I cannot recollect that they ever affirmed that they had succeeded, in a single instance, within

this cantonment. If any progress had been made, it would indubitably have created a powerful sensation in the European community; but although in daily intercourse with several individuals, who were intimately connected with the missionaries, yet I cannot affirm that I ever heard of any conversions.* I retained a native convert in my service for several months, who was employed by the missionaries to circulate their tracts; but he never mentioned any particular instance of success in his vocation, at least within this cantonment. Unquestionably, some conversions have been effected; but I doubt if more than 100 or 200 individuals have become nominal Christians in the space of 30 years, the first commencement of the labours of the missionaries. As yet, the colossal fabric of the Hindoo religion remains entire. Christianity has not penetrated to the threshold.† The causes of this appear to be—

* The colonel of the corps to which I belonged formed a school with the laudable view of promoting this object, in which translations of the New Testament were taught. Several of the seapoys and non-commissioned officers attended this school, and evinced no disinclination to read the Scriptures; but certainly not one of them was converted. These men are well known to me. The master of the school was a Hindoo, with whom I have frequently conversed: He understood the translations of the New Testament very well, and, as a means of livelihood, considered it no derogation from his faith to teach this knowledge to others; but, at the same time, he remained stedfast in his original religious opinions. The school entirely failed.

† According to the Report of the Serampoor Missionary College, in September 1819, there were nineteen Christian students at this seminary; but, from the statements given, they appear to be entirely boys, varying in their ages from five years to twenty.

1*st*, That utter loss of rank, character, and wealth, which must ensue from embracing a strange faith; that entire divorce from that which constitutes the principal charm of life—the enjoyment of the domestic affections—the delightful intercourse which subsists with parents, children, friends, wife, to be given up for ever;—this, the purest source of our earthly joys, to be converted into bitterest hate:—And all these sacrifices to be made, without obtaining that estimation in a new community, which might counterbalance these evils—On the contrary, with the knowledge that the convert must encounter that feeling of contempt and scorn with which mankind regard those who have apostatized from the religion of their ancestors, arising from an instinctive distrust of their motives.

2*d*, The progress of Christianity amongst the intellectual portion of the community has been retarded, by the consideration that the Hindoo religion has existed for ages prior to this dispensation; that it equally inculcates the existence of the Supreme Being, the doctrine of a future state, and the practice of a pure and disinterested morality; that this system of faith depends, in their estimation, upon the same evidence as Christianity, namely, human testimony or tradition; and that it has continued in full operation for centuries after the introduction of this new religion: Hence, it is inferred by them, that the existence of the Hindoo system of worship is permitted; that the Supreme Being has willed that different revelations of his existence should be communicated to mankind; that divers modes of worship are acceptable to him;

and that various paths are open by which the various portion of the human race may unite in a purer and more exalted state of existence. The divine character of Jesus Christ is not denied, nor yet the excellence of his morality; but it is contended by them, that his mission could not have been intended for the salvation of the Hindoos, otherwise it would have been direct, and not bestowed after a lapse of centuries, when millions of human beings have died without its saving influence.

3*d*, The cause of its failure amongst the vulgar must be ascribed to its abstract and intellectual character. Christianity is a religion adapted to a refined and civilized people. It does not address itself to the senses; it lays no hold of the passions; it disdains the employment of visible images to fix the attention of the worshipper; and at this advanced period, when the agency of miracles is intermitted, it appeals solely to reason for the truth of its doctrines. Such being the case, is it surprising that Christianity should make no progress amongst a people unaccustomed to exercise their reason on the doctrines of religion, to whom the existence of the Divinity is typified by palpable objects, which are necessary to stimulate their devotion; whose senses are powerfully impressed by the pomp, the ceremony, the grandeur of their religious festivals; and whose imagination is strongly excited, and their affections warmed, by the adventures of their romantic mythology, which give an interest to every grove and stream throughout the land? The multiplied forms and ceremonies of the Hindoo religion have a still more powerful tendency to rivet this

faith in the minds of the people, and to indispose them towards the reception of a more simple doctrine. The unceasing operation of this system in its numerous observances, which regulate every action of their lives—their ablutions, evacuations, meals—must overpower the mind of the Hindoo, and render him altogether subject to the despotic influence of religion; these endless ceremonies must perpetually remind him of the divine power which ordained them, and render it almost impossible for him to emancipate himself from those shackles which bind down his faculties. It is too much to expect, that the powerful array of habits and prejudices which are created by this system should instantaneously give way to the desultory attacks of a few meritorious individuals. It is not in this, as in other religions, where any innovation in spiritual doctrine merely affects the interests of the priesthood—here a mighty revolution would be effected, which would resolve society into its original elements. The institution of casts opposes a more formidable barrier to change than exists under any other system. It is only necessary to have witnessed its living operation, to perceive that the subordination it has established is so complete that it must require an entire change in the moral and political condition of the Hindoos to enable them to throw it off. View it in real life: In the army, the Bramin seapoy (of whom there are many in the Bengal service) implicitly obeys his native officer, although he be of an inferior class, or even of the soodur, the lowest of all; but, released from the parade, the scene is altogether changed—he will not permit his

superior to sit on the same seat with him; he does not eat with him, and generally keeps aloof from all social intercourse with those of an inferior tribe. When both parties are on duty, and in uniform, the native officer exacts the customary salute due to his rank, which is willingly paid by the Bramin seapoy; but when they are undressed, religion resumes its empire over the mind of the former—he performs the accustomed reverence to his superior, and would shudder at the idea of violating this duty. The Hindoo religion has sunk deep into the hearts and minds of the existing generation; it is associated with so many darling opinions and prejudices, regarded as equally sacred by them with the most sublime ordinances of the Christian faith, that its subversion must be the work of ages. For a considerable period of time the Bramins will possess a superiority of intellectual knowledge: In the career of improvement opened up to them under the British rule, their doctrines may be modified so as to suit the enlightened spirit of the age; but the love of power will induce this hierarchy to defend, with obstinacy, the graduated scale of ranks which is established by this religion;—and that prostration of intellect, which has resulted from their system, will afford them powerful facilities in maintaining the contest. The progress of the Christian religion in the Roman empire affords us some data to reason upon in speculating upon the probability of its progress in the East: it required three centuries to establish it as the national worship, and this at a period when the human mind was prepared for the reception of a new religion—when the nearer proofs of the existence of

Jesus Christ, and the miracles which attested his doctrine, were calculated to produce a more vivid impression upon the people. The Mahomedan religion (although eminently intellectual as compared with Hinduism), in the space of nine centuries, has made no progress in India; and this, although powerful encouragement was held forth by several pious Emperors, who promised liberal assignments of land to Hindoo proselytes. The conduct of the English rulers is altogether different—they have manifested throughout an entire impartiality.

In such a state of society it must appear surprising that a single conversion should ever be made. I have witnessed a pious missionary alight from his boat, and harangue a multitude of people assembled on the banks of the Ganges, on the sin and error of their idolatrous worship, but never was surprised at the result. The people gazed, listened, and departed their ways, wondering at what appeared to them the folly or madness of the person who addressed them.

4thly, There has been no previous training which might dispose the minds of the people to listen to the claims of Christianity—no adventitious culture which might impart new properties to the soil. Education appears to be the only efficacious instrument of effecting this change, and of elevating and enlightening the mass of the population: it would insensibly strengthen their faculties, and prepare them for the reception of a more intellectual worship. The acquisition of knowledge would gradually purify their religion, and enable them to cast off the chains which priestcraft had imposed. This rational

course of change does not suit the views of the missionary—his aim is to produce instantaneous effect; the more rapid the conversions which he makes, the greater his success in rescuing so many souls from perdition. Animated by this powerful impulse, he cannot wait for the slow progress of time,—he disregards human means, and trusts principally to the powerful operation of grace; and it is only of late, when the direct mode has failed, that his attention has been more particularly directed to the immense aid which he would derive from a better system of education.

The personal demeanour of the missionaries, it ought also to be added, has not been calculated to win the confidence, or to conciliate the affections of the natives; it does not exhibit that genuine philanthropy and practical toleration which distinguishes the general conduct of Europeans in the East; it evinces a deplorable ignorance of human nature, and a signal but unintentional want of humanity. If you wish to convert a particular race to your belief, it must strike you as a very irrational process of argument, to go out in the highways, and tell men abruptly that their religion is a falsehood—their sacred books a collection of fables—and that they must instantly renounce their faith to ensure their salvation.* That such has been too often the practice of

* The calmness and forbearance which the people have evinced on these occasions, is truly exemplary. How would an English congregation be astonished, if the ministers of their religion were thus wantonly trifled with in the execution of their sacred office! Would not the lower orders of the people be too apt to subject the offender to the discipline of the beadle, or even to stone him.

the missionaries cannot, with truth, be denied. And is not this a cruel and insulting mode of conduct? What right has any missionary to revolt the sacred feelings of any Hindoo, by asserting the falsehood of his religion—and this in the public street, where he has no opportunity of proving this doctrine. If he conscientiously believe in this opinion, let him use that superior reason which God has given him, to convince the native of his error; but it must be done in the silence of the closet—not in the noise of the highway. In a spirit of meekness and candour, let him urge those demonstrable proofs of the authority of the Christian revelation which have convinced him—instead of denouncing, in the very threshold of the argument, as a system of falsehood and idolatry, the entire worship of the Hindoo, without endeavouring to prepare his mind, by a previous course of discipline and enlargement, to appreciate the weight of evidence, which, in his estimation, supports the exclusive truth of the Christian dispensation. Let the

Something like this has occurred in India, but, I believe, very rarely: the indignation of the people has confined itself to hooting the offenders out of their villages. In England the mass of society is protected, by law, against those who rashly attempt to unsettle the national faith. What individual of this description can utter what he believes to be the truth respecting the established religion? In England, if a Hindoo reviled the national faith in the same manner that some of the missionaries have done in India, he would be subjected to one or two years' imprisonment. It does not appear to me that there is any occasion for this, or that the support of the civil power is necessary to the cause of religion anywhere; but, to be consistent, the people of England who think otherwise should equally protect their fellow-creatures the Hindoos as the members of their community.

missionary also beware of bringing too early into his argument an array of questions connected with the recondite mysteries of his faith—which, at first, can only tend to perplex the mind of the Hindoo. As stated before, the spiritual guides of the native population are not disposed to call in question the divine character of Jesus Christ—they merely contend that his ministrations were not intended to be addressed to them, else they would have been directly communicated; and that the revelation which they possess is also a special one, standing entirely independent of any other, and equally entitled to implicit belief, as being bottomed, in their estimation, on precisely the same species of testimony which accredits the Christian, namely—*tradition and miracles*. Now, as this is the objection, which, in the eyes of the Hindoo, forms the primary bar to the reception of the gospel, the direct chain of proofs which Christianity possesses must be first recognized by the upper classes of the community before any thing can be successfully done towards the conversion of the inferior ranks. Hence it is evident, that the most efficacious preliminary which could be employed in aid of missions, must be the preparatory diffusion of education among the different ranks of the native population—the necessary precursor of inquiry and civilization;—and the instrument which, from the existing circumstances of India, is, of all others, unquestionably the best fitted to facilitate the accomplishment of the important object in view.

I must, at the same time, acquit the missionaries of all intentional design to wound their feelings: their errors have sprung from the purest motives—

but such unquestionably has been the tendency of their conduct. This being the case, I intreat these men to consider what their own feelings would be, if, placed in a similar situation, their religion was wantonly assailed. Would they not feel it as a cruel and bitter insult? Their situation in the East affords them a noble opportunity of practising the divine rule of Jesus Christ—"Do ye to others as you would have others do unto you." Applying this precept in practice, they ought to respect the conscientious opinions of their fellow-creatures, however erroneous. If the missionary is a man of reflection, he must know that the very nature of the Hindoo religion has a more powerful tendency to rivet this faith in the minds of its disciples than that of the Christian;—that the pious Hindoo regards its most trifling ordinances as equally sacred with the most solemn institutions of the Christian faith. The missionary may be so far advanced in the scale of intellectual being, that he may require no visible object to animate his piety;—that, unassisted, he may contemplate the perfections of the Deity by the pure light of reason; but, in the pride of this knowledge, he ought not to despise the uneducated Hindoo, who is compelled to fix his attention upon a material representation of the Supreme Being, from the greater imperfection of his faculties. He ought to know that the intention is the same in the sincere worshippers of either religion; and that the difference simply arises from the different degrees of civilization at which their different communities have arrived. Such being the case, he ought to regard the idolater with pity, not with abhorrence. A conscientious Chris-

tian may be perfectly convinced of the authenticity of his own religion, but this may not enable him to disprove that of others to their satisfaction. As the Supreme Being has permitted these worships for ages, it would appear presumptuous in man not to respect their existence. If this consideration influenced the missionary, it would restrain him from employing Hindoo converts with the view of propagating Christianity. He must know that these men have rarely embraced this faith from conscientious motives:—expelled from the community of their ancestors, they have been compelled, by necessity, to become Christians. This being the case, the upright missionary ought to sympathize with the just indignation of the Hindoo, who shrinks with abhorrence from the boon of Christianity when proffered by a miscreant whose character has been stained by the commission of every crime. Assuredly this description of persons cannot be viewed as accessions to the Christian church: driven to this course by their profligacy, and the prospect of immediate subsistence, they cannot be regarded as having exercised free agency. Unless they have inquired for themselves, and satisfied themselves of the superior authenticity of the Christian revelation, they must be regarded as mere mechanical agents, who have transferred their faith from one guide to another, but have no pretensions to be considered as rational Christians. It may fairly be asserted, that not one of these neophytes has ever sufficiently mastered the English language so as to be able to read and understand the evidences in favour of his new creed. I have not heard that any translation has been made

which could instruct the convert in the nature of these evidences; if not, he has taken his religion entirely upon trust, and has merely changed his spiritual guide. It is surprising that the missionary has not pursued a more eligible course than that of field-preaching, his favourite mode of propagating Christianity. It must be obvious, that the chance of effecting an immediate change would be infinitely greater, if he exerted himself to interest the minds of the intellectual portion of the community in favour of the new worship; if he succeeded in influencing their opinions in support of his belief, he might be certain that the uneducated mass would blindly follow their religious instructions. He possesses a powerful instrument in the native press, which might set forth his arguments and proofs. A few plain reasonings addressed to the thinking portion of mankind, exhibiting the superiority of the Christian faith as a rational system of belief, would do infinitely more than the hundreds of thousands of scriptures which have been scattered throughout the land, without producing the slightest benefit, from the inability of people to read them. It is an egregious error which the English public have fallen into, in supposing that the cause of Christianity has been advanced in proportion to the number of Scriptures which have been distributed. Very few of the people can read these books; and if they do, they are perused with an interest altogether different from that in which they are regarded in the eyes of Christians. That profound impression which renders them sacred in their estimation, does not exist with the Hindoo: He regards them as mere human per-

formances; and exercises his reason in judging of their contents, with the same freedom as if he read an interesting narrative or history. If the missionary pursues the course which has been suggested, he ought to refrain from asserting the falsehood of the Hindoo religion, and abstain from all reprobation of its practices. Every allusion of this kind involves an assumption of mental superiority, which human nature cannot submit to;—if calm and dispassionate reasoning is employed, the mind of the Hindoo may be convinced, and he will perceive his errors, without being told of them. These well-meant but injudicious vituperations only serve to inflame his feelings, and to shut the door to all impartial discussion. If the missionary will divest himself of this assumed religious superiority, and enter into a fair discussion with the learned Hindoo or Musselman upon the merits of their respective beliefs, and this upon the basis of mutual respect for each other's sacred opinions, he unquestionably will find them to be candid and tolerant opponents. I have perused the new testament in the Persian and Hindoo languages, along with a learned Musselman and Hindoo, and was quite surprised at the moderate and candid tone in which they examined its doctrines. They admitted its divine origin—the beauty of its morality—and the simplicity of its worship; but could not perceive that this dispensation was intended for them, for the reasons I have stated as the second cause which has operated against the progress of Christianity. In their religious opinions, I admired that liberal spirit which regarded the whole human race as possessing the

means of attaining to a purer state of existence, if they fulfilled the moral and religious duties prescribed by their respective faiths; and this struck me the more forcibly when contrasted with the narrow doctrines which pervade many sects of the Christian world, who regard salvation as entirely confined within the pale of their own belief. If success has not attended the labours of the missionaries, it would be unjust to impute it to the supineness of this body. Their indefatigable exertions in translation, teaching, and spiritual exhortation, evince their entire devotion to the cause in which they have engaged. There can be no career of utility more honourable to human nature, where men leave their native land, and expose themselves to the hazards of an ungenial climate, solely with the view of benefiting a foreign race—an enterprise which exhibits a bright example of high and disinterested virtue. Men may conscientiously differ as to the wisdom and rectitude of the system which they have pursued, or the benefit which may result from their labours; but they must admire the lofty motive which has stimulated them to action. There can be no more signal instance of disinterestedness than that which Dr Carey has displayed, in giving up the liberal salary which he receives from government as Sanscrit professor (at least £1500 per annum), for the support of the Missionary College. Every one must feel a pleasure in expressing his sense of the meritorious exertions of the missionaries; but, that his opinion may be justly appreciated, it ought to be given with fairness;—there is no occasion to exaggerate the amount of their labours,

which seems too much the case in England. Thus, the *Quarterly Review* for November 1816, states, that they have translated the Scriptures wholly, or in part, into 27 different languages,—that "many thousand copies of the gospels have been distributed in these languages; and it is said, that the distribution of the Scriptures and of religious tracts in the vernacular tongue has had the effect of exciting a lively interest in the knowledge of the gospel; and that of late many instances have occurred of conversion by means of these translations alone, without the intervention of any missionary; that many Brahmins, and others of high cast, have recently been baptized, and that a great number of native preachers have met with the greatest success in various parts of India." The translation of the Scriptures into 27 languages by five or six individuals, within 15 or 20 years, and these men engaged in a variety of important occupations, must strike one as an achievement altogether miraculous, which has not been parallelled in the annals of literature. This appears the more extraordinary, when contrasted with the long and painful labours of the luminaries of the English church, in their endeavours to give a correct translation of the Scriptures from the original languages. But the wonder ceases, when it is understood in what manner these translations have been made. A statement of this was given in a Magazine, published in Calcutta in October 1818, which has not been contradicted. From this it appears that the business of translation has been prodigiously expedited since the days of King James. The paper alluded to says—"In the

translating room of the missionary establishment, the various pundits, or men learned in the languages of Asia, are placed, forming a circle, in the centre of which is placed a pundit, versed in Hindoostanee, a language in which all the others are supposed to be well skilled, and in English, with which this pundit himself must necessarily have an intimate acquaintance. So soon as the Mahratta, the Seikh, the Guzeratte, the Orissa, the Burmah pundits, &c. have prepared their writing materials, a verse is read from the English text by a missionary, or any other European or Anglo-Asiatic, and this verse, as it is read word by word by the Englishman, is repeated word by word in Hindoostanee, by the central pundit, in the hearing of the various pundits who surround him, each of whom sets the word down in his own language or dialect;—and thus the work is completed." I was induced to inquire into this matter from reading the statement in question; and was informed by a Christian convert that it was the case—a fact which ought to be distinctly explained, as this unprecedented work of translation might, in a future age, ignorant of the manner in which it was accomplished, be regarded as something miraculous in the career of those who were the first to exert themselves in promoting the cause of Christianity in India.

It would be unfair, however, to infer, from what has been stated, that all these translations are badly executed. On the contrary, I am induced to think, that, in those languages in which the missionaries are really skilled, the task has been as well performed as circumstances would admit of. I do not profess to have read any of them except that which

was translated into Persian by that accomplished scholar, the Rev. Mr Martyn of Cambridge, and the Hindoostanee translation executed by Dr Corry, chaplain of the Bengal establishment. Unquestionably they reflect great credit upon these gentlemen. There are some translations, in Hindoo verse, of religious hymns, describing the love of repentant sinners to their Redeemer, which do not appear to me so happy. By following the original too literally, and making an unguarded use of that amatory language which the native has associated with the description of earthly love, it produces upon his mind an impression which would scandalize the serious Christian. It will readily be allowed, that the talent of composing in English verse is no ordinary accomplishment; how much more difficult must it then be in a foreign language—a consideration which certainly ought to have its full weight with any one who should propose to himself such an undertaking. On this dangerous ground it would seem much more decorous, if the grave missionary would rein in his Pegasus, lest he should risk a fall; the attempt to climb the steps of Parnassus may be very meritorious, but in his vocation, where it is of paramount importance that he should be clear and distinct, it would seem much more useful if he would limit his literary labours to earth-born prose. The extraordinary conversions which are recorded by the *Quarterly Reviewer* may have occurred; but they are unknown in the East. The individuals who have embraced the Christian religion, generally speaking, are considered as men who have been expelled from their cast on account of

their crimes, or who have been attracted to this faith by the less severe restraints which it imposes in regard to diet and observances. Their moral estimation is very low: in this respect the Hindoo or Mussulman ranks infinitely higher. There never will be a want of seeming converts as long as the missionary holds out encouragement in money. By a needy Hindoo it would be esteemed no disgrace to relieve his wants by an apparent compliance; but when this relief is obtained, his resolutions in favour of a new faith are too apt to vanish with the occasion which called them forth.

But while the direct attempt at conversion may thus be regarded, after an experiment of 30 years' duration, to have altogether failed, there is reason to believe that this failure, which, as already observed, has arisen from the particular circumstances of India, may ultimately prove the means of compassing the highly important object in view, by directing the attention of the missionaries to a more powerful and sure instrument for accomplishing this great aim; and this is by the introduction of education, and the diffusion of English science and literature through the medium of translations. Accordingly, within these three or four years past the attention of the missionaries and of the European public in Bengal has been laudably directed towards this object; and in this career the missionaries have rendered inestimable service to humanity by their disinterested exertions, having generously devoted their time to the translation of simple elementary school-books, such as epitomes of history, systems of geography,

arithmetical tables, &c. and completely succeeded in establishing various schools, where these works are practically taught to the rising generation;—and, what is still more rare, this instruction is frankly bestowed, unmingled with any religious dogma which might deter the people from receiving it. This was absolutely necessary to secure their success, having pledged themselves to refrain from inculcating their religious principles under the guise of this instruction; a declaration which inspired confidence, and induced the natives to flock to the schools. These undertakings have also been liberally patronised by the Brahmins, which affords a signal refutation of that abuse which it is too fashionable to bestow on these men. Thus there appears a fair prospect of communicating to the native population that substantial knowledge which can be acquired at an English day-school. And this is by far the best means of promoting Christianity; as the inextinguishable curiosity which education excites will naturally lead to the study of the religion of a people so superior in intellectual character; while the higher claims which Christianity possesses, as a rational system of belief, must be expected to make a powerful impression.

The principle which has impelled the missionary to exercise his vocation on the highway is, no doubt, the consideration that the Scriptures imperatively prescribe that he shall be earnest in his ministrations at all times and seasons. But, if it is deemed expedient to modify this injunction as regards the cause of education, to be consistent it would seem

necessary that he should refrain from these unseasonable discourses. Until the progress of education has elevated the Hindoo community in the scale of being, I would intreat the Christian missionary to suspend oral instructions. He may make some converts; and the hasty admission of these converts to a participation in the ordinances of Christianity may make them Christians in name, but, it is too often to be feared, without that purity of faith or morals which can entitle them to that distinction. The rapid transition from error to truth, from darkness to light, is often dangerous; and this consideration ought to induce the missionary to make some pause before he attempts, with presumptuous hand, to raise the veil which renders the prejudices of the Hindoo sacred in his own estimation. Let him confine himself to the circulation of the Scriptures, the agency of the native press, and tolerant discussion with the educated portion of the community. It is a noble design which animates him to active exertions, in the hope of rescuing these victims of bigotry from the debasing influence of their superstitions; but, alas! the mournful experience of history too often shows that these well-meant endeavours may be often productive of infinite misery and bloodshed to those whom they were intended to benefit. The labours of the Calcutta school-book society are solely directed to the instruction of the native population, with no direct view of effecting conversions; and appear to be the fit precursors of a more enlightened age. The brightness with which this prospect of improvement has dawned is not likely to be overcast by the

storms which religious bigotry might engender. This society was formed in 1817, and ranks, among its members, the most distinguished individuals of the European and native community. Its expenses are entirely defrayed by subscription. The attention of the society has been directed, in the first instance, to the providing editions of the common spelling books, grammars, and dictionaries which might facilitate the direct acquisition of the English tongue. At the same time, translations of simple elementary works have been rendered into Bengalee, Hindoostanee, and Persian, that the natives may attain instruction without the labour of acquiring a new language. These comprise abridgments of history, travels, geography, tables of arithmetic, collections of fables. The translation of Goldsmith's abridged *History of England* was undertaken by Dr Carey; and that of *Joyce's Scientific Dialogues*, the *Travels of Mirza Aboo Talib*, and other works, by different gentlemen skilled in the language. The task of translating *Ferguson's Astronomy* into Bengalee has been undertaken by three learned Hindoos, who confidently look forward to its utility, in eradicating the deep-rooted prejudices of their countrymen, independent of the scientific benefits which will result from it. This feeling is clearly expressed in their letter to the society, in undertaking the work. After their preparatory labours, their attention was directed to the formation of schools, in which these works might be practically taught.

In February 1821, at which period I left Calcutta, 2500 boys within the limits of this city, were

instructed according to this improved system of education. And all this good has been effected by annual subscriptions and donations somewhat less than £5000 per annum. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the disinterested exertions of some individuals, who, filling important stations in the civil, military, and medical service, have cheerfully given up that time which was required for relaxation to the nobler task of benefiting the native community. The names of Messrs Bayley, Macfarlane, Montague, Gordon; Captains Irvine, Stewart, Lockett, Bryce, are conspicuous. As yet, the government has bestowed no pecuniary encouragement upon this society; and in this respect it has acted with a just caution. An enlightened government is bound to respect the national will; it has no moral right to force improvements against the inclinations of its subjects. It may fairly leave this to the general sense of the community; if it should be favourable to an enlightened change, it may then interpose with beneficial effect. This appears to be the moment when the sanction and pecuniary aid of government would prove of eminent service: under a despotic rule, there exists a want of public spirit in its citizens, and every useful undertaking is left to be accomplished by the executive. The present institution would never have seen the light, had not the apathy of the native character been stimulated into activity by the superior energy of the European. But it is impossible that a few Europeans can extend the means of education to the population of a vast empire;—at least it would require, operating on this small scale, a

length of time not easily to be reckoned; and such is the political debasement of its subjects, there exists no probability that this duty will be performed by them. Thus, there arises an imperious necessity that the government should afford pecuniary aid towards the erection of these schools. At present, this improved system of instruction is confined to Calcutta and its neighbourhood; but would it not be a mighty benefit, if it could be extended throughout the entire extent of our dominions? This must necessarily be a work of time; but the foundation could be easily laid, if government would afford the means. Under the Bengal presidency, our territory is divided into about 50 districts, containing each a population of from 600,000 to 1,200,000 individuals, the civil government of which is intrusted to a European judge and magistrate, and two assistants for each. Now, it would be an easy matter to establish one school in the principal town of each district, in which this improved system of elementary instruction might be taught. To effect this desirable object, it would only be necessary to form an establishment at Calcutta, for the purpose of qualifying native teachers; and encouragement ought to be held forth to a certain number of individuals, to attain a sufficient knowledge of the English language, to qualify themselves for the purpose of translating the common school-books. The attention of others could be directed to the instruction of a certain number of select pupils in these works: When properly qualified, these individuals might proceed and establish schools in each district. Some little assistance, it is true, might be necessary

for the first year or two, in providing books, &c. but, in a short time, the sums which were paid for instruction would defray the expense of the school. The nature of the climate renders it unnecessary to expend large sums in the erection of school-houses; as, in India, instruction is, for the most part, communicated in the open air. Some benevolent European would, generally, be found at each station, who would bestow some attention upon these infant establishments. The clerical, medical, and military classes have ample leisure in India;—it is only the civil servants of government who are perpetually engaged in the discharge of their duty. The beneficial effects arising from the establishment of each school would quickly be perceptible, in raising the general character of education throughout the district; whilst the superior knowledge, which would be communicated at the new seminary, would naturally attract a number of pupils. To counteract this injury to their interests, and excited by a spirit of rivalry, the neighbouring schoolmasters would exert themselves to acquire the same improved skill, at the same time the pupils of this system would rapidly disseminate its method throughout the community.

By the operation of these causes, it might fairly be expected, that, in the course of 20 or 30 years, this improved system of elementary education would be completely established throughout British India. And all this good could be effected at an expense quite inconsiderable, when it is considered that the British and national societies of education have been enabled to instruct 100,000 individuals annu-

ally, with a revenue not exceeding £4,200. It must be evident, that 50 or 60,000 pounds applied yearly, in this way, would completely succeed in establishing this system throughout India.

Mr Prinsep informs us, that the successful result of the policy pursued in 1817–18 will enable British India to afford a tribute of two millions to the people of England: If so, would not the interests of humanity be consulted, if a small portion of this wealth was diverted from this channel, and applied to the moral instruction of the Hindoo community? Prior to the formation of the School-book Society, a college had been instituted in Bengal, for the instruction of the children of opulent natives in the higher branches of European learning. This undertaking was directly sanctioned by government, and is liberally supported by the natives, by whom the expense is entirely defrayed. The instruction which is here communicated embraces oriental literature, the European languages, and affords opportunities of acquiring some portion of our science; but it must necessarily be confined to a few: And the European secretary of this college has suggested the propriety of translating *Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding* for the benefit of this institution.—In January or February 1821, the foundation of a magnificent college was laid by the Lord Bishop of Calcutta. What system of instruction is intended to be taught there, I am ignorant of, but it was rumoured that this institution was intended for the reception of such proselytes as might be converted to the Christian faith by the regular clergy on the establishment; and that the orthodox principles of

the Church of England were to be inculcated, combined with the elementary system of education. But I have not heard that the members of the establishment have been at all successful in this way: whatever has been done has been effected by the Baptist missionaries. In imitation of the School-book Society in Calcutta, similar institutions have been formed at Madras and Bombay. Thus, various paths of improvement are opened up, by which life and vigour may be communicated to the torpid energies of the Hindoo community; but these are nothing in comparison with the immense benefits which are likely to arise from the introduction of the art of printing into India.

This inestimable gift was bestowed upon this country by the celebrated Sanscrit scholar, Wilkins. The first fount of types, in different Asiatic characters, was prepared with his own hands, and successfully applied in practice. In the minds of a more enlightened generation, his name will be associated with those who have conferred the most signal benefit upon the species, by the discovery of a new power augmenting the sum of human enjoyments. The art languished for some time, but revived under the patronage of that distinguished orientalist, H. T. Colebrooke, Esq. Under his auspices, a press was established, in which correct editions of the Sanscrit classics have been brought out, and which have proved of eminent service to the students of that difficult language. Within the last ten years, this art has made a wonderful progress; the successful example of the missionaries, in printing the translations of the Scriptures, stimulated a native in their

employ, to risk the speculation of publishing some popular works in the Bengalee language. This literary enterprize completely succeeded,—the wealth which he acquired having induced others to embark in the same scheme; and there are now no less than four presses in constant employ, conducted by natives, and supported by the native population. To afford some insight into the state of literature, the following list of the most popular works which have been printed at their presses, is extracted from the first number of a valuable missionary publication, which has just commenced in India, and which has thrown great light upon this subject:—

1 *Gunga-bhuktee-turungince*, History of the descent of Gunga.
2 *Joy-deva*, History of Krishnu.
3 *Unnud a-mungal*, Exploits of several of the gods.
4 *Rosa-munjaree*, Descriptions of the three kinds of men and women in the world.
5 *Rutee munjuree*, On the same subject.
6 *Koroona-nidhan-bilas*, Account of a new god recently created by an opulent native.
7 *Vikru-mungal*, Exploits of Krishnu.
8 *Daya-bhag*, A treatise on law.
9 *Jyotish*, An astronomical treatise.
10 *Chanukhya*, A work containing instructions for youth.
11 *Subdu-sindoo*, A dictionary.
12 *Uheetihan*, Ditto.
13 ———, A treatise on the materia medica of India.
14 *Rag-mala*, A treatise on music.
15 *Battrish-singhasun*, The thirty-two-imaged throne.
16 *Betal Puchecsee*, Account of Raja Vikrumaditya.
17 *Vidya-ninda*, A treatise ridiculing physicians.
18 *Bhugvut-geeta*, A translation in Bengalee of the work formerly translated into English by Wilkins.
19 *Muheemunee-stuva*, The praises of Shiva.
20 *Gunga-stuva*, The praises of Gunga.

21 *Sukhee-churitra*, The duties of men.
22 *Santee-sutuk*, On contempt of the world.
23 *Shringar-teelok*, A treatise on women.
24 *Usachu-panchalee*, A treatise on the days termed impure by the Shastras.
25 *Adee-ross*, A treatise on women.
26 *Chundee*, The praises of Doorga, &c.
27 *Choitunyu-churectamrita*, Account of Chitunya.

It is calculated that about 400 copies of each of these printed Bengalee works have been sold within the last ten years, and this rapid multiplication of books has stimulated the literary appetite of the public in an unusual degree. The superior cheapness, and greater facility of reading printed works, compared with manuscript ones, has rendered them accessible to a greater number of readers, and facilitated the progress of knowledge. That inextinguishable thirst of information, which animates humanity in every condition, has now begun to secure the means of gratification. The direct advantage which will result from the introduction of the art of printing will be, that the sacred books in Sanscrit literature, which contain the principles of their religious belief, will be completely laid open to the public. The work of translation from Sanscrit into Bengalee has already commenced; and, were these labours encouraged, and education more generally diffused, in a short time the knowledge which is contained in the sacred depositories of their faith would become familiar to the vulgar. The power of the priesthood in India arises from the command which they possess over the Sanscrit language, and the superior knowledge which this is supposed to confer, in enabling

them to ascertain the divine will, revealed in this sacred literature. The multiplied forms and ceremonies which are prescribed by this faith are shut up in these volumes;—so that the power of revealing this supposed divine knowledge invests the Bramin with an absolute command over the uninitiated commonalty. The daily events of life in this religion assume a sacred character, and render it necessary that the uneducated Hindoo should constantly consult his spiritual guide. The ceremonies of births and marriages, their meals, ablutions, the investiture of the sacrificial cord, the reading of the vedas, which is rendered doubly efficacious in his presence, the oblations to the manes of their ancestors, the knowledge of lucky and unlucky days, are all regulated by the Bramin, and enable him to subjugate the minds of the community to his will. It is he who discloses, with solemn awe, the punishment which is prescribed for certain offences—those cruel mortifications, interminable pilgrimages, costly sacrifices, and endless invocations of the name of the divinity, which are supposed to expiate crime;—and it is the belief that this knowledge must lead to the favour of the Supreme Being, which induces the victim of this superstition to propitiate the Bramin, that he may intercede with the offended deity, and avert his wrath. Such being the state of this society, it must be evident that the most precious gifts which could be bestowed upon this unfortunate people, would be a correct translation of these sacred books, which would enable them to judge for themselves;—and that improved education which would ultimately rescue them from the mental thraldom by which they are depressed.

The mighty benefits which have resulted from the translation of the Christian Scriptures into the vulgar tongues of Europe might reasonably be expected to take place in India. If sufficiently skilled in his own language, the Hindoo of lower cast would feel that he had risen to the same level of knowledge with his privileged instructor,—that there was no occasion for consulting him: he would exercise this new power in examining whether his spiritual guide had interpreted these books correctly, and in what instances he had perverted his superior knowledge to the gratification of his own selfish purposes. From this moment the power of priestcraft would be at an end; the colossal fabric of the Hindoo religion would tremble from its foundation. Emancipated from the trammels of this superstition, the power of reason would speedily be exercised in inquiring into the nature of the doctrines revealed in these books, and the evidences upon which they are founded. The arbitrary institution of casts would be arraigned, and the natural inequality of it exposed. The marked injustice which ascribes superior efficacy to the devotion of a Bramin; that exalted power, and greater impunity to do evil, which are granted to the priesthood by this system —would be perceived; whilst that abject submission which is required to their decrees, revolting their feelings, would impel them to throw off all regard for their authority. This is not likely to be the work of a day: the progress of improvement in enlightened Europe is lamentably slow; how much more so in India. That unbounded respect for the Braminical order, which has sunk deep into the hearts

of the people, will uphold this religion for some time; but it will be greatly purified in its exercise. The light which European civilization can confer will be imparted to the priesthood. The Brahmins have evinced every desire to attain intellectual improvement. This knowledge will teach them that they have too often invested their gods with the brutal passions of humanity; that it is altogether unreasonable to suppose that a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness can delight in the cruel inflictions, the atrocious barbarities, the childish and unmeaning ceremonies which are prescribed by this faith. The progress of refinement will instruct them that the most rational worship which can be offered to the Supreme Being is to promote the happiness of our fellow creatures; and they will consider it their duty to inculcate the superior efficacy of good works, combined with devotion to God, as being far more likely to conciliate the favour of the benevolent Author of existence than the mechanical performance of frivolous observances. A more attentive examination of nature will lead to the knowledge of a first cause, which, although acknowledged at present, is too often obscured in their minds by the more lively interest which is excited by the visible representation of the creative powers of nature.

The translations of the Christian Scriptures, exhibiting the great truths of natural and revealed religion, unincumbered with the cruel superstitions, the severe austerities, the interminable ceremonies, which disguise these principles in Hinduism, will present a pure model by which they may reform

their faith, while the elementary course of instruction which is now beginning to operate in India will afford them the means of correcting the geographical, chronological, and astronomical errors which pervade their sacred books. The authority of the priesthood beginning now to be canvassed by the inferior orders of society, the Brahmin will find it expedient to mitigate its exercise; and the monopoly which he possesses of communicating divine knowledge will be broken up from the greater facility of its attainment. Other individuals who have acquired this religious knowledge may aspire to communicate it, and will be listened to; and thus the powerful barriers which prevent talents from rising to their proper level will be removed, and the social union will henceforth begin to be regulated by the principles of reason and justice. It is the introduction of the art of printing, and the powerful impulse which has been given to education by the enlightened spirit of the European community, to which we must confidently look forward as affording the only chances of improvement in India. When we look back to the profound abyss in which the human mind was sunk in Europe, from the third to the fourteenth century, and recollect what the discovery of the art of printing did in raising humanity from this depression, is it too much to expect that the same beneficial influence will result from its application to Indian literature? This alone may effect a moral change in the vast continent of Asia. Already the dawn of improvement has manifested itself; the celebrated Bramin Rammohun Rae having demonstrated, from the Vedas, that

the unity of the Supreme Being is inculcated in these works, and that he alone is the object of worship. He regards the worship of inferior deities, the institution of casts, the restrictions with regard to food, and numerous observances of this faith, as aids required by the imperfection of the human faculties, and which may be discarded by those who have attained to the knowledge of this truth. He has established a small sect in Calcutta, the worship of which approaches nearly to that of a philosophical deism. It is encumbered with no dogmas or ceremonies; it consists principally of hymns expressing the unity of the Supreme Being, the love which human creatures owe to the benevolent author of their existence, and the beauty and grandeur visible in his works. I write from recollection of a translation of one of these hymns which appeared in a Calcutta newspaper, and may be in error as to the character which I have ascribed to their worship; but such is the present impression upon my mind. It is a mistake to suppose that the lower orders of the Hindoos are ignorant of the existence of the Supreme Being; at least, they are familiar with the name, independent of the Hindoo trinity, Brahma, Vishnoo, and Shiva; but what is remarkable, no separate worship is paid to the Creator. In this respect, they are precisely on the same footing with the Catholics, with whom the intellectual idea of the Deity is effaced, by the more powerful impression which is made upon the senses by the visible representations of the virgin or the saints. This enlightened Hindoo Ram-mohun, has rendered a signal service to his countrymen in exposing the

cruelty and injustice of the practice which condemns a widow to sacrifice herself on the funeral pile of her husband; he has endeavoured to prove, by extracts from the Vedas, that this duty is unsanctioned by Scripture. This naturally produced a defence of this doctrine, with numerous texts from the sacred writings in support of it. This controversy has excited a powerful interest amongst the intellectual few: as might be expected, the force of numbers seems to be with the established opinion; but at least it is consolatory to reflect that his reasonings have had a fair hearing, which affords every hope that the cause of humanity will ultimately triumph. Nothing can be inferred from the quotations from the Vedas which have been exhibited by either party. Like the sacred books of other religions, they afford texts which support each side of the question. Of late, the attention of this benevolent man has been directed to the laudable purpose of introducing the pure morality of the gospel amongst his countrymen.

Although unconverted to Christianity, he has published a compilation of the moral precepts of Jesus, entitled, "*The Guide to Peace and Happiness.*" The peculiar doctrines on which the salvation of the Christian rests, are omitted, on the principle "that historical and some other passages are liable to the doubts and disputes of freethinkers and Anti-Christians, especially miraculous relations, which are much less wonderful than the fabricated tales handed down to the natives of Asia, and consequently would be apt at least to carry little weight with them." Such are the sentiments expressed in his

preface; which are further illustrated in a note to this passage, which places the Christian miracles on the same footing with those of the Hindoo mythology. See the above extract of his sentiments in a review of his work, in an interesting missionary publication, *The Friend of India*, for September 1820. It is to be regretted that Rammohun had not expressed himself in a more becoming manner on this important subject; it would have been better if he had clearly stated the grounds on which he rejected the evidence of the Christian miracles.

It appears to me that the character of the Hindoo people has not been correctly appreciated, from not sufficiently attending to the separate influence of government and religion in its formation. That cruel misgovernment and oppression of which they have been the victims under the Mahomedan system of rule, has powerfully impressed the character of the people. It has eradicated all generous and patriotic sentiments in their hearts; it has destroyed all confidence in the benevolent intentions of their rulers; and has corrupted their morals, by creating habits of mendacity, duplicity, and fraud. There exists nothing like that public spirit and enlarged social feeling which animate the higher and middle classes of English society. Under the debasing influence of that despotism, it was not in the nature of things that these virtues could be created: how is it possible they could love that power which oppressed them?—Exposed for years to its cruel rapacity, and unable to retaliate by force, they were compelled to resort to every unmanly expedient, in order to escape its merciless exactions. Every thing which

could be effected by subterfuge, craft, insinuation, or flattery, was esteemed lawful to repel unjust attacks upon property. Hence their habitual want of veracity—their instinctive distrust and fear of persons invested with authority—and that heartless apathy and indifference to the general cause of humanity. This is strikingly visible in the interview of a native with a European: The latter may entertain the most benevolent views in his favour, and, conducting the conversation upon a footing of perfect equality, proposes such questions as are customary between man and man in a free state of society; but, overcome by the habitual dread of power, and conscious of the superiority of the person who addresses him, he shrouds himself in reserve, or, suspecting that some sinister purpose is couched in what is said to him, he evades a direct answer, or more frequently tells an untruth, that he may baffle the purpose of the European. Instead of expressing the undisguised sentiments of his soul, his attention is solely occupied with penetrating the hidden designs of his superior. It requires a long and intimate intercourse to induce the native to lay aside this reserve, and to lay open the secrets of his heart. In general he restrains the expression of every natural emotion, and merely studies to say whatever may please the other. This base and abject behaviour alienates the European, and induces him to despise the native, but with little reason: this depravity is not the fault of the individual, but the unavoidable condition of humanity under a system of violence and injustice. The most enlightened European, if placed in similar circumstances, would exhibit the

same vices in his personal conduct. This consideration ought to dispose him to regard the native with pity, and not with abhorrence. There has been no visible improvement since the introduction of the British government; and it is impossible it can be otherwise, until the moral character of the inhabitants is regenerated—or until the number of European public functionaries is increased in a tenfold proportion. It is not generally known—but the truth ought to be spoken—that the country is principally governed by natives, and those debased in character by the inevitable tendency of misgovernment. In an immense district, perhaps 100 miles in length, containing a population of a million of souls, and this solely governed by a European magistrate and two assistants, it must be obvious that it is utterly impossible for a single individual to control the great number of subordinate native officers, who are indispensable to carry on its functions. In practice, the government is administered by these men in the arbitrary spirit of despotism. Habituated to this system, they consider force as the only legitimate instrument of government:—exposed to the severe exactions of superior power, they esteem it perfectly just, when they attain command, that they should pervert their authority to the gratification of their own selfish purposes: hence the shameless extortions and oppressions, which prevailed under the Mahomedan system of rule, exist at this day—unchecked, at least in a very slight degree, by European control. The greatest talents and the most indefatigable personal exertions will not enable an English magistrate to effect this in any great de-

gree; he cannot communicate his moral being to those agents; he does not possess the power of ubiquity; he cannot restrain the countless exactions of the minions of power; his time is principally occupied in hearing causes in the centre of his district. The civil service of India possesses as great a portion of public virtue and ability as the political functionaries of any other government; but this will never enable our system of rule to attain perfection until their number is increased. The European magistrate occupies the same exalted station which a Roman pro-consul or quæstor did in a foreign province. Like him, he exercises supreme power, and, generally speaking, dispenses justice with the strictest impartiality; but he stands alone, being supported by native agents notoriously corrupt and destitute of public virtue. They are men of a different age and period of civilization, and this vastly inferior to that of Europe in integrity or sound principle. The idea of exercising power for the benefit of others is altogether foreign to them. They unblushingly assert that men are justified in using their authority to enrich themselves; and succeed very generally in the practice. Thus the same causes still continue to operate in demoralizing the people. The direct introduction of British law has been still more unsuccessful in improving the character of the natives. Its operation is confined to the city of Calcutta, and it is generally acknowledged, by those who have had extended opportunities of observing the Hindoo community, that the character of its inhabitants is much inferior, in moral virtue, to that of the population of those districts where the exist-

ence of the supreme court is unknown. Unquestionably it has conferred certain rights, which ultimately may raise the character of the people; but in the first instance, its operation has been pernicious: adapted to a nation more advanced in the scale of civilization, it has not been transplanted with advantage. That profound reliance upon human testimony which it exhibits in its practice may be right amidst a highly moral people; but is altogether unsuited to a nation amongst whom falsehood is so prevalent. This, combined with the slowness of its proceedings, its strict proofs, and endless delays, has powerfully contributed to enable notorious criminals to escape with impunity; and has afforded too great facility to the commercial part of the community in avoiding the fulfilment of their engagements; at the same time, it has too suddenly released the lower orders from that dependence upon their superiors, which peculiarly characterised the Hindoo system of legislation, and has thus ingrafted habits altogether foreign to their character. In this respect, the introduction of this system of law into India exhibits, on a smaller scale, the same errors which were committed by the French philosophers at the commencement of the French revolution, who conferred a greater degree of liberty upon the lower orders than what their previous habits enabled them to exercise beneficially. Thus it appears, that their government has operated perniciously in debasing the character of this nation; and it now remains to inquire into the separate influence of religion. If the experience of history is to be relied upon, it would seem evident that the Hindoo

religion ought to have partaken of this intellectual degradation in an equal degree; but in India the irresistible operation of despotism, in vitiating the moral character, appears to have been partially counteracted by the superior power which the Bramins possessed as the first order of the state, and which afforded them powerful facilities for impressing their doctrines upon the minds of the people; and thus enshrining in their hearts those moral principles which are blended with the most childish superstitions in this faith. The Bramins appear to have been eminently successful in imbuing the character of the lower orders with that morality which exists in this religion, and interesting their affections in its worship: perhaps this is to be ascribed to the particular efficacy of ceremonies, which, although idle in themselves, imprint the more powerfully upon uneducated minds those divine rules for the conduct of life, which are commanded by every religion, and which involve those moral principles which are essential to the existence of society. As compared with the lower class of Europeans in India, they appear to me to possess, in many respects, a superiority in moral virtue. In the domestic relations their conduct is highly exemplary. Their duty to their parents and kindred is strictly fulfilled; their exertions for their support excite the admiration of the European, who perceives his countrymen squander, in sensual gratifications, those resources which are devoted by the Hindoo to the welfare of his family. They possess a much greater command over their passions than the generality of Europeans; they do not abandon themselves to those de-

grading sensual excesses which stain their character. They are seldom impelled to any disinterested exertion in the cause of humanity; but, at least, they refrain from injuring others. In their personal demeanour to each other, they exhibit a polish and amenity of manner which contrasts advantageously with the coarse and repulsive behaviour of Europeans. The virtues of mildness, patience, temperance, cleanliness, humanity to animals, they possess in a superior degree. They are far more tolerant in their opinions, and exempt from that false pride which induces the Englishman to look down with contempt upon all other nations. In the discharge of their duty as servants, they are unrivalled for their fidelity, and this to strangers of a foreign race who have obtained dominion over them by violence.* In that portion of society which fell

* The opinion which Mr Mill has formed of the Hindoo character appears to me very erroneous. His object is to refute the extravagant ideas which Sir William Jones had formed respecting its perfection; but, in doing so, he falls into the opposite extreme, and exhibits it in the darkest colours. His authorities are missionaries and police magistrates, whose occupations rendered them familiar with the vilest portion of the community. In refuting his opinions, Captain V. Kennedy, of the Bombay Military Establishment, has shown, in a paper read before the literary society of that presidency, that, in India, crimes are of rarer occurrence and of less magnitude than in England. By comparing the number of trials and convictions before the circuit courts in Bengal, with a similar record of the courts of assize in England for 1815, he finds that, in proportion to their respective population, there is in British India at least 2293 fewer convictions than in England. The corruption of the native police in Bengal allows much crime to remain unpunished, and so far vitiates the parallel; but this is in a great measure counterbalanced by the severity of the laws in England, which deters

under my observation, there occurred few thefts or violations of property. At the same time it must be admitted, that they are vastly inferior to the European in a regard to veracity, and that downright honesty which prompts to an undisguised expression of his opinions. Their virtues are more artificial than natural; they perform their duties because they are commanded, not from that spontaneous impulse which impels a European to do good or evil. There is visibly a want of heart amongst the whole people: you respect the motive which animates a Hindoo to action, but you cannot love him. There does not exist that rude generosity or disregard of self which stimulates an ignorant European to befriend a stranger, or to risk his own life in defence of others, from the natural working of humanity in his bosom. Under a free government the human character is more natural. The European undauntedly speaks the truth: there is no dread of power to restrain him—he is honest in his dealings, because the circumstances in which he is placed have not created habits of fraud, and because the law will compel him to fulfil his engagements. Conscious of his independence, he disdains to court the good

humane individuals from prosecuting, and the heavy expense, which operates still more perniciously in insuring impunity to offenders. The ease with which a livelihood is obtained in India, as compared with England, has a tendency to prevent crime. The fact itself, stated by Captain Kennedy, is curious, and ought to induce Mr Mill to re-consider his theory. When the comparative moral superiority of the lower orders of either race is so dubious, it seems strange that we should be so earnest in the reformation of others, when so noble a field lies open to us in the bosom of our own community.

opinion of others, which renders his demeanour rough and abrupt. Unfettered by priestcraft, he disregards the moral doctrines of his faith; and, if uneducated, is too apt to pervert this liberty to the gratification of his selfish and malignant passions. In the formation of his character, political causes are more efficacious than religious. With the Hindoo it is entirely different. Government has debased his character instead of ameliorating it; but the triumph of religion is much more apparent in the eastern than in the western world. The Bramins have been enabled to form a people who practically exercise a considerable degree of moral virtue; in this community, if the human character is undignified by the more generous or heroic perfections of our nature, it is at least free from the violent excesses, and possesses the milder virtues in greater perfection than that of the European. These remarks apply to the lower orders of either community. As regards the higher orders, the superiority is so manifestly on the side of the European, that it would be idle to institute the comparison. It has always struck me that there is a marked similarity in the character of the Hindoos and that of the Indians of South America, as modified by the influence of Christianity in the Jesuit establishments of Paraguay. The character of this people is admirably described by Southey, in his history of Brazil.

The opinion which I have expressed of the moral character of the Hindoos may be esteemed partial; and is perhaps too exclusively founded in a knowledge of the military class. This may be the case. It is impossible for one man to possess an intimate knowledge

of the various races scattered throughout a vast empire; but this ought not to prevent him from expressing his opinion of that class which falls within his own observation, which is all that can be expected from an individual. The fortune of my life has thrown me into habitual intercourse with the native soldiers of the Bengal army. I have passed 12 years in India, constantly present with a seapoy battalion, during six years of which I generally commanded a company, which enabled me to obtain some insight into the character of these men. This experience has impressed me with a high opinion of their virtues, and induced me to regard them as infinitely superior to the same class of men in the English army. The manners of these men are uniformly mild and decorous; their intercourse in society is rarely disturbed by quarrels which render it necessary for the European officer to exercise his authority. There are few crimes committed by these soldiers. In the generality of corps in the Bengal army there are not more than four or five courts-martial annually;—in a European corps it is not unusual to have the same number within a month.*

* I recollect one corps, the 2d battalion 22d Bengal N. I. in which no court-martial had occurred for two years. This might be owing to accidental circumstances; but so far it goes a great way to prove the high moral character of this people, that a thousand soldiers could be kept together such a length of time without the necessity of punishment. In the year 1818, three battalions of Bengal seapoys proceeded on service to Ceylon. Although exposed to severe privations, their conduct was highly exemplary; so much so, that Colonel Kelly, of his Majesty's 83d regiment (who commanded where one of these battalions was stationed), dispensed with their attendance at parade to witness a punishment,

These tribunals take cognizance not only of military offences, but of civil crimes, such as thefts, frauds, and, in many instances, of murder; hence it may be inferred these are of rare occurrence in the Bengal army. The virtues of moral restraint, prudence, and economy, they possess in an eminent degree; the generality of them save half their pay, which is remitted monthly for the support of their families. In times of scarcity, I have been delighted with observing young unmarried men, who brought large sums for the purpose of remitting to their homes. On being interrogated as to their motive, they replied, that it was a sacred duty, inculcated by their Shasters, to support their parents in the hour of distress. This duty is powerfully inculcated by their legislator Menu:—

"The ample support of those who are entitled to maintenance is rewarded with bliss in Heaven; but hell is the portion of that man whose family is afflicted with pain by his neglect; therefore let him maintain his family with the utmost care."

"Therefore a son begotten by him shall relinquish his own property, and assiduously redeem his father from debt, lest he fall into a region of torments."

"Let every man constantly do what may please his parents, and in all occasions what may please his preceptor: when these three are satisfied, his whole course of devotion is accomplished."

These injunctions are rigidly fulfilled by the Bengal seapoys. During my service in India, scarcely

observing, at the same time, that the general conduct of the Bengal seapoys was such as rendered the example unnecessary to them.

a month elapsed that I did not remit large sums of their money on this account. Acts like these are far more useful than the low course of drinking and debauchery in which the European soldiery (and, generally speaking, the English populace,) squander their savings. With the spectacle of these virtues in the Hindoo community, and the degrading exhibition of the vices of their countrymen, which is seen every day in the bazaars of Calcutta, it is surprising that the missionaries have not exerted themselves more in the reform of the latter. It would seem more rational if they harangued these men on the highways: there would be some chance of being understood, which does not always happen with natives. In their conjugal relations, the Hindoos appear to be eminently exemplary. A considerable portion of the Bengal seapoys are married men, but their wives are generally left at their homes: during this separation it is esteemed disgraceful to violate their duties by forming any other connexion. Every irregularity of this kind is marked with reprobation; at least, in conversation with their European officers, it is always mentioned as a stigma against the moral character of the individual who neglects this duty. In practice they appear to remember the emphatic injunctions of their legislator:—

"Let mutual fidelity continue till death; this, in a few words, may be considered the supreme law between husband and wife."

"Let a man and woman, united by marriage, constantly beware lest, at any time disunited, they violate their mutual fidelity."

The Hindoos are reproached with their lascivious-

ness; but this accusation does not appear to me to be founded on fact. In the army there exists a considerable degree of moral restraint. It is esteemed disgraceful in a soldier of the Bramin or Chutrees classes to abandon himself to sensual gratifications. A short period before I left India, a fine young Bramin seapoy, of the corps to which I belonged, committed suicide. The cause was altogether unknown; but, on inspecting the body, it was found diseased from venereal infection. Hence it was inferred, that a sense of the shame and dishonour which would attach to his character by the discovery, had impelled him to commit this rash act. Such was the opinion of the native officers who were ordered to investigate the cause of this suicide.

With these pacific virtues, the Bengal seapoy possesses professional merits of a superior order. Born a soldier, his character is early marked by a high sense of military honour, and a love of distinction which impels him to signalize himself. Elevated in rank among his countrymen, he is naturally more exempt from the mean and degrading vices of the lower ranks, and evinces more warmth and generosity of feeling: in the field, he reposes the most absolute reliance on the skill and gallantry of his commander, and, under his guidance, will fearlessly confront the greatest dangers. Under the influence of kind treatment, their attachment to their officers is unbounded: There is no toil or sacrifice which they will not undergo at their desire; but, to call forth this feeling, their confidence must be gained; and this can only be done by means of their language. To the attainment of this object the atten-

tion of the young soldier must be directed, who aspires to command men through the medium of their affections. The labour which is bestowed in its acquisition is amply compensated by the increased power and influence which it enables him to obtain in the hearts of his men. When once attained, he will find them easy to govern, and his exertions in their favour amply rewarded by their gratitude. Where power is beneficially exercised, there is no want of regard or affection. Those who have witnessed their unaffected sorrow at the tomb of an officer whom they respected, can do ample justice to this trait of their character. Whatever be my fate through life, I shall ever feel a pride in having commanded such soldiers, and will rejoice that fortune threw me amidst so mild and amiable a race. In explanation of the high character which I have given these men, it ought to be stated that the profession of a soldier is esteemed far more honourable in India than in England; and that the rank and elevation which it confers, attracts a number of individuals from the better classes of society. The estimation in which the military profession is held in any community marks the degree of civilization which it has attained. In the East, the flower of its population are to be found in the ranks; in the West, the duty of defending the country from danger is intrusted to the dregs of the community.

The soldiers of the Bengal army are principally drawn from the first and second classes in society. In a company of native infantry there are generally from 15 to 25 Bramins; 40 or 50 of the Chutree or second class; and the rest of the third class;

with about 10 or 15 Musselmen. In intelligence, cleanliness, and knowledge of their duty, the Brahmin seapoys appear to me to rank the first. As might be inferred, *a priori*, from their superior education and elevation in society, they possess a greater sense of honour, and their moral character is superior to that of the other classes. These men belong to the first Braminical tribes, the Ooghas, Missurs, and Thakoors of Terhoot, Shahabad, or Sarun; the Doobees, Tribedees, Choubees, Panrees of Benares, Allahabad, and Oude. The European who ventures to deliver an opinion upon the character of the natives is unavoidably biassed by the nature of his situation and limited means of observation. The soldier is thrown into contact with the manly, the affectionate, the high-spirited youths of the upper provinces, who are endeared to him by the dangers through which they have passed, and their attachment to his person; this induces him to form a favourable opinion of the whole population. The civilian is more favourably situated for taking a comprehensive survey of the general character: his professional duties enable him to obtain great insight into the character of various classes, and his liberal education strengthens his powers of observation; but disadvantages exist in his elevated station which prevents his mingling with the lower classes, and his habitual occupation as a magistrate, which renders him too familiar with the vices of the community. The missionary possesses more industry than either, and is animated by a much nobler object; but the rooted abhorrence which he entertains of the Hindoo religion is too apt to vitiate

and discolour his statements. By comparing the evidence of these witnesses, a general opinion might be formed of the character of this singular people; but this requires greater powers of generalization, and a more philosophic impartiality than has been usually brought to the task.

In Europe, too much reliance appears to be placed on the accounts of the missionaries. Mr Ward's book is esteemed admirable authority in deciding upon the native character; but, allowing it to be correct, it can only be said to delineate the manners of the inhabitants of Bengal, a province of this vast empire.* It does not appear that he went beyond this province, or is intimately acquainted with any other modern language. I have not his book to refer to; but such is the impression on my mind from reading it. There is a great deal of valuable information in this book, and the writer seems to be an honest, upright individual; but it appears to me his abhorrence of the Hindoo religion

* It is well known to every person who has been in India, that the character of the inhabitants of the province of Bengal is much inferior to that of the Hindoos of the upper provinces. Such being the case, Mr Ward's book is calculated to convey a false impression of the great body of the people, his observations being only founded on a knowledge of the Bengalees, the most contemptible race in India. His vocation, too, has rendered him familiar with the greatest miscreants in the community. What respectable Hindoo would approach a man of his stamp, who has no sympathy for his religious opinions? Not being in possession of his work, I am compelled to make some observations upon it from a review which appeared in the *Edinburgh*; but these in no respect differ from the opinion which I had formed from a careful perusal of the entire work on its first appearance.

has imperceptibly biassed his opinion, and induced him to draw the character of this people in the darkest colours. The strength of this religious feeling is such, that he reprehends that eminent character, Sir William Jones, because he allowed some images of their gods to remain in his house. Such being the case, it must be obvious that this want of toleration and sympathy with the religious feelings of the natives in a great measure incapacitates him from doing justice to their character. The vices which he ascribes to the Hindoo character are so flagrant, that society could not exist under their continual operation. The understanding of the reader is revolted by these statements. Instead of relying upon them, he finds it much more satisfactory to refer to general principles, which teach him that a considerable degree of moral virtue is necessary to the very existence of every community; and that the Hindoos must partake of this in proportion to the civilization which they have attained. The extravagance and glaring injustice of some of his assertions is such that the slightest reflection is sufficient to refute them. Thus, in illustrating the pernicious effect of the worship of the lingam or phallus, he states, with great gravity, that a chaste woman, faithful to her husband, is scarcely to be found among the millions of Hindoos. If so, promiscuous intercourse must exist altogether unrestrained, and there can be no inducement for forming the matrimonial connexion. But the fact is directly the reverse: the Hindoos, generally speaking, enter into this state, and submit to great personal sacrifices for the support of their wives and families at a distance;

but would they do so if they thought they were unchaste? As long as the institution of marriage exists in a community, and is respected, it may be safely inferred that a considerable degree of conjugal virtue will prevail; for who will submit to the restraints which this state imposes if he cannot purchase this advantage? Mr Ward is lamentably ignorant of the manners of the Hindoos, otherwise he must know that any violation of this duty is generally followed by loss of cast; and that this alone must operate as a powerful check to any irregularity. But, supposing these licentious desires to exist, which are natural to humanity in every state, he must be aware that the habits of Hindoo society are powerfully calculated to repress them. The seclusion and retirement in which a Hindoo female lives affords no opportunity for intrigue. They are not immured like the Musselmen women: they are allowed to proceed to the river for the purpose of their ablutions; but this is generally done in a body; and, in these circumstances, it is esteemed highly indecorous in a man to address or approach them. With all their vices, the Hindoos possess a correct sense of female honour; and their public manners evince great respect for the purity of women. In private life, these females are entirely confined to the society of relations of their own sex. They rarely go out unattended by one of these women, who are all interested in preserving the honour of the family. The delightful occupations of visiting, shopping, and gossipping, which afford so much liberty to European women, are altogether unknown;

and thus powerful obstacles are opposed to the gratification of the passions. The greater freedom which is allowed to females in the western world, as compared with the restraints imposed upon them in the East, has a powerful tendency to elevate the character of women, and inspire them with a just sense of the duties they have to fulfil. This, combined with the greater liberty of choice in forming the connexion of marriage, ennobles the passion of love, and renders it far more natural. An attachment founded in confidence and affection is much more likely to be favourable to fidelity than that which is constrained by fear.

In Asia, the power of man has been perverted to the oppression of women. Distrusting their natural inclinations, he has shackled their liberty, which has debased their character; hence, that refined sense of honour, and purity of manners, which characterize female society in Europe, does not exist; but it is unfair to infer from this, that the Hindoo women are generally unchaste. The absence of this superior moral feeling is supplied by those prudential restraints which take away temptation: at the same time, their duty to their husbands is sedulously inculcated in their youth; and this enforced by the awful sanctions of religion, which, perhaps, exercises a more powerful influence over the Hindoo female. The punishment which follows a violation of this duty, is as emphatically expressed in the Hindoo as in the Christian Scriptures. Their legislator, Menu, declares,—"A married woman, who violates her duty to her lord, brings infamy on herself in this world,

and, in the next, shall enter the womb of the Shakal, or be afflicted with the elephantiasis, and other diseases which punish crimes."

"Since adultery causes, to the general ruin, a mixture of classes among men, thence arises a violation of duties, and thence is the root of felicity quite destroyed."

"Should a wife, proud of her family, and the great qualities of her kinsmen, actually violate the duty which she owes to her lord, let the king condemn her to be devoured by dogs, in a place much frequented."

"And let him place the adulterer on an iron bed, well heated, under which the executioners shall throw logs continually, till the sinful wretch be there burned to death."

Whether these sacred denunciations powerfully operate in deterring from the commission of this offence, I do not possess much minute information to enable me to determine; but I am inclined to think, that, in practice, the virtue of chastity exists in a very considerable degree. There are many European officers who have formed connexions with native women, but they are all Mahomedans. I have rarely heard an instance of a Hindoo female degrading herself by an alliance of this nature. In the upper provinces of India there are few Hindoo prostitutes; this profession is principally by Mahomedan women. The worship of the lingam is strongly reprehended by Mr Ward, from its tendency to inflame the passions; and to this he imputes the demoralized character of the Hindoo women. But the view which he takes of it is glaringly unjust: He

does not enter into their religious feelings, but judges of their conduct by his own;—the impure ideas which are associated in his mind with this image are falsely ascribed to the Hindoos. In this he reverses all natural justice; for surely we are bound to judge of this worship according to the sentiments which are entertained of it by its votaries, and not according to our preconceived opinions or European habits. No Hindoo will acknowledge that voluptuous emotions are excited in his mind by this image, and certainly there is nothing in it to stimulate them. Prurient desires indeed are not likely to be excited by the sight of a misshapen idol. The obscene associations which he connects with it are altogether unknown to them, who worship, in this image, the creative powers of nature. Viewed by the light of reason, this adoration is absurd; but the first step to reclaim them from it must be, to do justice to their feelings, and not to misrepresent them. The mere nudity of an object does not render it indecent,—this must depend upon the character or expression; and here the workmanship is so rude that it must fail in impressing the senses. In this image, Muhadso or Shiva the benefactor is worshipped. I have witnessed a pious Hindoo female approach and decorate this object with flowers, and then prostrate herself in prayer before the Deity revealed in this form; but in her mind this is associated with no impure idea. Her soul is filled with reverence, and she hastens to pour forth her gratitude to the beneficent Author of nature for the blessings showered upon her. Her soft and harmonious features are resplendent with

joy and devotion, and not disfigured by the agitating expression of a contrary passion. This spectacle was calculated to excite far other sentiments than those which Mr Ward has expressed. The devotion of an uncultivated mind is as sincere, and calls forth as much respect, as that of man in the highest state of refinement. The misery and evil which result from the Hindoo religion have been greatly exaggerated by the missionaries. The tormenting bodily inflictions and rigid austerities which are practised, are unquestionably detrimental to human happiness; but it should be recollected that it is only the devotees who suffer from this mistaken mode of worship, and that they form a small portion of the Hindoo or of any other community. Upon the mass of society their religion hangs more loosely, and is principally evinced by a regard to forms and ceremonies, which, in many respects, are calculated to promote human happiness, by their tendency to create habits of cleanliness, temperance, and self-restraint. The public festivals of this religion are arraigned by Mr Ward as powerfully efficacious in demoralizing the people. This does not appear to me to be the case: I have attended several of these festivals, and saw nothing very immoral in them. The heroic exploits of their gods in the overthrow of giants and powerful armies are usually represented; and in such a way as to interest the affections and call forth a just moral sympathy, by displaying the triumph of the good over the evil principle which desolates the universe. These exhibitions create a lively sense of pleasure, and are calculated to excite that devotion which is founded on love and confi-

dence. It is unreasonable to suppose, that the Governor of the universe can be engaged in the fabulous adventures of this mythology, and it is impious to ascribe human propensities to the Author of nature; but, independent of this, there is nothing in these festivals peculiarly detrimental to society. In their effects they are far more favourable to happiness than that ascetic morality which is too often combined with religion in some parts of Europe, which represents the Supreme Being as an enemy to simple human pleasures; and which is coupled with the debasing doctrine, that a worship which is founded on fear is only acceptable to a beneficent Deity. The character of the ministers of this religion has been hardly dealt with. The European philosophers and missionaries seem to agree in considering the Bramins as engaged in a conspiracy against the other classes of society; that their intellectual talents are perpetually exercised in rivetting those chains which bind down their fellow-creatures; and that they care little for their belief, except in as far as it is calculated to gratify their love of power and sensual gratification. I cannot believe this, and am inclined to entertain a better view of the matter. I have always thought that the generality of the Bramins were much the same as the regular clergy of any other religion; that they conscientiously fulfilled their duties, because they sincerely believed in the faith which they professed; and that they conceived their religion was calculated to benefit men, not to injure them. Some daring genius may have framed the system which regulates the Hindoo community with a direct view to enslave his species, as

is generally represented; but it is at least as probable, that the legislator who established this form of society, may have imagined that he was disinterestedly employed in advancing the happiness of his fellow creatures, at the same time, that he was gratifying his own love of power and consequence. In the infancy of civilization, it was certainly a great step to divide men into four classes. By this arrangement, that division of labour, which is esteemed of such essential importance to society by political economists, was attained in an early stage of civilization. But, setting aside speculation, it may justly be said, that the greater part of the Bramins are blind mechanical agents of the present system; and too stupid to enter into the deep designs against the human species which have been ingeniously ascribed to them by the European philosophers; and which the prejudices of the missionaries have rendered them too eager to adopt. It is generally supposed that they have designedly kept the people in ignorance, that they might the more easily subjugate them to their will; but, in opposition to this, it ought to be known, that it is unequivocally admitted by the missionaries, that they have manifested every disposition to promote the success of the new system of education; and that they have been the principal agents in introducing the art of printing among the natives. Considering that the Bramins possess such power and influence over their countrymen, it might naturally be inferred that they were individually wealthy; and that they had completely succeeded in acquiring a fixed and liberal provision for

themselves. But this is not the case. At the present day there are numbers of Bramins who are obliged to betake themselves to the labours of agriculture, and arms, in order to obtain subsistence; and there are even some who have been compelled to become the servants of Soodurs, or persons of the lowest class. The unbounded sensuality which prevails at some of the sacrifices of this religion, as represented by Mr Ward, may exist. Setting aside his prejudices he is unquestionably a man of veracity, and ought to be depended upon; but, if frequently practised, it is surprising that it is not more generally known. In the upper provinces, at least, I am inclined to think these abominable excesses rarely occur. I have never heard that they did, or met with any person who could give any information respecting them. At the public entertainments which are given by Hindoos on occasion of the grand festivals of their religion, it is not unusual to introduce dancing girls, who, aided by the charm of melody, endeavour to captivate the attention of the company by voluptuous and graceful movements; but that there is nothing very indecent in this, may be inferred from the fact, that these exhibitions are often attended by European ladies of character.

It is truly ludicrous to observe the extreme length to which people will carry their prejudices. Thus the Abbé Dubois gravely ascribes the fasts which are prescribed by the Hindoo religion to the gluttonous habits of the Bramins, who have recourse to this abstinence in order to afford their stomachs an opportunity of recovering their tone after their

scandalous excesses. Such preposterous charges carry along with them their own refutation.*

The cruel practice of burning widows on the funeral pyre of their husbands, has justly called forth the reprobation of every writer on the Hindoo religion; but there are few persons who enter into the feelings which lead to the sacrifice. The Hindoo widow ascends the funeral pile, and sacrifices her life in the ardent hope of securing the eternal happiness of her lord, and of uniting with him in a better state of existence. To this she is powerfully

* The following paragraph, relating to the character of the Hindoos, is extracted from No. 78 of the *Asiatic Journal*, for June 1822, a London monthly publication, under the head of "Notes of Instructions to Assistants and Officers acting under the orders of Major-general Sir John Malcolm, G. C. B." dated Camp, Dhoolia, 28th June 1821:—"7. Many of the moral defects of the natives of India are to be referred to that misrule and oppression, from which they are now, in a great degree, emancipated. I do not know the example of any great population, in similar circumstances, preserving, through such a period of changes and tyrannical rule, so much of virtue, and so many good qualities, as are to be found in a great proportion of the inhabitants of this country. This is to be accounted for, in some degree, by the institutions of the Hindoo, particularly that of caste, which appears to have raised them to their present rank in human society, at a very remote period: but it has certainly tended to keep them stationary at that point of civil order, to which they were thus early advanced. With a just admiration of the effects of many of their institutions, particularly those parts of them which cause, in vast classes, not merely an absence of the common vices of theft, drunkenness, and violence, but preserve all the virtuous ties of family and kindred relations, we must all deplore some of their usages and weak superstitions: but what individuals or what races of men are without great and manifold errors and imperfections, and what mind, that is not fortified with ignorance and pride, can, on such grounds, come to a severe judgment against a people like that of India?"

impelled by the strength of public opinion, which applauds this devotion to her husband, and attaches disgrace to those who ignobly refrain from exhibiting this proof of affection. Nature may rebel against this usage, and assert her empire within her bosom; but the workings of humanity are repressed and overmastered by the influence of religion and custom, which exalt the importance of this duty and sanctify it in her eyes. That regard to public opinion which animates her conduct, is the same principle, differently modified, which impels the European gentleman to sacrifice his life in an affair of honour. In her it becomes a heroic virtue sanctioned by her faith; with the European this sacrifice of life is made in opposition to the dictates of reason and religion. With all his pride and independence of thinking, he is equally a slave to the tyranny of custom. Were the inhabitant of another planet to alight upon this globe, and to behold the widowed female of Asia tear herself from the joys of life, and mingle her ashes with those of her husband, in the consciousness of achieving his salvation; and, on the other side, to view the legislators of Europe perilling their lives in an affair of honour, that the chance of death might determine those differences, which, amongst an intellectual people, ought only to be decided by reason,—He would exclaim with indignation against these false prejudices, which caused so much misery to humanity; but this feeling would be blended with a just admiration of that singular union of feminine gentleness and manly resolution which impels the Hindoo female to this act; and, even in a selfish point of view,

regarding her object as the attainment of eternal happiness, he would consider it as a much more rational motive of action, than that which urges the European gentleman to stake his life in order to protect his worldly reputation. The practice of duelling appears a savage and barbarous custom to the Hindoos, and is regarded with as much abhorrence by them as the sacrifice of widows by us. But, to abolish this practice of self-immolation, instead of reproaching them, our first step must be to enlighten public opinion. The mere order of government will not effect its abolition as long as public opinion supports it; and there will be a thousand ways of evading the commands of authority. The number of victims to this religious prejudice has been prodigiously exaggerated: It is only a few, but unfortunately the purest and most exalted in character, who devote themselves in this way; and at present the practice is principally confined to the province of Bengal. In the upper provinces it rarely occurs; at least I have been so informed by native officers and seapoys, and I can aver that, during a residence of 12 years in India, I never heard of or saw this sacrifice, nor have I ever met with a European who had witnessed this melancholy exhibition; but, that it does occur frequently in Bengal, is undeniable.

The sacrifice of human lives at the shrine of the idol Juggernaut is another fertile topic of exaggeration. At the annual festival which takes place at this celebrated seat of superstition, in the province of Cuttack, it is generally represented that, when the image of the god is brought forth, and exposed

upon a car to the ardent gaze of the people, numbers of devotees, in the hope of attaining eternal happiness, precipitate themselves beneath the wheels and are crushed to pieces. This is not the case at present, although it may have occurred formerly. I resided two years in this province, and, although I have never been present at this festival, I was in the habit of daily intercourse with gentlemen of the civil and military service who had witnessed it, and never heard them mention that a single instance of this sacrifice had occurred within these two years.

CHAPTER III.

STATE OF THE PRESS.

The liberty of the Press has never existed in India, as exercised in England.—The late regulations of Lord Hastings have not allowed of the liberty of the Press; on the contrary, they prohibit it.—The reasons urged in justification of the restrictions on the Press examined, and their impolicy maintained, from their tendency to prevent Government from obtaining correct information as to the effects of its political measures; which would thus enable the executive to guard against any irruption of discontent in its subjects, or disaffection in its soldiery.—The apprehended danger of free discussion on the minds of the natives, shown to be erroneous, from their ignorance of the English language, and the peculiar stage of their civilization at which the Indian community has arrived.—The liberty of the Press in India would perform the same service which parliamentary opposition effects in England, by exposing the errors of administration, and thus enabling the executive to rectify its measures.

The liberty of the press, as exercised in England, has never existed in India. Under a government possessing the arbitrary power of sending individuals to Europe who abuse the liberty of the press, it is in vain to look for freedom of discussion. The administration of Lord Cornwallis was marked by the exercise of this invidious power in one or two instances; but no direct check was imposed upon the press, during his career, except the dread of this obnoxious punishment. It was reserved to Lord

Wellesley to establish a direct censorship, by requiring every editor of a newspaper to forward a copy of his journal (prior to publication) to the government secretary, upon whom devolved the task of expunging such articles as were supposed to be unpalatable to the supreme authority. At the same period, the summary power which the legislature conferred upon the executive was exercised with great rigour. Under these vexatious restrictions, all liberty of discussion expired. Subject to the arbitrary control of any individual, with no rule to direct his judgment but his caprice, the most harmless effusion might be regarded as a studied attack upon authority—whilst just and sound animadversions upon its conduct might pass altogether unnoticed. This system continued during Lord Minto's administration and the early part of Lord Hastings's career. In the year 1818, however, the censorship was abolished, and the following regulations established for the government of the press :—

'The editors of newspapers are prohibited from publishing any matter coming under the following heads :

"1*st*, Animadversions on the measures and proceedings of the Honourable Court of Directors, or other public authorities in England, connected with the government of India ; or disquisitions on political transactions of the local administrations ; or offensive remarks levelled at the public conduct of the members of council, of the judges of the supreme court, or of the Lord Bishop of Calcutta.

"2*d*, Discussions having a tendency to create

alarm or suspicion, among the native population, of any intended interference with their religious opinions or observances.

"*3d*, The republication, from English or other newspapers, of passages coming under any of the above heads, or otherwise calculated to affect the British power or reputation in India.

"*4th*, Private scandal and personal remarks on individuals, tending to excite dissension in society.

"Relying on the prudence and discretion of the editors, for their careful observance of these rules, the governor-general in council is pleased to dispense with their submitting their papers to an officer of government, previous to publication. The editors will, however, be held personally accountable for whatever they may publish in contravention of the rules now communicated, or which may be otherwise at variance with the general principles of British law, as established in this country, and will be proceeded against in such manner as the governor-general in council may deem applicable to the nature of the offence, for any deviation from them. The editors are further required to lodge, in the chief secretary's office, one copy of every newspaper, periodical or extra, published by them respectively."

These restrictions appear to place a severe restraint upon free discussion; but it is undeniable, that, since their introduction, a marked improvement has taken place in the character of the Calcutta press. Relieved from the deadening pressure of the censorship, the elastic spirit of freedom has manifested itself, by springing forward into new and untrodden regions of in-

quiry—at least in India. A variety of important information respecting the moral and political condition of the natives, agriculture, commerce, the revenue, and judicial systems, has appeared, which would never have seen the light under the former restraint. The idle portion of the Indian community consisting principally of military men, public discussion has chiefly turned upon the peculiar interests of this class; at the same time, many valuable hints have been thrown out, which the government might avail themselves of in the improvement of their army, and the better administration of justice to the native portion of it. Since the same period, the press has teemed with plans for ameliorating the condition of the country-born population, and pointing out their interests to the peculiar notice of government. In no respect is the salutary influence of an improved press more manifest than in the reform of the police and better regulation of the city of Calcutta. Under the former system, no one dared to animadvert upon the acts of the police magistrates of Calcutta: any exposure of abuses was suppressed, lest it should give offence to powerful individuals; but, subject to the control of public opinion, their conduct has visibly improved. This beneficial change is principally to be ascribed to the liberal and enlightened sentiments expressed by Lord Hastings, in his reply to the Madras address of congratulation on the successful result of his policy in 1817–18. In reference to the abolition of the censorship he thus expresses himself:—"It is salutary for supreme authority, even when its intentions are most pure, to look to the control of public scrutiny,—

while, conscious of rectitude, that authority can lose nothing of its strength by its exposure to general comments; on the contrary, it acquires incalculable addition of force. The government which has nothing to disguise, wields the most powerful instrument that can appertain to sovereign rule; it carries with it the united reliance and effort of the whole mass of the governed: And let the triumph of our beloved country, in its awful contest with tyrant-ridden France, speak the value of a spirit to be found only in men accustomed to indulge and express their honest sentiments."

It is delightful to read such sentiments as these;—to behold in Lord Hastings, in the decline of life, the same unalterable attachment to freedom which distinguished his early days;—and this, too, in the government of British India, where the habitual exercise of an enlightened but arbitrary power has a powerful tendency to estrange the statesman from the wholesome restraint which public opinion imposes upon his actions. The manly avowal of these sentiments gave a new tone and character to the Calcutta press; and this effect was powerfully aided by the independent spirit of one individual. Much discussion has prevailed in India respecting the political merits and demerits of the *Calcutta Journal*, into which it is not my intention to enter; but, surely, all parties will agree, that the animated labours of its editor have imparted new life and vigour to the daily press. It is impossible to avoid being struck with the marked inconsistency in these liberal opinions of Lord Hastings, and the rigid restrictions imposed on the press during his go-

vernment, as promulgated in the regulations for the guidance of the editors. The explanation is, in all probability, to be found in the nature of his political situation: With a direct path marked out for him by the supreme authorities in England, he was compelled to conform to it in his public conduct. Such being the case, these emphatic declarations in favour of free discussion must be regarded as the natural and undisguised workings of the soul, struggling with and overmastering those artificial restrictions which chained down and oppressed his will. It is remarkable, that, whilst the censorship has been abolished in Bengal, this invidious power still exists on the coast presidency; and it is not unusual to see articles inserted in the Calcutta journals, which have been rejected by the censor at Madras. It may, perhaps, be hastily inferred from this fact, that the liberty of the press, in discussing the public conduct of government, exists in Bengal in the same spirit as in England. The fact is quite otherwise. In India, the spirit of inquiry is allowed to exercise itself in saying every thing in favour of the supreme authority, but the human faculties must remain altogether dormant in pointing out its defects. The most entire liberty of discussion prevails respecting European politics. Every thing may be said respecting existing administrations, or princes, in the West; but, as regards the East, the intellectual labours of public writers are solely limited to the praises of their rulers.

This, at least, prevails in what is strictly called political discussion. Unquestionably, the abolition of the censorship has stimulated individuals to com-

municate a great body of information, on a variety of subjects interesting to the community; but there never has existed, in India, the right of public discussion—of animadverting, with freedom and fairness, upon the actions of their rulers;—the truth cannot be spoken—the opinion of the public has never been fairly brought to bear upon the conduct of the governing body; nor does it exercise any efficient check through the medium of the press. And such must always be the case, as long as these restrictions and the arbitrary power of deportation exist. It therefore cannot be said, that the liberty of the press has resulted from the abolition of the censorship: the only substantial benefit which this act of Lord Hastings has conferred is, that the right of publication is allowed, subject to responsibility—a visible improvement upon the old system, which rendered the right of discussion altogether dependent upon the arbitrary control of an individual. Under the necessary expansion of mind resulting from this innovation, public opinion has expressed itself indirectly upon the conduct of government, in indulging a spirit of inquiry upon subjects apparently unconnected with its peculiar functions, but, in reality, dependent upon it: but all direct animadversion, or fair and manly discussion of its merits and defects, is pointedly repressed. It seems evident, that the prosperity of British India would be prodigiously improved, if the free and direct action of public opinion was brought to operate upon its government; if the liberty of the press was practically exercised in the same spirit as it operates in England,—and such would seem to be the convic-

tion of the present governor-general.* With this opinion in favour of change, I shall proceed to consider the arguments for and against the present system. And shall premise, by declaring, that it appears to me, every European is bound to respect the existing regulations which abridge the freedom of the press. Coming out to India with the knowledge of their existence, he can have no pretext to justify their infringement; at the same time, he is not precluded from exercising his reason, in examining their scope and tendency, under a government more favourable to general liberty.

It has been urged, in justification of this system, that a free spirit of discussion would endanger the stability of our dominion, by crippling the energy of the executive;—that the natives are accustomed to implicit obedience to its authority;—and that the very appearance of opposition would loosen the chain of subordination, and ultimately subvert the state. This reasoning appears to be founded on an entire ignorance of the state of society in India, and of sound principles in political philosophy. It is only in a certain period of civilization that the direct action of the press upon the government in expressing public opinion, and its reäction upon the people, is perceptible; and this can only exist in a community where the people have attained a due share of power and intelligence, and are enabled to influence the conduct of their government. This cannot be said of British India. The power of the people is nothing—its government an

* If we can judge from his sentiments formerly quoted.

enlightened despotism. In all despotic states the influence of the press is unknown: the power and intelligence of the people necessary to create it, cannot exist in such a state of society. Such being the case, in the event of grievous misgovernment, the force of public opinion expresses itself, in this period of civilization, by a direct appeal to force. —Who ever heard of the liberty of the press in Turkey or China? This admirable contrivance for enabling public opinion to act upon the government is altogether unknown; hence the people are compelled to resort to insurrection. The state of British India is nearly similar. The victims of a cruel period of misgovernment and abuse, under their former rulers, its population has never attained that weight and consequence which would enable it to influence the government by means of the press. Thus debased in intellectual character, they are altogether beyond the pale of its action. The only legitimate power which they are accustomed to recognize in government, is the agency of force; and the only check which they have provided for misgovernment, is a resort to the same extremity. The alarming rebellions which occurred in the provinces of Rohilcund and Cuttack, during the administration of Lord Hastings, sufficiently illustrate this opinion: Neither party resorted to the agency of the press; every thing was decided by force. With this knowledge of the political state of India, it is surprising that men should still persist in entertaining chimerical apprehensions of danger from the liberty of the press. How is it possible that this freedom of discussion can endanger our do-

minion? Who is it that reads amongst the natives with a view to enlarge his mind, or form his opinion of the existing government, through the medium of the press? Their knowledge of English is limited to the slender stock which enables them to obtain a livelihood in the service of Europeans; and this confined to a few hundred individuals within the immense city of Calcutta. Beyond the suburbs the language is unknown. The example of Rammohun, and one or two individuals, may be cited as instances of individuals who have attained some notions of civil liberty; but he, like Bacon or Galileo, has outstripped the genius of his age. Thus, there exists an irresistible check to the apprehended danger, in their entire ignorance of the language by which the press is to operate. The progress of human improvement is mournfully slow. A century or two in all probability will elapse before the Hindoo community will be elevated in the scale of being, to the degree that an enlightened public will influence the conduct of the supreme power, by expressing its will through the medium of the press, and experience a beneficial reäction by learning the opinions of its government by the same channel. Until this bright æra arrives, it is in vain to talk of the agency of the press in its operation upon the native population. The government, too, seems to entertain the same opinion respecting the dangerous tendency of the press. [See the second article of the regulations prohibiting "discussions having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion, among the native population, of any intended interference with their religious opinions

and observances."] But surely an enlightened government, like that of Bengal, need not be told, that, if the pernicious operation of the press had a direct tendency to produce this alarming evil, its salutary power of exposing falsehood would be infinitely more efficacious in counteracting it, especially when supported by the powerful influence of government, and the general interest of the European community. If no design of innovation was contemplated on the part of the supreme power, its prompt disavowal would repel the danger, whilst the merited punishment of its calumniator would powerfully deter from the commission of a similar crime. The government possesses the same power of punishing a libeller as exists in England, by prosecuting him in the civil court; and no one will contend that the abuses of the press should remain unpunished. In all probability, this power would be rarely exercised. The occupation of a professed libeller can scarcely exist in India. The European community is not sufficiently numerous to enable it to afford employment to those who would pamper its malignant passions by the slander of individuals. Closely identified with the interests, and forming the great body of its public functionaries, there is no temptation to defame the government. A public writer who would pursue this course from mercenary motives, would evince an utter ignorance of his own interest. In opposition to the general spirit of the community, his work would speedily perish. If these reasonings are correct, it must be apparent that the stability of our government cannot be endangered by the freedom of the press. In the exist-

143111

ing state of the native population, it remains to be inquired, if the operation of this spirit of discussion on the European part of the community would threaten its security. Strangers in a foreign land, their fate interwoven with that of the government, and the principal agents of its power, is it likely that they should stand forth to advocate a system of policy detrimental to its interests—that they should propagate alarms subversive of its existence? Human nature forbids it. Every consideration of interest or duty would impel them to exert their faculties in its defence. The freedom of the press would afford every facility in exerting this aid. The exercise of public discussion would naturally devolve upon the intellectual part of the community. At the present moment, the civil, military, and, above all, the medical and clerical branches of the service, possess by far the greater portion of this knowledge, at least nine-tenths of the cultivated intellect in British India; but these classes have a manifest interest in upholding the government—all their talent is enlisted in its service. What chance is there of their subverting it? None: But were greater freedom of discussion allowed, they might perform important service in maintaining it,—by enlightening the government as to the real interests of its subjects, and correcting its mistakes,—by exposing the misery which has resulted from rash and unskilful laws,—and by bringing forward such a mass of information as would enable government to legislate soundly on the general interests of the community. It must strike the most superficial observer, that, under a government carried on by so

few public functionaries, every aid is required to enable it to perform its functions; and that every encouragement should be held out to individuals, to contribute such information as might assist in the performance of this duty. In regard to our external policy, the benefits which would result from an increased liberty of discussion are no less obvious. By directing the political talent of the community to the conduct of its government, the advantages and disadvantages of its system of foreign relations would be rendered manifest. Thus, if a course of action was pursued, degrading to our character and disadvantageous to our interest, the salutary expression of public opinion would destroy it in the bud, and avert that national dishonour which would have sullied our fame. At present, this powerful check to a career of aggrandizement exists in the opinion of enlightened Europe; but it would be far more efficacious if exercised on the spot. But, to render the advantages to be derived from the liberty of the press more strikingly manifest, I shall proceed to consider the subject in its application to our system of government in India, civil and military.

The strength of the British government in India, appears to me to depend upon the number and discipline of its armies, and the moral and intellectual superiority of our character, the confidence reposed in which by the natives enables us to command the services of the military classes,—those in whom the real and efficient power of the community resides under a despotic form of government. The high pay which the British government affords, its strict justice, and the noble provision made for those dis-

abled in action, allures the more adventurous and courageous spirits to enrol themselves under its standard. This appears to be that wonderful charm by which a small but skilful band of Europeans are enabled to keep in subjection some 70 or 80 millions. The military classes in Hindostan rule over their countrymen. The superior energy and moral strength of the European character enables it to wield this mighty force at its pleasure; and directs it to subject the vast population of India to its will. Hence, it must be obvious, that were the affections of the soldiery alienated, the British government could no longer stand. Its civil institutions have not attained to that perfection that these alone would maintain it, unaided by the power of its armies. Such being the case, of what incalculable importance it is, that the temper and disposition of this body should be known—that the slightest symptom of discontent or even imaginary grievance should be instantly communicated to the supreme power. Has not the safety of the state been in danger by the ignorance of government on this head? Does not the history of the Bengal army teach us, that mutinies have arisen from the mistaken zeal of officers commanding corps, who had reported that the whole of their men had volunteered for foreign service, when this could only be said of a part; and when the attempt to make them embark was resisted by force? Had the liberty of the press been allowed in India, surely some officer of these corps would have stood forward to direct the attention of government to this alarming discontent. It is well known, that at Java, in 1816, the Bengal Light Infantry

Battalion had conspired against its officers; and had determined to assassinate them, with the ultimate view of subverting the British authority in the island. What were the causes of this? The seapoys alleged a breach of faith on the part of the government; that it had promised to relieve this force in three years,—and had detained them six years in a foreign country;—that this shameful injustice had compelled them to have recourse to arms. This may have been the true cause or not; it is sufficient for me to say, that I have heard this plea urged by soldiers who had served in this battalion. It remains to inquire, was there any thing in the conduct of government to afford a colour for this pretext? Its general practice, with regard to troops who have engaged to serve beyond sea, on general duty, is to relieve them every three years. With regard to volunteers, the rule is different: it is generally understood that they shall return when the particular service upon which they are employed shall have been accomplished;—it is no part of their engagement to serve beyond sea in the general duty of the islands. This was precisely the case with the troops at Java. They had offered their services for the conquest of the island, which was effected in three months; and yet they were detained six years on its general duties;—in truth, no other troops were raised for its defence. It may be urged, that the greater part of these men wished to remain on the island, and that government, aware of this, delayed their return. I am inclined to think that this was the case with a considerable portion of these troops; but, allowing it to be just, it will not vindicate the conduct of go-

vernment in leaving its engagements unfulfilled to the remainder. Why should an exception have been made against those gallant spirits—who were not bound to go beyond sea—who could not be forced,—but who stood forth in a moment of need, and offered their services? With such men the pledge of the state ought to have been sacred. But the practical conclusion I mean to draw from this fact is, that, had a liberal spirit of discussion been allowed on military affairs, it is certain that the knowledge of this disaffection would infallibly have reached the supreme authority; and who can doubt that an enlightened government would alter its conduct, and thus avert that danger which threatened its existence? It must be obvious to any one acquainted with the structure of Asiatic society, that the mass of its population are accustomed to look up with implicit reverence to those upon whom they depend for subsistence. This is precisely the case with the native soldiery in regard to their European officers. In them alone is the government effectually represented. They are the springs which impel the machine. The superior energy and intellectual superiority of the European character is manifest through them; only an uneducated race of men never look beyond this. Hence it might be inferred, that an accomplished body of European officers would possess an almost boundless influence over their men. Such would appear to be the case. The recent disturbances at Madras afford lamentable evidence of it. Considering that the direction of the only efficient power in the community resides in this body of European officers, is it not of paramount import-

ance to the government, that there should be a safe and legitimate channel by which the opinion of this class of men should be known? Their grievances unequivocally stated;—if just, redressed;—if unreasonable, beaten down by sound argument or force. What other medium is there but the press? Had even that limited spirit of discussion which characterizes Lord Hastings's administration been allowed at Madras in 1809, it is more than probable that portentous conflict between the executive and its military force might have been altogether avoided! Had there been any channel by which the sense of the army could have been conveyed to government, it would have known the general discontent which its measures had created; and this information, coming upon it by degrees, would not have roused its passions, or alarmed its pride, by any attempt at dictation. Perfectly aware that the power of directing the army against the civil authority existed in the great body of European officers, the government would have felt the necessity of conciliation—of altering its conduct, so as to allay the disaffection which pervaded that body. If the liberty of the press had existed, the most distinguished officers of this army, Close, Malcolm, Wilks, Munro, would have availed themselves of its power to reconcile the contending parties. Elevated by their talents to a closer connexion with the government, and identified with it in interest, but feeling a natural sympathy in the cause of their brethren, their situation naturally pointed them out as mediators.

Under a system more favourable to the independent exercise of discussion, they would have stood

forward to heal those cruel wounds which threatened the existence of our Indian empire. Addressing themselves to their fellow-soldiers, they would have pointed out the unreasonableness of their pretensions,—the paramount duty which they owed, as citizens of a free state, of submission to the civil power, at least until all redress was denied; and would have powerfully recalled to their remembrance that it was only a series of the most cruel and provoking outrages on their rights which could justify resistance. At the same period, they would have told the supreme power, in firm, but respectful language, that soldiers are human beings, endowed with reason as other men, and accustomed to recognize its influence as paramount in all human affairs;—that the severe mortifications which the pride of this army had received, and the injuries which its interests had sustained, ought to be redressed;—that a harsh exhibition of its power, and disdainful refusal to listen to its claims, was a conduct unsuitable to an enlightened government;—and that it would be far more honourable to its character, to evince a desire to determine its differences by the fair exercise of reason and persuasion than to resort to arms, without an attempt at negotiation—a policy characteristic of the lowest period of civilization. There being no medium by which the pulse of the army could be felt—no expression of its opinions by means of the press—the government was altogether ignorant that its conduct had created such a vast mass of hostility; whilst, deprived of the salutary check which public opinion would have exercised upon its conduct, the military body was

entirely abandoned to the evil voice of its passions. In this state, a deep-rooted sense of inquiry agitated the army, which rankled the more from there being no vent for its expression. Ignorant of its danger, the government was not restrained from pursuing that irritating and domineering conduct which exasperated this wounded spirit to such a degree that it ultimately provoked a contest between the supreme power and its military force. In all probability the shock between these conflicting bodies might have been stayed by the agency of the press, which the impartial part of the community would have employed in exposing the errors into which both parties had fallen. It may be objected to this reasoning, that the attempt to convince an army of the errors of their conduct, by the exercise of reason and discussion, is strikingly absurd;—that experience demonstrates that military men are unaccustomed to recognize the influence of reason in human affairs;—that the habits of their profession naturally dispose them to have recourse to violence and injustice;—that they cannot be reasoned with, and have an irrational propensity to decide disputes entirely in their own favour. This may be admitted in part; but it should be recollected, at the same time, that the party in question were not an uneducated soldiery, with whom brute force is paramount in every civil transaction; on the contrary, that they were a well-educated and liberal-minded body of officers, whose habits disposed them to acknowledge that principles of reason and justice were essential to the welfare of society;—and that those who were distinguished by the possession of these qualities were

entitled to the first places in its government. Recent events have thrown some light on this subject. The revolutions in Spain, Portugal, Naples, Sicily, have shown that soldiers are not the mere creatures of command—the blind mechanical agents of power; on the contrary, that they are imbued with the same feelings and passions as the rest of the community, and as thoroughly impressed with the advantages resulting from rational liberty. The names of such men as Washington, Fayette, Carnot, Hastings, Fitzpatrick, Wilson—soldiers—distinguished for their ardent love of freedom, affords a practical refutation to this debasing doctrine which excludes the military profession from all pretensions to the character of moral and intellectual beings. Several of the claims of this army have been animadverted upon with great severity, as altogether unprecedented under a civil government. I more particularly allude to the opinion that the army should be represented in council, or rather, that military servants should be eligible to sit in council. If the military power is so essential an element in the government of India—if the existence of the civil authority depends upon it—nothing can be more reasonable than that the councils of the state should be aided by a person who is thoroughly aware of its temper and spirit. If a member of the military body can attain the first place in the government, such as Sir Thomas Munro, why should he not be able to fill the second?

The beneficial effects resulting from the limited discussions on military affairs, which have been permitted in Bengal during the administration of Lord Hastings, are already apparent. It was generally

understood that the government seriously contemplated the introduction of promotion by brevet into its military service, instead of that gradual rise by seniority which prevails at present. The expression of public opinion showed that this projected innovation was decidedly adverse to the wishes of the great body of its officers: and, opposed to the sense of the army, it is not likely that government will persevere in this plan. It appears to me that the press has done eminent service to the government, by exposing the pernicious tendency of plans which have been brought forward by individuals for the improvement of its army. The grand object of these schemes seems to have been to augment the number of European officers in each corps, and thereby to quicken their promotion. This was to be accomplished at no expense to the state, as the number of native officers was to be diminished, with the express view of meeting this extra charge. So that by this measure the interests of the native officers of the army were to be sacrificed, with the view of benefiting the European portion of it. It is lamentable to think that self-interest could so far blind men as to induce them to stand forth to advocate so grievous an act of injustice. Would it be believed, that those gallant spirits who had led forth their brave soldiery into the field—who had fought with them side by side—who had gained their honours and distinctions by their courage and devotedness;—that these men should be the first to exert their talents to the injury of their fellow-soldiers? Was this their return for their fidelity under temptation, their patience under suffering, their ardent attach-

ment to their leaders, which has often led them to carry off their wounded European officers at the imminent hazard of their lives? Was it by their hands that this cruel and mortifying wound was to be inflicted? It had heretofore been the proud distinction of seapoy officers, that the connexion between them and their men was maintained by benefits, not by injuries. Alas! how mournfully would it have been reversed had these plans succeeded. But the salutary effects of discussion were here strikingly manifest—the specious pretexts by which these innovations were recommended to the people of government having been ably refuted, and their tendency to render the army more inefficient than under the present system fully exposed.

In considering the objections which may be urged against this liberty of discussion in military men, it will be contended, that the discipline of the army could not subsist against the spirit of opposition that it would excite against superior authority,—that the habit of prompt obedience, so indispensable to the existence of an army, would soon be destroyed. And it will likewise be said, that the right of representing grievances exists under the present system, which removes all pretext for public discussion of the interests of the army. It does not appear to me that the sound principles of military subordination are likely to be injured by this liberty of thought. The general principle of obedience is so clear and distinct, and the penalty of disobedience so manifest, that scarcely a situation can arise, in ordinary circumstances, which would warrant resistance in a soldier. It is only a marked illegality in an order,

subjecting the inferior to punishment who obeyed it, which can justify resistance; and even then it is thoroughly impressed on every soldier's mind, that, unless the interests of humanity are endangered by this order (such as a command to destroy an unoffending individual, or what subverts those established principles upon which society is founded), it is his duty to obey, in the first instance, and then represent the misconduct of his superior. Such being the case, how are these cardinal principles to be eradicated by this freedom of discussion? In the field, or on the parade, the officer is practically convinced that obedience is the vital spring of an army—that he can only command the services of his men by its agency; but how is this to be injured by the liberty of the press, which operates in the closet, which addresses itself to the enlightened judgment of the public, and whose reasonings by no possibility can influence his native soldiers so as to excite to disobedience.

It now remains to consider this subject in its connexion with our civil government in India. It must strike the mind with irresistible force, that a government of this nature, carried on by a few public functionaries, consisting of about 800 individuals in the three presidencies, exercising dominion over 60 or 80 millions—these strangers in the land, and altogether opposed in character and manners to its inhabitants, is singularly unqualified for administering power, so as to render it beneficial to the community. The grand defect of this government appears to be, that its public functionaries possessing no stake or influence in the country—no hereditary

power over the people—there exists no natural sympathy between the latter and their rulers. Deprived of this salutary support, its agents must encounter insuperable difficulties in attempting to ascertain the real operation of the measures of government on the welfare of the community, and in collecting such information as would enable it to legislate correctly. In Bengal, there are several extensive districts containing a population of a million or 1,200,000 souls, the civil government of which is solely confided to two individuals—a European judge and collector of revenue. Such being the case, it is scarcely possible that the most meritorious individuals can acquire that minute knowledge of the various interests of their districts which is necessary to the just administration of their power. Their time is scarcely sufficient for the ordinary performance of their duties, and allows of no leisure for extraneous inquiry. When an individual has acquired this knowledge by superior ability, or the laudable sacrifice of that time which is required for health or relaxation, his reputation for talent and integrity induces the government to remove him to another district, to correct the evils resulting from the imperfect administration of others. Thus, the benefit arising from his labours is in a great measure lost to the people, who are deprived of an able ruler, whilst the individual is perhaps removed to another province altogether different in language and manners, where the same indefatigable exertions must be gone through to qualify him for exercising power beneficially. The operation of this cause in depriving the government of correct information—the limited num-

ber of its public functionaries—the perpetual changes which the rise by seniority creates—the departure of its most enlightened servants to Europe—and the want of a permanent interest in the welfare of the country, which the possession of landed property by Europeans would create—prevents our government from operating so beneficially as might be expected from its enlightened character. The misgovernment and oppression of which these regions have been the victims under their former rulers, by degrading the character of the inhabitants, has aggravated the difficulties with which the British government had to contend. Under the pressure of a despotic form of government, the people could never attain that wealth and power which would enable them to influence the conduct of their rulers, or assist them in its internal administration. There never has existed in India any municipal corporations or provincial assembly, which could aid the government by relieving it from the petty details of its internal administration, and which could operate beneficially on the supreme power, by conveying correct information as to the general sense of the community on its measures. It must be obvious, that a government of this character, which is not founded on consent or affection, which exercises no natural influence over the people, could only have been introduced by force, and that it must mainly depend on the military power for its support. But the entire command of this force, for the purpose of maintaining its power, cannot secure a government against the insurrection of its subjects. A grievous course of oppression and misrule naturally

provokes resistance to superior authority. Such being the case, is it not of primary importance to government, that it should possess correct information as to the nature of the existing discontent, that it may avert the impending danger by an immediate change in conduct? But there exists no political machinery in British India by which this knowledge can be conveyed to the executive—no medium by which the grievances of the people can be formally expressed. The only channel by which the supreme power receives information is that of its functionaries—the very persons whose arbitrary conduct may have excited this disaffection, and generally the last to perceive the impolicy of their conduct. It is here that the agency of the press would be strikingly efficacious. There exists in the provinces a number of intelligent individuals altogether unconnected with its internal administration, such as medical, clerical, military men, merchants, and indigo planters, who come into daily contact with the mass of our subjects, and could communicate important information as to the practical effects of the measures of government on the general prosperity of the community. To the indigo manufacturer, the precise operation of our revenue system on the general condition of the ryut and zumeendar must be perfectly familiar. Did there exist liberty of discussion in India, these individuals would be eager to communicate their information to the public: animadverting with fairness on the conduct of the government, they would point out the errors in its internal policy, and would perform important service to it, by expressing the opinion of its subjects

on the general propriety of its measures. It is thus that the agency of the press would compensate for the want of those political contrivances for expressing public opinion, which render the task of government so difficult in India. If an alarming discontent existed in a province, in all probability some individual would step forward to communicate this information to the public. Apprized of its danger, the government would feel the necessity of a change in conduct. The gradual but sure warning of the press would enable it to do this without precipitation—without any violent shock to its dignity, or compromise of its interests. In this manner, a formidable mass of disaffection, which was arraying itself against the supreme power, would be altogether dissipated by the salutary operation of the press. It is the want of this noble instrument for expressing public opinion which accounts for the singular phenomena that accompany popular insurrection in British India. The growing storm of discontent which impregnates the mass of its society against their rulers, is preceded by no warning—the same profound calm appears on the surface. Altogether unexpected, the tempest bursts forth with a violence which threatens to subvert the stately fabric of our empire. It is well known, that, during the administration of Lord Hastings, there have been two alarming popular insurrections; the peculiar nature of which has been altogether overlooked in the more brilliant events of his career. One broke out at Bareilly in Rohilcund in the year 1816, the ostensible cause of which was the collection of a trifling house-tax for the purpose of maintaining an efficient

police establishment. Other causes are said to have coöperated—the disgust and disappointment which the landholders experienced in not receiving a permanent settlement of their revenue, which they were, in some degree, led to expect. *2dly*, An over-assessment in the triennial settlement which was made in these provinces. These may be the true causes, or not, I shall not pretend to say; but let us mark the facts of this insurrection. Thirty thousand men, from various parts of a district, at least 100 miles in length, assembled on a given day, and attacked the military force, without the slightest intimation being given, to the civil authority, of this formidable combination against its power. The knowledge of the danger burst upon it like an earthquake; fortunately the valour and fidelity of the military force repelled the danger, after a sanguinary contest. This daring attack upon its authority ought to convince the supreme power, that some medium of communication is wanted between it and its subjects. In the present state of political society in India, this can only be effected by European agency, and in a very imperfect manner by means of the press. In the year 1817, an alarming rebellion broke out in the province of Cuttack, which raged in this province for nearly two years: order was only restored by the superiority of our military force. The existing causes are said to have been—over-assessment in the triennial settlement of lands, which compelled the government to sell the estates of ancient landholders for arrears of revenue, and thus disposed their minds to rebellion—the personal corruption of the European judge and magistrate

of the province, which necessarily led to the most grievous exactions on the part of his native officers—injudicious regulations in the sale of salt monopolized by government. These powerful stimulants of disorder produced an alarming eruption of popular discontent, which was altogether unexpected by the civil rulers of this province. The practical politician will here say, do you seriously suppose that the liberty of the press would have prevented these insurrections? In reply, it can only be said, that, in all probability, it would not; but that it affords a likely means of doing so, by the rapid information it conveys of the first symptoms of discontent; and that we are bound to use all human contrivances to avert such a calamity. In these provinces, Rohilcund and Cuttack, there existed in each 30 or 40 intelligent Europeans, altogether unconnected with its civil administration. Under a free spirit of discussion, if any notorious mal-administration prevailed, it would be surprising if some public-spirited individual did not stand forward to expose it. The judge and magistrate of the district of Cuttack had been formally accused of corruption, and this appeared so far substantiated by evidence, that the supreme power appointed a civil commission to investigate the whole of his conduct. This individual declined appearing before the tribunal, and embarked for Europe. The pretext which he assigned was, that, when it was known that government had determined to prosecute him, the fear of its displeasure would deter his witnesses from coming forward in his defence, and that thus the investigation would terminate in his ruin. There being no possibility of ob-

taining a fair trial, a proceeding like this astonished the community. Is there no law compelling the civil servants of government to stand an investigation? If not, the executive branch of a government must be lamentably weak which cannot thoroughly sift and punish the malversations of its servants. The same imbecility is not exhibited in the other branches of the service; peculation and corruption is promptly punished. But, setting aside the tremendous evil of insurrection, important advantages would result from an increased liberty of discussion, if applied to the ordinary course of our civil government. Thus, there are many civil servants who would be disposed to discuss the merits of the laws enacted by the supreme power; but there exists no opportunity of doing this under the present system, when this is altogether prohibited. There are many judges who might be disposed to controvert the decisions of the courts of appeal and circuit; but there exists no safe channel for doing so under the present restrictions upon the press. When we reflect that a single individual exercises civil rule over a million of people, with scarcely any check upon his authority, it must be obvious that he may unintentionally give many erroneous decisions, or issue orders extremely detrimental to the public welfare. Would it not be desirable, that a calm, but earnest exposition of his errors, should be laid before the public? In what other way can government learn the character of its servants, whether their administration has proved beneficial or otherwise. This freedom of discussion would operate as a wholesome check upon the whole body

of the magistracy; but this is altogether precluded under the shackles which are imposed upon the press. It may be urged, that all the advantages contended for are gained by the reports of the public functionaries of government;—that the defects of existing laws are quickly perceived, and instantly remedied by those practically concerned in their execution;—and that the peculiar opportunities which its servants possess enable the government to collect a vast body of information which individuals cannot obtain. It must be admitted that very valuable information is collected in this manner; but it is only in emergencies—an insurrection, or alarming defalcation of the revenues—that its agents are called upon to report; and even then the bulk of this knowledge is lost to the great body of its servants or the public at large. These reports are never published. When government have once availed themselves of the information which they contain, they are thrown aside for ever. Independent of this, there are many circumstances which combine to render these reports less beneficial than might be expected;—the forms of office—deference to superiors—an unwillingness to speak unpalatable truths—to expose the errors of the government—have all a tendency to bias the judgment, and to render these official documents an unfair picture of the state of the country. Surely it would be of advantage to obtain the opinions of other men altogether unconnected with the civil administration. Their statements might be full of errors; but, placed in circumstances altogether different, they could not fail to obtain a variety of information, which the

exalted station of its public functionaries precluded them from obtaining. In this respect, these communications would perform the same service as the Opposition does at home, by exposing the errors of administration, and enabling the executive to rectify its conduct. No check of this nature has ever existed in India. The insurrections which occurred during Lord Hastings's administration, never elicited a single remark, in the public journals, as to the causes which produced them. Is it fit that this unnatural state of things should endure—that, witnessing a cruel spectacle of misgovernment, no one should be at liberty to exercise the power of alleviating human suffering, by apprizing the supreme authority of the unintentional errors of its administration? There can be no situation more humiliating than this, where the benevolent intentions of individuals are altogether counteracted by the mistaken policy of the government. It may be useful to consider more particularly what objections may be urged against the exercise of the liberty of the press in India. It may be said that the dignity of the head of the state would be lowered by personal attacks upon his character;—that the energy of the executive would be crippled by animadverting upon its conduct. This is not likely to be the case. If any false accusation was preferred against the governor-general, the conviction that an enlightened public would decide with justice upon its truth, might safely enable him to despise it, or the press might be employed to refute it; and, lastly, the law might be called on to punish it. If the charge was founded on truth, it is but just that he should suffer

in public opinion, and that he should be compelled to pay deference to it; but, at the same time, it should be recollected that this moral degradation must ensue, whether there exists a press or not. It is impossible to conceal the personal actions of a ruler from the searching inquiry of a public so enlightened as that of India. What probability is there of the energetic vigour of the executive being impaired by this liberty of discussion? Where the general principle of obedience is so thoroughly impressed on the mind of every public functionary, although opposed in principle to the measures of the executive, is it at all likely that this difference in opinion should impel him to disobedience? Does not the example of England teach us, that generals, admirals, ambassadors, are employed with advantage in the service of their country, whose political principles are entirely opposite to those of the ministers of the day? But who is it among its servants that is likely to oppose the supreme power? Influencing their hopes and fears by its immense patronage, it must exhibit a rare disinterestedness in the person who evinces his superiority to all selfish motives, by exposing its errors. In India, as elsewhere, it is far more profitable to laud the existing system. Where the prospect of rising to wealth and distinction —the cherished hope of revisiting their native land, principally depends upon the favour of the ruling authority,—it is in vain to contend that the machinery of government will be encumbered by the resistance of its servants. In such a state of society, some powerful stimulus would seem requisite to encourage an individual to sacrifice his private in-

terests to those of the community at large. There still exists another class, from whom danger might be apprehended by removing the present restrictions on the press. It may be urged that the country-born or Eurasian [illegible] would embrace the opportunity to embarrass government, by urging their claims to that rank and office from which they are excluded at present, and that they would demand, as a matter of right, that they should be admitted into the civil and military service on the same footing as persons born in Europe. This is very likely to be the case; but there exists no reasonable ground of alarm on this score; because, if there is any apprehension of danger, the operation of the press will be found beneficial in apprizing the executive of this hostility. Thus warned, it may either concede these claims, or adopt such other course as it may deem expedient. The only real grievances of which this class can complain, are,—1*st*, their ineligibility to hold commissions in his majesty's, or the company's service,—2*d*, their exclusion from the privilege of sitting as jurors in the civil courts of law,—3*d*, their being deprived of the benefit of British law without the jurisdiction of Calcutta, being then subject to those laws which the government has enacted for the regulation of its native population. These disqualifications ought to be founded on just and reasonable grounds, and their consideration must be left to the British legislature. The apprehension of danger to our empire, from the hostility of this class, is altogether chimerical. How can it exist from a body so insignificant in numbers, without power and influence over the

native population, and possessing no command over the military force—the only efficient power in India in the existing state of society. Independent of this, their interests are closely identified with the British power, from their possessing almost all the subordinate situations in the public offices; and their estimation amongst the natives principally depending upon that connexion. Were this government overthrown by Asiatics, they would share its fate. Descended from a superior race, possessing a thorough contempt for the natives, and imbued with European habits and feelings, coupled with the paucity of their number, they would cling to the parent state.

Having considered the objections which may be urged against the exercise of the press in India, it must strike every one that the evils which are likely to arise from its injudicious exercise are altogether trifling, when compared with the benefit which will result from its salutary influence. Where so noble a field is presented for its exercise, embracing the interests of millions, there can be no more animating object to stimulate the labours of the intellectual portion of the community; and it is this disinterested exercise of their faculties, in improving the state of political society in India, which will atone to humanity for the evils of our career. But this extensive sphere of utility is prodigiously narrowed by the present restrictions on the press, and this without any increase of strength or influence to the supreme power. Surely there can be no danger to its authority. A government like this, commanding the services of numerous armies, an enlightened body of public functionaries, and the confidence of the

wealthier part of its native population, may safely despise malignant scribblers; and will encounter no hazard by calmly listening to those whose only wish is to strengthen it by communicating information as to the real interests of its subjects.

The state of public opinion in India, in regard to European politics, must excite some curiosity. And it will strike the reader with surprise to be told, that, of six weekly newspapers which were published in Calcutta 1819–20, only two espoused the principles of the existing administration in England; the rest advocated the opinions of the opposition—not their party views—but the general principles of civil and religious liberty which characterize that body. Generally speaking, political discussion is conducted with much less warmth and animosity than in England. There does not exist that strong personal interest which animates the combatants in Europe. And it is much better that it should be so: uninfluenced by their passions, men are enabled to exercise a calm and unbiassed judgment upon the conduct of the rival parties which contend for the government of England—and to review their actions in the true spirit of history. The character of Indian society has been reproached with its apathy and indifference to English politics, but without any sufficient reason. The immense distance from the scene of action, and the weaker sense of personal interest, appear to me to explain this phenomenon, without supposing any peculiar distaste to the subject. If the state of the press can be considered as a fair index of public opinion, this would serve to show that the principles of opposition are popular in British India.

CHAPTER IV.

NEPAUL WAR.

The causes which led to the Nepaul war arising, in a great degree, from the pacific policy of Lord Minto.—The opinions of the whig statesmen of England examined, in regard to our Asiatic policy; and their inexpediency maintained.—A short account of the military operations against the Nepaulese; and remarks on the peace concluded with this power.—The elevation of our ally the Nabob of Oude to the regal dignity discussed; with conjectures as to the policy of Lord Hastings in sanctioning it.

Lord Hastings assumed the reins of government in October 1813. His predecessor, Lord Minto, had left the state involved in negotiations with the Nepaul government; and, adopting the maxims of the whig statesmen of England as the rule of his conduct, his administration may be regarded as a fair trial of the moderate and pacific system recommended by the theoretical writers of the whig party. The leading characteristics of this system may be said to be, a determination to avoid war, as leading to a dangerous extension of dominion; and a resolution to bear with serious injuries, and even to concede something to the jealousies and caprices of the native powers, rather than resort to the alternative of arms: moreover, a rigid adherence to the principles of the law of nations is prescribed, without at

all reflecting that in Asia they are altogether ignorant of the existence of this system of law.

Such were the pure and elevated principles of action which these statesmen inculcated. Conscious that we possessed superior power, what could be more noble than refraining from using it harshly, even when right: this would be a conduct worthy of a moral and intellectual people. But, with all my admiration of this system, I cannot but regard it as extremely fallacious; the opposite state of civilization in Europe and Asia rendering it utterly impracticable. In the East, force alone is the grand regulating principle. Their poets and philosophers all acknowledge it lawful to use it for the purpose of aggrandizement; and the successful application of it is the standard by which they judge of the fame and glory of their rulers. Hence the monarch who does not make use of it is regarded as [illegible] etchedly imbecile. With regard to the Mussulmans, the undisguised use of force, in contempt of faith and justice, may fairly be ascribed to the pernicious doctrines inculcated in the Koran. With the Hindoos it is different: their legislator has preached otherwise, and rather patronizes a defensive system of policy; but in practice they have pretty uniformly followed the example of their Moslem conquerors. In the East, aggrandizement is justified as a manly, honourable, and legitimate course of policy: in the West, this principle is restrained and modified by laws and manners, and disguised under a variety of pretexts, which deceive the vulgar, and very often those who make use of them.

But to return to my argument, which is—that the

opposite state of civilization in Europe and Asia, renders the whig policy impracticable in the east. In the first place, it appears to me that the human mind is so little advanced in Hindostan, that its native princes are in a great measure unable to understand their true interests. This constitutes the most marked difference between European and Asiatic rulers; and in this respect the inferiority of the latter is decidedly manifest. Considering aggrandizement as a duty, the monarchs of the East grasp at every opportunity for pursuing it, without at all considering their capacity to maintain their conquests, or the probable superiority of the power whose territory they have attacked; hence, with states of this character, the dignified forbearance and exemplary moderation which the whig politicians inculcate could only lead to further aggression and injury. *2dly*, From their limited knowledge of human nature, the native princes are too apt to infer that the same insatiable passion for war and conquest which stimulates them to incessant action, is equally characteristic of our policy, and that we only wait for an opportunity to crush them effectually; and impelled by this consideration, they rush into hostility, without reckoning the consequences, whenever an opportunity occurs for striking a blow. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, that the generosity and disinterestedness of whig counsels are disadvantageous in the East; and that a more vigorous and energetic policy is better adapted to the state of society there. That jealous anxiety for the fair fame of England—that earnest desire that she should stand pure and unstained at the bar of

public opinion in Europe, are honourable to the national character—and to the praise due to such feelings those writers are justly entitled who have advocated a pacific and moderate system of policy in the East; but they should recollect, at the same time, that the Indian governments have high duties imposed upon them—one of the most sacred of which is, to protect their subjects from wanton aggression; and that they must even do this at the risk of extending our dominion in the east. But to apply these reflections to our dispute with the Nepaulese:—That government, acting upon the generally-received principle of aggrandizement, and conscious of the advantages it possessed from its inaccessible territory, and the courage and hardihood of its warlike population, had directed the energies of its people towards our territory, and made successful inroads thereupon. These aggressions were noticed by the British government in the calm and dignified tone becoming the head of an enlightened people addressing himself to the ruler of a state equally civilized, and who could appreciate his reasoning. Major Bradshaw was deputed to remonstrate against this infraction of the law of nations, but his mediation appears only to have stimulated the Nepaulese to more aggravated outrages. No sooner had the rains set in, 1814, than an inroad was made upon our territory, our villages were plundered and burnt, and our police establishment massacred.

The moment was now arrived when the British government was called upon to chastise these invaders, and to redress the injuries of its subjects by an appeal to arms. Lord Minto had throughout

manifested an extreme reluctance to resort to the alternative of war; and the expected arrival of a successor probably deterred him from adopting a more vigorous policy. Where an administration has been pacific throughout, it is natural to wish that its close should be characteristic. His successor arrived. This nobleman, Lord Hastings, resolved to employ arms as the only effectual means of coercing these savage mountaineers; and thus manifested a deeper insight into the Asiatic character than his predecessor. The most extensive preparations were accordingly made for the invasion of Nepaul. Four divisions of the army were destined for this enterprise, amounting in all to about 24,000 men. It was intended that this force should penetrate the enemy's frontier at four different points. This frontier bounds our territory for about 6 or 700 miles, running along in a direction from east to west; thus presenting a wide field for the operations of an invading army.

The 1st, or Dinapoor division of the army, under Major General Marley, was ordered to push direct for Khatmandoo the enemy's capital, *via* Muckwanpoor. The strength of this division was scarcely more than 6000 men.

The 2d, or Benares division of the army, under Major-general Wood, about 4,500 strong, was ordered to move in the direction of Bootwul, with the view of making a diversion in favour of the 1st division; but Muckwanpoor being, on a loose estimate, at least 100 miles distant from Bootwul, it ought rather to be considered as a distinct operation—nei-

ther division being able to afford effectual support to the other.

The 3d division of the army, under Major-general Gillespie, 6,000 strong, was destined to penetrate towards Sirunugur, by the valley of the Dhoon, and to take up a position which would effectually cut off the communication between the enemy's force on the banks of the Sutledge and their territories in Nepaul proper.

The 4th division of the army, under Colonel Carpenterlony, was directed to move directly against the enemy's positions on the banks of the Sutledge, and to drive their force upon General Gillespie's division.—The strength of this division was estimated at 5,500 men.

This widely-extended scale of operations could only have been planned from the supreme contempt entertained for the enemy, and the utter ignorance which prevailed respecting their character and resources. It was known that the Nepaulese had succumbed to the Chinese in 1793, a people whom we are accustomed to regard with sovereign contempt; and that, with respect to tactical skill, their troops were prodigiously inferior to our own. Their courage and military daring—that lofty confidence in themselves which a long career of conquest had inspired—their pride as an ancient and unsubdued people—the impregnable defences of their country; —all these powerfully-exciting causes, which roused their noblest feelings and called forth every energy in defence of their country, were unlooked for, unknown, or disregarded by us. Indeed, the general opinion in Bengal was, that a smaller force would

have sufficed for entirely over-running the country in a few weeks; and the course of operations seems to have been planned in the general belief that no serious resistance would be offered. Otherwise it must have been obvious, that the plan of operations offered vast advantages to an active and enterprising enemy.—Operating upon so extensive a base, with such weak divisions, would it not have been easy for a daring enemy to have beaten them in detail? What support could these unconnected bodies have afforded each other? Was it necessary that they should move thus disunited? There is something splendid and imposing in the conception of the plan of the compaign;—the idea of four columns operating simultaneously, and proceeding, by parallel movements, to overrun an entire kingdom, makes a powerful impression upon the imagination, and is calculated to impress us with a high idea of the talent and skill requisite to direct these combinations so as to produce a scientific result; but, in truth, there was no field for the masterly display of these qualities in the commander-in-chief. He might sketch the general plan of the campaign, and point out the precise spot where each column was to act; but it was altogether impossible to regulate the movements of divisions operating upon a base of 500 or 600 miles; and, without communicating with each other, the operations of these corps necessarily became insulated. Could they have been combined, nothing was more calculated to distract an unskilful enemy; but this unity of effort was utterly impracticable in a mountainous country, the localities of which we were altogether ignorant of. As a means

for the attainment of an end, I cannot admire the plan of the campaign; on the contrary, it always appeared to me, that the object in view might have been attained far more simply, effectually, and cheaply, by concentrating our force instead of dividing it. What occasion was there for these attacks upon the enemy's positions on the banks of the Sutledge? It was known, that the Goorkas (in that quarter) were a handful of conquerors, like ourselves, amidst a population eager to throw off their yoke, and that they never had, nor could make, roads on our territory—being entirely occupied in guarding against the imminent hazard of a revolt. Surely a regiment of cavalry, and two or three battalions of infantry, would have sufficed for guarding our frontier in that quarter. Instead of consuming our strength in these attacks upon the extremity of their empire, would it not have been wiser to have concentrated a powerful force under General Marley, which would have struck a vigorous blow at their capital:—that in our power, the extremities would fall of course. Whereas the conquest of the outskirts of their empire might not always command the submission of a high-spirited people uninjured in the centre of their power—more especially an uncivilized race, unable to calculate their true interest. Had 14 or 15,000 men been concentrated under General Marley, instead of 6000, in all probability the first success on his part would have terminated the contest: As it was, the war was protracted to two compaigns, and this entirely owing to the weakness of this division, which prevented its advancing against the enemy's

capital. As the avowed object of Lord Hastings was, the signal chastisement of the Nepaulese—not the conquest of the kingdom—the more rapidly and entirely the power of the British state was felt in their capital, the centre of their power, in the same degree were the ends of his Lordship attained in going to war. I shall proceed to advert to the course of operations pursued by each division of the army; not for the purpose of writing a regular narrative, to which I make no pretensions, but merely for the sake of throwing out a few observations.*

In the prosecution of the design against the enemy's capital, General Marley, with the 1st division of the army, had advanced as far as Baruhgurhee, in the Terhae, on the 25th December 1814; here he halted, until his battering train should come up, which was expected in eight or ten days. In this position, the commanding officer detached a con-

* It is to be regretted that none of the intelligent officers who served with the army in this interesting campaign has favoured the public with a narrative of its operations. The writer of these observations was attached to General Ochterlony's division during the second campaign; but the corps to which he belonged was not actively employed. Having been just raised, it was reserved to guard the general depôt of the division. The short account here given is founded on no better authority than the gazettes, aided by the recollection of what the writer has heard from several of the officers who were engaged in some of the most interesting affairs of the campaign. Some assistance has been derived from a sketch of this campaign, published in the *Asiatic Magazine*, which commenced in Calcutta in 1818; but the writer does not appear to have had access to better authority, and the view which he takes of it is entirely different.

siderable portion of his force: Major Roughsedge, with 600 men of the Ramghur Battalion, was directed to post himself in advance, on the banks of the Battor river, at least 30 miles distant.

Captain Sibley, with five companies of the 2d battalion 15th N. I. about 400 strong, one 6-pounder, and 50 irregular horse, was ordered to proceed in advance to Pursah, about 20 miles distant from the main body of the army: this position was opposite to one of the passes leading into the Nepaul valley. On the right of the army, Captain Hay was posted with the Chumparun Battalion, about 800 strong; and, in advance of his position, Captain Blakeney, with five companies of the 2d battalion 22d N. I. was directed to take post at Sumunpoor. Thus, of an army from 6 to 7000 strong, at least one-third was detached. This must appear extremely injudicious, and at variance with the established rules of war, which prescribe, that, before an active and daring enemy, the commander of an army should preserve his force as entire as possible; but, if the general erred in this respect, he only partook of the delusion which pervaded the minds of the officers of the Bengal army. Animated by a long career of success in the plains, they had come to regard, with unmeasured contempt, the military skill and prowess of any Asiatic enemy. This unbounded confidence in themselves naturally produced some neglect of those precautions indispensable to the safety of an army when in front of a resolute foe.

The enemy determined to take advantage of this extreme division of our force, by making an effort to

cut off some of our detachments. With this view, by a well-concerted and simultaneous movement, the detachments of Captain Blakeney at Sumunpoor, and Captain Sibley at Pursah, were attacked at three o'clock in the morning of the 1st January 1815, completely surprised, and nearly destroyed. In these affairs, Captains Sibley and Blakeney, and Lieutenant Duncan were killed. Never were surprises more complete. With Captain Blakeney's detachment, a number of the seapoys were cut down in their tents;—at Pursah, Captain Sibley's detachment never had time to form. In the darkness they clustered together; and, opposing the most obstinate resistance to the attack of an overwhelming superiority of numbers, were almost all cut down. The European artillerymen displayed the most heroic bravery in defending their gun; the contest became far more animated and personal than is usual in regular warfare. The Goorkhas planted a standard opposite the gun, and after each discharge rushed forward to seize what to them would be the noblest trophy of their valour; but the courage and intrepidity of these men enabled them to repel several daring attacks. With such energy did they resist, and so closely were they engaged, that the matross with the sponge-staff was compelled to knock two or three of them down with this instrument;—but in the end, these gallant spirits, worthy of a better fate, were cut down at their posts, whilst nobly discharging their duty. It is surprising that the practice still prevails of detaching one gun with a division on service. It must be obvious that the fire of one gun can be of little service, unless sup-

ported by that of another; after the first discharge, a sudden rush on the part of the enemy may obtain possession of the gun, unless the assailants are checked by the fire of a second. From the gallantry and spirit displayed by this detachment, there can be little doubt that, had there been a fair field afforded for asserting its discipline, its superiority would have been abundantly manifest; the certainty, rapidity, and regularity of its fire, and the spirit and unity of its charge, would have enabled it to repel the enemy with comparative ease. The force of the enemy in these attacks was estimated at 4000 men, with a number of elephants, each carrying a small swivel. In the spirit of a barbarian people, the bodies of our seapoys, who had fallen, were cruelly maimed and disfigured by the Goorkhahs. These unlooked-for disasters having paralyzed the movements of the first division of the army, it was deemed inexpedient to advance with a force so materially reduced in numbers; all offensive operations were therefore suspended until the army should be reinforced.

It is now time to notice the operations of the 2d division of the army, in the diversion which was intended in favour of the 1st division. This division, commanded by Major-general Sullivan Wood of his Majesty's service, did not advance before the end of December 1814. It then halted at a village within four or five miles of the Bootwul Pass. On the 3d January 1815, the following disposition was made for forcing the pass:—Major Comyn, with the 2d battalion 17th N. I. was directed to make a detour, with the view of getting into the rear of the enemy's position, whilst the Major-general proceeded to at-

tack it in front with his Majesty's 17th regiment, five companies of the 2d battalion 14th N. I. and some light companies. On their march, this column came unexpectedly upon the enemy, strongly posted in a redoubt which we were altogether ignorant of. The Nepaulese commenced a heavy fire upon our troops, which was briskly returned on our part; but the unexpected resistance and the vivacity of the fire appear to have embarrassed our operations. No disposition was made for turning the redoubt. Indeed, the scene of action being a thick jungle, was eminently unfavourable for the display of any superiority of discipline or valour. A general of superior military talent might, therefore, easily fail in such a situation. After sustaining a loss of about 100 men in killed and wounded, orders were given to retire. The casualties principally occurred in his Majesty's 17th foot, which conducted itself with a spirit and gallantry characteristic of British soldiers. Major Comyn succeeded in effecting his detour without experiencing any resistance; but conjecturing, from the fire of the main body having ceased, that it had not succeeded, he deemed it expedient to retire. Thus this diversion entirely failed; and every idea of acting on the offensive, with so small a force, was thenceforth abandoned. The knowledge of these disastrous surprises at Pursah and Sumunpoor (together with the unsuccessful attempt on Bootwul), coming at the same moment to most stations in India, coupled with the lamented death and failure of Major-general Gillespie, at Kalunga, produced a deep gloom in society. It seemed as if the spell of British invincibility had been dissolved by the daring

onset of a few resolute mountaineers;—as if that powerful hold on public opinion, which the reputation of superior valour had obtained us—that mighty charm which enabled us to rule the minds of men, would operate no longer in our favour. An apprehension was entertained that the native states were ready to pour in upon us;—and that thus that stupendous fabric which the genius, and enterprise, and heroism of the national character had erected in the East, was likely to pass away like "the baseless fabric of a vision."

The profound interest which these events inspired will excite the surprise of the European reader; especially when compared with their trivial importance. But his feelings can never be those of an Anglo-Indian, who, standing alone in the midst of thousands subject to his sway, feels that his security is far more intimately connected with the triumphs and reverses of our arms than an inhabitant of Europe. In Asia, the success of a barbarous enemy would inevitably lead to the massacre of the European population, or, at least, to the utter extinction of every worldly hope;—whilst, in Europe, the triumph of an insulting foe is only marked by pecuniary exaction. Thus are the extremes of refinement and barbarism distinctly marked in the scale of civilization. But all this dismay and alarm were groundless: as yet there had been nothing in the contest to warrant our fears. The forces of the contending states had not been fairly arrayed in the field; there had been nothing but midnight encounters where the assailant generally has the advantage, and escalades, where the odds are greatly against him, at least in the face of day.

Indeed, the colossal edifice of the British power is by far too solidly founded—in the number and disciplined valour of its armies—in the superior military and political skill by which they are directed,—ever to be shaken by the disjointed efforts of the native powers. No! as long as it retains that moral and intellectual superiority which leads to all this, it will stand secure; it is only by the superior science and intellectual energy of a European enemy, or the disaffection of its native soldiery, that it can be seriously endangered.

In the meantime, the 1st division of the army remained stationary. Except a skirmish with a detachment of the enemy, which took place on the 20th February, 1815, nothing of consequence occurred. Lieutenant Pickersgill, of the 24th N. I. had proceeded with a small escort to some distance from camp, for the purpose of surveying. Whilst employed in this duty he discovered 3 or 400 of the enemy posted in a village on the skirts of the forest. This officer immediately dispatched information to camp; and, until reinforcements should arrive, judiciously posted himself within the embankments of a tank, at some distance from the enemy. On receiving this intelligence, Lieutenant-colonel Dick, of the 25th N. I. (upon whom the temporary command of the division had devolved) immediately ordered 100 of the irregular horse, under the command of Cornet Hearsay of the 6th N. C. to reinforce Lieutenant Pickersgill; and, assuming the command of the piquet, proceeded in person to his assistance, at the same time ordering a battalion of infantry and some guns to follow in reserve. Upon the arrival of Colonel

Dick's force, the enemy advanced with spirit to charge it; but, seeing the formidable reserve in the rear, they halted, and commenced their retreat. This was the signal for our troops to charge, which soon converted their retreat into a flight. The enemy lost 100 men killed in this affair, and 57 were made prisoners. In this skirmish, a number of the young officers of the army performed the part of common troopers, in charging and cutting down the enemy. On hearing, in camp, that there was a prospect of active service, such was their eagerness to witness it, that they mounted their horses and rode to the scene of action. On arriving at the spot, the ardent and impetuous spirit of youth blazed out on seeing the enemy; they joined in the charge, and performed eminent service. Lieutenants Paton and Wilson of the 25th N. I. and Cornet Hearsay of the 6th cavalry, were mentioned, in General Orders, as having particularly distinguished themselves by their individual bravery. A practice like this, so utterly at variance with the discipline and subordination indispensable to the existence of an army, naturally called forth the animadversion of the superior authorities. It has been asserted that poisoned arrows were employed on this occasion by the Goorkhas. The knowledge of this could not but excite the indignation of our army; but the fact does not appear to have been distinctly proved. Major-general G. Wood, of the Honourable Company's service, assumed the command of the 1st division on the 22d February. Its force had been augmented to 13,000 men, 3000 of which were Europeans. After passing so much time in inglorious ease, nothing

could exceed the spirit and exultation of this army in the prospect of coming into contact with the enemy; but their hopes were not realized. At this season of the year the Major-general deemed the attempt to penetrate to the enemy's capital hopeless; and limited his operations to a movement in the Terhae, in the direction of Jungypoor, where no enemy appeared. The cause of this resolution is understood to have been the apprehension of sickness within the hills; and it has been asserted that this opinion was sanctioned by a committee of medical officers: but as yet there had been no sickness. To a high-spirited army like this, unbroken in numbers, and reposing a proud confidence in its courage and discipline, no determination could have been more mortifying. What must have been the humiliation of the government, after the exertions it had made to collect so fine an army? Surely some attempt ought to have been made, were it only to have vindicated the reputation of our arms, the lustre of which had been sullied by the prior events of the campaign. The operations of the succeeding year, under General Ochterlony, in this quarter, proved that an army could remain in the hills until the middle of March: this would have afforded General Wood's division three weeks for active operations, had he determined to advance at the time he assumed the command of the army. But, in justice to this officer, it ought to be stated, that sickness had begun to break out in General Ochterlony's camp at that period.

Thus the campaign had entirely failed in this quarter. Its grand object, the capture of the ene-

my's capital, remained as distant as ever. The services of the 2d division of the army were now required for a more ignoble purpose. Orders were given that they should prevent, as much as possible, the cultivation of the Terhae for the ensuing season; also to destroy the resources, so that the enemy might not be able to subsist when our troops were compelled to quit the country on the approach of the rains.

It is time to advert to the operations of the 3d division of the army, which was destined to penetrate the valley of the Dhoon, in order to cut off the retreat of Umeer Singh from the banks of the Sutledge. This force assembled about the 21st October, 1814. A strong detachment, commanded by Colonel Mawbey of his Majesty's [illegible] regiment, was immediately directed to advance, with a view of occupying Kalunga, a hill fort, the possession of which was indispensable towards prosecuting ulterior operations. Upon approaching Kalunga, Colonel Mawbey found that his force was altogether inadequate for the reduction of the place, and therefore determined to suspend operations until the main body should arrive. Upon receiving this intelligence, General Gillespie moved, with the whole of his force, to the support of his advanced division. On his arrival at Kalunga he determined to carry the place by assault. To effect this object, four columns were formed—the 1st column commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Carpenter, 17th N. I. supported by a reserve under Major Ludlow, of the 6th N. I.; the 2d column by Captain Fast of the 17th N. I.; the third column under Major Kelly of the 7th

N. I. and the 4th column by Captain Campbell of the 6th regiment N. I. A dismounted troop of his Majesty's 8th dragoons formed a reserve at head-quarters. The strength of each attacking column might be estimated at 1000 men: the European and native troops were intermixed. The dispositions for the assault were eminently calculated to distract and appal the enemy. By a simultaneous attack of four columns on separate points, it was expected that the unity, variety, and energy of their onset would confound the enemy, and overpower their means of resistance. To effect this disposition, the 3d column, under Major Kelly, was directed to move to the opposite side of the hill on which Kalunga stands, and to post itself at a village called Kinsale. The 2d column, under Captain Fast, was directed to occupy the village of Lakhound; and the 4th column, under Captain Campbell, took post at Ustul. On the 30th October, the day prior to the assault, batteries for 2 twelve-pounders, 4 six-pounders, 2 mortars, and 2 howitzers, were erected under the direction of Major Pennington, of the artillery, at 800 yards distance from the fort. Thus, every preparation being made, final orders were issued for the storming of the fort on the 31st October. Annexed are extracts from these orders:—

"Officers will be careful to direct their men on all occasions to reserve their fire, and on no account to allow a shot to be fired at random; and the Major-general expects they will distinctly explain, to their respective corps, the necessity, in action, of taking a cool and deliberate aim; and, above all, to impress

on their minds the advantage to be gained by a determined use of the bayonet.

"Officers at the head of columns of attack will move deliberately, so that the men will not lengthen out, and be enabled to preserve their distances and keep up without fatiguing their men, or exhausting their breath: officers therefore are recommended to bring their soldiers to the storm in possession of all their physical powers, to effect the impression that animal spirits and unimpaired vigour can always command.

"Strict silence to be observed; and if necessary to give a word of command during the march of a column to a point of attack, it must be communicated from the front to the rear by the men themselves repeating, in a whisper, the word of their commander.

"When the head of a column is prepared to debouche towards the point of attack, a short halt should be made to gain breath, if circumstances will admit; and the officers in command will bring up their men in compact order, with steady and cool determination. This is the moment an enemy will endeavour to take advantage of any coolness or precipitation.

"In all attacks (generally speaking) against entrenched and stockaded posts, firing and halting to reload only causes severe loss—this may be avoided by an undaunted and spirited storm.

"In case of ambuscade or surprise, a soldier requires all his natural courage; and when he is so situated as to be exposed to these attacks in narrow pathways and jungles, he must predetermine within

himself to preserve the utmost coolness: hurry must be avoided to prevent confusion; and even loss sustained with steadiness can be remedied; and an officer in command ought always previously to arrange in what way he should repel and guard against such occurrences.

"The enemy we have to encounter are dexterous in using a short sword.—Officers, caution your soldiers to keep them at the point of the bayonet; in the storm, beware of their closing.

"When several columns move to given points, officers commanding columns will bear in mind the utility and necessity of regulating their march so as to render the attack simultaneous. The effects of several columns moving at once on an object is on most occasions decisive.

"Let emulation actuate all; but corrected by steadiness and coolness—no breaking of ranks or running for who is to be foremost in the contest—each column must be a mutual support—and every soldier, actuated by the principle of cool and deliberate valour, will always have the advantage over wild and precipitate courage.

"Major-general Gillespie presumes to offer these few suggestions, notwithstanding the many excellent and experienced officers in the field might have precluded the necessity: he relies, however, on their indulgence, which he is confident he will experience from the harmony and zealous soldier-like feeling that appears to inspire all.

"Officers commanding columns are requested to set their watches with the Major-general's. Officers commanding columns will be pleased to order twelve

men armed with tulwars (or swords) to precede each of the columns."

Who can withhold his admiration of these remarkable orders? What a rare union do they exhibit of science, caution, and fearless intrepidity;—and how forcibly do they inculcate the advantages of disciplined valour in the assault. They are truly the production of a man who had studied the art of command—who was aware what a skilful officer can do in regulating an attack. Such orders as these ought to have been recorded in the regimental books of the Indian army.

At eight o'clock in the morning of the 31st October, the signal was fired for the assault. The columns under Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow immediately moved forward, and, advancing with rapidity, succeeded in carrying a small stockade which the enemy had erected on the road leading from the Table Land to the fort. Animated by this success, they rushed forward to mount the walls;—but here they encountered an enemy worthy of their valour—the daring onset of the British served only to rouse the enemy to a more noble resistance; they poured such a destructive fire of grape, musketry, and arrows, as compelled the assailants to retreat to the stockade with considerable loss. A troop of the 8th, or Royal Irish, which led the storming party, sustained their national reputation for valour. The inflexible courage with which the Hindoos have defended their forts is exemplified in history, and nowhere was this quality more signally manifest than at Kalunga;—but in this instance they displayed a daring and adventurous spirit, unusual with their

countrymen. Disdaining their artificial defences, they leapt from the walls, and fairly measured swords with the Royal Irish, their opponents. The courage and intrepidity of this small band enabled them to repel this attack; but the attempt was honourable to the Goorkhas. By one of those unfortunate accidents which frustrate the wisest combinations, the signal for the assault was not heard by the columns under Major Kelly and Captain Fast; thus the advantages to be derived from combining these attacks were entirely lost. The 4th column, under Captain Campbell, moved forward and covered the retreat of the 1st column and the reserve.

At this period, three companies of his Majesty's 53d foot arrived from camp. The General immediately placed himself at their head, and, with two six-pounders, moved on to the assault. The guns were pushed up within 25 yards of the walls, and served with the utmost coolness; whilst the storming party formed under their fire, and advanced to the assault. But the courage of the garrison was adequate to the emergency; the same destructive fire compelled the storming party to retire. A second attempt experienced the same fate. These unfortunate failures served only to inflame the heroic spirit of Gillespie: he felt as if the character of his country was at stake, as if its martial reputation had been sullied; and that the moment was now arrived when its sons were called upon to risk their lives in its service. Animated by these sentiments, he placed himself once more at the head of the troops, and led them on to storm a wicket, from which a heavy fire was maintained by the enemy; but this was des-

tined to be the end of his career;—he was shot through the heart whilst cheering his men, and instantly expired. Thus perished Rollo Gillespie, as a hero would wish, in the field of honour. He was eminently a soldier—whose pride and delight was in his profession; and his highest ambition the honourable discharge of its duties;—as a man, his ardent spirit led him to seek danger, and difficulty, and suffering; he felt that he only existed in scenes which other men shrunk from; that those hazards to which they exposed themselves, from a sense of honour and duty, were what he positively delighted in; that in such scenes only could the heroic energies of his soul be gratified. He has been reproached with foolhardiness, and not without reason; yet, if we judge from these remarkable orders issued by him on the occasion of the assault of Kalunga, it would appear that the elements of prudence and caution were duly mingled, in his mental composition, with the more brilliant qualities which we look for in the soldier.

The loss on our part was very considerable, amounting to five officers, and 24 rank and file killed; and 15 officers, and 195 rank and file wounded. It is impossible to look back on the operations carried on against Kalunga, without making some observations on the mode of attack adopted against that fort. Disdaining the resources of art, and reposing an entire confidence in the valour of his troops, the General determined to assault the place, and to trust every thing to force. Instead of employing those certain resources which science affords for reducing a fortified post, had he waited for his

battering train, and postponed the assault until a breach had been made, the result might have been very different. As it was, the mode of attack which he pursued was attended with consequences extremely detrimental to the British interests; it was unavoidable that the repulse of a powerful British force should inspire the Goorkhas with a lofty opinion of their own valour; and that this proud confidence in themselves should inspirit them to a more determined resistance. The events of the war appear to countenance this opinion. The idea of the superiority of the British power seems to have vanished from the minds of the Goorkhas; at no former period in our Asiatic wars did we encounter an enemy who displayed similar courage and conduct. Indeed, the whole experience of our Indian wars demonstrates, that no people have displayed a more obstinate courage in defending their forts than the inhabitants of Hindostan; with them it is a point of honour to stand an assault. Where was this spirit more manifest than in the defences of Bhurtpoor, Komona, Kalunga? Were we not invariably repulsed, although these forts were regularly breached? A knowledge of these facts ought to have regulated the operations against Kalunga. The mode of attack which the General pursued, might succeed against a dastardly enemy; but was altogether unsuited to the character of the Goorkhas. Indeed it is obvious that it must be utterly impossible to mount a rampart when defended by men of courage, who are perfectly aware of the time of assault. The advantages of situation are so great as to render the attempt almost hopeless; in truth, behind a wall

men are nearly upon an equality in respect of courage. On the other side, it may be contended, that the attempt at escalade has often succeeded in our Indian wars, and the capture of Allyghur and Rampora may be cited as triumphant exemplifications of it. But these are not parallel cases; they were taken, in a measure, by surprise, by blowing open the gates, when the attention of the enemy was occupied otherwise, in expectation of an open attack against the walls. This, it must be acknowledged, is a very different thing from boldly attempting to mount the ramparts in front of an enemy determined to throw you down. The causes which have led to this mode of attack are obvious. By a brilliant *coup de main*, the waste of human life, time, and labour arising from a protracted siege is prodigiously lessened; and, to effect these desirable objects, in besieging a town of importance, an attempt at escalade ought certainly to be risked; but it appears to me, the attack should be made at night, with the view of surprising the enemy, because the darkness and uncertainty as to the point threatened are greatly in favour of the assailant; and, if unsuccessful in the first assault, the detachment ought instantly to be withdrawn, as the object is to surprise the fortress—not to fight. The enemy being on their guard, there can be little chance of succeeding by main force. An experiment of this kind may be risked with little loss, prior to employing those resources which science affords, in effecting the reduction of a fortified town.

An admirable expedient was adopted by General

Gillespie at Kalunga, for securing the success of his different divisions; each attacking column was preceded by a body of swordsmen, a disposition which appears well adapted for a storming party, as in the assault it is of great importance that the soldier should possess the utmost freedom in his motions, and that his offensive weapons should be light, so that he may exert every energy in mounting a ladder, without being encumbered by his arms: applying these observations, it is obvious that a sword is infinitely better adapted for this purpose than a musket, the weight of which latter is a great encumbrance. The first impulse of the soldier, indeed, must be to throw it away, and to trust to his bayonet only. Unquestionably considerable advantage is derived from the fire of musketry; but it would only be necessary to arm the swordsmen with pistols (a much more handy weapon) to produce the same effect;—and thus armed, a body of men would be far more likely to mount a breach, or climb a ladder, than another party accoutred in the usual manner. No army possesses greater facilities for forming a body of expert swordsmen than that of Bengal. It is the national weapon of the seapoy of Hindostan, and he delights in its exercise; indeed, it is with the utmost difficulty that commanding officers can restrain their men from carrying their swords into action, or upon the line of march. The practice, however, is with reason discouraged, as tending to induce the men to throw away their muskets, and to trust entirely to their swords. So far this exclusive reliance on the musket may be useful in the field, but it would be the height of folly to persist in it, when it is proved

that the use of the sword is so superior in the assault. Again, it may be highly proper that an entire battalion should be armed with muskets; but this affords no reason why a select portion of this corps should not be furnished with an additional weapon, where peculiar circumstances warrant its adoption. In such a case, a blind adherence to established rules must prove eminently pernicious.

But to return from this digression, and to resume the narrative of the operations of this division. By the death of Major-general Gillespie, the command of this force devolved upon Colonel Mawbey of his Majesty's 53d regiment, who received orders from the commander-in-chief to invest the fort of Kalunga, as closely as possible, with the view of preventing the introduction of supplies and reinforcements into the garrison. At the same time, a formidable battering train was dispatched from Delhi, to ensure the ultimate reduction of the place. On the 24th November, the battering train arrived. No time was lost in erecting batteries; and, on the 26th November, a breach in one of the curtains of the fort was reported practicable. Orders were immediately given for the assault next morning;—the storming party, commanded by Major Ingleby, 53d regiment, to consist of the grenadiers, light infantry, and a battalion company of his Majesty's 53d regiment, and the whole of the grenadier companies of the native battalions in camp. These formidable preparations served only to inflame the courage of the garrison; and, instead of resigning themselves to fate, with the blind confidence of Asiatics, they had strained every nerve, during the night, in strengthening their de-

fences. Having erected a stockade behind the breach, with a trench before it, and flanked its entrance with several guns, they awaited the assault, with a determination to exert every energy in repelling it. Early in the morning of the 27th, the storming party moved on to the assault, but encountered such a formidable resistance, that, after exposing themselves for three hours to a most destructive fire, they were compelled to retire. In this assault, in which the officers of the 53d regiment highly distinguished themselves, while endeavouring to lead on their men, Lieutenant Harrington of this regiment perished most nobly. He fell in the breach whilst calling upon his men to follow him. Our loss was very heavy; officers killed 3, wounded 8; non-commissioned officers and privates, killed 34, wounded 409. This severe loss is to be ascribed to the length of time that the troops were exposed before the breach. What useful purpose could be gained by it, it is difficult to imagine; it appears obvious, that, if the storming party cannot attain their object within an hour, it would be infinitely better that they should be withdrawn. Animated with hope, and ignorant of the obstacles which oppose him, the soldier's best chance of succeeding is in the first attempt; but every successive failure tends only to dishearten him, and to weaken his confidence. But the commander-in-chief was not satisfied with the result of this enterprise, and ordered a court of inquiry into the conduct of the troops engaged. In India, it is invariably the practice, where a European regiment is present with a division, that it should lead in every storming party; thus, if this division has seen much service, the European corps

is nearly swept off, whilst particularly the native corps are strong in numbers; and this was the case with the 75th and 76th regiments in Lord Lake's campaigns. In these two assaults of Kalunga, the 53d regiment must have lost 400 men in killed and wounded. The practice in question has arisen from the superior confidence reposed in European valour. This confidence may be well founded, but if so, would it not be desirable that a European corps should be reserved for any extraordinary emergency? Instead of exposing it continually, it would be much better that each corps and camp should lead in the assault in due rotation, which would cherish a spirit of emulation highly beneficial to the service. The officers of the Bengal army place great confidence in their seapoys, and are convinced, that, were a fair field allowed for their valour, they would mount the breach with a spirit worthy the soldiers of any other service.

On the morning of the 30th, the Gourkhas abandoned fort Kalunga, which was entered by Major Kelly, while the last of the garrison were making their escape. It at first excited some surprise that this heroic band, consisting of not more than 2 or 300 men, which had successfully resisted an English division 6,000 strong, should have quitted their post at a period when their continuance would have proved of eminent service to their country. But it was afterwards discovered, that some measures which had been taken by us to cut off their water, had so completely succeeded, as to force their immediate evacuation of the place. On the whole, their defence of Kalunga must excite our warmest admiration, and, there is reason to believe, that, had it been generally followed, the conquest of the coun-

try would have been achieved with difficulty. On evacuating Kalunga, the Killedar retired to a hill about three or four coss distance, and took up a position with the remnant of his party. A detachment from the English force, under Captain Warner of the 6th N. I. approached this position, but failed in dispossessing the enemy. Having received intelligence that considerable reinforcements were expected to join the enemy in this position, the commanding-officer determined to dislodge them; and, to effect this object, Major Ludlow (an officer of superior skill and enterprise) was directed to assume the command of a detachment, consisting of 150 men of the light infantry battalion, and five companies of the 1st battalion 6th N. I. On arriving at the enemy's position, Major Ludlow found that they had evacuated this post, and retired to one more inaccessible. The commanding-officer immediately halted, and sent forward a seapoy as a spy, who might bring accurate information respecting the enemy. This service was well performed by the seapoy, who brought back the requisite information. The position of the enemy was nearly inaccessible, on the summit of a steep mountain, the ascent to which was rendered difficult by there being only one road, and that commanded by the enemy. But difficulties served only to animate the gallant spirit of Ludlow; at 10 o'clock *p. m.* he moved forward, and, aided by moonlight, commenced ascending the hill. About one *a. m.* they came upon the enemy, whose fires were still burning; but the difficulty of the ascent having occasioned a great deal of straggling, it was necessary to halt until the rear

closed up; and, in the mean time, the seapoy spy was sent forward to reconnoitre; his advance, however, was observed by one of their sentinels, who gave the alarm to their camp. At this crisis Major Ludlow, with admirable judgment, determined to attack them in this moment of alarm, although only 100 of the light infantry were sufficiently advanced to be thus employed—such were the difficulties of the ascent. Captain Nathaniel Bucke, of the 16th N. I. volunteered to head the advanced party; Ensign Turner, of the 7th N. I. commanded the 2d party; and Ensign Richmond, of the 16th N. I. the 3d party. These divisions attacked the enemy with spirit, and maintained the contest with great animation until the main body came up. Upon its arrival, the advanced division pushed forward, and charged the enemy with such impetuosity that they were unable to withstand their attack, and fled in all directions, leaving 50 men killed in the field. In this attack Captain Bucke received a severe wound by a matchlock ball, whilst engaged in personal contest with the enemy. A seapoy, named Seetul Singh, performed eminent service in bayoneting the Ghoorkha who was engaged with his commanding-officer. Thus these intrepid mountaineers fled before an inferior body of those men whom they had repelled from their walls. The effects of darkness in distracting the faculties, and appalling the hearts of men, are wonderful! The courage and intrepidity which the British detachment displayed in this night attack are worthy of admiration. The command of the division had now devolved upon Major-general Martindell, whose first operations were directed

against the important post of Nahun; but the enemy evacuated the post on the approach of our army. The services of the army were now required for the laborious purpose of bringing up the battering train of the division, preparatory to investing the fort of Jumpta, distant about four miles from Nahun. To render the reduction of Jumpta more certain, a combined operation was immediately undertaken against some heights commanding the place; for which purpose Major Ludlow moved, on the evening of the 26th, with the grenadier company of the 53d regiment, five companies of the light infantry battalion, and the 1st battalion 6th N. I.; whilst Major Richards moved in the morning of the 27th, in another direction, with the light company of his Majesty's 53d regiment, five companies of the light infantry battalion, and the 1st battalion 18th N. I. for the purpose of coöperating with Major Ludlow. Upon approaching the heights, Major Ludlow found the ascent strongly stockaded in several places—but, undaunted by these obstacles, he determined upon the assault. Advancing with courage, they carried several of the smaller stockades with ease. Emboldened by this success, they rushed forward against the largest stockade: but here their career was stopped; the abruptness of the ascent prevented there being supported by the main body, which compelled them to retire after suffering severely. Lieutenant Munt, of the 1st regiment N. I. perished on this occasion, and Lieutenant Seyer, of the 6th N. I. was dreadfully cut by the Goorkhas, but rescued out of their hands by the personal exertions of Major Ludlow. With the view of co-

operating in this attack, Major Richards moved forward, and, in spite of the fire of the fort, took up a position within 900 yards of it. This fired the spirit of the Goorkha commander, who drew out his force, and assaulted our troops with fierce impetuosity. Like the heroes of Montrose or Prince Charles Edward, they attacked our line of infantry sword in hand; and were only repelled by the superiority of our fire and the determined use of the bayonet. Never was the triumph of disciplined valour over barbarian energy more conspicuously manifested. Four times did they attempt to storm our position, and as many times were they repulsed. The action of this day presented events of a singular nature; the improved military science of the 19th century was opposed to that which characterized the feudal age. Whilst Major Richards was thus nobly supporting the reputation of the British name, Major-general Martindell had received intelligence of Major Ludlow's failure, which determined him to send positive orders to Major Richards to retire, under the apprehension that the entire force of the enemy might be directed against him. It is to be regretted that this order was given, as Major Richards had completely succeeded in maintaining his position. Had his detachment been reinforced, it would have been attended with eminent advantage to the public service. On receiving this order, Major Richards immediately commenced his retreat, making the necessary dispositions, by ordering the light company 2d battalion 26th N. I. to cover it. With admirable tact, the Goorkhahs had perceived that our division was about to retrograde, and had anti-

cipated such a movement by occupying a hill which lay in the line of their retreat. Thus, after the labours of a well-fought day, a more desperate conflict was to be gone through; but nothing could daunt the spirit of this division. They succeeded in overcoming this obstacle, though with the loss of nearly the whole of the light company of the 2d battalion 26th N. I. which perished with its officers, Lieutenants Thackeray and Wilson. To maintain the discipline of this company in its highest perfection was the great aim of Lieutenant Thackeray through life.—What a noble consolation it must have been to this officer, in his dying moments, to have reflected, that his unparalleled exertions in contending against the enemy had mainly contributed to save the detachment.

After a fatiguing march, during which they were continually harassed by the Goorkhas, Major Richards's detachment arrived at Nahun, having sustained a severe loss in officers and men.—A soobadahr and 40 men had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and, contrary to expectation, were treated with humanity, and dismissed on their parole. Thus, this combined movement entirely failed. The operations of the division were now suspended until reinforcements should arrive: until then, the Major-general contented himself with maintaining his position before Nahun. These reinforcements did not arrive before the beginning of March. The Major-general was now directed to coöperate with Major-general Ochterlony, in the siege of Malown. For this purpose, Major Richards was detached, on the 31st March, with a considerable force, with instructions to occupy the

Peacock mountain, preparatory to reducing the fortified post of Jytuck. To counteract this movement, a force of 1300 Goorkhas moved from Jytuck, with the view of surprising Major Richards's detachment. On the morning of the 1st Major Richards continued his march; but the day had scarcely dawned, when this formidable force was discovered in front of our line of march. Lieutenant Young of the 47th N. I. who commanded the advanced guard, lost not a moment in attacking them with the light companies. The Goorkhas received this charge by a well-sustained fire; but Major Richards coming up at this moment, and charging them instantaneously with his main body, they fled in great confusion. In this skirmish the loss of the enemy was very severe—killed, 107; wounded, 250. Our loss was—killed, 7; wounded, 2 officers, 27 sepoys. Major Richards was now at liberty to occupy Punchul, a position which enabled us to cut off the garrison of Jytuck from supplies. The division was now occupied in investing Jytuck, and carrying on the siege of this post until the fall of Malown, which event led to the surrender of Jytuck, by a special article in the treaty concluded with Umeer Singh, by Major-general Ochterlony. This finished the career of this division, the different corps of which returned into cantonments.

It remains now to give some account of the operations of the 4th division, commanded by Major-general Ochterlony. It is understood that this officer (from the facilities which his political situation afforded) was better acquainted with the Goorkha character than any other general officer commanding a di-

vision;—that he was thoroughly aware of their superiority, in point of valour, to the generality of Hindoos—and that this knowledge guided his operations against the enemy—that he was cautious in risking his troops in enterprises where the most desperate courage would fail merely from the obstacles which the nature of the ground presented—and that he trusted to our superiority in science and resources as the most effectual means of subjugating an enemy, whose country afforded no fair field for bringing the contest to an open decision in the plain. On the 4th November this division advanced to Nalaghur (a hill fort), which was immediately invested. On the 5th the place surrendered. The garrison marched out with their arms, their personal safety being secured to them.

The political address of the General was now exerted in detaching the garrison from their allegiance to the Goorkha power. This course was perfectly justifiable; inasmuch as it was generally understood that many of the Nepaulese proper had reluctantly engaged in furthering the ambitious designs of the Goorkhas. The operations of the division were now directed against the fort of Ramghur, prior to which the General succeeded in forming an alliance with the inhabitants of Plassiah, who cherished a bitter animosity against the Goorkha power.—Their exertions were found to be of eminent service in overcoming the obstacles which opposed the advance of the division to Ramghur, as the difficulty of transporting a field train, in a mountainous country like this, could only be surmounted by the most laborious efforts on the part of the army. On the 24th

November, batteries were erected against a stockade which defended the entrance to Ramghur. This fort is situated upon a lofty hill, and was occupied by Umeer Singh Thappa, who commanded in this quarter with a force of 6000 men. In the event of being closely pressed, the Goorkha commander had provided a retreat to Malown, the principal seat of his power. On the 25th November, Lieutenant Lawtie, of the engineers, had proceeded from the batteries with the view of reconnoitering the positions of the enemy. Whilst employed in this duty, a powerful body of Goorkhas interposed themselves between his small body and our camp, and cut off their retreat. An officer of talent is never without resources: he instantaneously formed the resolution of attacking a redoubt in front, which would secure his safety until reinforcements should arrive. Animated by his spirit, his men pushed forward and gained the redoubt, but found themselves unable to maintain it against the overwhelming odds which were brought against them. They were therefore compelled to retire, leaving 45 men killed, among whom was Lieutenant Williams of the 3d N. I. The defences of the fort were now found to be so strong that the Major-general was compelled to suspend operations until reinforcements should arrive. Nothing could be more distressing to the Bengal seapoys than the nature of the service in which they were engaged. Transported from a warm climate into one where the cold was so great that their officers amused themselves with throwing snow-balls, and stinted in their usual allowance of provisions, it was a situation, of all others, where their fidelity to the

state was put to a severe test. In such circumstances, how easy would it have been for these men to have deserted to their homes.* But it is honourable to the soldiers of this army, that they passed through this ordeal without any stain upon their character. On the 26th December, the Major-general was reinforced by the 2d battalion 7th N. I. commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Lyons, which escorted some heavy guns required for the purpose of sieges. Upon the arrival of this force, the General determined to cut off the communication of the enemy with Malown, his principal fortress; and for this purpose Lieutenant-colonel Thomson was detached with the 2d battalion 3d N. I., the light infantry battalion, a suitable proportion of guns, and some auxiliary troops. This officer moved on the 28th December, and commenced operations very successfully, by seizing some heights which commanded the enemy's post. The possession of this position compelled the enemy to evacuate a stockade which was commanded by the heights. Perceiving that they were out-generalled in this movement, the enemy determined to regain their former superiority by a bold attempt to surprise Colonel Thomson's position. At dawn of day, a strong column was observed in our front, and our troops had just time to form when the Goorkhas made their onset. But, aided by the advantage of the ground, the regularity of our platoon fire, and the destructive effect of our shrapnells, our troops succeeded in repelling their

* Some desertions occurred before this division entered the hills, but I believe none afterwards.

charge. Undaunted by their failure in the first assault, the enemy again attempted to storm the position, but were compelled to retire, leaving 31 killed on the field.

The result of this affair determined Umeer Singh to move to the northward, with the view of throwing himself into Malown; and, in order to force him to this alternative, or to bring him to action, the main body of the army moved forward under General Ochterlony, whilst Colonel Thomson pressed him on the other side of the Ramghur range of heights. At this juncture the Goorkha commander manifested some irresolution in his plans, and seemed inclined to move towards Belaspoor, with the Rajah of which place he had formed no alliance; but a counter-movement on the part of General Ochterlony determined him to hasten his retreat towards Malown. To prevent the Rajah of Belaspoor from affording any efficient aid to Umeer Singh, Colonel Arnold marched with his brigade on the 31st January, and took up a position within four coss of Belaspoor. The nature of the country opposed the strongest obstacles to an invading enemy, but no opposition was made. The Rajah remained encamped beyond the Sutledge, but sent a message to General Ochterlony requesting that he might remain neutral. He was evidently waiting until one party should obtain a decided advantage.—A weak state, between two powerful neighbours, has no other resource but calculations of this nature. The advance to Malown being greatly retarded by the nature of the ground, the Major-general determined to commence operations against the fort of Ramghur,

which had been left in the rear of our army. To effect this object, Captain Hamilton of the 7th N. I. was detached with a force consisting of 200 regulars, and 1000 irregulars. The conduct of the siege was intrusted to Captain Webbe of the artillery, and Lieutenant Lawtie of the engineers. On the 12th February this detachment broke ground before the fort, at 400 yards distance.—The enemy did not sally out until our troops had securely posted themselves; and were repulsed with loss. On the 13th and 14th the pioneers were engaged in constructing a road for the conveyance of the battering train; and on the 15th one of the eighteen-pounders was dragged up to this post. Such were the difficulties of the ascent that another could not be brought up before evening. The fire from this battery soon silenced the guns in the fort; and, in the course of the ensuing day, several messages passed between the garrison and our troops, but the enemy refused the terms which were offered them. On the afternoon of the 16th, the northern face of the fort was laid in ruins, and a report made to the commanding officer that the breach would be practicable in a short time. The powerful impression which our artillery had made on the walls had the usual effect on the mind of the Killedar.—Perceiving that a storm was inevitable, he sued for terms, and was allowed to march out with the honours of war, on condition that the fort of Jagooree should be given up at the same time. The garrison of Ramghur amounted to 100 men, and that of Jagooree to the same number. With such diminished means their government could not expect much: still, if these

garrisons had fought as heroically as their countrymen at Kalunga, the strength of this division of the army would have been wasted before these paltry fortresses, and the subjugation of their country averted for a season. The fall of Ramghur was followed by that of Taraghur, which was invested on the 10th, and breached on the 11th: the garrison, 250 strong, made their escape during the night. It is surprising that this garrison made such a feeble resistance, considering its numbers and the precautions they had taken to counteract the effects of breaching, by erecting an inner wall of loose stones. The reduction of Chamba, which capitulated on the 16th, threw the whole of the enemy's fortresses (to the south of the Gunba) into our possession. The superior science, judgment, and enthusiastic courage of Lieutenant Lawtie of the engineers, were eminently conspicuous during the whole course of these operations; the labour of conducting the details of these sieges having almost entirely devolved upon him—and to this must be attributed his decease, which took place towards the end of the campaign. His death was felt as a public loss. These successes of our arms were attended with the usual effects, in inducing those who wavered to court our alliance.—The Rajah of Belaspoor, and others, were quite zealous in their offers of service; but they produced a very different effect on Umeer Singh, who was alarmed lest we should attack Soorugghur. To render its defences more secure, he commenced the erection of a new stockade in the line between Taraghur and Malown, and, by uniting ponderous masses of rock with stone walls, he succeeded in

erecting a work of considerable strength; but heart and soul were wanting—these strong entrenchments were abandoned by the enemy on the first fire from a howitzer. Sir David Ochterlony now determined to commence operations against Soorugghur, and for this purpose Captain Hamilton of the 7th N. I. moved forward at midnight, on the 31st March, with instructions to gain the heights in its neighbourhood, an object which was effected without any opposition. The remainder of the troops, after a fatiguing march of 15 hours, succeeded in bringing up the guns and baggage. A party of the enemy, who were posted in a stockade between our position and Soorugghur, commenced a fire of musketry upon our troops, but were quickly silenced by a six-pounder, which was brought to bear upon the stockade. It was now discovered that the elevation of our position was too great to enable us to form efficient batteries against Soorugghur. Our force, therefore, remained in position, overawing the garrison of Soorugghur, whilst other operations were in progress. The period was now arrived when the Major-general had matured his plans against Umeer Singh. By the reduction of his fortresses the field was now open for attempting a series of combined operations against his positions in the Malown range of hills, and which, if successful, would ultimately compel him to retire within that fortress. To effect this object five columns were put in motion, with instructions to move against separate points in this fortified range of heights.

The 1st column, consisting of the two light companies of the 19th regiment N. I. and 1000 irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant Fleming of the 19th

regiment, was directed to move at 10 o'clock in the morning of the 15th, with instructions to occupy the post of Ryla, situated between Dab and Deoliah.

The 2d column, consisting of the 2d battalion, 7th N. I. commanded by Major Lawrie, was ordered to move against the fortified position of Deoliah.

The 3d column, consisting of the 2d battalion 3d N. I. commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Thomson, had the same destination as the 2d column, but was directed to move by a different route.

The 4th column, consisting of three companies of the 1st battalion 19th N. I. and a body of irregulars, the whole commanded by Captain Bowyer, was directed to move and occupy a position in the direction of Malown. This attack was to be considered as a feint, but with instructions to convert it into a reality should circumstances afford an opportunity.

The 5th column, commanded by Captain Showers, and consisting of two companies of the 2d battalion 7th N. I. a company of the 1st battalion 19th N. I. and a body of irregulars, was destined to move against the enemy's cantonments to the right of Malown, with orders to consider this attack as a feint, to be improved as circumstances might direct.

By thus dividing his force, the Major-general confidently anticipated that the variety of these attacks, and uncertainty as to the real point threatened, would distract the enemy, and diminish his means of resistance.

At the time appointed, the 1st column moved on and took up its position without interruption. The occupation of this point was the signal for the other

columns to proceed to the different points of attack. The march of the second and third columns was so well calculated that both these columns gained the heights at the same moment—and, uniting with rapidity, they pushed on to gain a more advanced position.

Whilst ascending a steep hill, the progress of this column was checked by the fearless intrepidity of 20 or 30 Goorkhas, who rushed from the summit, sword in hand, and struck a momentary terror into our ranks: The men wavered, and retreated a few steps—the moment was perilous; the success or failure of the column hung upon a thread, but the event was not long doubtful—discipline and a sense of honour triumphed over this temporary impulse; they advanced with renewed courage, and drove the enemy before them. On gaining the summit of the hill, the position of Deothul appeared in view; but, previous to attaining it, it was necessary to dislodge the enemy, who occupied a strong position in the vicinity. This service was ably performed, and the enemy, dispirited at the boldness of the attack, retreated in disorder to another position, which they were again compelled to abandon. Thus far success had crowned the efforts of this column; but it had no effect in relaxing their vigilance, the remainder of the day having been employed in throwing up works for the protection of the post. The moment was now arrived when Umeer Singh felt that it was necessary to make a last and desperate effort to maintain the ascendancy of the Goorkha state, or that it should perish for ever. Should the British maintain their present po-

sitions, the fall of the Goorkha power was inevitable. Animated by this conviction, he determined to assault Colonel Thomson's position next morning, with a select body of 2,000 men, commanded by Bukhtyar Thapa, a chosen commander. At dawn of day, this column assaulted Colonel Thomson's position with a courage and conduct of rare occurrence in Asiatic warfare. Having marched in perfect order within 20 or 30 paces of the entrenchment, they delivered their fire, and, then sword in hand, rushed forward to carry it. Such was their ardour, that several of these gallant spirits leapt over the wall, and were bayoneted within the entrenchment. Never was the courage of the Bengal seapoy put to a severer test; it was only by the superiority of our fire, the advantage of our position, and the destruction which our grapnells carried into the ranks of the enemy, that our troops were enabled to repel this daring onset. The first fury of this torrent being spent, the combatants had time to breathe. This was a proud moment to the British: the consciousness of the valour which they had displayed, inspired them with a thorough conviction that they would be able to foil every attempt of the foe. Other feelings agitated the Goorkhas—rage, shame, the humiliating sense of defeat; and these stimulated to the utmost by the severe animadversions of their chief, who, conscious that his private interests were identified with the existence of the Goorkha power, was roused, by every personal feeling, to goad his men to the combat. Addressing himself to their national prejudices as Hindoos, and to their feelings as soldiers, he exhorted

them to renew the assault. Impelled to action by these animated remonstrances, they advanced once more against the entrenchment. Their utmost efforts were now directed against the guns (to the possession of which all Asiatics look forward as decisive of the contest.) Every nerve was strained to gain their object. The contest became most animated and destructive in this quarter. The artillerymen were almost all swept off: Lieutenants Cartwright, Armstrong, and Hutchinson, with the assistance of two or three privates, alone remained to serve the guns; but the coolness and fortitude of this small remnant, aided by the exertions of the infantry, enabled them to repulse this formidable attack. The confidence of the enemy had now visibly abated, although several desultory attempts were still made against our position. But the courage of our troops would be restrained no longer; they leapt the entrenchment, and drove the enemy before them. Thus baffled and discomfited, the Goorkhas retreated, leaving 500 men killed and wounded on the field.

The 4th column, commanded by Captain Bowyer, moved forward at the appointed signal; and, advancing with rapidity, gained the point which had been assigned to it in the plan of operation;—it remained in this position from 7 *a. m.* until 12 *a. m.* At this period, perceiving that the column on his right, commanded by Captain Showers, had entirely failed, and that a body of auxiliaries on his left had retreated, the commanding officer determined to retire;—thus acting in conformity to his instructions, which directed that this attack should only be

considered as a feint. This retreat was executed with a skill and judgment which have been rarely equalled on the part of the commander. To retreat down a hill, in the presence of a superior enemy, who is ready to charge from the summit, is at all times a perilous undertaking, and can only succeed where the discipline of a corps is perfect, and the soldiers repose entire confidence in their chief. This was eminently the case in the present instance. The movement was executed precisely as is practised on a field day: one half of the detachment retired and took up a commanding position, which enabled it to cover the retreat of the other party—thus alternately protecting each other; whilst the Goorkhas rushed down the hill, anticipating the destruction of the detachment. But their hopes were baffled; their charge was invariably repulsed by the superiority of our fire. In this manner, the commanding officer effected a most masterly retreat. At no period, during the campaign, was our superiority in discipline more manifest than in the conduct of this column.

The 5th column, commanded by Captain Showers, marched from Ruttunghur at the appointed signal. On ascending a steep hill, between the Kukree stockade and Malown, it was attacked by a body of Goorkhas, who charged from the summit, and overthrew our column. Although the failure of this detachment was a humiliating sight to those who witnessed it from the batteries, yet the retreat of this body is said to have been eminently picturesque, having rushed down this steep declivity in the shape of a wedge, pursued by the Goorkhas sword in hand. On reaching the plain, our troops felt that the advantages of

situation were no longer on the side of their opponents: they rallied, and drove the enemy before them. The commanding officer, aware that the reputation of the Goorkhas for superior valour, and their dexterity in the use of the sword, had made a powerful impression on the minds of the seapoys, stood forth in his own person, a heroic example of what they ought to do in the hour of danger. Advancing in front of his detachment, he awaited the shock of the Goorkhas, having slain one of their chiefs, with whom he engaged in personal combat. He fell covered with wounds. Those who knew him, feel how impossible it is to do justice to his character as an officer. His heart and soul were devoted to the service. In war, his ardent spirit led him to seek the post of danger; but in peace, his conduct was no less marked for a kindness and sympathy with the wants of his soldiers, which did honour to him as a man.

With the most unfeigned respect for his character as an officer, I shall presume to make some remarks on the orders which he issued for the conduct of his column. Reposing an entire confidence in the valour of his men, he had given the most positive orders that his soldiers should only use the bayonet in the attack—trusting alone to their determined use of it for success. To this must be attributed the failure of the attack. On looking back to the operations of the different columns, it will be found that their success can only be ascribed to the superiority of our fire, and the perfection of our discipline. Of the first essential advantage this column was deprived, which, in all probability, led to its overthrow. In-

deed, it must be obvious, that, where the contending parties are upon an equality in point of courage, an attacking column, ascending a hill, when not allowed to fire, must inevitably be defeated. The fire of the opposing enemy must thin the ranks and dispirit the assailants, whilst the advantages of situation affords an immense superiority in repelling the attack. It is only by a superior fire, and greater perfection in discipline, that these disadvantages can be overcome. In these respects the British were immeasurably superior;—but who will dare to say that our seapoys possessed a superiority in valour? An officer should study the genius of his troops, and adapt his mode of attack to their national habits. Every officer who has served with a native corps, must have observed, that our seapoys (like all Asiatics) repose greater confidence in the fire of musketry than in the use of the bayonet. The use of the bayonet has been judiciously introduced into our native armies; but it will require time to naturalize it. At present it ought not to be regarded as an exclusive weapon.* Thus the plans of the General were in a measure crowned with success. A commanding position had been gained on the heights, which cut off the communication between Soorujgoor and Malowa, and which would further enable us to prosecute such operations as would compel Umeer Singh to retire into the latter fortress. This successful result of our operations made a profound impression on the Goorkha general. Dispirited at

* Our loss in this series of operations was two European officers, three soobadahrs, four naichs, and 52 seapoys, killed; five officers, one serjeant, and 287 men wounded.

the failure of his attack on Colonel Thomson's position, he determined to evacuate the fortress of Soorughur, and, concentrating the whole of his force, to throw himself into Malown. This movement was accordingly executed. Sir David Ochterlony could now direct his entire force to the destruction of the enemy's army.

Before adverting to the fall of Malown, I shall proceed to give some account of the operations of the brigade commanded by Colonel Nicholls, the successful result of which had a powerful influence in determining Umeer Singh to surrender his fortress. Colonel Nicholls's brigade was destined to operate in the province of Kemaoon, forming the direct communication between the enemy's territory on the Sutledge and Nepaul proper. The strength of this force could not be estimated at more than 2000 men. It consisted of the 1st battalion 4th N. I. commanded by Captain Faithfull, and the 2d battalion 5th N. I. commanded by Major Patton. Prior to the advance of this brigade, a body of irregulars, commanded by Colonel Gardiner and Captain Hearsey (both officers of superior talent, who had distinguished themselves in the Mahratta service), had been pushed forward, and had made considerable progress in reducing the province.

In order to effect its entire reduction, Colonel Nicholls advanced with a battering train, and laid siege to Almorah, the capital of the province. Whilst employed on this service, information was received, that Hustee Dull, a distinguished Goorkha leader, had withdrawn from Almorah, and had taken up a position at Gunnahali, in consider-

able force. To prevent interruption in the siege, Major Patton was dispatched with five companies of the 2d battalion 5th N. I., five companies of the grenadier battalion, and a body of irregulars, with instructions to bring this force to action. By the most rapid exertions, Major Patton came up with the enemy before they had time to take up a position. Losing not a moment, he attacked and dispersed the enemy. Their chief fell, covered with wounds. Our loss was trifling.

On the 25th April Colonel Nicholls determined to assault the outworks which protected Almorah. For this purpose, the 1st battalion 4th N. I. was directed to advance against the principal breast-works occupied by the enemy—a service which was nobly performed by that corps. Animated with a just confidence in themselves, they now mounted the walls with daring intrepidity; and the enemy, paralyzed by the resolution displayed in this enterprise, fled before them. In the advance of this corps, Lieutenants Purves and Wight greatly distinguished themselves. The gallantry which the regular troops exhibited stimulated the irregulars to an emulous rivalry. Eager to display their valour, they advanced, under the personal command of Colonel Gardiner, against the remaining breast-works, which were carried with distinguished success. The loss sustained was not more than 40 men killed and wounded. Although the enemy had manifested a want of their usual courage in defending their outworks, yet they determined to make an attempt to regain the positions they had lost. To effect this object, a combined operation was planned; and, at midnight, a powerful body attacked Lieutenant Costley's position, whilst the garrison made a

sortie against Colonel Nicholls's camp. Lieutenant Costley found it impossible to defend his post against the immense superiority of the assailants, and was compelled to retire with his small force. But the Goorkhas were not long allowed to triumph,—a detachment of the flank battalion, under Lieutenants Brown and Whinfield, supported by Colonel Gardiner's irregulars, having advanced against the post, and successfully established themselves. In the course of the night, the Goorkhas made several attempts to regain their position, but were constantly defeated. The sortie of the garrison entirely failed. On the morning of the 26th our approaches were advanced within 70 yards of the fort, which enabled us to throw shells into it with great effect. This intimidated the garrison so much that a great number left the place, whilst the others remained concealed. Our troops, conceiving that the enemy had evacuated the place, now advanced against the principal gate. But the movement was premature; the garrison again took heart, and, commencing a smart fire upon our troops, compelled them to retire. Although the enemy repelled this unpremeditated attack, the spirit of the garrison was evidently broken. Nothing is more calculated to produce effects against an unexperienced enemy than the throwing of shells. Their bursting in a small fort, which affords no protection against the splinters, appals the bravest. Had the use of them been more generally resorted to in our sieges in India, many forts would have been abandoned which caused the loss of valuable lives in the assault. On the evening of the 26th the Killedar sent a flag of truce, requesting a suspension of arms. This was

acceded to by Colonel Nicholls, and a convention entered into, on the basis of terms which Mr Gardiner, the civil commissioner, had proposed to the Killedar prior to the commencement of hostilities. By this treaty, the Goorkha commander engaged to evacuate the fortified places in Kemaoon, within ten days after the signing of the treaty. On the part of the British government, it was agreed by the commissioner, that the Goorkha troops should retire unmolested beyond the Sardah river, one of the boundaries of the province. The most important advantages resulted from the fall of Almorah. By its capture, the army of Umeer Singh was abandoned to its fate. It was now impossible that it should receive succours from Nepaul, whilst the possession of an entire province in the centre of the enemy's territory was calculated to dispirit their people, and to convince them of the superiority of the British power. The judgment, skill, and intrepidity manifested by Colonel Nicholls, in the course of operations against this province, were what might have been expected from his high name. With reference to the character of the enemy, it must be obvious that their defence of this province was extremely feeble; indeed, is is generally allowed, that their troops were of an inferior description to those under the personal command of Umeer Singh. When the intelligence of the surrender of Almorah reached Malown, it created a powerful sensation amongst the Goorkhas. Their leaders remonstrated with Umeer Singh, and urged him to surrender the fortress;—but the spirit of this chief remained unbroken. He reminded these soldiers of their duty to their country, and urged, with reason, that, if they held out until the com-

mencement of the rains, the British force would be compelled to retire. These remonstrances produced no effect upon his hearers. They withdrew daily with their followers, until only 200 men remained to defend the place: Unsubdued in mind, the proud spirit of Umeer Singh was forced to bend to circumstances.

On the 15th May a capitulation was agreed upon between Sir David Ochterlony and the Goorkha commander, which terminated the campaign in this quarter, and completely extinguished the Goorkha power and influence in the provinces to the westward of Gogra. By this convention the garrison were allowed to march out with the honours of war. The same terms were extended to Rungoor Singh, Killedar of Jytuck, and the troops under his command. These chiefs were at liberty to proceed to Nepaul with the whole of their followers. On the part of Umeer Singh it was stipulated, that he should evacuate Malown and the whole of the posts held by the Nepaulese between the Sumna and the Sutledge, together with those in the adjacent territory of Ghurial. It was further stipulated, that the Nepaul troops were at liberty to engage in the British service, should the British government be disposed to accept of their services. The respect of the British general for his antagonist was manifested in allowing him a suitable guard for his person. Thus, the plans of the Governor-general were crowned with entire success in this quarter; the British ensign waved on those heights which bade a proud defiance to our power. On reviewing the events of the campaign, it is manifest, that its successful result must be principally ascribed to the superior skill and

judgment which characterized the operations of Sir David Ochterlony's division. Appreciating from the first the character and resources of the enemy, he was aware that rash and headlong valour would fail against such a foe, and that it was only by calling forth that superiority in science and resources which we possessed, that we could triumph against such an enemy. Possessing the entire confidence of his troops, every energy was devoted to the public service. It is fortunate for the reputation of the Marquis of Hastings that this division possessed such a commander. Had it failed, the campaign must have been altogether unsuccessful. In adverting to the close of this campaign, it would be unjust to withhold from the Bengal seapoy, that praise to which he is eminently entitled.—Unaided by any European force, the soldiers of this division, and that of Colonel Nicholls, encountered every danger and difficulty with a spirit honourable to any army. The mind of Sir David Ochterlony was now occupied with the measures necessary for the defence of those countries which we had conquered. The means adopted for that purpose will excite the surprise of the European reader.—Those very Goorkhahs who had fought against us were taken into our service, and formed into four battalions, and these men have fulfilled their engagements to the British state with irreproachable fidelity. Such is the confidence reposed in them, that there are only five companies of a regular native corps stationed within the provinces, who could act against them in case of revolt. The plan adopted by the British general manifested a thorough acquaintance with our Asiatic policy. In what other way have we maintained our immense possessions

in Hindostan, but by enlisting the energies of its military population in our service? All conquerors have used nearly the same expedients. It is safer to govern by means of a body which has exercised a commanding influence over their countrymen, and which they have been accustomed to respect: in this way no violent shock is given to their opinions and usages, and they fall naturally into habits of subordination. The alacrity with which the Goorkhas transferred their services to their conquerors, is a singular moral phenomenon, but equally characteristic of the whole Hindoo race. It is remarkable that the same men who have displayed the most heroic courage in a particular cause, should offer their services to those who have trampled it down, without an emotion of shame or repugnance—that men who cherish a love of home, and a tender sensibility to the ties of relationship, should be altogether devoid of the love of country. This is the moral taint which debases all Hindoo institutions: there is nothing in them to excite any genuine patriotism, or generous social feeling. The fact to which I have alluded speaks volumes as to the defects of their social system.

The rainy season having now commenced, this division retired into cantonments. The reverses which its arms had sustained, made a profound impression on the court of Khatmandoo, which began now to entertain serious thoughts of peace.—The idea of contending singly against the overwhelming superiority of the British power was considered by one party as hopeless, whilst another party (reasoning from what had happened to other states) regarded

the slightest connexion with the British state as revealing the destruction of their independence, and the extinction of their national dignity. Men with such feelings naturally looked forward to war as the only means of averting these portentous evils. At the present juncture the party who were anxious for peace prevailed. A negotiation having been immediately opened with the view of learning the sentiments of the English government, these were declared to be —the perpetual cession of the provinces taken in the course of the last campaign—the entire renunciation of the territory in dispute, which occasioned the war, and of the whole Terhae, which bounds our territory along the hills. Besides these, the humiliating condition was required that an English resident should be received at Khatmandoo. On hearing these terms, the Nepaulese envoy broke off the negotiation, on the ground that he was not authorised to treat respecting the cession of any territory excepting that which was in dispute. The negotiation appeared now to languish, but was again resumed. The Marquis of Hastings, understanding that the principal officers of the Nepaulese enjoyed estates in the territory which was proposed to be ceded, was induced to offer similar possessions, or an equivalent in money, to the amount of two or three lacs of rupees, subject to the discretion of the Goorkhah court. This proposition was rejected, on the ground that the possession of the Terhae was indispensable to their existence,—its superior fertility rendering it the granary of the kingdom. The object of the British government, in demanding the entire cession of the Terhae, was simply, that, by establishing a

definite boundary, there might be no cause for dispute in future. In other respects its possession was of no value to us, the revenue scarcely balancing the expenditure. Such being the case, it would have been foolish in the extreme to have maintained so expensive a contest for so inconsiderable an object. In these circumstances, the Governor-general evinced a becoming moderation in relaxing the original demand. Instructions were now forwarded to Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, the British commissioner, empowering him to negotiate upon a new basis, according to which that part of the Terhae which lies between the rivers Kalee and Gunduck, was all that was now demanded, and of the rest only so much as was in our actual possession; which terms, together with the stipulated pensions, were declared to be the ultimatum of the British Government. This disposition to concession was not met in a suitable spirit by the Nepaulese envoys, who declared that they would not accede to these terms, without submitting them to their court. At the same time they offered to sign the treaty, provisionally: provided that the portion of the Terhae, between the Koosee and Gunduck, were substituted for the pensions proposed. This was refused, and the negotiation broken off; but the negotiators declared, that they would return in 12 days with the treaty signed. On the 28th November, 1815, these plenipotentiaries returned and signed the treaty, by the terms of which the ratification of the Rajah was to be delivered in 15 days. This period expired without any appearance of the ratified treaty, and it was afterwards ascertained that the Nepaul government had deter-

mined upon war. Untaught by experience, they had resolved once more to try the perilous hazard of hostilities; having, in the meantime, received an accession of strength from the arrival of Umeer Singh, who, with becoming disdain, represented the offer to pension the Rajah's ministers as insulting to his dignity, and degrading to the national honour, in placing his subjects in direct dependence upon a foreign power; whilst he held forth to view the brilliant exploits of their troops at the commencement of the last campaign, as affording a bright augury of what might be expected in the ensuing contest. These sentiments, so flattering to their pride, had a due effect on their minds; but, in truth, the substantial loss which would result from the cession of the greater part of the Terhae must be regarded as the immediate cause of hostilities.—Although inconsiderable to us, it had ever been regarded as the most brilliant appanage of the Nepaul state. In the meantime, the promise of aid from Scindeah determined them to amuse the English government for the present, by affecting an eager desire to negotiate, that the season for active operations might pass away without any attempt on our part. The Bengal government suffered itself to be deceived by this crafty policy; it relaxed its preparations, and the commissariat department received instructions to discharge the cattle necessary for the transport of grain, and to sell that which was stored in depôt. This injudicious conduct had nearly frustrated the success of the campaign, as the army was not enabled to move before the end of January, a delay which allowed only two months for active operations. Con-

sidering that the campaign failed in this quarter the former year, solely from the lateness of the season, it is surprising that the government did not exhibit more precaution in guarding against this contingency. The British government, no doubt, justified this conduct on the principle, that it was so much the interest of the enemy to make peace, that he could by no possibility refuse the terms offered. This reasoning might be good as applied to a European state; but it requires little knowledge of Asiatic history to perceive that its princes understand their own interest but imperfectly, and their caprices have a great share in influencing their determinations. The government in this instance appears to have neglected the admirable rule adopted by Lord Wellesley in all his negotiations—by uniting civil and military powers in his deplomatic agents, the collision of civil authorities was avoided, and the public functionary, to whom this power was delegated, was enabled to devote every faculty to the public service. It is only by an energetic system like this, that diplomatists can act with effect, when opposed to Asiatics, with whom every thing is fair which can be gained by subterfuge and fraud; and who are only accustomed to yield to reason when enforced at the point of the bayonet. At this period, the troops, although at no distance from the scene of negotiation, were scattered in cantonments, instead of being concentrated; had they been prepared to move at a moment's warning, and the entire direction of negotiation confided to the British commander, this vigorous attitude might have averted the contest;—at the least, this avowed determination to resort to

force would have spared us the humiliation of being overreached by a people so far inferior to us in real knowledge. The British government now determined to call forth all its resources, with the view of striking such a vigorous blow at the enemy's capital as would terminate the war. An army of 15,000 men was accordingly assembled, consisting of his Majesty's 24th, 66th, and 87th regiments, and 11 or 12 native corps. General Ochterlony was summoned from the western provinces, and directed to assume the command of this force, with the entire control of political and military affairs. Thus the errors of the former campaign were wisely avoided, and our entire force was directed against the principal seat of the enemy's power. On assuming the command of the army, the Major-general directed that it should advance through the Sal forest, which skirts the Nepaul mountains—a mat. 1. which was accomplished without the slightest opposition from the enemy; and the army encamped at the foot of the Chereea-ghatee pass, which defends the entrance into the first range of hills. On reconnoitering the pass, its defences were found to be of the most formidable nature, being stockaded throughout, and occupied by the enemy in great force. To assault so strong a position would have been a perilous undertaking; and it is fortunate that the judgment and foresight of the British commander rendered this operation unnecessary. With a mind devoted to the public service, this distinguished officer had employed his leisure hours during the rains, in obtaining the most accurate information relative to the passes into Nepaul; and, although there was no prospect of service

at the time, this knowledge was destined in the sequel to be of eminent service to his country. He had ascertained, from the Goorkhas in our service, the existence of a bye-path, unknown to the generality of their countrymen, and undefended at the present moment. With a just confidence in himself, the General determined to stake his professional reputation in an attempt to scale these hills by this path-way. At midnight he proceeded, in person, at the head of a light division, by a road which lay through the dry bed of a mountain-torrent. The rugged bottom, the steep ascent, and the darkness, were calculated to try the nerve of the troops; but the spirit of their veteran leader pervaded the entire body, and animated them throughout their toils. After struggling throughout the night, the morning dawned, when they perceived they had turned the enemy's position in the Chereea-ghatee pass. The joy of the British could only be equalled by the consternation of the Goorkhas, who evacuated their position, which was immediately occupied by our army. This is a brilliant exemplification of the energy of mind as applied to the operations of an army; every thing was effected by superior knowledge—physical force was of little avail. Having succeeded in passing the first range of hills by this admirable manœuvre, the attention of the British commander was directed to strengthening this position, and establishing a direct communication with the plains, which would secure the passage of supplies. With the view of distracting the enemy by a variety of movements, and covering his real design, Sir David Ochterlony had directed that a column,

commanded by Colonel Kelly of his Majesty's 24th regiment, should move in the direction of Hureehurpoor, a hill fort commanding the pass which leads into the Muckwanpoor valley; whilst another should move to the westward, and, if possible, should pass the hills in that direction: this division was commanded by Colonel Nicol, his Majesty's 53rd regiment. Colonel Kelly advanced in the direction of Hureehurpoor, and, on arriving within view, perceived a commanding position near the fort, which he directed to be occupied by the light companies. The enemy quickly perceived the error they had committed, and advanced in great force to assault this position; but the superiority of our fire compelled them to retire, after sustaining a severe loss in killed and wounded.—The fort was quickly evacuated. The column commanded by Colonel Nicol succeeded in passing the hills, without encountering any opposition, and joined the force under General Ochterlony.

Thus, the British commander completely succeeded in establishing his army within the Nepaul territory, and these resolute mountaineers were condemned to the humiliating mortification of seeing an enemy in the heart of their country.—That iron frontier which had repelled the tide of Mahomedan invasion, and daunted the spirit of our commanders in the former campaign, failed in opposing a barrier to the superior skill and courage of this army. The Goorkha force, in retiring from the Chereea-ghatee pass had taken up a position in front of Muckwanpoor, against which post the British army advanced, and encamped on the 28th February,

within two miles of the enemy, occuping a hill in front, from which the enemy had retired. As if now taught the value of this position, by the fact of the British occupying it, the enemy determined to retake this hill, and, advancing in force, they drove in the piquets which occupied it. Aware of its importance, reinforcements were sent to maintain the position; and the 2d battalion 12th N. I., 2d battalion 25th N. I. and light company his Majesty's 87th regiment, ascended the hill for this purpose. The importance which the English general attached to the position served only to raise its value with the Goorkhas. As if determined that the courage of the opposite armies should be fairly put to the test, in contending for the possession of this eminence, the flower of their army marched to the assault, and several gallant efforts were made to storm it, but without effect. The nature of the ground at the summit of our position, rugged and bushy, prevented our troops from charging; in such circumstances the efforts of the contending parties were principally confined to the fire of musketry, which was carried on with such animation that several British officers, with their fowling-pieces, engaged in it with the utmost keenness. In this manner the greater part of the day had passed without advantage to either party. Towards evening, as the 2d battalion 8th regiment was ascending the hill, it was perceived that an opening presented itself in that quarter, which would enable us to attack the enemy; the order was instantly given, and three companies of this corps, under the personal command of Major Nation, advanced deliberately against the enemy—reserved their fire until it could

be given with effect; and then charged with such spirit that the enemy retired in great confusion, leaving two guns in our possession. The success of this charge is principally to be ascribed to the energy and skill with which Major Nation directed the movement of his small body—and yet, his conduct has not been marked by any of those honours which it is the pride of an enterprising soldier to obtain—whilst they have been lavished upon others far less deserving of them. Although hitherto overlooked, it must be consolatory to this officer to reflect, that, in the opinion of his fellow-soldiers, to him alone is to be attributed the successful termination of this affair.

Our loss amounted to 219 killed and wounded. The enemy left 500 men killed and wounded on the field. Lieutenant Tirrell of the 20th N. I. was the only officer killed. There was something in the fate of this young soldier which excited universal sympathy. With the most ardent desire to see service, at the distance of 500 miles from the scene of action, he had given up a staff appointment and volunteered to serve with the army. Pushing on by dark, he joined one of the corps which formed the rearguard of the army; but a spirit like his could not repose in a post like this. Applying to be removed, his wishes were gratified by being posted to a corps in front. Eager to distinguish himself, he obtained the command of a piquet on the hill, in front of the enemy. This was destined to be the scene of action, and it fell to his lot to repel the first fury of the assault: thus far he had been eminently fortunate. What situation could be more favourable to an as-

ring soldier, ambitious of distinction? But here, to the very hour which promised to realize his brightest hopes, he was doomed to perish.—He fell, covered with wounds, whilst nobly engaged in defending his post. The action of the 28th February convinced the Goorkhas of the futility of contending against British superiority. On the 3d March, the commander of their army requested permission to forward the treaty duly ratified. The British general replied, that it could not be expected that the English government would grant the same terms now as before the commencement of hostilities; but, at the same time, expressed a readiness to receive an envoy from the Nepaul state, if vested with full power to conclude a treaty. In the meantime he pushed on his approaches to within 500 yards of the fort of Muckwanpoor, and made every demonstration of a serious attack against the place. This determined conduct made a suitable impression on the enemy, the Nepaulese envoy having appeared and pressed the acceptance of the treaty which was negotiated at Segoulee. As the English general had previously determined upon accepting the treaty, peace was quickly reëstablished between the two states. The supreme government so far modified its terms, that it deemed it politic to cede a portion of the Terhae in lieu of the stipulated pensions—an arrangement which was acceded to by the Nepaul government. The Marquis of Hastings certainly evinced a laudable moderation and magnanimity in ratifying these terms.—When our superiority was so manifest, it was worthy of the national character that the hour of victory should be marked by a spirit of

conciliation. The intelligence of the cessation of hostilities was not received in a similar spirit by the army. It was contended that the whole of the Terrae should have remained in our possession, in order to establish a definite boundary, and that the fort of Muckwanpoor should have been ceded to us, that we might command a road to their capital, and thus effectually restrain any future encroachments. There was considerable weight in these reasonings; but they would seem insufficient to counterbalance the substantial advantages resulting from a treaty which put an end to a contest operating as a ruinous drain upon our finances, and which vindicated the national honour by obtaining the cession of the territory which led to the contest. All armies delight in war, especially when successful. The various employment it affords to the faculties of all, renders it far more interesting than the monotonous life of a cantonment. The more ardent spirits rejoice in the prospect which it affords them of rising to honour and distinction;—whilst the more worldly are powerfully agitated by the chances it presents of prize-money and promotion, and staff-appointments. The newsmonger, too, is eminently in his vocation, its triumphs and reverses affording him materials for interesting as well as profitable discussion. It must be admitted, however, that these personal interests, and agitating considerations, preclude, in a great measure, military men from forming a sound judgment in regard to negotiations for peace—their affections being enlisted on the other side. But the variety of service which the Bengal army went through in these campaigns, proved extremely beneficial in confirming its disci-

cline, and in developing the military talent of its officers. In the presence of an active and courageous enemy, it was indispensable that every precaution should be adopted in guarding against their attacks; whilst every faculty was called forth in endeavouring to overcome the obstacles which the nature of the country presented. War in the East having, in these more recent periods, assumed a new character, it was necessary to call in the superior science, and rigid application of its rules, as practised in the West, to command success. In the plains of Hindostan, it was only necessary to see the enemy, and to come in contact with his line, to ensure the victory. In the mountainous region of Nepaul, patience in supporting labour, and fortitude under privations, were to be endured, in sight of an enemy whom it was impossible to attack; and, even when an opportunity presented itself, the most adventurous courage and scientific movements would have failed at times in obtaining the mastery, had they not been supported by a prodigious superiority in artillery and powerful entrenchments. It is only in Nepaul that our arms have encountered that resistance which men, possessing a spark of courage or heroic resolution, should oppose to an invading enemy. From the paucity of officers, important commands were confided to captains and subalterns. This early training inspired them with a just confidence in their own power, and elicited talents which promised to be of service to the state in any future contest. Considering the known character of the Marquis of Hastings, it is perhaps superfluous to observe, that, where zeal and enterprize were signally

displayed, they were, generally speaking, justly distinguished and rewarded. On surveying the state of the belligerents on the conclusion of the war, it is apparent that the Governor-general had succeeded in his plan of humbling the Goorkha power, and of curbing their ambitious spirit. By the possession of the mountainous territory to the westward of the Gogra, its means of aggression were diminished in that quarter; whilst the protection afforded to the Sikkim Rajah, to the eastward, rendered it impossible to pursue their views of conquest in that direction, without coming into contact with the British power. The original ground of the war had been obtained by the cession of the contested territory. But these barren conquests were achieved at the waste of life and treasure greatly beyond their value; whilst the question still remains undecided, whether the object of the war might not have been obtained by a resolute determination to drive the Goorkhas from the disputed territory, combined with positive orders to resist the slightest aggression;—and thus the expense of a more extended scale of hostility might have been avoided. The expenses of this war were supported by a loan of two crores of rupees, or £2,500,000 from the Nabob of Oude.* This prince

* The wealth which his predecessor left at his decease has been estimated at eight or ten millions—a sum infinitely beyond what any European sovereign is known to have ever possessed. This may be exaggerated, but still it is not improbable. The late Nabob, Sandut Ulee, was excessively penurious, possessing a revenue of 1½ millions.—It would be no difficult matter to save 3 or 400,000 pounds annually; and this, in 16 years, the time that he remained upon the musnud, would amount to five or six millions. At all events, the fact is certain, that his successor lent 2½ millions to the Honourable Company at this period.

had just ascended the musnud, and, what was very convenient for us, possessed a full treasury. Like all Asiatics (who judge of others as they would act themselves, in similar circumstances), he must naturally have expected to be squeezed on his accession. To be requested only to lend his money must have therefore been very gratifying; at all events, there is no refusing a governor-general who is obliging enough to intimate such a wish. This generous devotion to our cause was rewarded by associating him in the honour and glory of the war. Being declared our ally, this warlike prince proclaimed to the world that he had drawn his sword purely to avenge the injuries done to his subjects. This magnanimous declaration astonished his people, who were in entire ignorance of the grievous outrages which had been perpetrated in their territory, until their prince announced them to the world; and who were only apprized, on the arrival of the Governor-general, that the state was on the eve of a contest. At the close of the war, his exertions were recompensed by the cession of that portion of the Terhae which skirts his territory, together with a district in Rohilcund, which was said to be acceptable to him.

These sacrifices were not purely disinterested on our part—this arrangement being beneficial to us, inasmuch as it liquidated one of the crores of rupees which his excellency had obliged us with. As it is generally understood, and sanctioned by Mr Prinsep, that the revenue of these districts was inadequate to the expenditure under our management, this must be acknowledged to be an admirable way of paying a debt. Since this period, in 1820, the

Vizier of Oude has assumed the regal dignity, under the title of King of Oude, which has been recognized by our government. It is difficult to divine the motives of Lord Hastings in acknowledging this self-created monarch, in alliance with the Emperor of Delhi, and outwardly regarding him as the supreme power in Hindostan, and his court as the centre from which all titles should emanate. With what regard to honour and good faith can we countenance (in direct opposition to his own) his assumption of royalty on the part of his superior? Is it from a regard to truth, that the British power is all-paramount, and that of the Emperor of Delhi an empty phantom? This would be the conduct of a noble mind, which disdained the childish, foolish, and insulting mockery which attempts to veil the real and substantial power which we possess in the East. Can there be any thing more degrading to a character possessing any elevation, than a pretended respect to a power which in reality does not exist? Is it from a regard to the independence of the native princes,—from a conviction that the British government possesses no control over their actions? Such a view of the matter would be in unison with the early part of Lord Hastings's political career, when he stood forth the protector of their rights, and advocated the Carnatic claims.

CHAPTER V.

MAHRATTA AND PINDAREE WAR.

General reflections on the erroneous opinions entertained in England respecting our ambitious policy in India, and the general rapacity of Europeans in the East.—The late Pindaree and Mahratta war occasioned by the aggressions of these States.—An account of the measures which were adopted for their repression, and the political arrangements which have resulted from the overthrow of these powers.—The conduct of Lord Hastings animadverted upon, for extending our subsidiary system to the Rajpoot States.—The general nature of our subsidiary alliances examined; and their marked injustice and impolicy maintained.—The personal character and administration of Lord Hastings contrasted with that of his predecessors, Lords Cornwallis and Wellesley.

In the year 1817, the Bengal government determined to call forth all its power, with the view of utterly extirpating the Pindaree hordes, and imposing a proper check on those states which supported them. Never was there a juster cause of war: a series of cruel and unprovoked attacks upon our territory compelled us to resort to arms. It was impossible that a government, professing to regard the welfare of its subjects, could remain insensible to their calls for protection; that it should suffer its fairest provinces to be ravaged, without making an effort to

avert the storm which burst periodically upon its territories, and overspread the land with calamity. And yet, with the knowledge that such savage atrocities were perpetrated by these miscreants, it is surprising that some of the purest of our public characters in England have withheld their sanction of this war in the senate, on the ground of insufficient information. This is unjust to their countrymen in the East. Surely it is fitting that they should cherish the same liberal feeling in judging of their actions, which they are accustomed to exercise towards the continental nations. In Europe, our most enlightened public writers have uniformly regarded our wars in the East as arising from a systematic spirit of aggrandizement on the part of government; and this stimulated to the utmost by a sordid thirst of wealth on the part of individuals. The splendid declamations of Burke, Fox, Raynal, &c. and the more philosophical reasonings of Mr Mill, have disposed the English public to think that our career has been altogether aggressive—that an unprincipled ambition has been the spring of our Indian policy—that the national character has been stained by the shameless rapacity of its agents—and that the injuries done to India are unredeemed by any of those institutions which bespeak a wish to raise it in the scale of civilization. The eloquent representations of these writers may be just; but it seems evident that their zeal in the cause of humanity, their detestation of oppression, has biassed their judgment, and disposed them to view the character of our Asiatic policy through an exaggerated medium. It is just that men of this stamp

(possessing a large and expansive benevolence), would advocate the cause of the weaker party, and it is a noble and disinterested use of the excelling faculties with which they have been endowed; but if the very nature of it has a tendency to warp the judgment, and to render them deaf to the reasonings of the other party, what pretensions have such men to hold the scales of justice? It has been the fate of our Asiatic statesmen, that their conduct has been judged by a speculative class of writers, who have formed an ideal theory of perfection, to which they expect that the actions of men should correspond. Tried by this *beau idéal* of political morality, our Asiatic policy has been found wanting, which has called forth the vituperations of the European philosophers. But the principle upon which they proceed is unjust. It is unfair that the conduct of men should be judged according to any preconceived standard of political morality. The only fair test to decide upon human character is to compare it with the actions of other men in similar circumstances, and in a like stage of society. It is in the political theatre as in private life: men may form to themselves a clear conception of what is right, but the operation of the passions prevents their acting up to this ideal conviction. Had these philosophers been guided by a spirit of impartiality, they would have made due allowance for the conduct of men who were compelled to act from the pressure of circumstances;—whom the urgency of the moment would allow no time for deliberation as to the remote bearings of their policy upon the happiness of other states, with whom self-preservation was law, and who were necessarily com-

pelled, at times, to prefer what is expedient to what is right. That exalted standard of political morality to which these philosophers refer, ought, undoubtedly, to be held forth to view by the public writer, that men may aspire to its imitation in practice; and it is just that the historian should mark, with moral indignation, how far a system of policy has fallen short of this theory of perfection. But this should be done with due allowance for circumstances, and the state of society in which men are compelled to act. This has been generally neglected by those who have written on India affairs; and it is rare to meet with a single writer who has not condemned the whole circle of our Asiatic policy, without discrimination. The history of the world affords no parallel to the surprising moral phenomena which accompanied the conquest of Bengal, except at the invasion of Mexico and Peru by those ambitious spirits whom the adventurous genius of Cortez and Pizarro had animated to these enterprises. In either case a small but heroic band, possessing superior military skill, courage, and conduct, overthrew mighty empires, with an ease which astonished the victors as much as the vanquished; and thus exhibited the most triumphant examples which the world has yet seen, of the prodigious advantages which superior civilization confers in a contest with states who are less advanced in the career of improvement. But here the parallel fails.—The possession of the opulent regions of Peru and Mexico was attained by the slaughter of millions; that of Bengal by the plunder of a few of its native rulers. Never did a powerful nation obtain the mastery

over a feeble people with less injury to the vanquished. The mass of our Indian population remained untouched in property, laws, religion. Thus far the comparison has been eminently favourable to our countrymen; but it may be objected, that this triumphant superiority in their conduct is solely to be ascribed to the prodigious advance which the world has made in civilization since the days of Cortez and Columbus. This must be admitted as the leading cause of the different phenomena; but the same objection cannot apply to a comparison instituted between the conduct of the modern French and that of our countrymen. In Germany, Italy, Spain, their career has been marked by severe exactions; whilst the plunder of the treasures of art—the intellectual glory of a people—has degraded their character in the eyes of civilized Europe. Other nations have conquered as it were by chance; but it was reserved to the French to organize a regular system of conquest. They gloried in the design of enslaving the human race; and, what is humiliating to reflect, the literary talents of the nation were prostituted in aid of this cause.—Their public writers advocated, with zeal, the probability of success in a scheme which would chain down the energies of the human intellect for ever. The career of the English, as a conquering people, has been altogether different. A handful of strangers amidst a vast people, it was only the entire loss of their property, and the massacre of their people, which forced them to arms.

It was then that the secret of their strength was revealed: The victory of Plassy displayed the supe-

riority of Europe over Asia, and the event of that day raised these commercial adventurers to the rank of monarchs. But there was no system, no plan in this: the force of circumstances led to it alone. Since then their territory has expanded into an immense empire; nor will it be denied that self-interest has had no share in this? As human nature is constituted, it would be in vain to deny it,—the consciousness of superior power, the intoxication of success, and even the desire to confer benefits, by a more enlightened system of government, having had all a tendency to increase our power. But this ambitious spirit operated imperceptibly, and in spite of us. A lawless scheme of conquest, or inordinate thirst of wealth, was at all times foreign to the views of our government. Had it even cherished such a design, what was to prevent its execution? To those who are acquainted with India, it must be manifest, that, at all times within the last 25 years, it would have been an easy matter for the British government to have rendered itself the entire master of India.

If the history of British India is viewed in a candid spirit, it will be found that some of our wars were forced upon us by the jealousies, caprices, and groundless suspicions of the native powers. Cherishing a rankling animosity against our power, an impatience of our superiority, and stimulated by that lawless passion for conquest which is characteristic of all Asiatics, they rushed into hostilities without calculating the consequences; and thus hastened their overthrow*. If this is a fair view of the

* It is not maintained that the conduct of the British government has been altogether immaculate; but that its career has not

subject, is it not cruel and unjust to reproach men with a system of policy which is belied by their actions? Does our knowledge of human nature lead us to believe, that the same people who have stood forth the undaunted opposers of this system in Europe, should exhibit, in Asia, the humiliating spectacle of a line of conduct entirely opposite in spirit and principle? If so, physical causes must have a prodigious influence in debasing the moral character.

It is to be hoped that a fair consideration of these reasonings will disabuse the English public from the erroneous judgment which they have formed of our Asiatic policy.

The rise of the Pindaree power it is superfluous to enter into minutely, after the able and accurate account which has been given by Mr Prinsep.* The existence of these bands is no new phenomenon in Asia. In a country fertile in revolutions, where the death of the sovereign stirred up every ambitious pretension amidst his family, and where the splendid prize for which they contended could only be won after the most cruel contests, which left the victor the master of a territory a prey to civil dissentions,—in which, the precautions necessary to secure himself in the centre of his power, rendered it impossible to exert a vigorous action in the extremities

been more profligate than that of the generality of European states, and that its general character has been glaringly misrepresented by the Whig orators.

* The writer has derived great information from the perusal of this work, in regard to the designs of the British government and the Pindarees, for which he expresses his obligations.

of his empire;—in such a state of society, it is not surprising that bands of adventurers should arise who respected no legitimate power,—to whom the contests of the rival princes were utterly indifferent,—whose only aim was plunder,—who had shook off every tie which linked them to humanity—and made war against society. The moral debasement of Asia is one great cause of this phenomenon. In a country whose inhabitants are devoid of patriotism—where the love of self is unallied with the more ennobling love of country—where brutal force tramples over the natural rights of mankind;—its demoralized population rush forward with alacrity to plunder their native villages, unchecked by any emotion of remorse or sorrow. Extending their range of mischief, their desolating progress is marked by a system of pillage and rapine which first lays their fairest provinces, and leaves their country a bleeding victim of the outrages of its sons. The contests between Scindeah and Holkar, for the mastery of the Mahratta empire, appear to have been the principal cause of the rise of the Pindaree power. Feeling the importance of their aid, these rival chieftains endeavoured to conciliate their favour by liberal grants of territory. In the year 1794, their principal leaders established themselves on the banks of the Nerbuddah; having obtained this tract of country by a special grant from Scindeah. Here, a permanent establishment had no effect in diminishing their appetite for plunder. At the beginning of the cold season, having arrayed their forces, they proceeded in their annual career of rapine and desolation. In the year 1800, their two leaders, Heroo and Burun,

died. Kureem Khan, a bold and enterprising adventurer, succeeded to the influence which they possessed over their followers. This chieftain adapted his policy to the times. In a period of commotion, when the services of his followers were in great demand, he was enabled to increase his power and consequence, by affording his aid at the precise period when the greatest sacrifices were cheerfully made to obtain it. In the commencement of his career he sided with Holkar, by whom his services were suitably recompensed. Altogether devoid of principle, he transferred his allegiance to Scindeah, with an alacrity characteristic of a genuine soldier of fortune. This defection was rewarded by bestowing on him the title of Nuwab, with a suitable grant of territory. Pursuing his career of aggrandizement, he increased his possessions, by interfering in the civil affairs of Bhopal, and by affording his aid in the contest between this state and the Najpoor Rajah.

The wars which ensued between Scindeah and the British court was admirably suited to the genius of Kureem Khan. Profiting by circumstances, he had determined to exalt himself at the expense of the weaker party. This laudable design was pursued with such success, that, at the end of the war, he had wrested from Scindeah a territory yielding a revenue of 15 lacs. Thus far he had been eminently successful. Superior energy of character had enabled him to attain the supremacy amidst his rivals, and to elevate his band of marauders to the character of a permanent power. Pursuing an undeviating system of conquest, it is remarkable that he never forgot the original object of their confed-

eration. Intent upon increasing his territory, he still had leisure to plan those desultory incursions which enriched his followers, and increased their number. But still there is something unstable in Asiatic greatness. The rising power of this enterprising chieftain excited the fear of Scindeeah. With profound craft he invited him to an interview, professing the utmost regard for his person.

The dupe of these attentions, Kureem Khan repaired to his camp: when once in his power, this perfidious prince, with the characteristic treachery of a Mahratta, seized upon his person, and plundered his camp. The imprisonment of Kureem Khan diminished the power of his band; it was reduced to 2 or 3000 horse. A rival chief, Cheetoo, succeeded to that power and influence which he possessed. In the year 1811, Kureem Khan purchased his release for six lacs of rupees, and beheld himself once more at the head of those marauders who constituted his pride and power. The fame of his military reputation attracted a crowd of adventurers to his standard; and, thus strengthened, he was enabled to retake the greater part of his former possessions, in the course of a few months. Elated with this rapid success, the ambitious spirit of this successful soldier rose with circumstances. At this period he formed the design of effecting a general combination of the Pindarees, with the view of plundering the rich and defenceless city of Nagpoor. At their annual festival, he addressed them in animated language, laying open to their view the glorious prospect of a rich harvest of plunder, and exposing the defenceless state of Nagpoor. This description in-

flamed their passions, and roused them to the adventure; but the mean jealousy of Chetoo defeated the enterprize. Unable to brook the superiority of Kureem Khan, he retired with his force, and thus ruined a design which had every prospect of success. Irritated at the failure of this plan, the genius of Kureem Khan was stimulated to a more hazardous undertaking.—As yet, the rich and fertile regions of British India had remained untouched, the dread of our power having proved their safety. The boundless prospect of wealth had awakened their cupidity, but the hazards of the enterprize had subdued their courage. This adventurous soldier was the first to break the spell which bound their faculties. In the year 1812, he planned an expedition against the British territory, and, passing through Rewah, his force entered the Merzapoor frontier, proceeding within 30 miles of the rich city of Benares. They then turned towards Gyah, another seat of Hindoo superstition, and retired by that frontier, loaded with wealth and unbroken in numbers, having accomplished this inroad without encountering a single British soldier. Their progress was marked by the accustomed routine of spoliation and outrage. This successful incursion exposed the defenceless state of our frontier. At this period, indeed, and at the point of the irruption, there was no corps of cavalry within 150 miles, nor infantry within 50 miles. The bold character of this exploit ought certainly to have challenged the admiration of his countrymen, but it only served to rouse the hatred of his rivals; and Kureem Khan was again destined to undergo the vicissitudes of fortune, Scindeah having dispatched a powerful army with orders to crush him entirely. With his usual gal-

lantry, Kureem marched out to meet his enemy; but the treacherous defection of his rival Chetoo ruined his cause, and he was compelled to fly and seek refuge in the camp of Umeer Khan, also a soldier of fortune. Here he remained until 1810. Chetoo, in the meantime, contrived once more to resume his ascendancy over the Pindarees, and became absolute master of their movements. This chieftain distinguished himself by no enterprise of moment until the year 1815, when he projected an expedition against the Nizam's dominions and the adjacent British territory. This incursion was accomplished with complete success. The rise of a river prevented the devastation of the British territory, but the plunder collected in the Nizam's dominions was immense. The booty which these plunderers had amassed stimulated the passions of their companions; and another expedition was planned, with the design of plundering the Madras territory. This force, 10,000 strong, penetrated our frontier in the Masulipatam district. It is painful to contemplate the extensive misery and distress which resulted from this inroad. The very first day they marched 38 miles, plundering, on the line of their route, 92 villages; and the second day, after a march of the like distance, they destroyed 54 villages, subjecting the inhabitants to the severest tortures to compel them to discover their wealth. Arriving at Guntoor, a civil station, they plundered the houses of the inhabitants; but the government treasure was protected by the exertions of a handful of troops. The next day they marched 52 miles westward. After remaining 12 days in the Company's dominions, they recrossed the Kistna, and retired with impunity. This frightful picture

of ravage and cruelty must ever mark a Pindaree incursion as the greatest scourge of humanity. How consolatory to reflect, that the progress of civilization has rescued Europe from similar outrages. In the years 1816-1817, their depredations were carried on on a much more extensive scale, extending across the whole peninsula of India, and more especially directed against those provinces which had escaped the ravage of the preceding year. The campaign was chequered with various success on their part; two of their largest divisions having received a severe chastisement from the respective divisions of Majors Lushington and M'Dowall, whilst a third division, which had penetrated to Ganjam and plundered the town, was intercepted on its return and entirely discomfited. A similar fate attended a division which attempted to penetrate the Bundelkhund frontier. The most striking military feature of these encounters, is the immense superiority which our cavalry possessed over that of the enemy, even in that which is supposed to constitute their peculiar excellence, the power of making long marches. On referring to the events of this year, it will be found, that, after performing marches of 60, 70, 80 miles, within the 24 hours, our troops were enabled to come up with the enemy, and inflict their merited chastisement. Such marches as the Bengal and Madras native cavalry accomplished in this campaign, are altogether unparalleled in Europe.

At this period the Bengal government determined to exert all its strength, in the attempt to crush these predatory hordes; but, before adverting to

these preparations, it will be necessary to estimate the strength of the Pindaree power. The different chieftains who had established themselves on the Nerbuddah (and recognized Chetoo as their head), could muster a force of 35,000 horse. Independent of this formidable array, another power had sprung up in the west of India, differently constituted, but actuated by the same predatory spirit. The decline of the authority of the Holkar family under an imbecile regency was the signal for those ambitious spirits who aimed at independence, to emancipate themselves from its control. Umeer Khan and Muhumud Khan, distinguished commanders in their service, embraced the opportunity of establishing an independent and distinct authority. Their forces were of a much superior character to those of the Pindarees; their infantry, in particular, having been trained and disciplined on the European model, surpassed that of any native power, whilst their artillery was respectable. They had also introduced the use of horse-artillery with success. The amount of their forces was not less than 30,000 men. The views of these chieftains were entirely distinct from those of the Pindarees; instead of preying upon the population at large, they directed their force against all established governments who were unable to resist their power, exacting regular contributions on the same principle as those legitimate freebooters, Scindeah and Holkar. In the year 1814, the death of Muhumud Khan left this force under the entire command of Umeer Khan. Possessing an efficient army, the views of this ambitious leader were solely directed to personal aggrandizement. His first attempt in this pur-

unit, in 1810, was foiled by the interference of the British government. As yet, this adventurous soldier had respected our boundary; but, possessing no territory, nor existence as a political power, what reliance could be placed upon his moderation? At the head of an army whose sole vocation was plunder, every thing might be gained, and nothing risked, by a sudden irruption which would abandon our territory to his followers. Whether in peace or war, the same precautions were necessary to be adopted against a power of this description. Such was the state of India in 1817. There existed in its bosom a body of 70,000 men who were solely devoted to deeds of rapine and cruelty; in whom every manly feeling was extinct, who shrunk from the perils of an equal contest, and who preyed upon the weak, the lowly, and the industrious, wringing from them their wretched pittance by the most excruciating tortures,—men whose hearts were steeled against every human affection, and brutified by crime. Unrestrained by principle, or good faith, they made war against civil society, and threatened its existence. Their confederation might be described as an array of the evil passions of mankind against those principles which constitute its well-being and its pride. A moral pest like this could no longer be endured; and the hour was arrived when every civilized government was required to stand forth in defence of social order. If this community was suffered to exist, the fair prospect of happiness which dawned upon India, from the superior civilization of Europe, would be clouded for ever. A successful irruption within our boundary might excite a general combi-

nation of Mahrattas and Pindarees, who, sweeping our territory annually, would enfeeble our commanding attitude, and limit our exertions entirely to self-defence; and thus retard the march of human improvement. A defensive system had entirely failed in checking their inroads.—Penetrating our line in various points, they had committed extensive depredations, and baffled pursuit. A prodigious expense was incurred annually by a precautionary system of defence, with no commensurate benefit. Thus, the most imperious motives called upon the government to resort to arms; and, had it neglected this duty, it would have justly incurred a high measure of odium. It is delightful to contemplate moderation and self-denial in the conduct of those who are intrusted with power. Accordingly, at this period (in 1815), the policy of Lord Hastings was marked by a degree of forbearance and self-command which are rare amongst statesmen. Subduing that just impulse which prompted an immediate appeal to arms, he determined to await the sanction of the supreme authorities in England, before commencing offensive operations.

To a high-minded soldier there could have been no resolution more trying than to restrain that impatience of insult characteristic of his profession, and, what was far more difficult, to sacrifice the fair opportunity which was presented of acquiring that fame and glory so seducing to those who possess power, and so apt to bias their public conduct. His behaviour in this instance affords a signal refutation to those who have charged our Asiatic policy with a systematic spirit of aggression.

In September 1816, instructions were received from England, which authorized the Governor-general to expel the Pindarees from the territory which they had usurped in Malwa and Saugor, with a power to make such arrangements with the neighbouring chieftains as would prevent their reëstablishment. This limited policy fell far short of the extensive views which the Governor-general had planned. On the spot, and regarding the political phenomena of India with intense interest, the mind of Lord Hastings was better enabled to penetrate the cause of the morbid eruptions which disturbed its tranquillity, and to adapt a remedy to the distempered state of society. The evil existed in the want of a supreme and controlling power, possessing a decided superiority in character and resources, which, interposing its authority, could organize a league of the different states;—the primary object of whose confederation should be the preservation of the public tranquillity, by uniting their efforts to crush the lawless banditti who were let loose upon society. *2dly*, The entire dislocation of political society in central India, the perpetual contests for power and dominion which it exhibited, rendered it necessary that there should be some definite boundary which would restrain the pretensions of the rival parties; and, by offering the guarantee of their respective possessions, and binding the members of the league to respect their mutual territories, there appeared a fair prospect of restoring tranquillity to these troubled regions. The commanding attitude of the British government naturally pointed it out as the only power which could organize this league,

and which possessed sufficient authority to enforce the decrees of this Asiatic congress. Such were the views which were entertained by Lord Hastings, as indispensable to the erection of a permanent political system in central India. The breaking up of the Mussulmen empire—the decline of the power of Scindeah and Holkar, had removed every efficient check, and rendered central India a vast theatre of anarchy and misrule. Possessing no government which could control the malignant and predatory character of its population, there existed an imperious call that Britain should step forward and protect the rights of outraged humanity.

By pursuing the united plan which the supreme authorities in England had directed, a temporary check would have been given to the Pindaree power. Driven from their haunts in Malwa and Saugor, their connexion with Scindeah and Holkar would assure them an asylum from whence they would renew their incursions upon our territory. Thus, a temporary expedient of this nature would have altogether failed; the nature of the evil requiring that these hordes should be utterly extirpated, and that those states who had hitherto supported them should unite in their suppression, or consider themselves as enemies to the British government. In conformity to these views, it was announced to the Mahratta states that they could not be suffered to remain neutral; that the period was arrived when it was incumbent upon them either to join in the league for the extirpation of these miscreants, or to risk the hostility of the British government. At the same time, it was intimated to the independent states of

Rajpootana and Bhopal, that they would be included in the league, on consideration of paying a moderate sum to the British government, to defray the expense of their protection. In this deviation from the line of conduct which had been marked out by the supreme authorities in England, the Governor-general declared to his council that he took the entire responsibility upon himself.

Before adverting to the plan of the campaign, I shall proceed to throw out a few remarks respecting the line of policy which the Governor-general pursued. The conception of a grand confederation of states, the sole objects of whose union should be the repression of the irregular ambition of its members, and the preservation of general tranquillity, could only have originated with a mind which had been accustomed to take a large and comprehensive view of human affairs—a system of policy known in Europe under the name of the balancing system, and which has operated successfully at times in checking the career of unprincipled aggrandizement. Its application to India, as a subject of political experiment, must be regarded as the leading characteristic of Lord Hastings's administration. The motives of Lord Hastings, in forming this union, appear to have been of the purest nature. Feeling an ardent desire to rescue mankind from the cruel disorders of which it was the victim, he hastened to offer the aid of the British government in organizing a system which would utterly crush those turbulent and rapacious spirits who convulsed the whole frame of society in central India. Conscious of the superiority we possessed over these nations, what more noble use

could we make of our power than in healing those wounds which its demoralized population had inflicted upon their country? Could the influence of superior reason be more beneficially exerted than in calming those dissentions which agitated the native states against each other, and in exhibiting to them a purity and disinterestedness in our public conduct which they might aspire to imitate? This was the policy best befitting the high character of England—and, as the interposition of the British government was offered to the larger states unaccompanied by the usual requisition of a subsidy, or a demand that an armed force should be stationed within their dominions, it is but fair to ascribe these benevolent views to the general cast of his Lordship's policy. The principle, however, which was applied of compelling all the native states to join in the operations against the Pindarees, appears of a more questionable nature; but, considering the avowed connexion which subsisted between Scindeah and Holkar and the Pindaree leaders, and that these chieftains availed themselves of the services of their bands, and abetted their incursions, it was but just that they should be called upon to unite in their suppression, or share their fate. The case was different with the other states. As enemies of civilized society, it was unquestionably their duty to array themselves against the Pindarees—but then, it may be asked, what right had we to compel them? And, if we apply the principles of European international law to our conduct in India, would not this be regarded as a violation of national independence, and an abuse of might over weakness? Compulsory aid is weakness;—and,

even if substantial strength, is it to be weighed in the balance against that real power which an adherence to justice and moderation inevitably creates? This conduct could only be justified on the principle that these powers could not withstand the Pindarees, and that their resources would be employed against our power. This is possible, but improbable. The safety of the Pindarees consisted in flight, not in organizing a systematic resistance: if they once halted, they were lost. The policy pursued towards the Rajpootana and Bhopal states, by which they were only to be included in the confederation of states on the condition of paying a tribute to the British government for their protection, appears to me to be of a very objectionable character. It stained the purity of our motives, and exposed our policy to the charge of aggrandizement, and was altogether at variance with that disinterestedness so loftily assumed.

It is time to advert to the plan of the campaign, which was formed on the most extensive scale. The entire disposable force of the three presidencies was ordered into the field, and presented a magnificent display of the resources of the British power.—At least 100,000 regular troops, and 20,000 irregulars, were destined to act against the Pindarees. On the side of Hindostan, four divisions, under the personal command of Lord Hastings, were prepared to act offensively, whilst two divisions were reserved to guard our frontier. On the Madras and Bombay frontier, the Commander-in-chief (General Hislop) was directed to prepare four divisions for active operations, reserving a fifth division to defend our

territory. Advancing simultaneously, and on a widely-extended base, this powerful force was destined to sweep the whole of central India, and, gradually converging to a centre, to hem in the Pindarees within the different divisions, and thus ensure their destruction. Possessing a vast superiority in force, this plan was well adapted for carrying it into action. On the 16th October 1817, Lord Hastings assumed the command of the grand army, which immediately advanced against Scindeah's capital. This chieftain had manifested the utmost reluctance to join in the league against the Pindarees, whose depredations he had supported, that he might secure their services in the pursuit of his own selfish views. Thus situated, he identified his interests with theirs, and viewed the designs of the British government as altogether inimical to his power. With these feelings, it was necessary to employ force to bend him to our will.—and the appearance of a powerful British army compelled him to unite in the suppression of the predatory powers. To effect this important object, he was required to furnish 5,000 horse, whose services were entirely at the disposal of the British government, and under the control of a British officer. The hostile spirit of this prince rendered it necessary that we should possess some security against a breach of his engagements; and, for this purpose, the cession of the forts of Asseirghur and Hindeah was demanded during the war. To this demand the Maharajah acceded with the greatest reluctance, and it was only the overwhelming superiority of our power which compelled acquiescence. Thus, by the

prompt and energetic policy of the Governor-general, the principal Mahratta state was forced to unite in the extirpation of its lawless partizans. That formidable people, who contended with us for the sovereignty of Hindostan in the plains of Delhi and Laswaree, were reduced to humble themselves before our power. The conduct of the British government, in the policy which was pursued with this state, requires no justification. Affording an asylum to these freebooters,—abstaining from punishing their atrocities, and enlisting them in its service,—could it be regarded in any other light than as a kindred power, animated by the same spirit; and thus exposed to the vengeance of civilized society? At this very period, and prior to the signature of the treaty, a correspondence had been detected between this prince and the court of Nepaul, wherein he exhorted that state to make common cause against the English government. In these circumstances, we are only left to admire the dignified moderation which pervaded the Governor-general's conduct.* The measures of Lord Hastings were crowned with the same success in the negotiations with Umeer Khan, the Patan general. Perceiving the hopelessness of the contest, this fortunate soldier agreed to disband this army, on condition that the British government should guarantee the integrity of the territories which he held under a grant from the Holkar family. By this arrangement, a compact and well-ordered force of 30,000 men, devoted to purposes of

* A similar circumstance afforded Lord Wellesley a pretext for assuming the dominion of the Carnatic.

oppression and plunder, were compelled to abandon these lawless pursuits, and to begin a career more favourable to the interests of society. With an ardent desire to improve the character of this body, and a wish to change their predatory habits, the British government made an offer of lands to such as were willing to embrace this occupation; whilst the more warlike and turbulent spirits were taken directly into our military service. This successful treaty accomplished the liberation of 30,000 men from this force. Their deliverance filled them with unbounded joy, and inspired a noble confidence in the future.—But their hopes were not realized.

Thus far the most entire success had attended the execution of the Governor-general's plans; but at this period the political horizon was strangely overcast. The sudden intelligence of the revolt of the Peishwa, and the defection of the Nagpore Rajah, burst upon the public like some grand convulsion of nature. Kept in entire ignorance of the policy of our government, and led to believe that these states reposed with confidence and gratitude under the shade of British protection, they were deceived by the profound calm, and gazed with wonder at the unexpected phenomena. The causes of this hostility appear to have been an impatience of that political control to which they were subject,—a thorough dislike of that officious interference which delighted in giving advice on the internal regulation of their states,—a detestation of that superiority which they regarded as a usurpation of their natural rights,—and a determination to embrace the first opportunity of emancipating themselves from this hated subjection.

These predisposing causes to disaffection were inflamed by the intelligence which they received of the warlike preparations of the British government. Cherishing a rooted distrust of our intentions, and naturally disposed to think that our policy was equally ambitious with their own, they could only conceive that this immense force was destined to subvert their remaining power, and were thus stimulated to make a grand effort to avert their utter extinction. Under these impressions, the Peishwah proceeded to organize a general confederacy against our power. The hostile disposition of Scindeah, Holkar, the Nagpoor Rajah, and the hesitating alliance of the Nizam, rendered them eager to enter into the league; but their habitual disunion, jealousies, and want of political foresight rendered it impossible to cement a well compacted union. The superior energy and political sagacity of Europe were again destined to triumph over the imbecility of Asia. Their conduct betrayed a signal want of plan and concert. Instead of exploding this array of hostility, at a season when our force was scattered in cantonments and altogether unprepared for the contest, they chose to display their sagacity by commencing hostilities at a period when we possessed powerful armies in the field, and when the principal member of the confederacy (Scindeah) was compelled to yield to this overwhelming superiority. The desperate but unsuccessful efforts of the Peishwa, and the Nagpoor Rajah, to expel the English forces from their capitals, were altogether foiled by the signal gallantry of these troops. The arrival of reinforcements enabled our commanders to drive these

princes from their territories, and to render themselves masters of their dominions: As if fortune had conspired in our favour, the advance of the army of Holkar, to aid the Peishwah, enabled us to crush the confederacy at a blow. The brilliant success of the Madras army at Mehudpoor prostrated that power. The operations against the Pindarees had been attended with a like effect—their different bands were altogether dispersed, killed or taken prisoners; and their distinguished leaders had either perished or thrown themselves upon the mercy of the British government. Thus, in one short campaign, the magnificent and comprehensive plans of the Governor-general had been carried into execution with the most brilliant effect. The events of this war bring to our recollection the bright days of Lawrence, and Coote, and Clive, when the superior genius and enterprise of these leaders displayed in the result of a well-fought day, enabled them to cast down and erect kingdoms, transfer the possession of power to different dynasties, and regulate the destiny of millions. In this eventful contest the power of the Mahratta states had been irretrievably broken, with scarcely a struggle—the predatory bands had been swept from the face of the earth, and the hostile attempts of the protected states, to shake off our alliance, had been altogether crushed. At this proud moment, the British state had risen to a loftier pinnacle of worldly grandeur than it had ever yet attained: the vast continent of India lay prostrate at its feet. It is ardently to be desired that the exercise of justice and moderation in its government will strengthen and secure this

preternatural power, and prevent its rulers from being dazzled by their dangerous elevation.*

It now remains to give some account of the political state of India at the conclusion of this war, and to examine the propriety of the measures which were adopted to secure its prosperity. The principal feature of these arrangements, is the incorporation of the Peishwah's territory within our own dominions, with the exception of lands, which yield a revenue of 15 or 16 lacs of rupees, reserved to form a distinct sovereignty for the Rajah of Satarah. The territory assumed by the British government, in this quarter, is estimated to produce a net revenue of 50 lacs. The determination of the Governor-general to annihilate the authority of this prince, appears to have been decided by the systematic spirit of hostility which he had invariably evinced to our power. The formidable confederacy which he organized against the British state rendered it impossible to repose any confidence in such rooted enmity. This conduct, according to Lord Hastings, was prompted by no ambitious policy. There was no design to provoke the Peishwah to hostility, with a view to seize his territory: it originated solely from a regard to self-preservation. With an enemy of this character there could be no choice between his extirpation or perpetual danger to our existence as a state. The elevation of the Satarah Rajah to a distinct sovereignty is an act of quite a different character. Considered in a selfish point of view, it is

* The military events of this campaign having been fully described by other writers, renders it superfluous to enter into any detail.

surprising that we should erect a dependent power (with the exception of diminished resources), precisely similar in character to that which we had overthrown. Reasoning upon the general principles of human nature, does not experience tend to make us to expect the same results from such an unequal union,—suspicion, treachery, and revolt? The ancient family had declined for several generations. The descendants of an unprincipled freebooter, who had gained these territories by force, the same weapon had deprived his family of them: thus, there existed no moral or abstract right to their dominions. This arrangement has been defended on the principle, that the Mahratta people entertained a profound respect for their ancient rulers; and that a regard for established opinions demanded the re-establishment of this power. This enthusiastic attachment to legitimacy is altogether at variance with the character of these plunderers; and contradicted by the fact, that the different Peishwahs have usurped the functions of sovereignty for 50 or 60 years past, without the slightest danger to their power from the pretensions of this family. As an act of pure benevolence, there is something in the idea of raising a fallen family which powerfully excites the imagination, and commands our sympathy; but, with more profound regard for this feeling, mankind are much disposed to respect that comprehensive philanthropy which regards the welfare of a nation, instead of that of a particular family. Had the British government employed the resources which the overthrow of the Peishwah had thrown into its power, in meliorating the condition of the Mahrattah people, instead of

squandering this wealth upon a particular family, they would have established their power upon a much more certain basis than the gratitude of princes. The defection of the Nagpoor Rajah was punished by requiring the cession of half his territory; whilst the right to interfere in the internal management of his dominions was positively stipulated by treaty.

The justification of this policy must rest precisely on the same grounds as that pursued towards the Peishwah. The spirit of Appa Sahib revolting against this humiliating subjection, and threatening hostility, the British government were compelled to depose him, and to elevate his grandson to the musnud. At present, this state may be considered as entirely under British influence; the minority of the Rajah incapacitating him from taking an efficient part in public affairs. The government is principally conducted by the British resident. At the commencement of the war, the court of Holkar was altogether independent of the British government. Its unprovoked aggression threw their territories into our power.—Assuming a right to dispose of them, on the principle of the law of conquest, the bulk of their territory was bestowed upon our allies, the Rajahs of Kotah and Bundee. The early submission of that unprincipled freebooter, Umeer Khan, was rewarded by a grant of lands, at the expense of his ancient masters. These cessions reduced its revenue to 20 lacs of rupees. Independent of these conditions, this court was compelled to receive a subsidiary force within its territories; and to maintain a contingent of 13,000 horse, at the call of the British

government. Thus, this formidable power, which had overrun our territory, in 1804–5; baffled the pursuit of our armies; and rendered the English government eager to enter into peace,—was left, at the close of this contest, in a humiliating state of vassalage. The Rajah of Bhopal was received within the circle of our protection, on the condition of paying a fixed tribute; but, in consideration of his eminent services during the war, this objectionable article was waved in the permanent treaty. The arrangements with the Rajpoot states were fixed on the principle, that any tribute which had been paid to the Mahrattas, or Umeer Khan, should be transferred to the British government; in consideration of which it engaged to protect them. At the same time, a right of political control was assumed over these states. They were restricted from forming any connexion with any other power; and pledged to refer their internal disputes to the arbitration of our government.* The different states, Oodepoor, Joudhpoor, Kotah, Boondee, Bikaneer, and Jeypoor, agreed to these terms, but with manifest reluctance. The dread inspired by a powerful army within their territory appears to have shackled their free agency.

On referring to Mr Prinsep's historical narrative

* The history of conquest is nearly similar in every age. Montesquieu has remarked, that the Romans always reserved to themselves the right of arbitrating the disputes of the princes or states whom they had conquered:—"De plus, lorsqu'ils avoient vaincu quelque prince considérable, ils mettoient dans le traité qu'il ne pourroit faire la guerre, pour ses differends, avec les allies des Romains, c'est à dire, ordinairement, avec tous ses voisins; mais, qu'il les mettoit en arbitrage: ce qui lui ôtoit, pour l'avenir, la puissance militaire."—*Grandeur et Décadence des Romains*, chap. vi.

it appears, that the powerful states of Jeypoor, Kotah, and Bikaneer, did not send in persons empowered to treat, until the months of January, February, and March. At this period the power of the Pindarees, Mahrattas, and Patans, had been altogether broken, so that there existed no cause for pressing these alliances, the original pretext having disappeared. The disinclination of the court of Jeypoor to the alliance was so marked, that Mr Prinsep positively states that it was only the approach of Sir David Ochterlony's army to his capital, and the show of making terms with his feudatories, which induced them to come to terms.* It is infinitely to be regretted that

* Mr Prinsep states:—"The negotiation fell into the same hands as had conducted the conference of 1816; but the personal indecision of the Rajah was such, that the negotiators did not make their appearance at Delhi until the middle of February; and probably even a further delay would have been experienced had not the Rajah begun to take alarm at the engagement concluded with Umeer Khan, and had not this apprehension been quickened by the approach of Sir David Ochterlony to his capital, and by a show of making terms with his feudatories, which threatened to detach them for ever from their allegiance. Fearing now to be left completely in the lurch, the principal people of the court were dispatched to Delhi in all haste, along with the deputation appointed to negotiate; and after much discussion the terms were at length agreed upon, though the treaty was not actually signed until the 2d of April, 1818."—*Historical Narrative*, p. 433. It is evident from this statement, that, prior to the signature of this treaty, an engagement had been concluded with Umeer Khan, which relieved Jeypoor from the predatory force which threatened it. The state of Jeypoor had always been independent, and owed no tribute either to Mahrattas or Patans. Since the conclusion of this treaty the Rajah has died, which caused a disputed succession, the decision of which was referred to the British government. The arbitration of this latter power was somewhat different from what is customary in private

this conduct should have been pursued. Professing to regulate our actions by principles of justice and morality, the advance of General Ochterlony's division was altogether inconsistent with their exercise. The attempt to subvert the allegiance of the feudatories of Jeypoor can only be regarded as a violation of those principles of national independence which we have uniformly professed to support. It is the introduction of our power into Rajpootana which has tarnished the glory which would otherwise have resulted from the magnanimity and disinterestedness displayed in our conduct throughout the war.

In this instance our armies appeared in these states,—not to raise up prostrate humanity, but to collect that tribute which the cruel exactions of the Mahrattas had extorted from their people. The quota to the British government was fixed precisely on the same scale. A change had occurred, but principally in name: the humiliating consciousness of subjection still remained. God forbid that I should assert that this connexion was in the end deliberately forced upon them.—No: the circumstances in which they were placed compelled them to subject themselves to our power. Excluded from the pale of the league, and exposed to the irregular ambition of the confederates, there remained no resource but admitting the British armies. The interposition of the

life. If I recollect right, the gallant battalions of Sir David Ochterlony were called in to support the argument of the British government in favour of the person whose cause it espoused—at least they assisted at the ceremony of his elevation to the musnud. In truth, we exercised the right of sovereignty in determining the succession.

British government in the affairs of the larger states can only be regarded as a noble and disinterested exercise of our power: no subsidy, no concession humiliating to their national dignity was demanded. Why not preserve the same exalted conduct to the smaller states? Surely their abject and prostrate condition, their utter inability to come in contact with our power, established a stronger claim to our generosity. This arrangement with the Rajpoot states can only be justified on the principle, that they were utterly unable to protect themselves—that, possessing independent authority, if they solicited a connexion with the British state, it was at liberty to prescribe its own terms—and, if acceded to by the other party, there could be no stain upon our character in forming this alliance. If such were the circumstances, the justification of the British government would appear to be complete.—But how stands the case? At the period when this arrangement was finally concluded, the energetic policy of the Governor-general had entirely crushed that powerful force under Umeer Khan which preyed upon these states, whilst the most complete success had attended the operations against the Pindarees. The irresistible display of our power had swept them from the face of the land. Thus, there remained no predatory force to disturb central India, and there existed no pretext for asserting that the Rajpoot states were unable to protect themselves themselves. Where was the enemy? At liberty to breathe, after a cruel period of suffering, in the first joy of their deliverance they cherished the fond hope of resuming their rank as independent states, and their admission into the confederation of

powers under the protection of the British government would have enabled them to assume this proud attitude. But these bright visions were sadly overcast; the determination of the British government to mark their admission into the league by the introduction of an armed force into their country, extinguished every ambitious hope, and left them to mourn over their lost independence.

It has been represented, that these states entertained the most anxious desire to obtain our protection. To me it appears quite otherwise: it is only necessary to read the impartial narrative of Meer Munsep to be convinced that they cherished a rooted dislike to our power. Placed between two evils—the brutal and systematic oppression of Umeer Khan, and the protection of the British government—nothing could drive them to form a permanent alliance with us. Exposed for years to his merciless exactions, with his army at their gates, they still temporized; and it was only the presence of a British army at their capital, with their exclusion from the league, which induced them to solicit our connexion. In such circumstances they could scarcely be considered as free agents. With the profound distrust which they entertained of our intentions, the display of force was injudicious.—Habituated to its abuse, and accustomed to bend before its influence, they could only regard its appearance with fear. It is manifest, from the whole of their conduct, that they dreaded a subsidiary alliance with the British state as subversive of their independence,—that, in comparison with the Mahrattas and Pindarees, they regarded us as a more moral, scientific, and enlightened race of freebooters; but

the more to be feared on that account, from the superior skill and ability which we displayed in the support of our power;—that they preferred submitting to the exactions of the former as likely to be temporary, whilst they avoided any connexion with the British state, as tending to establish a permanent evil.* In truth it is in vain to deny it; our power is disliked. Human nature in any shape revolts at

* The opinion here expressed is formed from a careful perusal of the 2d and 4th chapters of what may be termed Mr Prinsep's official narrative of the negotiations with the Nabob of Bhopal and the Rajah of Jeypoor, in 1815–1816, to induce them to receive a subsidiary force. In noticing the failure of the latter, he says,—"The indifference manifested by the Durbar of Jeypoor, on this occasion, to the advantages attending a closer union with the British, is perhaps in part attributable to the general reluctance felt by the petty independent princes to make any indissoluble alliances on terms apparently calculated to interfere with the unrestrained latitude of political action they had hitherto enjoyed. All our alliances with states of this description have necessarily a character of dependence on their part, and on that account are not very palatable. Yet a more obvious mode of accounting for the disinclination experienced on this occasion may be found in the actual circumstances of the internal government of Jeypoor. The whole territory was parcelled out into hereditary tenures of the nature of the fiefs or baronies of the feudal system. Over these the Rajah, a weak man, had much about the same degree of influence and authority as was possessed by the weakest of the kings of England, when the same system prevailed in that country. No member of this aristocracy, however, would willingly exchange a state of things which leaves so wide an opening to his hopes and ambition, for the perpetual repose and tranquillity that must result from the introduction of our influence."—*Historical Narrative*, p. 150, 151. In regard to the failure of the negotiation with the Nawaub of Bhopal, he makes nearly similar observations.

subjection. Such being the case, a regard to [illegible] licacy and national honour should have restrained Lord Hastings from offering this alliance; this alone was wanting to complete the unity of the conduct. Have not the perfidious revolt of the Peishwah, the unexpected defection of the Nagpore Rajah, and the vacillating policy of the Nizam taught Lord Hastings that such unequal alliances are detrimental to both parties; and that impatience of our superiority, hatred of subjection, and the inextinguishable love of freedom which exist even in despotic Asia, impel the weaker parties to embrace the first opportunity of throwing off the galling chain of dependence? And yet, after reading the frank and manly exposition of his motives to this policy, it is impossible to doubt the purity of his motives. Deceived as to the general wishes of the people, and entertaining an ardent hope that the mild and regulated sway of the British government would rescue these regions from the cruel rapacity of Umeer Khan, and that anarchy and misrule which its turbulent aristocracy had engendered, he entered into this alliance; and its completion he regards with delight as the mightiest good which had been achieved by the interposition of our power. In this instance, no selfish consideration—no prospect of national advantage, seduced him into the path of aggrandizement, but a fervent desire to benefit mankind. This has often been the case. Half the misery of mankind has arisen from the attempts of conquerors to meliorate their condition against their will. This is grievous (but unintentional) injustice.

The will of a nation is sacred. We have no right to do evil that good may result from it. Let us apply the case to ourselves.—Nothing can be more natural than that the enlightened and pious prince, the Emperor of the Russias, should entertain a wish to reform the demoralized habits of our Asiatic population, and that he should send an army on this laudable mission; but, with all our zeal to improve the natives, would we allow these warlike reformers free ingress into our territory? His lordship will be startled at being compared to Bonaparte; but he too was a philanthropic conqueror.—Witness his abolition of the Inquisition in Spain, and his benevolent design of conquering the British Isles, purely to rescue mankind from our commercial avarice.

Our relations with Scindeah remain apparently in the same state. This is the only independent power which exists in India; but the influence of this chieftain is prodigiously narrowed. Any ambitious pretension must be advanced at the expense of the interests of the protected states, which would necessarily involve him with the British government. Thus, the period has at length arrived when the influence of the British power has been established throughout the vast continent of India. A chain of subsidiary alliances with the native princes,—the possession of their capitals as a security for their engagements, and the appropriation of lands to defray the expense of our forces,—with the acknowledgment of our feudal superiority,—have rendered the native states entirely dependent upon our power. The grand and comprehensive system which the genius of Lord

Wellesley planned has been successfully executed by Lord Hastings.—The mighty sway which the emperors of Delhi exercised has been transferred to the British government. This system has been regarded with unbounded admiration by a certain class of politicians. With the Anglo-Indian community, generally speaking, it is a prodigious favourite. Opening a wide field to its ambition, and stimulating the selfish as well as the liberal passions of their nature, the prospect of its successful progress was regarded with intense interest. The advantages resulting from the operation of this policy during the late war, have been enumerated by Mr. Grimsp,—first, as respects the natives of India; secondly, the security of the British power. As regards the former—the entire deliverance of central India from the most destructive form of military violence, and the erection of a system which will secure the community from the recurrence of a similar calamity. Under the genial influence of this system, it is confidently expected that the agriculture and commerce of the country will make rapid strides towards perfection. As regards British India—a perpetual immunity from those hostile incursions which devastated our territory, and the establishment of a vigorous system of action throughout the whole of India, which will leave us no cause of internal alarm. At the same time, it is asserted, that the operation of this policy had prodigiously increased our security against external attack, by extending our frontier to the Indus, the Himalyah, and the impenetrable forests and mountains on the East—the natural barriers

of India.* These are noble objects to animate the labours of the statesman; and it remains to inquire whether they are likely to be accomplished. Such may be the case;—but, entertaining different views of the operation of this system, whether right or wrong, I shall proceed to express them. At first sight, it appears that a mighty good had been achieved by the liberation of central Asia from the brutal oppression of which it was the victim. But it was a deliverance in name rather than in reality—a change of masters. Unquestionably, advantage was derived to these states by the transference of power from a savage to a civilized race. But this was purchased by the sacrifice of their independence and the extinction of their national dignity; and this, too, without the consolation of any material exemption from their burthens, as they were condemned to pay their protectors for their exertions in their defence. The introduction of the British power into states of this character is certainly attended with benefit to the great body of the people. Disdaining irregular exactions, and abstaining from excesses, its conduct appears to manifest advantage when contrasted with the grievous outrages and lawless extortions of the predatory powers. Operating by a fixed

* In a financial point of view, it is contended by Mr Prinsep, that the war has been equally prosperous; and certainly there appears nothing to invalidate his statements. Our territorial revenue has been augmented, by these conquests, from 18 to 20 millions of pounds sterling. But this beneficial result is counterbalanced, in some degree, by an increase of debt to the amount of 3½ millions sterling. Thus, at the close of this contest, the Indian debt amounted to about 35 millions sterling.

and regulated pressure on their finances, its existence is much less injurious to their prosperity; but there are still disadvantages which counteract this beneficial influence. The anomalous and divided system of authority which these subsidiary alliances create, can only operate as a fertile source of disorder. Altogether discordant in views, and different in character, it would be a rare and extraordinary occurrence in political history, if the separate actions of the rival powers, which are united in this heterogeneous union, should combine so as to produce a harmonious result. The attempt to control the actions of princes who have been educated in the school of Asiatic mis-government, by the more enlightened maxims of European policy, has rarely succeeded.

In Asia, the interests of the people are nothing—their happiness altogether subordinate to that of the prince; his selfish gratifications the law of their government. In Europe, on the other hand, the force of public opinion—the result of superior civilization—has compelled the public ruler to regard the happiness of his people as the primary end of his government; and to subdue his personal inclinations when opposed to their interests. Such being the case, how is it possible that these opposite modes of government can thoroughly amalgamate, so as to promote the public welfare. These varying results of different periods of civilization cannot be reconciled together. It might have been safely predicted, *a priori*, that such an unnatural union, as these subsidiary alliances create, would only be productive of jealousy, disorder, and mis-government. When the

authority of the rival powers is so imperfectly defined, there must be a perpetual collision of opposite and contending interests. Possessing a real superiority, but affecting inferiority, the British government can scarcely brook the slightest opposition to its will. Decked out in a nominal superiority, but conscious of a real inferiority, and irritated the more by this ostentatious mockery, the native ruler is apt to regard the enlightened interposition of British authority as a direct violation of his rights—the remembrance of which he cherishes with a rankling animosity which frequently breaks out in rebellion. In such a state of political union, the chance of any tolerable compromise between these rival authorities, which might promote the prosperity of the inferior states, must principally depend upon the character of the residents at native courts. If the British representative should be a man of enlightened views, with a character distinguished for moderation, and whose interference in the internal affairs of the state was marked by a due regard for Asiatic opinions and prejudices, it is possible that he might mitigate the exercise of this authority so as to render the galling chain of his dependence less irksome to the native ruler; and thus, ultimately, reconcile him to the British dominion. But this can rarely happen. The entire opposition of interests which exists must inevitably engender discord. It must be the interest of the resident to restrain the native prince in those exactions which would impoverish his subjects, and thus ultimately disable the state from fulfilling its engagements to the British government; whilst the selfish policy of an Asiatic ruler

prompts him to extort the utmost from the means of his subjects. Thus checked in his darling propensity, his spirit revolts at this humiliating subjection, and he embraces with eagerness the first opportunity of throwing it off. To the British representative there can be no situation more painful. Conscious of the purity of his intentions, and eager to employ his superior knowledge in ameliorating the condition of the native state, he finds his well-meant interposition and advice uniformly disregarded. This insensibly wounds his self-love, and disposes him to consider the actions of the native ruler as decidedly hostile. Should the Envoy or resident, however, be a man of a different stamp, arbitrary and domineering in conduct, [illegible] field is open for misgovernment, from there being no efficient check or control over his conduct. Possessing the confidence of government, which derives its information through him only, he can manage to colour his actions so as to receive their support. Fortified by this power, and determined to make his will the law, by interposing his authority in behalf of those who oppose their native prince, he succeeds in erecting a superior authority within his dominions. Thus enfeebled in power, the native ruler is unable to enforce the payment of his revenues, and, failing in his engagements with the British government, his territories are seized upon; and thus the master of a kingdom becomes a miserable dependent of that power which lent its aid from a pure regard to the welfare of his people and the maintenance of his dignity. Again, the agent of the British government may be a man of an entirely different cha-

character soft and flexible, averse to the trouble of ruling, and accessible to flattery, these moral weaknesses are quickly perceptible by the discerning Asiatic. Skilled in the art of insinuation, by the most delicate attentions he insensibly gains his confidence and wins him to his purposes: thus strengthened, he proceeds unrestrained in his career of exaction. A prince of this stamp must inflict incalculable injury to his country. Possessing the entire command of the British subsidiary force, he can subdue all opposition. Unsupported by this power, the resistance of his subjects would compel him to desist; but his, the only efficient check to Asiatic misgovernment, is rendered altogether nugatory by the overwhelming superiority of our arms. Thus, British protection is felt as a grievous and intolerable calamity. There can be no spectacle more melancholy and humiliating than this, where the knowledge and strength of civilization are prostituted to the support of an unhallowed career of rapacity and oppression. These two last exemplifications of British misrule may be regarded as extreme cases; and I am inclined to think that the first example is the mode in which our power generally operates. But those who are acquainted with Asiatic history will acknowledge that the latter cases are not without a parallel. These particular evils are aggravated by more general causes. Conscious of our superiority, and thoroughly impressed with the belief that it will be exercised at a convenient period for the purpose of aggrandizement, they regard our power with fear and distrust. Impelled by these feelings, and convinced that their reign is altogether transitory, they

exert every energy in collecting a treasure which may serve as a resource in the hour of need. The expense of the subsidiary force is likewise felt as a severe burthen on the resources of the state. From various causes, the forces of the native princes are [illegible] diminished.—From a feeling of personal security, and regard to the interests of the military class, and as a security against oppression, an Asiatic ruler feels the utmost reluctance to reduce his army. Thus the country is saddled with an enormous military force, and those funds which were destined for the reproduction of wealth, are altogether lost to the community.

The operation of these causes prevents the states from deriving those benefits which would otherwise accrue from British protection. The natural result of such a union must be, that the interests of the inferior are sacrificed to those of the more powerful state. These states will prosper under British influence, as compared with Mahratta misrule; but, if left to themselves, they would have made much more rapid advances in improvement. Those who have had an opportunity of witnessing the striking superiority of those principalities which are free from foreign influence, as compared with the marked deterioration of the states which have formed a British connexion, must unequivocally regret the policy which has been pursued in Rajpootana, as utterly destructive of that fair prospect of happiness which they would reasonably have attained as independent states. If we refer to the actual condition of the subsidized states, their marked decline under British influence presents a striking contrast to those glowing visions of prosperity which are held forth as the

necessary consequence of the introduction of this system into Rajpootana. At the present moment, the authority of the King of Oude is so feeble, that, unsupported by the British power, it could not exist: he is unable to collect his revenue without the aid of the subsidiary force which is frequently employed in this service. The contrast between his dominions, and those of the British government, strikingly exemplifies the mischief which results from the division of authority which this system gives rise to, and the superior benefit which arises from a simple and efficient form of government. In Oude, every powerful zumeendar erects a fort, and sets his sovereign at defiance;—the revenue is only exacted by force. In the British territories, no zumeendar can insult the civil power by erecting a fortress—not a single soldier is required to collect the revenue; whilst their superior cultivation affords the strongest testimony of the superiority of our administration. The wretched system of misrule which prevails in the Nizam's dominion appears to be admitted by Mr Prinsep. Since the publication of his work, these disorders have increased to a frightful degree; and, if the public journals can be credited, the constant insurrections of its turbulent zumeendars, and their shameful exactions, render it almost impossible to travel the country.—Abandoned to the sway of a sensual and effeminate ruler, it has miserably declined in power and wealth. It may be urged, that, under this prince, these disorders would exist, independent of any British connexion. This cannot be admitted. In Asia, the feebleness and incapacity of a ruler naturally en-

mulates a more bold and energetic leader to govern turn his power. This salutary provision, which nature has made to rectify disorder, is rendered altogether nugatory by the overwhelming superiority of the British power, pledged to support the existing government. This protection operates as a perpetual safeguard to imbecility. It will be urged that this incapacity in the native ruler will be remedied by the enlightened control of the British resident; and this, to a certain extent, may be the case. But, allowing him to possess the purest intentions and the greatest ability, it is obvious that a single individual cannot do much. A stranger in an entire kingdom, ignorant of its various interests, and unacquainted with the character of individuals, the chances are, that he would legislate very imperfectly as to its interests; a residence of years would be requisite to enable him to form sound views as to its welfare. The advocates for the system pursued in Rajpootana will contend, that the evils arising from a direct interference in the internal affairs of the King of Oude and the Nizam, have been altogether avoided in our arrangements with the Rajpoot states; that we disclaim all control over their domestic policy; that each prince exercises an independent authority over his own dominions; and that our alliance is simply restricted to protection against external aggression. There is some inconsistency in these reasonings. If the policy of Lord Hastings has completely succeeded,—if its successful execution has introduced a profound calm into the stormy region of central India,—if the confederation of states are restrained from encroaching on each other,—against whom is protection

required? With the exception of Scindeah, the whole of these states are subject to our power. In theory we disclaim all interference in their internal affairs; but in practice reserve a right to arbitrate their disputes. Our passion for intermeddling (although in this instance a benevolent one) still breaks out. Thus, at Oodeepoor, a military legislator has had time to form a political constitution for that state: assembling the bold barons of that principality, he proposed his *magna charta*, which was agreed to as the charter of the state after an animated discussion which lasted until three o'clock in the morning. It is impossible to consider the subsidiary arrangements which have been made with the Rajpoot states, without perceiving that they are eminently calculated to produce discord. Fixed upon the principle that the amount of the British subsidy should be increased in the same proportion that the revenues of the state should improve, it is obvious that an agreement of this kind will naturally induce the native prince to conceal the amount of his revenue, and has a powerful tendency to create suspicion on the part of the British government. The circumstances in which they are placed will naturally engender fraud and craft in the inferior party, and a disposition to resort to force in the superior power. This stipulation alone must be regarded as fatal to the independence of these powers.

It now remains to inquire as to the prospect of increased security which will result from the extension of our influence in Rajpootana. There can be nothing more fallacious than the confident expectations which are entertained of increased security to our

dominion in the East, by the extension of the subsidiary system under Lord Hastings's administration?—Strange that men should still indulge in these sophistications in the face of the palpable and incontrovertible facts which have sprung up to oppose them! Strange that self-interest should so far pervert their judgments; and that they should remain so nearly insensible to the moral of the grand drama which has been acted before them. If there is any certainty in political science—if, from an attentive examination of facts, we are allowed to infer the cause which has produced them, there can be no truth more satisfactorily demonstrated than this, that the uniform result of the introduction of this system has been to excite a bitter spirit of hostility against its employer; that it has operated as a powerful stimulant to rebellion; and that it has endangered, instead of strengthening, our dominion. View it in its early progress—its introduction in Bengal, and the impatience of Meer Cossim under its thraldom, which led to his rebellion and destruction—the concealed hostility of the Nabob of the Carnatic under its debasing influence, which the capture of Seringapatam revealed to our government, and which was followed by the seizure of his territory—the disgust and irritation of the Nabob of Oude under its tormenting spirit of interference, which impelled him to offer the abdication of his dominion; and these exhibited in a fearful shape, during Lord Hastings's administration, in the rebellion of the Peishwah, the revolt of the Nagpoor Rajah, and the vast mass of hostility which the dread of its introduction had created throughout India. In the face of these facts, is it reasonable to

expect increased security from the extension of this system? As long as this unnatural dominion exists, the same causes will continue to operate; and that abhorrence of control and unconquerable desire of freedom which impelled these princes to revolt, must reasonably be expected to manifest itself in the dominions of Holkar, the Peishwah, the Nagpoor Rajah, and the Rajpootana states, where the events of the last war have enabled us to extend this system by erecting dependent states. The cherished remembrance of their former power and splendour, the desire of regaining their pristine rank, will operate far more powerfully on their minds than a sense of gratitude to the British government. At first sight, it appears that the apprehension of danger from a single state of this character is highly improbable—that a sense of the hopelessness of the contest would prevent its ruler from inviting destruction. This is so far just.—But it should be recollected, that, if disposed to revolt, a native prince would reckon upon the support of other states similarly circumstanced, and that he will further speculate on the chance of creating disaffection amongst our soldiery. Such being the case, it is manifest that the mighty fabric of our Indian empire has not been built upon so durable a foundation as the admirers of this policy would lead us to suppose. There is no principle of cohesion in the materials of which it is composed; its discordant elements contend against each other, and threaten to subvert this noble monument of our power. The cause of this instability appears to be the nature of our subsidiary alliances, entered into with states prodigiously inferior in power, and pos-

sessing no similarity of character or views which could cement this unnatural union. The general result has been, that the interests of the smaller have been sacrificed to those of the larger states; and that a deep sense of the insecurity and injustice resulting from this connexion has impelled the weaker states to risk their existence, in the attempt to shake off this oppressive power. Possessing that moral superiority which constitutes our real strength, powerful armies, and a well-governed territory, where the interests of the subjects are identified with those of the government, it does not appear to me that the security of our internal dominions is exposed to any direct hazard; but that, indirectly, their prosperity is likely to be affected by the efforts of the protected states to shake off our control.

It now remains to be considered, if any other line of policy could have been adopted at this period than that which Lord Hastings pursued. This nobleman has justified the conduct which he adopted towards the Holkar state and the Nagpoor Rajah, by converting these independent powers into subsidiary states under the control of British influence, on the principle that the fate of arms threw their dominions into our power; and that the law of conquest authorized our making such arrangements as would render their existence compatible with our security. Such being the case, would not the same principle have warranted the entire assumption of these territories under the direct control of the British government? It appears to me that incalculable advantages would have resulted from this arrangement. The deplorable consequences which

have arisen from the divided system of authority which our interposition in their internal affairs creates, would be altogether avoided:—no rival power would clog and embarrass the machine of government. The effects of this change would soon appear in the improved condition of these countries. By the introduction of a more enlightened system of administration, an exact settlement of the revenues, greater regard to individual rights, and that general security against spoliation which is the principal advantage of our sway, the affections of the inhabitants would be conciliated, and their interests identified with those of the British government. A fair prospect would be afforded of introducing that superior knowledge which constitutes our superiority, into these territories, and thus ultimately rescuing them from that misgovernment and misrule of which they were the victims. If these are esteemed ideal advantages, surely it will not be denied that a substantial benefit would result to these communities by their relief from the severe pressure upon their finances which the subsidiary system imposes. Compelled to maintain the British subsidiary force, and a large native army, the direct introduction of our authority would render the existence of this latter force altogether unnecessary. If the existence of the British government has been felt as a benefit,—if it has conferred signal advantages upon the mass of its subjects,—if its conduct exhibits, as compared with Asiatic governments, a noble example of the superiority of civilization over ignorance—of sound moral principle in opposition to craft and violence, as Lord

Hastings and the advocates of his policy represent, —surely every consideration of religion, morality, justice, and expediency, should impel us to seize every just opportunity of introducing this beneficial sway.

As Lord Hastings did act upon this policy, in assuming the bulk of the Peishwah's dominions, and a part of Holkar's territory, under the direct control of the British government, it is surprising that the same system was not pursued [illegible]. It may be urged, in justification of his lordship's conduct, that a regard for public opinion and a respect for ancient greatness dictated the course which he pursued in elevating the house of Satara, and maintaining the existing rulers in the Rajpoot and Bundelcund states,—that the affections of the people were conciliated by this studied deference for their rulers,—and that, as regards our security, it is infinitely safer to govern by means of a power thus constituted, which has been accustomed to command the unreserved obedience of its subjects. This may be esteemed a sufficient vindication of this policy; but it does not appear to me that this profound regard for their ancient dynasties has ever existed in India. With a devoted attachment to their original institutions and usages, they have manifested no earnest sympathy in the fate of their rulers;—no people have submitted more passively to a change of masters. The surprising feats of Clive and Lord Wellesley in the disposal of kingdoms—and even the exploits of Lord Hastings in this way, lead to a very different conclusion. Whoever has witnessed the elevation of

a native prince to the musnud, under British influence, must have observed that the people are never deceived by this contemptible mockery; that they substantially regard the English state as the master of their destinies. With the spectacle of a well-arranged English line to grace the ceremony, is it probable that it should be otherwise? It is scarcely possible to suppose that a statesman of Lord Hastings's penetration can be ignorant of these feelings, which pervade the mass of the people. Upon this supposition, the true key to his policy must be sought elsewhere. This explanation must be found in a regard to public opinion in England—the positive enactments of the legislature prohibiting extension of territory or dominion. The constant declamations against the ambition and rapacity of the Company's servants have had a distinct and visible operation on our Asiatic policy. Compelled by circumstances to extend our dominion, and restrained by parliament in this policy, the conduct of our governors-general has been shaped with the view of disguising this necessary increase of our power, and reconciling their conduct with the policy marked out for them by the supreme authorities in England. Studiously abstaining from any direct assumption of territory, least it should provoke inquiry, this policy has developed itself in the erection of dependent states, and other indirect modes of acquiring dominion. To this may be clearly traced the origin of the subsidiary system, which disguises the subjection of a nation under the benevolent idea of protecting it. Applying this principle to the elucidation of

Lord Hastings's conduct, it will satisfactorily account for the introduction of the subsidiary system into the dominions of Holkar and the Nagpoor Rajah, and the elevation of the Satarah prince from his obscurity. A policy like this, which the injudicious attempts of European legislation to regulate the progress of our Indian empire has created, is dishonourable to the national character. Professing the most disinterested views in the offer of our alliance, and pretending to regard these prostrate powers as entirely independent, what a mournful contrast does the result present! In their utter extinction as separate states, and the entire sacrifice of their interests to the support of our power—affecting inferiority where we really command—there is a character of deceit and fraud in these alliances which is altogether alien to the spirit of a free people. Why resort to this debasing hypocrisy? If these states are really conquered, why deceive them with the vain phantom of independence? If a manly and open policy was acted upon,—if the direct control of the British government had been introduced into these regions, instead of that Machiavelian practice of rule which the protecting system creates,—would not the mass of human suffering have been prodigiously diminished? Whatever have been the consequences of this system, it is but just to the statesmen who have directed the energies of our Indian empire, to remark, that the evil is not to be ascribed to them principally; but to the preposterous restrictions of the legislature, which pretended to regulate that which in its nature cannot be fixed—the destiny of

an empire—and this at the distance of half the globe. Never was a more signal instance recorded of the failure of abstract reason, in framing a perfect system of external policy for a community in a different state of society, and of the political relations of which it was profoundly ignorant. With an ardent desire to relieve human suffering in Asia, the parliament of England marked out the path which the Indian government should pursue; but it is melancholy to reflect, that the indirect result of this benevolent interposition has been that alarming picture of misgovernment and abuse which the operation of the subsidiary system presents. Unrestrained by these checks which the legislature imposed, the natural course of events would have led to the direct introduction of our authority into those countries which we had conquered.

It may be objected, that this would be a career of conquest; and this must be admitted partially. The force of circumstances—a regard to self-preservation—the selfish operation of the passions, and a consciousness of superiority—had all a tendency to advance our power; but it is unfair to regard this aggrandizement as the necessary result of a preconceived plan, and scandalously unjust to charge the sole guilt of this career upon the European governments,—as if no aggressions had been committed by the Asiatic powers,—as if the same passions were not common to both,—as if the policy of Europe was uniformly marked by treachery, craft, and undisguised oppression, whilst that of Asia presented a bright but humiliating contrast, of candour, disinterestedness, and superior moral feeling.

But whatever may be said of our Asiatic policy, there can be but one opinion as to the paramount duty imposed upon us, of governing these acquisitions so as to promote the happiness of the people. And in this view have these observations been directed. It seems indeed beyond dispute, that, nominally independent, but in reality subjugated, the prosperity of the protected states, would have been materially advanced if they had been subjected to the direct control of the British government, instead of that indirect system of influence which prevails at present.* The policy pursued by Lord Hastings in the Nepaul and Pindaree wars, forms by far the most prominent feature in his Asiatic career. In forming a final opinion upon his administration, it is impossible to avoid contrasting it with that of his distinguished predecessors Lords Cornwallis and Wellesley. As a practical statesman, his conduct does not exhibit those solid and useful talents which characterized Lord Cornwallis.—Aiming at no visionary good, that nobleman endeavoured to establish a permanent system in matters of finance and revenue, as being the

* These observations are not made to justify a system of conquest, but to point out, that, when subdued, a preferable system of government could have been adopted. Of course the direct introduction of the British authority could have been combined with a liberal provision for the maintenance of the native princes.

In this stage of the discussion, it would be glaringly unjust to Lord Hastings, not to afford the reader an opportunity of perusing his admirable exposition of the motives which influenced his conduct towards the Mahratta and Pindaree powers. For this purpose, his reply to the address of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, congratulating him on the successful results of his policy, is thrown into the Appendix.

first step to future improvement. Convinced that abstract ideas of political perfection must be applied to the state of society in India with infinite caution, the reforms in the administration of justice which he introduced were guided by this principle. Adapting his policy with rare felicity to the genius and manners of the people, an enlightened spirit of innovation was tempered by a due regard to Asiatic opinions and prejudices. With an ardent desire to exalt the Indian community in the scale of civilization, he sought this end by meliorating existing institutions, not by destroying them. In this respect, the civil career of Lord Hastings cannot be compared with that of Lord Cornwallis: his administration is unmarked by any direct improvement in our civil institutions, or attempts to rectify our system of finance and revenue, the details of which do not appear to have been familiar to his mind. This may be correct; but it may be justly urged, in defence of his Lordship, that the successful operation of Lord Cornwallis's judicial and financial system rendered any marked improvement unnecessary, and afforded no fair field for the display of his legislative talents;—and that, exercising a general superintendence in the internal affairs of government, it is infinitely better to trust the details of office to those who have devoted their lives to them. Again, as compared with Lord Wellesley, we do not meet with that vigour and energy of intellect—that powerful grasp of mind which embraced every thing political, commercial, civil. The animating spirit of Lord Wellesley is visible in every transaction of his

government: it gave a tone and character to the whole. In directing the warlike resources of British India he was unrivalled;—the conception of his plans was splendid and comprehensive, the means adapted to the end in view;—his tact in selecting military and political agents has not been surpassed. In his civil career, the institution of the College of Fort-William exhibits a noble example of that prospective wisdom which looks forward to the advancement of the human race in the career of improvement;—whilst his liberal encouragement of the commerce of British India evinced his entire superiority to the more limited views which influenced the Court of Directors on this subject. In these respects, the most devoted admirer of Lord Hastings ought not to establish a parallel between his administration and that of Lord Wellesley. But there is a moral beauty which is far above all those splendid attributes which distinguished Lord Wellesley's career;—and this the conduct of Lord Hastings exhibits in a degree rare amidst statesmen. What can be more exemplary than the dignified forbearance he exercised towards Scindeah, in refraining from punishing his unprovoked hostility? What would Lord Wellesley's conduct have been in these circumstances? Conciliation was not the virtue of that nobleman.—The dignity of the head of the state was at times lost in the angry passions of the politician. That elevated feeling which induces superior minds to disguise their superiority over the feeble, does not appear to have existed in Lord Wellesley. In his correspondence with the native states, the consciousness of his supe-

riority breaks out in every line. In comparing the external policy of his administration with that of Lord Hastings, some striking differences are apparent. The hostile spirit which Tippoo manifested against our power perhaps afforded a just cause of war; but it is difficult to find the same satisfactory reasons in justification of the hostilities which this nobleman directed against the Mahrattas. At this distance of time the policy which led to this war must be regarded as an aggression upon the rights of the Mahratta states. Entering upon the Poonah alliance, with the undisguised intention of introducing the British influence into the affairs of the Mahratta empire, under the sanction of the Peishwah's authority, is it surprising that the interference of this ambitious power should be regarded by Scindeah and Holkar as an unprincipled violation of their natural independence? A conduct like this naturally provoked war. With the spectacle of the entire subjection of those states into which this portentous influence had been introduced, would it not have been the blindest fatuity to have tamely suffered the introduction of this appalling power? The external policy of Lord Hastings contrasts advantageously with that of Lord Wellesley.—The causes of the wars which he directed must be acknowledged to have been just and necessary;—it was only the cruel aggressions of the Nepaulese and the predatory powers, which compelled him to resort to arms. The plan of a confederacy of independent states, the sole objects of whose union should be the repression of the irregular ambition of its members, and the preservation of general tranquillity, manifested his entire su-

periority to all selfish views of aggrandizement. It is only to be regretted, that this fair picture should have been deformed by the mistaken career which he pursued in Rajpootana;—and that an admiration of the subsidiary policy of Lord Wellesley should have seduced him into an imitation of it, by introducing this system into the conquered states of Holkar, the Peishwah, and the Nagpoor Rajah.

There is still another point of view in which the different conduct of these statesmen remains to be considered—the exercise of those powers intrusted to them over the European portion of the community in India. The administration of Lord Wellesley was marked by the establishment of a direct censorship over the press; whilst the power which the legislature confers, of sending to Europe those individuals who abused the power of the press, or rendered themselves obnoxious to government, was exercised by this nobleman, in several instances, with no remarkable forbearance, or regard for the principles of liberty. The political career of Lord Hastings has been distinguished by the abolition of the censorship; and, although exposed to irritating attacks upon his personal character, the invidious power confided to him has never once been exercised. Feeling that his government would derive strength and information from a temperate and enlightened discussion of its interests, his conduct has been shaped so as to afford a wider scope and greater freedom to the inquiries of the press, than has ever existed under any other Governor-general; and this, too, without crippling the energy of the executive. This difference in conduct is clearly to be ascribed to the

opposite political principles of these eminent statesmen. The personal character of Lord Wellesley appears to have been modelled on that of antiquity. There is a Patrician elevation and masculine severity of mind—the same unbending pride, and disdain of the people. Like the master spirits who ruled the destiny of ancient Rome, he seems to have thought, that he was born to sway the minds of men—to bend them to his purposes—that nature destined them to be the creatures of his will. A statesman of this stamp, feeling practically convinced that the people are unworthy of rule, evinces a marked disregard of public opinion.

The character of Lord Hastings is altogether modern. It is stamped with the enlightened philosophy of the 18th century, and his political career breathes its spirit throughout—its philanthropy and toleration—its earnest sympathy with the fortunes of mankind, and ardent desire to extend their political privileges, when they were qualified to exercise power. He has stood forth in the cause of the oppressed in Europe, and advocated the outraged rights of humanity. Such has been the general character of his Asiatic career. Convinced that positive institutions could not do much in ameliorating the state of society, his efforts have been directed to elevate the Indian community in the scale of civilization, by enlightening their minds, and by affording a wider scope to the European press, which might enable it to coöperate in this noble object. The powerful impulse which his encouragement has given to the societies formed for the dissemination of liberal and Christian knowledge; the abolition of the censor-

ship; and even the repression of the Pindaree system, —must all be considered as means towards the accomplishment of this end. And what purer glory can a statesman aspire to than this—where his power is solely directed to the public welfare? This administration, as compared with that of Lord Wellesley, is not so splendid and imposing, but it will confer more durable benefits upon mankind.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Our arrangements for the distribution of Justice examined, and their advantages and disadvantages pointed out, compared with similar institutions in England, and vindicated from the animadversions of Mr Mill and the Edinburgh Reviewers.—Remarks on the permanent settlement of the Revenue.—The prospects of writers adventuring to India.—Their allowance in the different branches of the service, and chance of returning to Europe with a fortune.

THE information of persons practically unacquainted with our civil administration in India is likely to be in some measure erroneous; but so far it may be useful, in the present dearth of knowledge, that it may induce others to step forward and correct their mistakes.* This being the case, I shall make no apology for the following observations, however foreign to my professional pursuits.

The legislative power in India is exercised by the governor in each presidency, controlled by a council. This council, in Bengal, consists of the Governor-

* The author has perused, in India, the civil regulations of the Bengal government, which afforded him the means of forming his present opinions. He has likewise read the fifth report, the observations of Colonel Wilks on this subject, and the respective publications of Messrs Tytler and R. Grant, from whom he has adopted some facts and arguments illustrative of his opinions.

general and three civil servants selected by the home authorities. In general, the military commander-in-chief, at each presidency, likewise occupies a seat in council; but this does not always take place. The laws proposed by the Governor-in-council, are formally discussed by the members; who likewise possess the power of proposing laws. Every opinion or argument is delivered in writing, and recorded for transmission to the home authorities. In practice, I have understood that the council rarely assembles, except in cases of emergency; and that, in general, the measures or regulations proposed are carried round to each member for his individual sanction. This must secure greater freedom and independence in the expression of the opinions of the members, and obviate much unpleasant discussion. At the same time it affords no field for the exercise of colloquial rivalry, or that desire of intellectual distinction, which, if indulged in a deliberative assembly, operates disadvantageously by inflaming the passions, and rendering the mind less open to the influence of reason. The practice of recording the opinions of the members, opposes a powerful check to frivolous opposition, by rendering it incumbent on every individual to assign a specific reason for his vote. The majority of votes determines whether a law shall be established.

In his legislative capacity the Governor-general cannot enact laws, or act independent of his council; but, in his executive or political function, he can exercise this power, on rare emergencies, subject to responsibility. The extraordinary circumstances in which we are placed in India, demand, that power

should thus be vigorously exercised. The laws enacted by the government are styled regulations, and are regularly translated into the native languages. They embrace the entire administration of civil and criminal justice—the regulation of the police—the collection of the revenue and customs—and the general interests of commerce.

To give a general view of these laws is altogether beyond my power. I have not the necessary books in my possession, which would enable me to do this; but the reader will obtain ample information, by consulting *Colebrooke's Digest*, and *Harrington's Analysis of the Regulations*. The administration of criminal justice is regulated by the Mahomedan code of law, which has been greatly meliorated in practice, and rendered more conformable to the enlightened spirit of European legislation, by abolishing its cruel punishments, correcting its defective rules of evidence and the unjust partiality of many of its provisions in favour of Mahomedans, in prosecutions instituted by Hindoos. The sanguinary law of retaliation, in the case of murder, which is allowed to the relations of the deceased by this law, and which regards the gratification of personal revenge as a paramount consideration to the welfare of the community, has been altogether abolished. In practice, this right was seldom rigidly exercised in Bengal, and was generally waved in consideration of a sum of money being paid by the murderer to the relations of the deceased, but this necessarily operated as a bounty to crime, and afforded impunity to the rich man who had wantonly shed the blood of his fellow-creature. The administration of civil justice is determined by the re-

spective laws of the Mahomedans and Hindoos, tempered by a spirit of equity on the part of the European judges. In causes where both the parties are Musselmen, the suit is decided according to the rules of Mahomedan law; if Hindoos, according to the prescribed usages of that people. In cases where the plaintiff and defendant are of a different race and religion, the question is decided according to the law acknowledged by the latter. To lay down an equitable rule for the decision of these causes, would appear to be a difficult problem in legislation. As the Hindoos compose nine-tenths of the population, it would seem a better mode than the present that the suit should be decided according to the law of the majority; or, perhaps, it would be more advantageous if it was determined according to the conscientious opinion of the judge.

The necessity of adopting some general rule must account for the present arrangement. Thus, independent of the regulations enacted by the British government, we have adopted in practice the great body of native laws, Hindoo and Mahomedan, written and unwritten, which we found established in the country. In this policy the British rulers appear to have proceeded upon the principle, that abstract ideas of political perfection could with difficulty be adapted to the state of society in India; and that, with a people so obstinately attached to their laws and usages, more substantial good would be effected by reforming existing institutions, than by destroying them. The arrangements which are made for the distribution of justice are as follows:—

Under the Bengal presidency, our territory is divided into about 50 districts, each containing a population of from 600,000 to 1,200,000 souls, the civil government of which is intrusted to one individual, designated a judge and magistrate, aided by two assistants. Thus, about 50 individuals administer justice to about 40 millions of people. Their chief duty, as police magistrates, consists in receiving criminal informations, binding over prosecutors and witnesses, and committing offenders for trial. In this respect, their functions are similar to those of an English justice of peace. Independent of this, they exercise a final jurisdiction in petty crimes, and possess the power of inflicting punishment. At first they were permitted to try and punish all petty larcenies, and the maximum of punishment was fixed at 30 stripes, or one month's imprisonment; but latterly they can take cognizance of thefts of greater magnitude, and sentence to one or two years' imprisonment. The whole of their proceedings are regularly recorded, and regulated by prescribed forms. The magistrate of the district may delegate a certain portion of his duty to his assistant. In his civil capacity, as judge of the district, the same individual tries all suits relative to property, rents, debts, partnerships, marriage, cast, and all causes of a civil nature, provided the parties reside within his jurisdiction. If the sum of money or property litigated is trifling, his decision is final; but otherwise an appeal lies to the provincial court of appeal, within the jurisdiction of which his district is situated. The judge may empower his European register or assistant to determine certain causes; but from his decision an appeal lies to his principal.

These duties afford ample occupation for his time; but, independent of this, a judge and magistrate exercises a general control over the internal economy of his district; he regulates the state of the roads, bridges, and jail; projects improvements, and orders disbursements for their repair; he fixes the rate of different kinds of labour, and sanctions the price at which grain is sold at the different markets throughout his district. All these duties require a knowledge of the principles of political economy, and demonstrate the utility of founding a professorship for this study at Hereford. If any oppression is committed by the military or the revenue officers of government, it is his duty to take cognizance of it.

The courts of circuit and appeal consist of four European judges, a register, and assistant, with a suitable proportion of native law officers. These tribunals try all prisoners who are committed by the magistrates of districts for capital crimes, robberies, or thefts, to a considerable amount. At present there are six of these courts, comprehending about eight districts within their jurisdiction. One of the members of the circuit court proceeds in rotation throughout the division for a period of six months, and holds a regular jail-delivery at the several district courts. Should any of the prisoners be capitally convicted, the sentence cannot be carried into execution until it has received the sanction of a superior criminal court in Calcutta, designated the Nizamut Udawlut, to whom accordingly is transmitted the proceedings of the trial. Whilst one or two of the members of the circuit court are engaged in making their rounds, the remaining two judges are employed in deciding

the appeals in civil causes, which are referred to them from the district courts. The judges of the court of appeal and circuit preside equally in civil and criminal causes; their decisions are final in cases where the property litigated is of trifling value; but where it is considerable, an appeal lies to the supreme civil and criminal court in Calcutta, entitled the Suddur Dewanee and Nizamut Udawlut. This court consists of a chief judge and three inferior judges, civil servants of the company, with a suitable proportion of native officers skilled in the Mahomedan and Hindoo laws. In its criminal jurisdiction the court is principally occupied in revising the trials transmitted for its sanction by the circuit courts, and either confirms, annuls, or modifies the sentence passed by these tribunals; but in no instance is it allowed to add to the severity of the punishment. Where the sentence, as finally sanctioned by the court, amounts to a forfeiture of land, it must be submitted, with all the proceedings, for the special consideration of government. In cases where extenuating circumstances have appeared on the part of the criminal, and where no discretion is authorized by the law as to the degree of punishment, the court possesses the power of recommending the delinquent to the mercy of government. Independent of this prerogative of mercy, the Governor-general possesses no criminal jurisdiction. In its civil jurisdiction this court decides upon all appeals which are referred to it from the inferior tribunals, provided the property concerned amounts to a certain value. In the case of personal property, this is fixed at 50,000 rupees; where the cause refers to landed estates, rents, accounts, &c. it is determin-

ed by other rules. In causes where the value of the property amounts to less than 50,000 pounds, the decision of this court is final; but should it exceed this, an appeal lies to the king in council; and even where this right of appeal does not exist from the inferior value of the property litigated, the court is at liberty, if it sees reason, to re-try the cause, and to reverse or confirm its own decision. In all these courts, the European judges are aided by learned natives, who declare the Hindoo or Musselman law which is applicable to the case in point. It is still a more striking feature in the rules laid down for the guidance of these tribunals, that in capital trials the principal native law-officer unites the functions of judge and jury in fixing the guilt of the prisoner and declaring the sentence of the law; and that the duty of the European judge is limited to superintending the proceedings. In this respect, he resembles the judge-advocate of a court martial, with this difference, that the latter has no right to give his opinion respecting the sentence, unless it is required by the members: on the contrary, the Indian judge is bound to sanction every trial, by his approval or disapproval. Should a magistrate of a zillah or district court be dissatisfied with the decision of his law-officer on any particular trial, he can refer it to the court of circuit and appeal, which possesses the power of reversing or confirming it. This court again can refer to the superior civil and criminal court in Calcutta. In all these courts, native pleaders have been introduced, whose fees are regulated by government. This is an innovation upon the practice of the native governments: in their courts the

suitors pleaded their own causes. To protect the public against the corruption of those who administer justice, some laws have been enacted for the punishment of it. It is ordered that native law-officers, suspected of this crime, should be tried in the court to which they are attached. A charge of corruption against the European judge of any district court must be laid before the Governor-in-council, who, after due inquiry into the circumstances of the case, refers the charge for trial to the court of circuit in which the district is situated, or appoints a special commission to decide respecting it. The Governor-general likewise possesses the power of sending home individuals with whose conduct he is dissatisfied.

This sketch of the civil arrangements in Bengal will apply equally to the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, where the same system prevails. It is evident, on the slightest consideration, that these arrangements have been framed with reference to the practice of another country more advanced in the scale of civilization; and that they have not been adapted with advantage to the existing state of society in India. Under the Mahomedan system of government, the zumeendar of each district presided over the administration of civil and criminal justice, which was dispensed in a summary manner. All capital cases were reported, before they were carried into execution, to the Nazim, who exercised superior jurisdiction in criminal matters within the province; in like manner, a right of appeal existed in civil causes, by carrying the suit to the court of the Dewan, who presided over the administration of justice in this department. In these district courts, the de-

cisions were speedy, the proceedings being unfettered by the forms and technicalities of law. In the administration of penal justice, the instantaneous punishment of the offence powerfully impressed the imagination of the people, and deterred from the commission of crime. As many of the provinces were not larger than several of the districts over which a single European magistrate presides at present, the delay in the event of a reference to the Nazim was not great. A system of justice like this, however imperfect, is perhaps more popular with the vulgar than a more refined jurisprudence, which, in its just dread of taking away the lives of the innocent, affords a greater chance to the criminal to escape. Under the present system, the administration of penal justice is prodigiously slow, as compared with the rapidity of the trial and decision under the Mahomedan government. If a prisoner is committed by the magistrate of a district for a capital offence, he may remain in confinement six months, until the circuit judge arrives, whose duty it is to try the prisoners; and if capitally convicted, another month may elapse before the sentence is confirmed by the supreme criminal court in Calcutta. If the trial is ordered to be revised, a still further delay ensues. The extraordinary powers which are granted to this supreme court, of annulling or modifying the sentence, appear very unreasonable: having no opportunity of observing the demeanour of the witnesses in the circuit court, it is surely much less likely to form a correct opinion of the guilt or innocence of the criminal, than the inferior tribunal. It would seem quite sufficient, if it confined itself to the duty of selecting

such cases as appeared worthy of mercy, and recommending them to the attention of government. In the first stage of the criminal procedure, the union of the functions of judge and magistrate in the same person, appears very injudicious, and calculated to operate unfavourably against the prisoner. In a charge for a capital crime, where he commits the prisoner until he can be tried by the circuit judge, no injury can result from this practice; but in the trial of thefts, and other offences, where his sentence is final, and involves a punishment of one or two years' imprisonment, to preserve a proper impartiality, it would appear more decorous if he delegated the functions of magistrate to his deputy. As the judge and magistrate of each district is allowed two European assistants, civil servants of government, it would certainly introduce a greater simplicity into the proceedings (and perhaps improve the administration of justice), by dividing these functions, and intrusting the sole duty of examining persons accused of crime to one of the assistants. This division of labour would afford a greater chance of having the duty well performed, and is sanctioned by the criminal code of every other country. Considering that we possess such a real intellectual superiority, it appears a striking anomaly in the practice of the British courts in India, that the native law officer performs the function of judge and jury in determining the guilt and punishment of the criminal; and that the duty of the European judge is limited to the approval or disapproval of the sentence. At first sight, this would seem to authorize the inference that the administration of justice was principally determin-

ed by natives; and that the European judge exercised no efficient influence in these courts. This is not the case.—In practice I have understood that the European judge generally determined the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and that the native officer performed the subordinate part of extracting the sentence of the law; but if so, would it not be more rational if the theory was rendered more conformable with the practice? The superior knowledge of the European, and his greater respect for justice cannot operate beneficially in practice, if this rule is literally followed. That enlightened and indefatigable young judge, the late Mr Tytler, seems to have contemplated this innovation. Although he has not discussed the subject, or adverted to this anomaly in practice, he thus expresses himself:—"I sincerely hope that the time is fast approaching when we shall have justice administered by Europeans only, as circuit judges; and when the Mussulman law, in criminal cases, is altogether disregarded."—*P.* 110. *2d vol. Considerations on India.* The effect of this arrangement would be, that the European judges would feel it peculiarly incumbent upon them to take a more active interest in the proceedings and sentence of the prisoner, for which they would be held specially responsible, and that their decisions would be tempered by a greater spirit of equity. In all civil causes concerning the rights of property, contracts of marriage, mercantile partnerships, &c. where a minute knowledge of the laws of inheritance, and their civil and religious customs, is required, the assistance of native law-officers is indispensable. Any marked innovation or in-

provement in the practice, unless supported by public opinion, might be attended with danger. But in the administration of criminal justice the case is entirely different. In the broad features of their practice all nations nearly agree; and the whole procedure is so simple as renders it level to the understanding of the greater part of the community. The natives know very well that, in most cases, all that is necessary is to weigh the evidence carefully on both sides before pronouncing sentence, and would therefore hail with acclamation any arrangement which secured a greater portion of knowledge, integrity, and impartiality on the part of those who fulfilled this important duty. The notorious corruption of the native law-officers, of which the most unequivocal testimony has been afforded by the most enlightened civil servants of the Company, affords an additional argument in favour of this reform. Their assistance may still be necessary in the criminal courts, but their functions should be altogether subordinate. This would no doubt be an innovation; but have not all our improvements upon the Mahomedan law been the same? This change would encounter some opposition from the Molvees, or persons skilled in the Mahomedan law, whose interests would be affected by it;—but are these to be put into competition with the general welfare of the community? In the administration of civil justice, the increased expense, delay, and uncertainty which have resulted from the introduction of the present system, have, in a great measure, counteracted the benefit arising from the decisions of more enlightened and incorrupt judges. The complex machinery

of courts of appeal and revision, which are provided under the present system, may be well adapted to a country like England, where the character of the public functionaries, and the perfection of the national institutions for the dispensation of justice is such that the people repose an entire confidence in the decisions of the judges, although the suitors may reside at an immense distance from these courts. Under a despotic form of government it is different: the applicant for justice is generally satisfied with the decision of the first civil authority of whom he demands redress. Should it be unjust, he suffers an injury; but, as judgment is summarily pronounced, he is saved the torture of suspense and delay. He is seldom inclined to resort to a higher civil jurisdiction, because he distrusts the character of his rulers, and entertains no respect for the public institutions of his country. Under the present system, he knows that the European judge is, generally speaking, pure in himself, and impartial in his decisions; but that he stands alone, being surrounded by native officers. To a man accessible to bribes, and destitute of public virtue, he is aware that they are personally interested in the success of every cause; and that every art is employed to colour and misrepresent facts in order to influence the opinion of their superior in favour of their own selfish views. With this knowledge, the native is too apt to infer that there is little chance of establishing his rights by instituting a prosecution in our courts. The immense distance at which the supreme courts of appeal are placed, operates as another disadvantage. The extremity of the Bengal presidency is at least

1000 miles distant from the capital where the court of supreme criminal and civil jurisdiction sits; and where the appeal is carried to the King in council, half the globe intervenes. This being the case, it cannot be expected that the natives in the distant provinces should repose much confidence in the decisions of men of whose character they are entirely ignorant. The tedious and operose process of appeal and revision by which justice is obtained in the last resort, has no doubt been introduced with a view to insure a correct decision; but, in its practical operation, it is too much calculated to produce injustice, by securing an undue advantage to the wealthy over the poor litigant, and is only adapted to an opulent community, where the suitors can afford to pay for the luxury of law. To illustrate this, we shall suppose, that, in the district of Saharunpoor, about 1000 miles distant from Calcutta, a wealthy zumeendar has oppressed a ryut, and dispossessed him of some valuable lands, to recover which the latter institutes a suit in the judge and magistrate's court of this district. At a very considerable expense, and after a long delay, he may obtain a decision in his favour; but the value of the property is such, that it may be the interest of the defendant to risk an appeal, and therefore he removes the cause to the court of circuit and appeal, which is situated at Barelly, about 200 miles distant. Here the plaintiff may again triumph; but, irritated by defeat, his oppressor appeals to the superior court of civil and criminal jurisdiction in Calcutta, and, if the property is valuable, may remove it across the globe. Hence it is obvious, that, in every stage of the suit,

it becomes the interest of the poorer party to compromise his cause with his oppressor, from his inability to defray the expense; and that thus the law which was destined to protect him, becomes in its operation an intolerable evil. In the existing state of society in India, it appears to me that it would have been better if no right of appeal had existed beyond the circuit courts. Considering the general ignorance which prevails in England respecting the laws and customs of India, what chance is there that the King in council should pronounce an equitable decision in appeals from the East? This provision would seem only calculated to encourage expensive litigation. In a rational point of view, it would appear more advantageous if this appeal could be made to his Majesty's supreme court in Calcutta, the members of which may fairly be supposed to possess some knowledge of the laws and customs of the natives. The introduction of native pleaders into these courts, appears a very questionable innovation. It may introduce greater method into the conduct of trials, and simplify the task of the judge; but perhaps this advantage is counteracted by the greater expense which it occasions to the litigant, and the delay created by employing greater subtlety, refinement, and chicanery in the pleadings. The beneficial check which is exercised by an enlightened bar on the conduct of the judges in England, cannot be expected to exist under a despotic form of government. The want of these pleaders in the courts under the native governments, seems to mark unequivocally the less advanced state of civilization as compared with Europe; and to afford certain

evidence as to the summary nature of the proceedings before these tribunals. In a more refined state of society, a suitor in a court of law feels it advantageous to intrust his cause to the management of others, that it may not interfere with the time necessary for the conduct of his own affairs; but, if the more imperfect division of labour, and greater leisure which the Hindoos possess, enable them to attend to their law-suits, there seems no good reason why they should be compelled to adopt the practice of another country. In this respect, every individual must know what his own interest prescribes better than the government can teach him. In India, I believe, a suitor in a court of justice is obliged by regulation to employ one of these pleaders; but surely he ought to have the right of advocating his own cause, as practised in England, when deemed expedient.

Such are the apparent theoretical defects in the judicial arrangements of British India; but by far the greatest evil undoubtedly consists in the limited number of public functionaries who are employed in their exercise. Under the present system, where one magistrate exercises dominion over nearly a million of people, it must be apparent, that, with the greatest talents and integrity, he can exert but little influence in the practical distribution of justice; and that the country is principally governed by natives.

In British India, the European judge and magistrate of a district occupies the same exalted station as the lord-lieutenant or sheriff of a county in England, with this difference, that the jurisdiction of the Indian magistrate generally extends over a tract of

country containing twice or thrice the number of inhabitants in an English county, and that his duties are ten times greater.

To illustrate the powerful influence which is exercised by natives, in the practical distribution of justice, it will be necessary to go into some detail. Under the existing arrangements, each magistrate is ordered to divide his district into departments of twenty square miles, and to intrust the superintendence of the police in each, to a native officer designated a daroghah, with a proportion of native officers under him. This officer resides in the centre of his district. Under each magistrate there are generally from 12 to 15 daroghahs, and the police jurisdiction of each extends over at least 50 or 60 thousand individuals. Considering the rank and influence which he possesses, his salary is wretchedly small, being not more than 25 rupees per month, or £36 per annum. This officer takes cognizance of all criminal offences committed within his jurisdiction, apprehends delinquents, receives bail for their appearance, or forwards the prisoners to the magistrate's court in the centre of the district. Every person who accuses another of a criminal offence, or of injuring his person, must prefer the charge in the first instance before the daroghah. Thus, it is apparent that, in practice, the native recognizes his countryman as the efficient agent in the general police of the country; and that, placed at such an immense distance, the superior probity and intellectual energy of the European magistrate can operate but feebly in controlling the conduct of his subordinates. The influence of these officers is not confined to the mere

duties of the police. In India, as in every other despotic community, it extends a great deal farther, and regulates many of the transactions of ordinary life. Thus, in a small village, if provisions, labourers, or any particular article is wanted by a traveller, application must be made to the police officer subordinate to the daroghah, by whom the dealer is summoned, and the commodity furnished. Of course these services are not altogether disinterested, and afford opportunities for exaction. Unquestionably this minute interference in the concerns of individuals is not sanctioned or countenanced by government; but that it does exist, will hardly be denied by those who have observed the state of society in India.

Under the present system, the advantages and disadvantages of the British government in India are principally felt in the personal conduct of its native agents, by whom its principal functions are carried on. Unfortunately for humanity, the actions of these men are too often corrupt, vexatious, and oppressive; and do not correspond with the intentions of the government whom they represent. Such is the character ascribed to them by some of the most enlightened civil servants of the company; and the truth of it is irresistibly forced on the conviction of others practically unacquainted with the civil details of government. Thus, if a military officer marches across the country with a division of troops, he is generally waited upon by the daroghah, or superintendant of police of the division through which he passes, who pays his visit with considerable pomp and ceremony, accompanied by a retinue of servants, whose pay far exceeds his monthly salary of 25 rupees. The attention of the Euro-

pean is roused by this: he naturally inquires of those about him, how it is that a man so wretchedly paid is enabled to make so splendid an appearance? The information which I have obtained in such circumstances, from native officers of respectability, sufficiently explains this. They stated, that this was entirely owing to their habitual profligacy, corruption, and want of principle, which enabled them to accumulate large sums;—that, invested with the power of seizing offenders, and exempt from the personal control of the magistrate, by the distance of his residence, they too often perverted their authority to their own selfish purposes, by abstaining from apprehending notorious delinquents, and conniving at their offences, as long as they could pay for such indulgencies. Thus, if one individual accuses another of having committed a theft or robbery, it is said to be a common practice with daroghahs to release the criminal, on consideration of his making him a handsome present; and, as they are judges of the evidence, in the first instance, it is easy with them to colour the matter, so as to represent it as insufficient to convict the prisoner. This is understood to be a fertile source of emolument. When a murder is perpetrated within the jurisdiction of a daroghah, the occasion is eagerly seized for the purposes of exaction; he hastens to the spot, and commences operations by examining a number of the inhabitants apart. He is thus enabled to learn the name of the delinquent, or, what answers his purpose equally well, to ascertain against whom suspicions are entertained. Thus armed, he charges the individual with the offence; and, where circumstances will admit of it, compromises with him for his crime. Should vague

suspicions be entertained against a number of individuals, the occasion is still more favourable for collecting an ample harvest. By working on their fears, and threatening these individuals, that they shall instantly be sent to the magistrate's court, he is enabled to collect large sums. To avoid the misery of being torn from his family, the injury which his private interests will sustain from his absence, and the disgrace attending a public imprisonment, the wretched villager, although altogether innocent, is compelled to make any sacrifice which will avert these calamities. The march of troops used to afford the inferior minions of power another pretext for exercising great oppression. Thus, if a certain number of porters were required, the myrmidons of office were wont to seize upon individuals who esteemed it an utter disgrace to carry a burthen, and who were glad to make any pecuniary sacrifice which would rescue them from this degradation. If cattle were required, they were torn from the useful labours of agriculture, which compelled the cultivator to redeem them. A regulation of government, during the last year, prohibiting military officers from applying to the agents of police for such aid, bids fair to afford some check to these disorders, by removing the pretext. It must here occur to the reader—Can such cruel outrages upon personal liberty and property exist, unknown to and unpunished by the European magistrate? The answer must be, that, placed in the centre of an immense district, it is impossible for one individual to control the conduct of his numerous subordinates; and that, being surrounded by individuals whose interest it is that he should remain in ignorance of these transactions,

many of them are unknown to him; but that when known they are punished, although the conviction of these offences is rendered peculiarly difficult by particular circumstances.

The daróghahs and inferior officers are, generally speaking, relations or dependants of the principal law-officers of the magistrate's and circuit courts, by whom they are recommended for their situations; and these men, feeling a natural sympathy with the corrupt practices of the former, from a knowledge of their own venality, the whole resources of their skill and experience are too often employed in the service of the criminal. For this purpose, the trial is sometimes delayed,—at other times hurried on—essential witnesses are kept back, and false evidence suborned. As, according to the regulations, these law-officers conduct the examination of the criminal, and determine his sentence, this extensive power too often enables them to absolve the offender.

The fear which a despotic government inspires in its subjects, extinguishes all confidence in their rulers, and prevents the victims of oppression from complaining against those who have injured them, lest they should provoke the resentment of their superiors. This operates in practice, by securing impunity to the officers of government who abuse their trust. The habits and customs of their European rulers oppose a powerful obstacle to the punishment of these offences, as contrasted with those of their former governors. Under the Mahomedan rule, the Nazim or governor of a province held a court of justice once a-week in the open air, to which the meanest suitor had access, and could expose the oppressive conduct of the officers of government. Unquestion-

ably, the knowledge which was thus obtained too often afforded a pretext for stripping the rapacious oppressor of his wealth, without benefiting the injured party by restoring his property. But this has sometimes happened; for, even in Asia, upright and high-minded rulers have occasionally appeared, who considered that extensive power was only given them for the benefit of others. And, in their hands, this public administration of justice was eminently calculated to repress oppression. Under the present rule, it is entirely different. The European judge is to be found in the centre of a court of justice, surrounded by his native officers, who render all access to his person difficult. The house, which is constructed after the European fashion, with narrow doors and windows, increases the difficulty, and renders it easy for his native officers to repel obtrusive complainants.

The retired and modest character of the European judge renders him averse to all display and exhibition of his person, which might afford opportunities to the poor to state their grievances.—This is very well illustrated by the author of the *Suer Mutakhuerin*, a work written in Persian, containing an account of the transactions of the English in Bengal. This native gentleman, who was intimately connected with the English, represented to Mr Vansittart, when president of the council of Patna, that he ought to appear in public occasionally, and dispense justice according to the practice of the ancient rulers of the country. The Englishman replied, that he could not transact business exposed to the gaze of a numerous assembly; and therefore preferred his closet. But, supposing that he had followed this advice,

it is obvious that some limit must be opposed to this practice, as, where one man exercises dominion over so many, it is impossible for him to listen to all. This sufficiently accounts for a regulation of government which requires that all petitions delivered into a court of justice, should be written on stamped paper, upon which a duty is levied. This can only operate in practice, by deterring the poor man from complaining of the unjust oppressions of the zumeendars and officers of government, and must be regarded as the greatest evil of the existing arrangements for the distribution of justice. But it appears to be almost unavoidable from the limited number of public functionaries employed in this duty. The inference is apparent, that, if England is to exercise dominion in India, their number ought to be increased. In justice to a meritorious body of men, it appears to me but fair to state, that I have understood there are many judges who render themselves, as far as practicable, accessible to every native, and by whom unstamped petitions are received in their own houses. The vulgar opinion which is entertained in England of the corruption of these, as indeed of all other public functionaries in the East, is altogether unfounded. That instances do occur of this want of principle, cannot be denied; but they are very rare. The present Governor-general, Lord Hastings, has adopted the salutary practice of the ancient rulers in bestowing every attention upon the complaints of the subject. In his tours throughout the provinces, and even in his daily walks and rides, this nobleman receives every petition from the meanest native, and has thus

given a more oriental character to the duties of his station. Unquestionably this is attended with little direct benefit to the aggrieved party, as it is impossible for an individual, in the exalted station of Governor-general, to afford time for the minute investigation of these complaints, which generally refer to suits pending in the courts, in the proceedings of which he cannot interfere with propriety. All that can be done is to refer them to the court within whose jurisdiction the party resides, with instructions to inquire into the truth of the allegations contained.—But even this is beneficial, inasmuch as it bespeaks a wish to do justice; and the very knowledge that such an appeal is open to all, must practically operate in checking oppression. The account which is here given of the oppressive conduct of the native officers of government may appear exaggerated; but that it is founded on fact, can be sufficiently proved by the evidence of others practically acquainted with our judicial system. Thus, Mr Tytler, an experienced magistrate, states, in his work on the state of India, in reference to the conduct of European judges and magistrates,—"They must trust much to their native officers; and of these, I will venture to assert, that there is not in Bengal one man proof against a bribe. The dacoits and robbers, while they have booty, are sufficiently safe, and we have those only sent in who have ceased to pay for their freedom. The wealth of a dacoit generally increases in the direct ratio of the number of his crimes; and thus the greatest criminals are allowed by the daroghahs to escape, and these Jonathan Wilds only send in the lesser offenders. The darogahs either suffer the criminals

to escape, without having gone through the form of apprehending them, or they apprehend them, extort what they can from them, and then let them go. There is also a great chance that the daroghah shall never hear of their crimes. Many of these good people trouble themselves very little about the state of the police, living well, and making their fortunes by selling their power and influence to the zumeendars."* Such are the evils which exist under the present judicial arrangements, and which counteract the benefit which would otherwise arise from a more enlightened administration of justice. With a knowledge of the general rapacity and venality of their native officers and the misery which is caused by their exactions, surely some more active measures ought to be adopted by the government, with a view to remedy these disorders.

Considering that a daroghah possesses such extensive power and influence, it is obvious that he ought to be a well-educated person; but this is rare amongst these men at present, and sufficiently accounts for their proneness to corruption. It would be easy for government to rectify this, by forming an institution for the purpose of educating individuals to fill these appointments. The pupils of this seminary might be employed in subordinate duties at first, the zealous performance of which would ensure their promotion to the more important station of daroghah. To remove every excuse for corruption, higher salaries ought to be given. Were this to be combined with a retiring pension, to be grant-

* See *Considerations on India*, Vol. II, p. 94–95.

ed after a meritorious course of service, it might operate a beneficial change in their conduct. At present these men are selected at pleasure from the mass of the people by the magistrates, and are placed in situations where it is altogether impossible for them to live upon their income, and where no hope exists of their obtaining a better appointment, or any reward for a conscientious discharge of their duty In such circumstances, is it surprising that they should be dishonest? By establishing a regular gradation of ranks, and holding forth a prospect of advancement to those who distinguished themselves by superior energy and probity in the discharge of their duty, a visible improvement might fairly be expected in their conduct. At present, when their salary is so small, and no provision made for retirement, it is evidently their interest to be corrupt; if detected, they can lose but little. Mr Tytler seems to suppose, that this would be attended with no beneficial effect: he says,—"It is a bad plan that the salaries of the daroghahs should be increased with the intention of making them honest. No salary that the company could afford to give would bear any proportion to the immense sums that these men make by corruption. It is true, that, had they a larger salary, they could not plead, in excuse for their corruption, that they had not wherewithal to live upon. But this argument only holds good with honest men; and I would venture to say, that no honest man, knowing what the situation of a daroghah is, would venture to accept of it."—*Vol. II, p.* 300. This reasoning may be correct if the whole of the natives of India are corrupt; but, if a certain portion of

moral virtue and common honesty exists in this, as in every other community, in proportion to its civilization, it appears to me inconclusive, inasmuch as the small salary which is given will fail in engaging men of character in the service of the state. The force of public opinion operates every where.—In the bosom of Asiatic society, no man will accept an employment in which he may acquire wealth, but the acquisition of which exposes him to the hatred of his fellow creatures, who can obtain a moderate but honourable subsistence in a station which insures him the respect of mankind. At present I have understood there are few individuals of respectability who will accept of this employment; and I have met with one or two natives who had refused it from an abhorrence of the foul practices to which it would compel them to resort. Why are such high salaries given to the civil servants of the Honourable Company, but to attract a certain portion of probity, talent, and respectability into their service, and to secure them from temptation by affording them a liberal subsistence? If this policy is successful, which can scarcely be doubted by those who have witnessed its effects in India, the inference is obvious, that, as far as the state of our finances will admit of, it ought to be applied to the native branch of the service. If the present officers are so corrupt as is represented, any increase of their salary may be thrown away; but the service may be reformed by introducing men of character upon higher salaries, and measures may be taken for their better education. This venality is not confined to those who are beyond the personal control of the European magistrate, but

exists in as great a degree in the very centre of his court. Thus Mr Tytler states, that when a criminal is put upon his trial, every engine of corruption is put in motion:—"The aumilah, or court-officers around the magistrate, inquire whether the criminal can pay in his own person, or whether it is worth the while of the zumeendar to pay for him. If by either way they can gain, then witnesses are kept back; the proceedings are garbled; trial delayed in some cases, in others hurried on."—*Vol. II. p.* 96. But the evil which arises from the demoralized character of these men, is perhaps infinitely greater in all civil causes, where the zumeendars and ryuts are parties. The extensive power and influence which the landed proprietors possess, is too often perverted to the oppression of the peasantry, and their wealth employed to secure impunity to these unjust proceedings. This the corruption of the native law-officers, and the expense and delay of the proceedings in a civil action, afford them every facility for accomplishing. Under the present system, the zumeendar or landed proprietor is allowed to let his lands in whatever manner he pleases; the obligation to grant a lease is no longer insisted upon by the government. Their exactions are generally exercised by demanding more from the ryuts than the sum originally stipulated in their verbal agreements, and by dispossessing them of their lands whenever they find it their interest to let them to other tenants who offer more for them. In the present state of society, there are some individuals who possess a few beegahs of ground, which are held on a different tenure from the generality of landed property, being granted for the support of

pious individuals, and are exempted from the payment of rent. If a wealthy native purchases an estate which is burthened with many of these grants, he finds it too much his interest to resume them; and, to defend this injustice, by contending that the grant is fictitious. To obtain redress for this cruel injury, the oppressed villager is compelled to quit his family, and to institute a suit in the district court, at perhaps 50 or 60 miles distance from his home.—Here, after enduring the agony of delay for months, his suit is brought to a hearing; but, unfortunately for him, the wealth of his oppressor enables him to corrupt the native law-officers, and judgment is given against him. Thus beggared and oppressed under the sacred name of law and justice, the wretched suitor is compelled to return to his home, brooding over his wrongs, and cursing in his heart those institutions which were destined to protect him in his rights. That this statement is not exaggerated, must be evident to all who have ever inquired into the nature of these suits.

Some knowledge of the exactions of the zumeendars is unavoidably gained by every military officer. By a late regulation of government, every seapoy who wishes to institute a suit in a civil court, is directed to state the nature of it to the officer commanding his company, who forwards it to the European judge. This arrangement is made with a view to benefit the seapoy in the trial of his cause, which is directed to be placed first on the file. These soldiers are generally the sons of cultivators; and, as they often hold lands in their own name, which are rented from the zumeendars, they are familiarly ac-

quainted with their exactions. But any information which is derived from this source must be inferior in value to that of Mr Tytler's. From his statements it must be evident that it is almost impossible for the ryut to obtain justice in a cause where the wealthy zumeendar is the defendant. Thus he says:—"The country now belongs to the zumeendars or landholders: their influence is consequently greater than that of any other body; it is their interest that we should remain in ignorance of the miserable state of their ryuts. All the information we receive is through them, or the corrupt officers of our courts, who are, to a man, in the pay of the zumeendars."—*Vol. II. p. 324.* But the evil appears infinitely greater when we are told that these zumeendars are the principal law-officers in the civil courts, who award a decision in civil as well as criminal causes, and this in cases where they are parties with their tenants. Thus, the same author states:—"Would it not be thought impolitic and extraordinary, if the judges and officers of our courts in England (for molvees and pundits are judges), being composed of the landed proprietors in each county, were to sit there to try the complaints brought against themselves by their own tenants; yet this is the case in most zillahs in Bengal. From the molvees and pundits down to the lowest writers in the court, all the officers are possessed of landed estates in the district—many of them openly, and others under fictitious names."—*Vol. I. p. 387.* Is it suitable to the national character that this unnatural state of things should endure—that these institutions, which were destined to punish the oppressor, should become

the principal instrument of his triumph; and that justice should be administered by those who shamefully violate its sanctions? Whilst this profligate disregard of principle exists in the character of those who dispense the law, is it surprising that the people of India should generally entertain the opinion that the wealthiest litigant is certain of carrying his cause in our courts? Unquestionably this order of things ought to be reversed: the European judge should exert that efficient influence in the decision of causes which his moral and intellectual superiority enables him to exercise beneficially; and the native law-officer should only perform the less important function of aiding him by his advice. The suggestion of Mr Tytler, that no officer possessed of landed property in the district should be allowed to serve in the court of the judge and magistrate, could easily be adopted in practice. In exposing the evils which arise from their possessing landed property in the district, this author states:—"Innumerable are the instances which a circuit into the interior of his district will afford to the magistrate of discovering the knavery of his officers. He will find the paltry mohurir (or writer) of his court, the man who walks to his kutcherry, attended by no one, or by a shabby little boy, and himself clothed in rags, possessed, notwithstanding, of large property in land, of great and powerful establishments of servants, who are necessary to maintain, in the mofussil, the terrible majesty of the Company's servant. They will find this man more revered, or rather more dreaded, than the magistrate or the judge. This is no small evil. It is, on the contrary, one great

cause of the weakness of our Indian courts, and calls for immediate redress."—*Vol. I. p.* 390.

The defect of the present arrangements appears to be that the decision of causes is left principally to natives. It may be urged that this is rectified in practice by the power which is intrusted to the European judge of approving or disapproving of the proceeding. It may be so; but, according to the letter of the regulations, it does not appear that he has the power of setting aside their decisions; and in these circumstances an indolent man will generally acquiesce in their opinion. Were he made personally responsible, he would take a greater interest in the proceedings; and the corruption of the law-officers would be somewhat diminished. In the existing state of society, the belief that every thing is to be gained by corrupting these men, is so firmly rooted in the minds of the people, that it must be the work of time to eradicate it. In India the administration of justice under the native rulers was so venal, that it was always customary with the wealthy suitors to propitiate the judge with a present. This, of course, accounts for the practice of the present day. Aware of the extensive influence which the native law-officers possess under the existing arrangements, their favour is gained by the same means. It is but fair to state, that I have understood that there are many judges who pay very little attention to the theory of the regulations, and determine the principal causes in their courts without regard to the opinions of their law-officers. But, even in these districts, a great deal of corruption prevails. If the European judge investigates every case, and decides

equitably, it is easy for the law-officers to guess in what manner he will determine a cause. With this knowledge they make no scruple to take money from the suitor who is likely to win his cause; and if he gains it they take all the merit to themselves. If the suitor discovers that he has been imposed on, it is his interest to remain silent, from the dread of punishment for offering a bribe. Whilst this general corruption exists, it is evident that no great improvement can be expected in the administration of civil justice, until the number of European judges is increased, or until the general tone of morality throughout the country is elevated by the introduction of a better system of religion and education, which must necessarily improve the character of these officers. In regard to criminal justice, many civil servants are of opinion that the authority which the zumeendars formerly exercised in regulating the police, ought to be restored to them; and certainly they appear less likely to abuse the extensive power which this confers, than the daroghahs, who possess no stake or hereditary influence in the country, and consider that office was only given them for the purpose of enriching themselves. It may fairly be presumed that an extensive land proprietor entertains some regard for his peasantry; and that his conduct, however oppressive, is restrained by some respect for public opinion. In aid of the extensive duties of the magistrate of a district under the present system, perhaps some assistance might be derived from the few indigo planters, and other Europeans scattered throughout our dominions. If their services were voluntarily offered, there seems no good reason

against their being accepted. At every civil station a gentleman of the medical service is attached, who has very little employment; by some trifling addition to his salary his services might be rendered available to the general police of the country. In the deplorable deficiency of civil functionaries, it appears to me that important service could be rendered by the military—that, wherever a division is stationed, the commanding officer, or some intelligent person selected by him, might be intrusted with the active duties of the magistrate, in apprehending delinquents. These individuals should exercise a final jurisdiction in petty crimes, and possess the power of inflicting punishment. All criminals committed for capital crimes, or offences of magnitude, could be delivered over to the civil magistrate for trial. At present the jurisdiction of an officer commanding a station is confined to his cantonment; but the advantages which have resulted from the summary process before a military tribunal, are so great, that it would be advantageous if it could be extended further. Indeed, it has always struck me that the innovation was too rapid which transferred the power of punishing criminal offences from the military to the civil power. Under the Mahomedan government the foujdar, or officer commanding the troops, exercised an extensive jurisdiction in criminal offences, subject to the Nazim; and, in a despotic state of society, his authority was exerted with a vigour and celerity well calculated to repress crime. Under a more enlightened government, it is perhaps better that the trial of capital crimes (where the circumstances will admit of delay), and the decision of civil

causes should be determined by a separate order of men, who are skilled in weighing evidence and balancing probabilities. But, had the ordinary administration of criminal justice rested with the military power, there can be little doubt that the energy of its exercise would have effectually restrained these daring bands of robbers, who infested the provinces of Bengal in the years 1810–11–12, and for the repression of whom the ordinary police was found altogether inefficient.

Such are the glaring defects in the administration of civil and criminal justice in India. But, admitting that they do exist, it would be altogether unfair to condemn them, without taking into consideration the benefits which have resulted from their institution. It is necessary to set the good against the evil before striking the balance which would determine the value of these arrangements. But this equitable mode of conduct does not appear to have been followed by that philosophic writer, Mr Mill, in his chapter on this subject; and certainly not a whit more by his able reviewer in the *Edinburgh*. Every thing which can be said against these institutions is powerfully stated; but scarcely a single observation in their favour. They lay claim to superior impartiality, and assert an exemption from those prejudices which bias the Anglo-Indian in forming his opinions; yet, with all these advantages, it is surprising that their statements are merely *ex parte*. This exemption from prejudice does not appear to me to exist in as great a degree as these writers suppose. The mental habits of the philosopher are nearly as fertile a source of error as those of the man of action. He

is too apt to form a high standard of political perfection, by which he tries all human institutions; and if they fall short, he is too much in the habit of condemning them, without regard to the utility which they produce. If circumstances enable him to exercise political power, he applies abstract political principles to the existing state of society, which the public are not prepared to receive, and invests the community with privileges, which, from their previous ignorance, they are altogether unqualified for exercising beneficially. By this conduct he produces infinitely greater disorders in society than those which he has adventured to remedy. It would be unfair to apply the latter part of these observations to these writers, but they appear to me liable in some degree to the former. The task of vindicating the judicial arrangements which have been adopted in India, must be left to those who are intimately acquainted with their merits and defects. Unquestionably, some information is required from them, which may counteract the effect of these statements. Until this is given, it will be quite sufficient for me to state a few facts, which may induce an inquirer to pause before he adopts the opinions of either Mr Mill or his reviewer. It is manifestly unjust to estimate the value of these judicial arrangements by any abstract theory of perfection. The fair standard by which they ought to be tried is, as compared with those of a country in a similar state of civilization; and, in estimating their utility, the most important consideration is to inquire,—Whether they are better or worse than those which they have supplanted? It is difficult to find a community similarly situated, with the

judicial institutions, of which a fair parallel might be established. In default of this the inquirer is necessitated to compare the system of civil and criminal justice established in India, with the more refined jurisprudence of his own country. On doing so, he will find that many of the defects of our system of law in India are equally to be met with in the administration of civil and criminal justice in England; and that in some respects the former has attained to a greater state of perfection. The perusal of Mr Mill's chapter on this subject produces the impression that the British administration of justice in the East has been productive of infinite misery and distress to the inhabitants of these regions; and that it would have been better for them had they remained under the control of their former rulers. Admitting the existence of the evils which he exposes with such ability, I am rather inclined to think that our administration of justice has been attended with some benefit to the natives; and will endeavour to show the reasons for this opinion. As a preliminary to this, the first step is to consider the nature of the system which it has superseded. That some salutary practices existed under the Mahomedan administration of justice has been already shown; but the benefit arising from them was counteracted by others of a very pernicious tendency. Under this system of law, the punishments which were inflicted on offenders were cruel in the extreme, and could not be tolerated by a refined people. The sanguinary law of retaliation, the excruciating practice of impaling, the mutilation of limbs, and severe bastinadoes, which were sanctioned by this code, have been alto-

gether abolished. The atrocious practice of exacting confession by torture no longer exists. The flagellations which are authorised by this law, are, however, still retained as a means of punishment. Even now, the korah, or leathern scourge, which is used in our jails, is a dreadfully severe weapon. In the only instances that I have witnessed it inflicted, which was but twice, the breasts, and a considerable part of the back of the offender were covered with a leathern jacket, to protect his body from the stripes, which plainly demonstrates that a milder weapon ought to be employed. If this punishment is still to be retained, it is obvious that a scourge similar to that which is used in the army should be employed, which will inflict a milder but certain punishment, without endangering the life of the offender, or revolting the feelings of the spectator in an equal degree. But it is to be hoped that this, with the other barbarities of the Mahomedan code, may gradually disappear. The cruelties of their former rulers are visible at the present day. In the province of Oude, I have seen on the highway small perpendicular buildings just sufficient to contain the body of a man, in which notorious criminals were immured, who were thus doomed to perish by the most dreadful of all deaths. Under the Mahomedan code of law, circumstantial evidence was never admitted. It was necessary that the crime should be substantiated by at least two eye-witnesses, and these Mahomedans. When it is recollected, that the Musselmen formed only a tenth part of the population, and these, too, the ruling class, it must be apparent that this iniquitous rule of evidence could

only serve to secure impunity to those Mahomedans who cruelly murdered their fellow-creatures of the Hindoo faith. By regarding the evidence of either, as equal in our courts, an important service was rendered to the bulk of our population. In their criminal courts, the punishments which were awarded for many offences, consisted in fines, which became the perquisite of the judge. Human nature is too weak to allow that such a power should be intrusted to any man. The grand defect of our administration of justice appears to be, that the influence of superior probity and character in the judges and magistrates rarely extends beyond the centre of their districts, and that thus its beneficial operation is prodigiously limited. But the same evil existed under the Mahomedan system in an equal degree. The supreme court of criminal jurisdiction in each province did not extend its direct control beyond the capital: in the villages, the dispensation of justice was intrusted to the principal zumeendar. In the administration of civil justice, the proceedings were glaringly irregular. The judge determined at his pleasure in what order the causes were to be heard and decided. The early institution of a suit established no claim to precedency. In the provincial courts, the fees of the law-officers were not fixed by regulation, which left the ignorant suitor too much exposed to their exactions. The arbitrary power which the judge possessed in determining the trial, proved a fertile source of corruption. By making him a suitable present, a wealthy and dishonest litigant was enabled to expedite or protract the decision of his cause at his pleasure. But, independent of this

disgraceful venality, the expense of a suit was prodigiously augmented by the large share of the property or money litigated which was taken by the government. This is powerfully stated by that eminent author, Mr Orme, who says,—"This is so avowed a practice, that if a stranger should inquire how much it would cost him to recover a just debt from a creditor who evaded payment, he would everywhere receive the same answer—'The government will keep one fourth, and give you the rest.' Still forms of justice subsist; witnesses are heard, but browbeaten and removed; proofs of writing produced, but deemed forgeries and rejected, until the way is cleared for a decision, which becomes totally or partially favourable, in proportion to the methods which have been used to render it such; but still with some attention to the consequences of a judgment which would be of too flagrant iniquity not to produce universal detestation and resentment."—*Government and People of Hindostan, b. III. c. 5.*

At the period of our taking the administration of justice into our own hands, it is generally understood that this custom prevailed; and that the greater part of this sum became the perquisite of the judges. Under this arrangement, it became manifestly the interest of the defendant in a civil cause, that he should propitiate his judge, by complimenting him with a larger sum than that which he would receive from the plaintiff, in the event of his gaining his suit. In the dread of this, the plaintiff might be expected to come forward handsomely. The result of this [illegible]he, that justice would be sold to the highest bidder. But the most glaring evil of this system of

law consisted in its unjust partiality to Mahomedans. In causes where both the parties were Hindoos, they were allowed to determine it amongst themselves; but, if one of the parties was a Mahomedan, the cause was determined according to the Musselman law.—Thus the cherished habits and prejudices of an ancient people were forced to yield to those of a small band of strangers, who had usurped dominion over them by violence. When we reflect on their devoted attachment to their customs and usages, it is evident that this marked injustice in the distribution of law must have been felt as an intolerable evil. Surely a mighty benefit was conferred upon the Hindoo community, by placing both parties upon an equality in this respect. The despotic nature of the Mahomedan government operated perniciously in the distribution of justice: the nazim or governor of a province could, at any time, remove a cause from the ordinary tribunals, and award a decision upon his own authority. Possessing such powerful influence, it was easy for him to pervert it to the gratification of his own passions. Under the British rule, the power of the Governor-general is only exercised in mitigating the severity of the laws. The arbitrary and despotic authority with which the Mahomedan rulers were invested, produced its usual effect—a general insecurity of rights and property. The spirit in which the government was administered naturally communicated itself to the subordinate agents, who evinced, in their conduct, the same cruel disregard of the interests of others. Their rapacity and exactions were such, that all productive ind... languished:—it is in vain to expect ...at a country

will flourish where the fruits of their labour are torn from men by violence. The effects of this system of government, in its application to the lower orders of society, are powerfully illustrated by Mr Orme. He states,—"The mechanic or artificer will work only to the measure of his necessities. He dreads to be distinguished. If he becomes too noted for having acquired a little more money than others of his craft, that will be taken from him. If conspicuous for the excellence of his skill, he is seized upon by some person in authority, and obliged to work for him night and day, on much harder terms than his usual labour required when at liberty."

There is indubitably much truth in this statement. Even at the present day, under the British government, it is too much the practice to force the lower orders to labour by compulsion. Unquestionably this is discountenanced by authority; but, however enlightened the government may be, it cannot change the character of its agents in a day. At present the arbitrary spirit of despotism infects the whole body of the people, public functionaries, or otherwise. In private life, if a European gentleman in the civil and military service wants any thing, nothing is more common than for his servants to say, "Give me a seapoy or a police-officer, and it will be brought instantly." If eight or ten seapoys march across the country, it is no unusual practice for them to seize upon the first individuals they meet upon the highway, and to force them to carry their baggage to the end of the stage, without remuneration. The first time that I marched with troops, the bearers whom I had hired to carry my baggage ran away,

during the night, which gave me considerable uneasiness; but my anxiety was soon relieved by the sepoys whom I commanded in the rear-guard, who told me that they had brought fresh men. In India, troops generally march during the night; when the morning dawned I observed these volunteers staggering under their burdens, and altogether unequal to the task they had undertaken. This excited my curiosity; upon inquiry I found that they were a motley group of weavers, cultivators, and others, who had been torn from their homes in the dead of the night by my soldiers, for the purpose of carrying baggage. This grievous oppression is prohibited; but, where small parties of troops march across the country without a European officer, it is difficult to restrain their conduct. The tyrannical exercise of power by those around him, insensibly influences the conduct of the more enlightened European.—Viewing these things habitually, he is apt to regard them with less emotion than they ought to excite. A striking view of the oppressive conduct of the Mahomedan government, as practised in his time, is given by Mr Orme, who says,—"Imitation has conveyed the unhappy system of oppression which prevails in the government of Hisdostan, throughout all ranks of the people, from the highest even to the lowest subject of the empire. Every head of a village calls his habitation the durbar, and plunders of their meal and roots the wretches of his precinct; from him the zumeendar extorts the small pittance of silver which his penurious tyranny has scraped together; the foujdar seizes upon the greatest share of the zumeendar's collections, and then secures the favour of his nabob by volun-

tary contributions, which leave him not possessed of the half of his rapines and exactions. The nabob fixes his rapacious eye on every portion of wealth which appears in his province, and never fails to carry off part of it; by large deductions from these acquisitions, he purchases security from his superiors, or maintains it against them at the expense of a war."—*Government of Hindostan, Book III, Chap.* 9. This statement appears to me prodigiously exaggerated: but whoever has witnessed the direct effects of Asiatic misgovernment in the subsidiary states, where the British administration of justice has not been introduced, must acknowledge that there exists some foundation for it. Thus, it is apparent, that the Mahomedan administration of law was still more defective than that of the British, and that the corruption and venality which prevail at present existed in a much greater degree under their former government. The transfer of power from a semi-barbarous to a civilized race has been attended with this advantage to the Hindoos, that it has secured them a more honest and incorruptible body of rulers.* Un-

* That eminent legislator, Sir James Mackintosh, entertains different opinions from the generality of European writers respecting the benefits which the people of Asia have derived from the introduction of our authority,—if any judgment can be formed from the charge which he delivered at Bombay in November 1804. At this time famine raged throughout the territories of that presidency. He states that the British government had saved the lives of 100,000 persons, by importing £60,000 worth of rice, and by instituting an hospital into which individuals were admitted from the native territories. The benevolence of the government was not confined to the inhabitants of our own territory: the subjects of the Mahrattah and other states flocked into Bombay, and were fed

questionably the superior knowledge which the Mahomedan princes possessed of the native character enabled them more easily to detect and punish the oppression of their agents; but it is notorious that they rarely exercised this power for the benefit of the subject, by refunding the spoil, and that their paternal care for their people was generally evinced by stripping the oppressor and appropriating his wealth to themselves. It now remains to show, that the defects which pervade the judicial arrangements of Bengal, are in some degree to be found in the administration of civil and criminal justice in England. The disgraceful corruption of the police in India, which operates so perniciously in preventing the punishment of offenders, does not exist in any great degree in England; but if the expense of a criminal process is such that it deters individuals from prosecuting, it is obvious that society is equally injured, and that crime must remain unpunished. I have understood that the expense of prosecuting an individual who is suspected of theft is not less than £39. This may be true or false; but the fact is undeniable, that societies are formed in different counties for the purpose of prosecuting felons, and that notorious criminals are often let loose upon society, from the inability of individuals to prosecute. In

and cured at the British expense. For nearly a twelvemonth the average of these individuals was about 12,000 monthly. Under the native governments, Sir James calculates that about an eighth of the population would have perished. The exertions of the Bengal government were equally praiseworthy in its endeavours to alleviate the misery which resulted from the epidemic malady which ravaged its territory in the years 1817-18.

this respect, the administration of criminal justice in India is much superior: no expense is incurred by prosecuting a criminal, and an allowance for their subsistence is granted to prosecutors and witnesses during their attendance on the trial. The multiplicity of capital punishments which deform the criminal law of England, and which insure impunity to the offender, by the reluctance of a humane jury to condemn a fellow-creature to death for the commission of a trifling offence, does not exist in the Indian code. The punishments are more nicely adapted to the crime, and generally consist of imprisonment, with or without hard labour. The end of all punishment, the example to the community, is much better attained in India than in England, by compelling the criminal to work on the public highway heavily ironed, and exposed to the gaze of all the people. In England the criminal is withdrawn from public observation, and thus the salutary effect of punishment is diminished. The punishment of death is rarely denounced by the Indian code; but, when an individual is sentenced to it, it is generally inflicted. The certainty of its infliction when condemned, must operate powerfully in deterring from crime. In England, capital punishments are denounced for the most trifling offences; but, of twelve individuals condemned to death, not more than one is executed. In the year 1818, of 1254 criminals condemned to death, only 97 were executed. This uncertainty of the punishment can only operate in securing impunity to offenders, and renders a lottery of that which ought to be fixed and certain. The severity of the punishment deters humane individuals from

prosecuting. The general state of the jails, and regulations for the comfort of the prisoners, appear to me far superior to that of similar establishments in England. In India, separate apartments are ordered for those under sentence,—those sentenced to imprisonment by the court of circuit,—those committed to take their trial before the circuit,—and those sentenced for petty offences by the magistrates. In England, according to Mr Buxton's statements, in half the jails of the kingdom there is no classification of the prisoners according to their offences. The suspected and the guilty,—the innocent man who is falsely accused, and the miscreant whose character is stained with the commission of every crime,—the young and the old offender,—are all crowded together within the same narrow apartment. As Mr Buxton feelingly and impressively expresses it:—"The moment he enters prison, irons are hammered on to him; then he is cast into the midst of a compound of all that is disgusting and depraved. At night he is locked up in a narrow cell, with perhaps half a dozen of the worst thieves in London, or as many vagrants, whose rags are alive and in actual motion with vermin; he may find himself in bed, and in bodily contact between a robber and a murderer; or between a man with a foul disorder on one hand, and one with an infectious disease on the other. He may spend his days deprived of free air and wholesome exercise. He may be prohibited from following the handicraft on which the subsistence of his family depends. He may be half starved for want of food, and clothing, and fuel."—*Page* 15. In India, this dreadful state of misery and suffering does

not exist. The jails are large, comfortable, and airy; the light of the sun can shine through, and gladden the heart of the wretched prisoner; and the greatest cleanliness is preserved by the facilities which are afforded for performing their ablutions. In general, no restraint is imposed beyond what is necessary to secure suspected persons. The building is generally surrounded by a high wall, along which sentinels are placed, who render all escape impossible. Within this inclosure there is a large piece of ground covered with grass, on which the prisoners who are not condemned to hard labour are to be seen walking about, and only fettered by a slight iron. In the centre of the inclosure there is a large tank, which affords them abundance of water for their ablutions and culinary purposes. A daily allowance, sufficiently ample for his subsistence, is made to every prisoner, and a blanket provided for him. To every jail an hospital is attached, with a European surgeon, to which the sick are instantly removed. During the day the greater part of the prisoners enjoy wholesome air and exercise, and are only locked up at night. Generally speaking, I believe, unsentenced prisoners are rarely fettered; but this in a great measure must depend on the magistrate. These remarks are made from actual observation, and principally refer to Alipoor jail, over which I have often been on duty with a company of seapoys. By a singular arrangement, the efficient management of the jail is intrusted to the prisoners, under the superintendence of a few police officers. An active intelligent individual is selected from each ward, and employed in its management. According to Mr Tyt-

ler, he is intrusted with the power of distributing their subsistence-money to the prisoners—is held responsible for the cleanliness of the ward—settles their disputes—and, in many jails, keeps the keys of the ward. By this admirable arrangement, a powerful incitement is held forth to good conduct in the prisoners; and a considerable expense is saved to the state by their employment. The fact itself, and its success in practice, is strikingly characteristic of that marked fidelity to their trust, where confidence is reposed, which advantageously distinguishes the Hindoo people. Upon his release from jail, every prisoner, who has been confined six months, is entitled to a sum of five rupees. In India, this will amply suffice for two months' subsistence, and, with economy, for three. By this liberal provision, one of the principal causes of crime is effectually cut off; and in this respect the judicial arrangements of India approach nearer to that perfection which philosophers demand, than those of England or any other European state. Whatever defects exist in the criminal code of British India are much more likely to be removed than similar imperfections in that of England. That profound admiration of antiquity—that powerful array of private interests, which oppose themselves to all innovation, and that spirit of party which identifies itself with the defence of all existing institutions,—cannot be expected to influence the minds of the members of the Indian governments in the slightest degree. The principal obstacle to improvement must be the expense. In regard to criminal law, it does not appear that the prejudices of the natives oppose any powerful resistance. The

adoption of the Mahomedan criminal law, as the basis of the present code, and its application to the Madras territory, has been objected to by that distinguished author, Colonel Wilks, who appears to prefer the Hindoo criminal law. Unquestionably, the hasty introduction of this code into countries where it was altogether unknown, must be regarded as a capital error in legislation. But, independent of this, it does not appear to me that there is any good reason for preferring the Hindoo to the Mahomedan law. From a cursory perusal of *Colebrooke's Digest of Hindoo Law and Menu's Institutes*, I should say, that the laws of the Hindoos are still more barbarous, inconsistent, and defective, than those of the Mahomedans. If the Hindoo law still prevailed in any considerable portion of the Madras territory, it was unwise to shock public opinion by the introduction of the Mahomedan code; any improvements could have been as easily ingrafted upon the one as the other. The idea of establishing one uniform code throughout a vast empire, inhabited by nations different in language, manners, and religion, is only worthy of an arbitrary despot, or an abstract political philosopher. In this respect, these antipodes in opinion harmoniously agree in introducing their systems, without any regard to circumstances, or respect for the preëstablished opinions, prejudices, and usages of the people for whom they legislate. If we gradually improve upon the ancient system of law established in each province or presidency, it seems to me of very little consequence whether the Hindoo or the Mahomedan criminal law forms the basis of our code. The Mussulman criminal law had pre-

vailed for centuries throughout the greater part of our dominions; and this must be regarded as the substantial reason for adopting it as the basis of our code in Bengal. In all that regards the apprehension and trial of the criminals, its practice is nearly similar to that of the Hindoo, and even the British law. All the advantages of the latter system—publicity in the proceedings, and the open interrogation of the prosecutor and witnesses before the court—have either been introduced or existed prior to our time. The dreadful expense, delay, and uncertainty in the administration of civil justice in India, and the facility which it affords to the rich man to oppress the poor, are notorious; but it is equally true that nearly the same defects exist in the practice of the law in England. The multiplicity of its forms, its endless delays, and glorious uncertainty in the issue, are proverbial. The expense is so great, that a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* informs us:—"In England it is better, in a mere pecuniary point of view, to give up £40 than to contend for it in a court of common law. It costs that sum to win a cause; and, in the court of equity, it is better to abandon £500 or £1000 than to contend for it."—*Number* 61, *p.* 138.

The expense of a chancery suit, and the exactions in the shape of fees, far exceed any thing of the kind in India. Some idea of these is given by Mr Bentham, in his profound work on *Rewards and Punishments*, edited by Mr Dumont.

Thus, if two individuals go to law about the settlement of an account, it is referred to a master of chancery for his decision. At the first summons

before his tribunal, none of the lawyers appear. At the second summons the same. At the third they appear, and the affair puts itself in train. For every summons the fees are paid. The master in chancery does not allow above half an hour, or an hour at most, to each cause: when the hour strikes, the hearing is put off until another day. I give the original, as I believe there has been no translation of the work into English:—"Sous le grand chancelier, il se trouve des juges rapporteurs nommés maîtres en chancelerie. S'agit il de procéder à la liquidation d'un compte? voici la marche:—Les procureurs, de part et d'autre, doivent comparoître par devant le maître. Prémière citation: il ne vient personne. Second citation: personne. A la troisième, ils comparoissent, et l'affaire se met en train. Mais, comme on n'accorde qu'une demi-heure, ou une heure tout au plus, et qu'on n'arrive pas au rendezvous à point nommé, l'affaire n'est qu'entamée: l'heure sonne, et l'on se retire. A l'audience suivante, il faut recommencer. Tout cela est d'étiquette. Or, à chaque citation, les honoraires se renouvellent."—*Théorie des Peines et des Récompenses, tome 2de, p. 57.* According to the same author, we learn that the judges, independent of their liberal salaries, derive some emolument from protracting the proceedings, and postponing the decision of a cause:—"Ainsi les grands juges, oûtre leurs amples salaires, qu'il ne faut pas leur envier, ont un profit casuel, qui se multiplie à proportion des incidens et des longueurs. Il y a des cas où un juge reçoit à peu-près quatre livres sterling pour une acte qui retarde de six mois les opérations de la justice."—*T. 2de,*

p. 56. This book was published as late as 1811; and no one will deny that Mr Bentham is intimately acquainted with the practice of the English courts. The character of the English judges is above all suspicion, and excludes every idea of their perverting this power to the gratification of their own selfish purposes; but, in comparing the judicial arrangements of England with those of India, where the judge receives no emolument beyond his salary, it is apparent that the preference must be given, in this respect, to that system which removes every possibility of the interest of the judge being opposed to his duty. It will be urged, that the evil which arises from this expensive administration of justice in England, and the facility which it affords to the rich man of committing injustice, is counteracted by the powerful check which public opinion exercises against oppression, and the greater sympathy which exists between the different orders in society. This must be admitted in part; but, in practice, the most efficacious check appears to me to consist in the existence of a skilful, wealthy, and independent body of lawyers, who will undertake the cause of any poor man who has suffered oppression, provided there appears a fair chance of gaining his plea; and thereby remunerating themselves for their trouble. But this advantage is purchased with no small portion of evil. It is evidently the interest of these men to render the proceedings at law as expensive as possible; and to oppose all innovation which tends to simplify the practice, and to diminish the expense. Forming a powerful body which exercises great influence over public opinion, is it sur-

prising that every beneficial change is warmly opposed? But, independent of this, how is it possible that any great improvement can be introduced in the practice, when a bill for this purpose, if it is not carried through by a member, costs not less than five hundred pounds? In India, these obstacles to improvement do not exist. That powerful array of private interests, which an organized body of lawyers oppose to innovation, is not yet formed. The profession is scarcely known, and altogether in an incipient state.

In regard to improvement, the government has only to attend to the opinions of its most enlightened servants in the judicial department. What has Mr Mill, or any one else, stated against the present system, which has not been urged by Mr Colebrooke, Sir Henry Strachey, or Mr Tytler, and others? These gentlemen have unequivocally stated that the imposition of fees, and stamp duties, has had no tendency to diminish litigation. If so, why not repeal them? It is well known that these taxes were originally imposed with a view to check frivolous law-suits, and thus to enable the judge more easily to decide upon the diminished number of causes which were brought before him. If they have altogether failed in producing this effect, the remedy is obvious. The more especially, as it is known that they were instituted with no direct view of producing revenue to the states, there can exist no good reason for their continuance. By this means, the principal objection which Mr Mill has urged against the existing system would be effectually answered, which, no doubt, is all that gentleman wishes for.

If doubts are entertained as to the inefficacy of law taxes, in diminishing litigation, it would be easy to determine it by experiment. All that is necessary, is to decree, that, within a certain number of districts, no fees or stamp duties should be imposed during the year. At the end of this period, by comparing the practice with that of former years, the result would show whether there had been any increase or diminution of law-suits. This may be a slow process of amendment, but better to do something than nothing. The just animadversions of Mr Mill have not produced any improvement that I am aware of. In closing these observations, it may be deemed superfluous to state, that no intention exists of depreciating the general administration of law in England. Any reference to its acknowledged evils has merely been made with a view to show the unfair standard by which the judicial institutions of India have been tried.

It now remains to consider the arrangements framed for the management of the revenue of British India. In each presidency this is intrusted to a department designated the board of revenue, which consists of a president, generally a member of council, and three other members. This board corresponds direct with government, through the medium of a functionary denominated the secretary to the territorial department. Its functions consist in superintending the collection of the land revenue, and in determining the settlement of lands throughout each presidency. Independent of this, it manages the estates of landholders disqualified by sex, minority, or lunacy, and the education of such as are

minors. It possesses also jurisdiction in appeals from the collectors respecting claims to pensions. It is obliged to keep regular records of its proceedings, and to report every important matter to the Governor-general in council for his sanction, previously to forming a final determination upon it. The members of the board are prohibited from trading, holding lands, or lending money to the landholders. Under the general superintendence of the board, the collection of the revenues is intrusted to a European collector in each district. His jurisdiction is the same as that of a judge and magistrate, and in general extends over a tract of country containing from 6 to 1,200,000 inhabitants. Thus, under the Bengal presidency, which contains about 50 districts, containing a population of 40,000,000, there are about 50 collectors to receive the revenue. His duty consists in collecting the land-tax, in regulating the management of the estates of landholders disqualified by sex, minority, or lunacy, and in providing for the education of such as are minors. He superintends the public embankments; an object of great moment in a country subject to inundation. He collects the tax on spirituous liquors.—He superintends the division of joint estates, and apportions the assessment on lands ordered to be sold by judicial courts in discharge of an arrear of revenue. He is intrusted with the payment of the pensions which, under the ancient government, had been granted to religious mendicants, or families in a state of decay. He likewise disburses the cash for the payment of the civil and military establishments within his district. A European assistant—a civil

servant of the company—is appointed to aid him in these important functions. It is obvious that these extensive duties cannot be performed without the assistance of a great number of native officers. Each district is divided into a certain number of departments, and the collection of the revenue in each intrusted to an individual, designated a tuhseeldar, with a suitable proportion of subordinates. His authority and influence are similar to those of a daroghah, in the judicial department. Independent of this, the collector is aided by natives, skilled in revenue-accounts, who are constantly attached to his person. Exercising such extensive influence over property, about the nature and localities of which he is in a great measure ignorant, the most upright and able public servant is obliged to depend a great deal upon the information of those around him. The influence which this confers upon individuals, operates in practice as a fertile source of corruption, and induces parties concerned to make large presents to his native officers. If they cannot influence the mind of their European superior, at least they will pretend to do so; which equally enriches them. Surrounded by these men, who are personally interested in every transaction, and to whom craft, dissimulation, and fraud are habitual, it is difficult to perceive the truth, where it is so much the interest to conceal it, and almost impossible to avoid the variety of snares which are laid for him. Under the Bengal presidency, in the provinces of Bengal proper, Behar, and Benares, the settlement of the revenue is permanent.

In the ceded and conquered provinces, com-

prising Allahabad, Agra, Rohilcund, Cuttack, and other districts, with our recent acquisition of Ajmere, and territories on the Nerbuddah, the settlement of the revenue is temporary, and I believe generally consists in a triennial settlement. The management of the revenue in the ceded and conquered provinces, is intrusted to two commissioners, who possess functions similar to the board of revenue. In India, the revenue of the state has, under both the Hindoo and Musselman governments, been principally derived from the land. According to the Hindoo lawgiver, the sovereign could demand a sixth or fourth, or even a third of the produce. The Mahomedan commentators on the law were much more complaisant to the masters of mankind, and allowed them to exact a half of the produce—but this only applied to infidels; to the faithful the contribution was fixed at a fifth. In India, the practice of the Musselman rulers was conformable to their theory, and the land-tax, which was paid by nine-tenths of their subjects, was generally half the produce. This must be regarded as the substantial cause of the general poverty of these fertile regions. In a country where half the produce was consumed by unproductive labourers, there could be no fund for the reproduction of wealth, and consequently no increase of national prosperity. The government swallowed up those resources, which, in a different state of society, are naturally employed in the encouragement of productive industry. Under the British government, the assessment was fixed upon nearly the same basis, and certainly the amount of revenue is not less than what was collected by their former rulers. In the provinces ceded by the

Nabob of Oude in 1801, it is well known that a greater revenue has been realized than under his administration. From the able report of Sir Thomas Munro, it appears that a similar improvement had taken place in the revenue of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, since their annexation to our dominions. This may be accounted for, without supposing that any increased exaction has prevailed under our government; but the conclusion which I intend to draw from it is this, that nearly the same state of society and distribution of wealth prevails which existed under their former rulers. And hence the disappointment which was experienced at the opening of the trade to India, in finding that the poverty of the people created no demand for our manufactures, is easily explained. This singular distribution of property, which prevails in the East, has excited a great deal of discussion. I do not intend to embark in the zumeendaree controversy, about which I know very little,—nor have I conversed with any intelligent natives on the subject, who could communicate correct information; but I have casually inquired of the ryuts, Who was the proprietor of the soil? and was invariably told,—"the sovereign." The arrangement which has been adopted by our government affords some countenance to this opinion.—It is true the zumeendar has been declared the proprietor of the soil; but the supreme authority still reserves to itself the right of disposing of his estate, in the event of any arrear of revenue. From the general tenour of Asiatic history, it is apparent that the zumeendar was only considered as a revenue-officer removeable at the pleasure of the sovereign. In this

situation, he was allowed a commission of 10 per cent. upon the revenue, and was authorized to keep up a considerable military force for the purpose of enforcing his collections. From the superior skill and minute knowledge of the resources of particular districts which individuals possessed, these offices had necessarily a tendency to become hereditary, and were generally continued in a particular family. This situation afforded favourable opportunities for increasing their wealth and influence; in their situation it was too natural to pervert their power to the gratification of their avarice. Thus, time and circumstances conspired to invest them with an authority which they did not possess from their official situation; and their power of exacting a greater share of the produce than they were legally entitled to, naturally increased. At the breaking up of the Mogul empire, and the assumption of the internal management of the country by our government, they had somewhat approximated to the condition of European landholders; and at this period it may be fairly conjectured that, instead of 10 per cent. they appropriated at least 20 per cent. of the produce to their own purposes. Such being the case, in a political point of view the government may have considered it expedient to regard them as proprietors; but the fact is undeniable that they were not so, in the European sense of the term. Like all despots, the Mahomedan monarchs considered themselves absolute maters of the property of their subjects: their public edicts announce this abstract right in the most imposing language. The descendants of a race of men who had gained their dominions by violence, these lofty pretensions per-

fectly accord with the history of conquest in every age. In practice this claim was so far modified, that a bare subsistence was allowed to the cultivators of the soil, who possessed a right of occupancy, and a liberal allowance to the zumeendar or collector. Independent of this, the remainder of the produce was considered as the property of the state. From the general tone of conversation amongst the natives of India, unconnected with the zumeendars or ryuts, it has always struck me that the people were habitually impressed with the opinion that the sovereign was the proprietor of the soil. In their daily language, they familiarly talk of the English government in this light. This belief in the proprietor's right of the sovereign, it appears to me, may be easily reconciled with the opinions of Colonel Wilkes, Sir Thomas Munro, Mr Tytler, and others, who contend that it exists in the ryut. To the monarch of India it must have been a matter of perfect indifference who occupied the land, provided the demands of the state were satisfied. It was his interest that the soil should be cultivated to the utmost, and that every facility should be afforded to the ryut in bringing waste lands into a state of tillage. This naturally required that the cultivator should be at liberty to dispose of his right of occupancy, if necessary to promote his interests. In these circumstances, if a ryut wished to give up the land which he possessed, with a view of engaging in some other occupation, there appears to have been no obstacle to his disposing of the right of occupancy. In such a state of society this was rarely worth much. The question, after all, is one of curiosity rather

than of real utility. It is sufficiently evident that a distribution of property prevailed, entirely different from that which exists in Europe; and under which the rights of all were pretty well ascertained. In these circumstances, it was of little moment whether the sovereign, the zumeendar, or the ryut was styled the proprietor. Under the British government the zumeendar has been declared the proprietor, with a full power to alienate his property. The rights of the ryuts remain nearly unaltered. At first an obligation was required that a regular lease should be given by them to their tenantry; but this has not been enforced. The cause which led to the permanent settlement of the revenue was evidently a wish to relieve the inhabitants of these regions from the dreadful uncertainty, perplexity, and vexation which results from an annual settlement of accounts. It was confidently expected that this arrangement would lead to a great extension of cultivation. The innovation which recognized the zumeendar as a proprietor, was too evidently influenced by our European ideas of property; but the change which it effected was less in reality than in name. It now remains to consider the effects of the permanent settlement upon the wealth and happiness of the country.

On the first introduction of this system in 1790, its operation was attended with a great increase of misery. The assessment was fixed too high, which necessarily led to the sale of the estates of the zumeendars who had fallen into an arrear of revenue; and thus a transfer of property took place, which deprived some portion of the ancient families of that

rank and influence which they maintained in society, and reduced them to beggary. The difficulty of proceeding against their tenantry with a view to recover balances of revenue, from the delay attending a civil action in our courts, was likewise felt as an intolerable evil. But, in the course of time, these disorders appear to have been rectified. A more enlarged experience enabled the revenue officers to fix the assessment more correctly; and a summary process was adopted in disputes between the zumeendar and the ryut, which enabled the former to recover his balances. At first the zumeendar derived no advantage from the permanent settlement, as, under this arrangement, he was prohibited from demanding any increase of rent from the ryuts. In these circumstances it was foolish to expect that he should take any interest in improvement. At present this prohibition no longer operates. In the event of any increase of produce or improvement in the soil, the zumeendar is allowed to derive a fair advantage from it, by increasing the rent. In a short time, the prodigious advantage which resulted from the permanent settlement, as compared with the annual arrangement and arbitrary exactions which prevailed under the Mahomedan government, began to be perceptible. About ten years after its introduction, the collectors of districts were called upon by Lord Wellesley to report upon the effects of this measure. If their information is to be relied upon, a visible improvement had taken place in the circumstances of the landholders, and a considerable extension of agriculture, accompanied with a marked diminution in the quantity of lands exposed to sale for

arrears of revenue. It is to be regretted that no authentic information is to be obtained respecting the precise operation of the principal measures of our government. In India, all official reports on this subject are deposited in the archives of government, and never communicated to the public. Their contents are only known to a few heads in office; and thus many of the civil servants are deprived of the benefit which might be derived from them. In England little has been communicated since the publication of the valuable information contained in the Fifth Report.

From the casual conversations which I have had with natives, with no direct view to obtain information respecting this measure, it appears to me, that they generally entertain the opinion that the interests of the zumeendars have been greatly improved by this arrangement, and that they had generally become wealthy. Even in India, some communications have appeared in the journals exposing the great advantages which the zumeendars have derived from this settlement; and indirectly reflecting upon the impolicy of the government in throwing away this rich fund of revenue. From what I have heard and read upon this subject, it appears to me unquestionable that at least one order of men has benefited by this arrangement. Under the Mahomedan government, any improvement in the circumstances of the landholder necessarily led to an increased annual assessment. The interests of the ryuts have not been ameliorated in the same proportion; but there is little foundation for supposing that they are deteriorated from what they were under their former

rulers. As the contribution which the zumeendar affords to the state is fixed, there can be no legal pretext for exacting more than the stipulated rent from his ryuts, on the ground that an additional impost has been authorized by government. Under the Mahomedan government, it was customary with the zumeendar to assess the ryuts for any deficiency in the revenue which was caused by one of their number absconding. The removal of this oppressive grievance has conferred a substantial benefit upon this industrious class of the community. From the inspection of some of the firmauns of Mahomedan emperors of India, it appears evident, that the Musselman ryuts were prodigiously favoured in the arrangements which were made for the collection of the revenue. The assessment was fixed at a tenth part of the produce, which was denominated ushir; whilst half the produce was exacted from the Hindoos. This mortifying inequality has been removed, and both classes placed exactly upon the same footing. Independent of this, the condition of the ryuts has been improved, by the powerful stimulus which has been given to the productive industry of the country, by the increased cultivation of indigo and cotton, created by the demands of European commerce. At the present day, the European manufacturer of indigo contracts immediately with the ryut for the cultivation of this plant, and avoids all connexion with the zumeendar. Where many of these individuals are scattered throughout a district, the effect is visible in the increased value of the lands, and consequent prosperity of the people. The existing restrictions which prevent Europeans

from holding lands, oblige them to employ natives in the cultivation of this plant. That the extensive power and influence which the zumeendar possesses, too often enables him to oppress the ryut, is unquestionable; but, in this unfortunate state, it is some consolation to reflect, that the weaker party is likely to possess the earnest sympathy of the European magistrate, which will necessarily lead to corresponding exertions in his behalf. It is to be regretted that the salutary provision which required that every zumeendar shall grant a written lease to the ryut, has not been enforced. It is obvious that this would oppose a powerful check to extortion on the part of the landholder; and the existence of this document would prove essentially useful in determining the numerous law-suits which arise between the proprietor and his tenant. Surely it would be easy for the government to keep a register of these leases in each district; or to reject, in our courts, the suits of the zumeendars who had neglected to grant them.

It is difficult for an individual, unconnected with the civil administration, to ascertain whether any marked increase in the cultivation has taken place. But whoever has travelled throughout the provinces where the permanent settlement prevails, must have been struck with the fertile and extensive cultivation which the general face of the country exhibited. There are many tracts in the districts of Benares, Ghazeepoor, Shahabad, and Sarun, which present the appearance of a rich garden, and where the prosperity of the country is apparent in the general appearance of the inhabitants. The same may be

said of Purneah, Burdwan, &c. in Bengal, and many parts of Rohilcund, and the Doab in Upper India. Throughout the provinces, the density of the population forces itself upon the notice of the most careless spectator; and the numerous flocks and herds of cattle attest the existence of a considerable portion of wealth. As compared with the cultivation in the King of Oude's dominions, it has always struck me that there was a marked superiority in the appearance of the British territory. At the same time, it is but fair to state, that I have beheld small independent states, governed by Hindoo rajahs, where the general cultivation appeared superior to that of the Company's provinces; and where the independent air of the peasantry announced a greater security of rights. In the year 1810, when a large force marched beyond the British territories in the direction of Saugor and Seronge, with the view of preventing the establishment of Meer Khan in these principalities, the division halted for nearly two months within the dominion of the Rajah of Tihree, the flourishing appearance of which excited the admiration of the whole army. This is perhaps to be accounted for by the smallness of the territory, which afforded great facility to an active ruler in the correction of abuses. That happy exemption from the inroads of the predatory powers, which the principal British provinces have enjoyed for nearly 60 years, must be regarded as the main cause of their prosperity; but unquestionably the permanent settlement of the revenue has powerfully coöperated in producing this effect.

It is remarkable that the rebellions which have lately disturbed the tranquillity of India were confined to the provinces of Rohilcund and Cuttack, into which this arrangement has not been extended. No information has been given to the public respecting the cause of this delay. It is now nearly 20 years since these provinces, with the other ceded and conquered districts, came into our possession; and it is generally understood that some promise was held out to the landholders of obtaining a permanent settlement. If this was ever given it has not been fulfilled; which induces the supposition that the government has repented of this magnificent act of bounty, by which it spontaneously gave up the right of the state to an increased revenue, in the event of any extension of agriculture which augmented the annual produce. There may exist solid reasons that a permanent settlement should not be granted to the landholders of these provinces. If no promise has been given on the part of the government, the question still remains open for consideration. In pledging the faith of the state that no increased demand shall be made upon the landholder, the danger consists in the probability that, at some future emergency involving a heavy expenditure, the government might be tempted to break its engagements, and thus its character would be stained in the eyes of its subjects. The habitual disposition of every government to spend whatever it receives, renders this event but too probable. In India, where the revenue of the state has been principally derived from the land, any attempt to tax the people in another way would encounter a powerful opposition, from the inveterate attachment of

the people to their ancient habits and usages. Even in cases where this taxation is intended for their own benefit, they will not submit to it. In the year 1810, or 1811, the government attempted to establish a house-tax in the city of Benares, for the purpose of maintaining an efficient police. It was never contemplated that the state should derive any revenue from this assessment: it was imposed with the view of checking the extensive depredation on the property of the citizens, and the tax was limited to the amount necessary to effect this purpose. But this innovation was received with marked disapprobation; and public opinion was manifested in opposition to it in a singular way.—The immense population of this celebrated shrine of Hinduism left their homes in one mass, and betook themselves to the fields, declaring that they would not return to their houses until this tax was repealed. The government was compelled to give way, and to indulge the citizens in their wish, that the fraternity of thieves might exercise their vocation with their usual freedom. The powerful check which is opposed to taxation under the most despotic government, by the force of public opinion, is illustrated in a very lively manner by the celebrated Montesquieu:—"C'est une erreur de croire qu'il y ait dans le monde une autorité humaine à tous les égards despotique: il n'y en a jamais eu, et il n'y en aura jamais; le pouvoir le plus immense est toujours borné par quelque coin. Que le grand seigneur mette un nouvel impôt à Constantinople, un cri général lui fait d'abord trouver des limites qu'il n'avoit pas connues. Un roi de Perse peut bien contraindre un fils de tuer son père, ou un

père de tuer son fils ; mais obliger ses sujets de boire du vin, il ne le peut pas. Il y a dans chaque nation un esprit général, sur lequel la puissance même est fondée ; quand elle choque cet esprit, elle se choque elle-même, et elle s'arrête nécessairement."—*Grandeur et Decadence des Romains, Chap.* 22. A just sense of the difficulty which it might encounter in imposing any new tax, and a regard to its own honour, may have determined the government to give up the idea of extending the permanent settlement throughout their territory. But, allowing every weight to these considerations, a regard to future improvement, and the welfare of their subjects, ought to induce them to give, at the least, a settlement of 10 or 15 years to the landholders, instead of the triennial arrangement which now exists. It is hard to be obliged to give up the fair prospect of improvement which the introduction of the permanent settlement afforded, by its tendency to create a wealthy and intelligent middle class of proprietors, so essential to the welfare of society, and which does not exist in India—but it is consolatory to reflect that this arrangement prevails in the most valuable of our provinces. If the government still perseveres in the design of rendering it general, the effects of this arrangement upon the political destiny of British India must form a curious speculation. The experience of history leads to the certain conclusion, that the executive will expend more than its revenue, and will be compelled to relieve its necessities, either by violating its engagements in regard to the permanent settlement, or by introducing new modes of indirect taxation, which may shock public opinion and endanger its dominion.—

Or, lastly, it may adopt the more rational and equitable measure of calling upon the zumeendars to contribute towards the increased expenses of the state. This may naturally lead to the convocation of provincial assemblies, and thus a more perfect order of society might gradually be established. The rise of the English House of Commons was certainly not more dignified in its origin, being called into existence by the pecuniary wants of the sovereign. The adoption of the permanent settlement as a measure of revenue, according to Mr Mill, has been equally productive of distress and misery as the judicial arrangements of British India. In the first stage of its introduction there appears some ground for this opinion; but, if tried by the result, after an experiment of ten years' duration, the conclusion ought to be widely different, if the evidence of the collectors of revenue during Lord Wellesley's administration can be depended upon. The thing is so obvious to common sense, that a permanent lease is better than a temporary one, and the measure itself was calculated to lead to so much benefit, that it is surprising Mr Mill has not more to say in favour of it. It is incumbent on a writer, who aims at impartiality, to point out the merits as well as the defects of existing institutions, otherwise he lays himself open to the charge of being too much disposed to gratify his intellectual superiority, by indulging in the pleasure of censure. In the arduous task of government, it is but just that men should receive some encouragement in their well-meant endeavours to ameliorate the condition of society; and it was perfectly competent to a writer of his powers to bestow it.

The statements and opinions which are given in his celebrated chapter on the judicial and revenue establishments of British India, are principally founded on the evidence of the civil servants of the company. If their testimony is esteemed good, when it tends to expose the defects of this system, with him at least it ought to be regarded equally valid, when they unequivocally testify as to the beneficial effects which have resulted from the adoption of the permanent settlement. Such being the case, his conclusion as to the inefficacy of this arrangement, as a means of improvement, ought to fall to the ground, if the official returns during Lord Wellesley's government (and I believe similar reports under the present administration) can be relied upon. Mr Mill has declared his opinion, that the British government has lost the noblest opportunity of ameliorating the condition of the lower orders of society in India, by availing itself of its power, to establish the ryuts as proprietors of the soil. This change would unquestionably have conferred a great advantage upon the great body of the cultivators, by rescuing them from the exactions of the zumeendars; and by its tendency to create an increased activity and industry, which the certainty of reaping the entire fruits of their labour would necessarily call forth. Independent of this, the possession of property would improve the character of the people, and raise them from their present abasement by the increased security and consequent independence which it confers. At present, it may be fairly conjectured, that the share of the produce which the state demands from the cultivator is increased one-half in the amount

by the intermediate agency of the zumeendars and sub-renters of land. Any plan which was calculated to relieve the ryut from this tax upon his labour would certainly be a great step in improvement. But, admitting all its advantages, the innovation which Mr Mill proposes, appears much too rapid in its nature, and pregnant with great injustice to one class of men, the zumeendars, jagheerdars, and others, who would be deprived of the fair advantages which they had attained in society.* From general evidence, it is sufficiently apparent, that throughout our provinces this body had acquired a degree of wealth, power, and influence, which was unwarranted by their official situation; but which, being sanctioned by time and prescription, it was certainly incumbent upon a legislator to respect. From the learned dissertation on the tenure of landed property of Umeer Hyder Belgramee, mooftee to the Sudr Nizamut Udaulut in Calcutta, it is evident that a right of disposing of their property was enjoyed by individuals to whom grants of lands had been made by the sovereign:—"If the king bestows on any one mowat (or waste land), that person becomes the proprietor, although he be not of the description of uhil mousarif, which character will presently be

* Mr Mill has too great a regard for justice to propose this innovation, without suggesting that the sacrifices of the zumeendars should be compensated. But is this possible? A measure which alters the entire frame of society cannot be regulated in the same way as an ordinary turnpike bill. What substitution can you propose for that line of power so natural to man in every state of society, and which these men are cut off from exercising by this sudden change?

described. No person hath power to dispossess the cultivator of such mowat lands, it being lawful to sell it, to appropriate it to religious uses, and to dispose of it as an inheritance."——"It is lawful for the king to grant arable land to any person as an akta (or jaegeer), but he will only be proprietor of the profit; and therefore he has power to give such land in farm to another, but not to sell, appropriate to religious uses, or to bequeath it."

Such being the case, with what regard to justice could we despoil these men of their rights? No extended views of improvement could justify so cruel an invasion of property. However intended to benefit the mass of our population in India, an innovation of the nature proposed would in all probability fail, from the violent shock which it would give to established opinions. Mankind are naturally disposed to revere existing institutions; and to respect the prescriptive rights of their superiors. In India, the greater portion of the zumeendars are Hindoos, the representatives of ancient families, familiarly known among the people by the title of rajah; and to whom they have been accustomed to look up with awe. With these feelings, they must regard a measure of this kind as an act of tyrannical oppression. Exercising a hereditary influence over their minds, it would be easy for the zumeendars to persuade the people that the blow was aimed at them through their interests;—and thus the stability of our empire would be endangered. The authority which a popular zumeendar possesses over the people, has been practically displayed under the present administration. In the year 1817, Jugbhundoo, one of the

principal landholders of the province of Cuttack, erected the standard of rebellion, and thousands of ryuts arrayed themselves under his banner. In its first introduction, this innovation would operate like an Agrarian law, by creating an equal partition of the soil or produce; and thus the natural order of things would be reversed, which invariably tends to produce inequality of property, wherever there exists a free scope for the exertion of human industry. The entire dislocation of the frame of society would necessarily be the result. The minute subdivision of property, which the operation of this system would tend to create, is opposed to the first principles of political economy, which teach us, that, where it prevails, it is impossible to accumulate capital for the purpose of improvement. Under this arrangement, it would be difficult to collect the revenue without an enormous increase in the expense. At present, where one individual pays direct to government a lac of rupees, under the operation of Mr Mill's system it would be necessary to collect the same sum from perhaps a thousand individuals, which would increase the duties of the revenue department in an incalculable degree; at least six collectors would be required where one performs the duty under the existing arrangements. In the small but exceedingly fertile district of Burdwan, which yields a yearly revenue of 600,000 pounds, the greater part of this sum is collected from one zumeendar, a Hindoo rajah, who farms the lands to others; under the operation of Mr Mill's system, it could only be realized by increasing the number of European collectors. From the evidence of the Fifth Report,

it is apparent that our finances will not admit of any increase in their number; at least such was the opinion of a committee of the House of Commons in 1812. Mr Mill will contend that General Sir Thomas Munro was able to effect the settlement of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, and to collect the revenue without the intervention of zumeendars. This must be admitted; but, in doing so, he did not innovate. The fiscal system of the Moghul government had never extended to these provinces; and therefore he acted wisely in abstaining from shocking public opinion by its hasty introduction. At the period when this settlement was formed, the revenue was collected direct from the ryuts: since then the Madras government has altered this arrangement, and adopted a system by which it realizes the collections through the agency of the head men of villages, which is certainly an approximation to the zumeendaree or farming system. In such a state of society, where the influence of zumeendars on a large scale is unknown, it is obvious that the innovation which Mr Mill proposes could be introduced with perfect safety. In these provinces it would be no change. General Sir Thomas Munro and Colonel Wilkes have proved, by irresistible evidence, that in these districts the ancient Hindoo institutions prevailed—that the sovereign collected the annual assessment directly from the cultivator, without the intermediate agency of zumeendars; and that the ryuts possessed a property in the soil, sufficiently manifested by daily sales of their lands. This is easily accounted for by the fact, that, until the invasion of these provinces by

Tippoo, they had maintained their independence against the Musselman arms; and that thus the Mahomedan institutions had no time to take root in the country. But, allowing that the state of society in these provinces is favourable to the innovation which Mr Mill proposes, it is unphilosophical to infer, from this admitted fact, that the change which he contemplates could be introduced with equal facility into the numerous provinces under our sway, where the Mahomedan institutions have prevailed for six or seven centuries, and which have, consequently, produced a state of society materially different. An error like this might have been expected from a practical statesman, who had formed a hasty generalization from a limited observation of facts; but could not have been looked for in a person profoundly skilled in the inductive philosophy. It is sufficiently evident from history, that, on the invasion of India by the Moghuls, the ancient Hindoo princes, and their descendants, became, in many instances, the zumeendars of the districts which they formerly governed; and that the jagheerdars and others, to whom grants of land had been made by the sovereign, possessed a right of disposing of the advantages which they derived from this grant. If the successive bands of ferocious adventurers who invaded these provinces respected these rights, ought not an enlightened English philosopher to pause before he hastily proposes a measure which might tend to their wanton violation? He may be perfectly convinced of the truth of his abstract principles, and may feel a natural wish to re-model society into conformity with them; but is there not great cruelty and injustice in this, when

the public mind is not prepared for their reception, and when a salutary reformation can only be accomplished by the violation of the cherished habits and usages of the people? It is fortunate for Mr Mill that he has been enabled to enact the philosopher in real life; and that, living in retirement, he has had nothing else to do but to sit in judgment upon the conduct of our Asiatic statesmen. If he had possessed power in India, and applied his principles in practice, it is obvious that they would have created a great derangement in society. The complaints of the oppressed zumeendars and jagheerdars would reach the bar of the commons. Like another Hastings, he would be recalled and arraigned before their tribunal. The Whigs would let loose Mr Brougham or Mr Bennet upon him. Mr Hume would enact the part of Sir Philip Francis;—the friends of administration would take a warm interest in the cause;—the placemen, the pensioners, and the clergy would feel that there was some analogy between their vested rights and those of the zumeendars: and thus, in all probability, Mr Mill would have perished a martyr to his love of abstract political justice, and the world would have lost his admirable exposition of Asiatic misgovernment.

It appears to me that the innovation which he contemplates could be introduced, and its advantages realized, without any violent shock to public opinion, by adopting a system more gradual in its operation. Thus, it is very well known that a number of the estates of zumeendars are sold annually, who have fallen into an arrear of revenue. This being the case, it would be easy to divide them into small

portions, and dispose of them directly to the ryuts, if they were disposed to purchase. If this system had been followed since the introduction of the permanent settlement in 1791, it is more than probable that half the landed property in India would have been in their hands. The objection will be—the difficulty of collecting the revenue with the limited number of public functionaries who can be afforded for this purpose, in the existing state of the finances. This must be admitted; but the admirable work of Mr Crawford, on the Indian Archipelago, has shown us, that, in nearly a similar state of society in the island of Java, the government has always collected the revenue directly from the cultivavators, without the intervention of zumeendars under the superintendence of European collectors. Perhaps some minute information might be obtained respecting the details of this system, which might simplify the practice in Bengal, and render the collection of the revenue, under this arrangement, less expensive than is predicted. Mr Mill appears to me to have fallen into an error in his opinion as to the inefficacy of large salaries in preventing the corruption of the civil servants of the company. The character of these public functionaries must principally depend upon the general tone of morality in the mother country. If the conduct of the middle and upper classes of English society is influenced by a regard to honour and fair dealing, in the ordinary transactions of life, it is but fair to presume that the same qualities are exemplified in the conduct of their countrymen in the East. But it is obvious that high salaries must be given, in order to attract a certain

portion of talent and probity into this service. Who would abandon his native country, encounter the vicissitudes of climate, devote himself to the intense study of languages, in order to qualify himself for discharging the laborious functions of a judge, and occupy himself eight or ten hours daily for 25 or 30 years, in the tedious drudgery of hearing causes, who was only certain of a moderate subsistence? Unquestionably many respectable men would be found in England, who would undertake this arduous duty for £700 or £800 per annum; but, admitting their honesty, the probability is, that they would be uneducated men—unskilled in the languages, and, consequently, unequal to the task which they had undertaken. At an advanced age it would be difficult to acquire a knowledge of the languages. But, to come to the point, if we suppose the Indian judge to be corrupt, it appears to me, in opposition to Mr Mill, that large salaries have a tendency to prevent venality.

The man who sells justice will argue thus, in the event of a bribe being offered to him:—It is true I may gain so much by accepting this sum; but, on the other hand, I must run the risk of discovery, which will deprive me of the emoluments of office. Thus it becomes a calculation of opposite interests: and hence the conclusion is obvious, that, in proportion as the salary is high, the motive is stronger which impels the mercenary judge to discharge his duty. Independent of this, as he is not stimulated by want to dishonesty, the temptation is obviously diminished. The salary of a judge and magistrate of a district in Bengal, is 28,000*r*. yearly, or £3,500

per annum. This important trust is seldom obtained under less than 12 years' service. In an extensive service there are no doubt in this, as in every other, many indolent persons who earn this sum very easily; but if a judge really does his duty, it does not appear to me that he is overpaid, as compared with the salary which is allowed to similar functionaries in England. But, at the same time, if well-educated persons can be trained for this service, with the prospect of less emolument held out to them, an unquestionable benefit would be conferred upon British India, by the facility which it would afford of employing a greater number of individuals in the administration of justice. The civil service of British India presents a noble field for youthful ambition, in which every intellectual energy may be exercised; and in which fewer obstacles are opposed to the rise of talent to its proper level than exist in any profession or service. This is in a great measure to be ascribed to the necessity which exists that the principal offices of government should be filled by men of ability; and by the facility which the government possesses of ascertaining the individual merits of its servants, by the examinations at the colleges of Hertford and Calcutta. Any individual who has distinguished himself at these institutions, is certain of filling the first appointments in the service. This splendid opening which is presented to individual enterprise, does not so much arise from any marked disposition in the government to patronize merit, as from the number of lucrative appointments which can be attained in the due course of the service through seniority, by every in-

dividual possessed of ordinary talents. Every civil servant is certain of becoming a judge, a collector, or a commercial resident, after a certain period of service, with a salary little inferior to that which is granted to the appointments in the secretariat and diplomatic line, which require a greater portion of ability. This being the case, he makes no interest to obtain these situations; and they are left to be filled by those who feel competent to the discharge of their duties. It is quite different with the military branch of the service, in which the possession of a staff appointment doubles, triples, or quadruples the ordinary allowances of its possessor: This rouses the self-love of every one, and induces the generality of men to put every spring in motion, either in England or India, which will enable them to obtain these situations. The weight of parliamentary interest is felt as powerfully in Bengal as in the neighbourhood of the treasury. As the government cannot be expected to know the individual merits of its numerous military officers, and is seldom obliged to respect public opinion in the nomination to particular appointments, except in the case of men who have eminently distinguished themselves by their gallantry in the field, and, in some instances, by a regard to seniority in some offices connected with the general administration of the army,—at least nine-tenths of the staff situations in the service are bestowed upon those individuals who possess the strongest interest. In the civil service of India, the principle of selection is combined with that of seniority. All individuals of a certain standing are eligible to hold a certain appointment, but it rests with the govern-

ment to nominate the person to fill it from amongst these qualified persons. Unless in circumstances where great ability is required, a regard to seniority generally prevails in practice.

Let us view the career of a young writer after leaving College.—He is at liberty to select the judicial, the revenue, the diplomatic, or the commercial line. By a regulation enacted during Lord Wellesley's government, he was obliged to confine himself to that branch of the service which he had selected. But, since then, it has been found advantageous that talent should range unrestricted from one branch of the service to another; and, in practice, I believe this regulation is not strictly followed, or has been repealed. If he prefers the judicial line, he becomes an assistant to a judge and magistrate, with a salary of 400*r.* or £50 per mensem. In the course of two or three years he becomes a register to a district or circuit court, with a salary of 6 or 700*r.* per month. After serving three or four years in this capacity, he may be nominated joint judge and magistrate of a district, with a salary of 12 or 1400*r.* per month. But this appointment only exists in a few extensive districts, and must be regarded as accidental in the career of the judicial servant. In the general course of the service he discharges the duties of a register for five or six years, and then rises to the important charge of judge and magistrate of a district, with a yearly salary of 28,000*r.* or £3,500 per annum.* The writers who entered the service in 1808, attained this station in less than 12 years. After re-

* The rupee is usually estimated at 2*s.* 6*d.*

maining six or seven years in this situation, the judge and magistrate of a district becomes a judge of circuit, with a salary varying from 35 to 45,000 rupees per annum. Remaining six or eight years in this grade, if a man of talents, he may then be selected to fill the exalted station of judge in the supreme court of civil and criminal jurisdiction, designated the Sudder Dewanee, with a salary varying from 50 to 70,000 rupees per annum. But this splendid prize can only be attained by a few;—this court being composed of only three members. Independent of this, the noble appointment of member-in-council is open to this branch of the service, with a monthly salary of 10,000 rupees, or £15,000 per annum. The judicial branch of the service affords a noble prospect of utility to those who wish to benefit their fellow-creatures, and regard power as solely intrusted to them for the good of others. The judge and magistrate of a district is in reality the governor of a province, whose personal character and conscientious discharge of his duty exercise a powerful influence in regulating the happiness or misery of perhaps a million of human beings. The judicial branch of the service demands very extensive qualifications—an intimate knowledge of the languages, manners, and religious prejudices of the natives, with indefatigable industry, and a habit of mind accustomed to weigh evidence, and balance opposing probabilities. But perhaps a greater portion of talent is attracted to the diplomatic or political line, from the extensive field which is afforded for its display in the eyes of the Anglo-Indian public,—its greater patronage,—and the less onerous nature of its duties. In this

branch of the service, the juvenile diplomatist commences his career as an assistant in the office of one of the secretaries to government, or is appointed to aid the resident at one of the native courts, with a salary of 6 or 800 rupees per month. In proportion to his length of service in this situation, his salary increases; and, in the course of 12 or 14 years, he attains the elevated station of secretary to government, in a particular department, or becomes the representative of the British state at a native court. In the latter station, at the principal native courts, he enjoys the princely salary of 8000 rupees, or £1000 per month. The residents at the courts of Delhi, Lucknow, Hydrabad, and Nagpoor, are indubitably very great personages:—in these dependent states, where the degree of political control which they may exercise is not very well defined, it must be easy for any one to enact the monarch, who feels the inclination.

A writer in the 31st number of the *Edinburgh Review*, in a very ingenious speculation on the affairs of India, has gravely suggested the propriety of constituting one of the royal family Emperor of Hindostan, with hereditary succession. With all due deference to this authority, it appears to me that a better selection could be made from amongst the residents, who, from the superior practice which they have enjoyed in the regal vocation, may fairly be supposed to be quite *au fait* in the knowledge of every kingly function. But, to return from this digression, it is obvious that the resident at a native court requires a minute knowledge of the history and politics of the different native states, and the

language, manners, and customs of the people amongst whom he resides; and that, above all, he should possess that practical knowledge of human nature which would restrain him from pressing improvements which the mind of the native ruler or people was not prepared to receive. The appointment of member in council is open to this, as well as every other branch of the service. In the revenue department, the young civilian commences by becoming assistant to a collector, with a monthly salary of 400 rupees; and, in the course of 10 or 12 years, attains a collectorship. From this situation he may rise to become a commissioner or member of the board of revenue. The duties of the revenue department are much less burthensome than those of the judicial branch of the service, which has necessarily led to a less ample remuneration. In Bengal proper, a collector of revenue does not receive more than 18 or 20,000 rupees per annum; in the upper provinces, where the permanent settlement has not been introduced, and where his duties are consequently of a more onerous nature, he receives 30,000 rupees per annum. In the commercial branch of the service, the writer becomes an assistant to a commercial resident, a salt or opium agent, or obtains an appointment in the department of customs, with a salary varying from 600 to 1000 rupees per month. In the course of 12 or 14 years, he may become a commercial resident, with a salary of 28,000 or 30,000 rupees per annum,—or a salt or opium agent, with 4 or 5000 rupees monthly salary. It is fortunate that there are few of these lucrative appointments, which might otherwise tempt

individuals to desert the more arduous and useful branches of the service—the judicial and the revenue. From this situation, the commercial servant may become a member of the board of trade, customs, and opium, and may ultimately attain the elevated station of member of council. The commercial line holds out a great attraction to indolent persons, from the little employment which it affords. Independent of this, as it is the only branch of the service in which individuals are allowed to trade, it affords a noble field to the active and enterprising individual who possesses capital, and inclination to increase it by commerce. Thus it is apparent, that the most splendid prizes can be attained by the display of superior ability and industry, and that every civil servant of the Company is certain of a rich provision if possessed of ordinary or even inferior capacity. But, independent of this, if the civil servant of India has manifested any extraordinary portion of talent, it is evident that the noblest gifts in the disposal of the crown may be conferred upon him; as exemplified in the elevation of Mr Hastings and Lord Teignmouth to the general government of India; and that of Mr Duncan, Sir George Barlow, and Mr Elphinstone to that of the subordinate presidencies.

With all these advantages, it is surprising that so few individuals are enabled to retire from this service. Out of 400 civilians employed in the Bengal establishment, I should doubt if more than six or eight return to Europe annually, for the purpose of resigning. The fortunes which they accumulate vary from 30 to 80,000 pounds. Perhaps one in-

dividual may retire every two or three years with 100 or 120,000 pounds. The length of their service in India varies from 25 to 40 years; and is rarely less than the first-mentioned period. The average must be about 30 years. The causes of this must be sought in the expensive manner of living which prevails in India,—the facility which a liberal provision affords of marrying early,—and the expense of transporting children to Europe, and providing for their education and settlement in the world. The style of living is unavoidable from the habits and manners of the country,—the restrictions of cast, &c. which impose the necessity of keeping many servants,—the excessive heat of the climate, which renders life unendurable to a European, without the aid of carriages, horses, palanquins, &c.—the high prices of European articles, such as beer, cheeses, hams, &c. which in many instances are 200 or 300 per cent. above the prime cost. But perhaps the principal cause that fortunes are not more generally accumulated, is to be found in the astonishing facility that the young and dashing writer possesses of running into debt, and which it requires all his subsequent savings to redeem. The credit which he possesses with Europeans and natives is beyond belief. It is too much to expect that a youth emancipated from all restraints should be able to resist the opportunity thus afforded of gratifying his love of pleasure. In these circumstances, it is not unusual to see a writer leaving college, saddled with a debt of half a lac of rupees, or 6 or 7000 pounds. The young man who is inclined to live within his income, feels it difficult to resist the contagion of

example, and must esteem himself fortunate if his college bills do not exceed 8 or 10,000 rupees. In truth, the Bengal civilian generally spends a fortune before he acquires one. The heavy charges of interest swallow up all his savings, and render it difficult for him to shake off his incumbrances. Large sums of money are obtained from natives at an interest of 12 per cent.—The person who lends this entertains views of profit much beyond the legal advantage which he is entitled to for the use of his money. If the writer is nominated to some appointment, the lender insists upon being employed in some official situation, or that one of his relations should be provided for. If his request is refused, a sight of his bond will speedily enforce compliance. If he succeeds in introducing his relations into office, the pernicious effects of their influence upon the general happiness of the country are powerfully illustrated in the following extract from Mr Tytler's work:—"Directed by their employer, the baboo or money lender, they intermeddle with all the official concerns of their master. By their falsehood and utter want of principle, they colour the cases which come before him; they quash the complaints of the more unfortunate natives who have not money to offer as a bribe; they promote the cause of injustice and defeat the purposes of benevolence; and, by receiving money (in the name of their young master) by whatever hands it is offered, they degrade the European character, pervert the law, and contaminate the source of public justice."—*Vol. I, p. 87.*

At the time when this gentleman wrote, in 1815, this system prevailed to such an extent that he states:

"It is a fact which deserves the most serious consideration, that more than one-half of the company's territories are managed by natives with but a slight degree of control from the helpless Europeans who are the heads of office."—*Vol. I, p. 37.* There is no reason to suppose that Mr Tytler entertained any unfavourable prejudice against the members of his own service, but surely this statement must be prodigiously exaggerated;—if not, better that our Indian empire should perish, than that power should thus be shamelessly prostituted. If we suppose that a tenth part of the Company's territory is governed in this manner, which appears to me nearer the truth, surely this melancholy consideration ought to awaken the mind of the youthful civilian to a sense of the deep injury which mankind suffer from this conduct, and the serious abasement of the national dignity which results from his inconsiderate habits of expense. The government ought to adopt more efficient measures for the repression of this evil. At present it has enacted a regulation, requiring every student on leaving college, to state (whether on oath or honour I am ignorant,) that his debts do not exceed 5000 rupees; but, from what I have heard, this has not proved efficacious in checking the evil. If, independent of 300 rupees monthly salary, 5000 rupees will not cover the unavoidable expenses of a youth at college, let him be allowed to contract debts to the amount of 8 or 10,000 rupees; but, if it can be proved that he exceeds this, he ought to be dismissed the service.

CHAPTER VII.

INDIAN ARMY.

Numerical amount of our army.—Its discipline and constitution.—Arrangements for the distribution of Justice, and projected improvements in its organization.—The advantages of promotion by brevet, as compared with seniority, considered.—An increase of European Officers recommended.—The claims of Officers of his Majesty's Service considered.—The prospects of Cadets and Assistant-surgeons embarking in the Indian service, with their respective allowances.

The Indian army in the service of the Company consists of 8 battalions of European, and 3 of native artillery; 18 regiments of native cavalry; 3 regiments of European, and 67 of native infantry; each regiment of 2 battalions,—amounting in all to about 180,000 regular troops, officered by about 4,000 Europeans, who rise to the highest rank in the service by seniority. Independent of this, another description of native force exists, consisting of militia, invalids, provincial corps, and irregulars, the strength of which may be estimated at 30,000 men; and a highly efficient and well-ordered European force 20,000 strong, transferred for a period from His Majesty's service, —forming, on the whole, an army of 230,000 disciplined troops. Considered in relation to the immense population which it protects, the ratio which the organized military force of the community bears to the other class of society is certainly less than

what prevails in Europe. The expenses of this immense force, with its numerous establishments, cannot be reckoned, on a loose estimate, at less than eight millions. Viewed as a whole, it appears to me that scarcely any army can have attained to greater perfection than that of India, in all that relates to its equipment, interior organization, and general excellence of its several departments.

The cause of this is obvious.—The British power in India is essentially military: the government has at all times felt convinced that its existence depended upon the excellence of the army, and its fidelity to the state, and has therefore adopted every measure which was likely to lead to its improvement, or to conciliate the affections of its native soldiery. It has embraced every opportunity of investing them with privileges which marked them out as a favoured portion of the community. If the seapoy visits any celebrated shrine of Hindoo superstition, he is specially exempted from that tax which is rigorously exacted from every other member of the community. If he engages in a law-suit, his cause is placed first in the file—an important advantage in a country where the decision of a suit is so much protracted by delay in the proceedings of justice. If the soldier wishes to remit money to his family, he is enabled to do this directly, through the intervention of the collectors of revenue, without incurring the expense of agency, or paying the usual difference of exchange. His pay is so liberal, that the generality of these men save half their allowances; and the grant of a pension enables the aged and infirm to spend the decline of life in ease and comfort. At the same time, every ar-

rangement has been adopted which might tend to secure the soldier against the possible injustice of his European officer, and every facility afforded to him of obtaining redress. It is impossible for any commanding officer to discharge a seapoy without obtaining the sanction of the commander-in-chief. In India, the government has not to encounter that marked opposition to every measure which is proposed with a view to benefit the interests of the army, that prevails in England, from the constitutional jealousy and distrust there entertained of a military force. Pursuing a career of conquest (whether unintentional or otherwise) for upwards of 60 years, the executive has uniformly patronized every measure which was calculated to render its army more efficient, and has adopted every improvement which the more extended operations of European warfare have called forth. These destructive missiles, Shrapnell's shells and the Congreve rockets, were introduced into India a short time after they were discovered; and the improvements suggested by Colonels Pasley and Jones, in the department of engineers, have been recently adopted. As compared with the civil institutions of British India, our military system has attained to greater perfection; but this is not to be attributed to any superiority in the military servants of government, or any demerit in its civil functionaries. It exists in the nature of things. To form an efficient and well-disciplined army, is quite an easy undertaking, when compared with the difficulty of introducing a good system of government into a country where every species of misgovernment has prevailed.

In the mechanical operation of organizing a well-arranged military force, most of the German princes have succeeded very well, who certainly have not been famed for their skill in the art of government. The philosophic Frederick was a great proficient in this way; but he was not equally happy in the formation of the code of law which he introduced into his dominions. In the Indian army, the beneficial effects of European control on the character of the natives are much more manifest, than its operation under the civil government of British India. The cause is obvious. In a battalion of native infantry, each officer commanding a company exercises a minute control over the actions of his men, and can check any oppression or injustice which may be exercised towards them by his subordinates. He is obliged to listen to all complaints; and the number of individuals subject to his authority being small, he can perform this duty with ease. In the event of his giving a wrong decision, the soldier can appeal direct to the officer commanding the battalion. If a seapoy is tried by a court-martial, his innocence or guilt is determined by the native officers who compose the court, aided by the superior intelligence of a European officer in conducting the proceedings, who exercises a beneficial influence in checking any improper bias for or against the prisoner, and in declaring the law applicable to the case in question. Thus, the soldier recognizes his European officer as the efficient agent in the distribution of justice, and practically experiences the advantages resulting from his superior intelligence and love of justice. It is easy for one man to attend to the interests of 100 individuals—

which is the duty of every officer commanding a company—but it is altogether impossible for a judge and magistrate, however gifted with talents and integrity, to pay the same regard to the interests of a million of people; and this exemplifies the superior efficacy of European control in the army, as compared with its effects on the general welfare of society under our civil administration. Perhaps it would have been better that the administration of justice in the army had rested entirely with the European officers. But, as the practice of sitting as members of a court-martial, upon individuals of their own body, has existed in the Indian army ever since its establishment, and the native officers have been accustomed to regard it as a right, any innovation on the practice would only shock their feelings, and might lead to more serious consequences, without producing any commensurate benefit. Unquestionably, many erroneous decisions are given by these men, whose previous habits have not qualified them to discharge the important functions of jurymen with advantage; but their errors may be always corrected in practice, if the European superintending officer exerts that influence which his superior intelligence and authority confers upon him. In truth, in most regimental courts-martial, where seapoys only, or non-commissioned officers are tried, the European officer generally determines the decision. It is only in general courts-martial, which are assembled for the trial of a member of their own body, that the native officers are apt to be biassed in favour of the prisoner, from the natural sympathy which they feel towards him. In these circumstances they are too apt to disregard

the opinion of the European judge-advocate, and to violate the principles of justice, by acquitting the prisoner in opposition to facts and evidence. Our commanders-in-chief sometimes remark that the European officers of the army have at times committed a similar error. If this is founded on truth, we ought not to expect that the natives should be exempt from this common frailty of our nature. But if unjust decisions are given by these men, it is obvious that it can be attended with no serious detriment to the public service, as the commander-in-chief has at all times possessed the power of dismissing a native officer without trial, which, if exercised in the case of those who are unfairly acquitted by their brethren, must effectually conteract the injury which would otherwise result from their partiality. If the native officers are disposed to favour their brethren, no one will accuse them of cherishing the same feeling towards the seapoys. This is easily accounted for. In most cases of court-martial, seapoys are brought to trial by their native officers for some neglect of duty, or disobedience of their orders; and, in these circumstances, it is but natural, however inequitable, that they should maintain the authority of their own order. In a trial of this nature, the European superintending officer feels it necessary to support the prisoner against the prejudices of the court, and to expostulate with them on the necessity of attending to those circumstances in his case which may amount to a justification. In a case where the commanding officer of a battalion, or any of his European officers, brings a seapoy to trial, this prejudice against the soldier equally pre-

vails. Accustomed to regard the authority of their immediate superiors as sacred, and anxious to gain their favour, from the powerful influence which it may exercise on their own promotion, they are too apt to fashion their decisions according to the supposed wishes of their commandant. Whoever has frequently superintended these trials must acknowledge, that he has been compelled, at times, to remind these men that a commanding officer was powerless within the walls of a court of justice. But whatever theoretical defects may exist in this system, it is undeniable that it proves efficient in practice, in securing a good administration of justice, and that the soldiers of our Indian army repose great confidence in the decisions of the ordinary military tribunals. The impartial distribution of justice in the army has had a beneficial operation in elevating the character of the native soldiery. The certainty of obtaining redress against any act of oppression or injustice, has inspired them with a sense of independence, and knowledge of their rights, which does not exist to the same extent in any other class of our Asiatic subjects. The present efficient state of the Indian army is principally to be ascribed to the great improvement in its organization and internal arrangements, which was created by the introduction of the regulations of 1796. Under this improved system, two battalions of native infantry were formed into one regiment, to which the same number of officers were allowed as is fixed in his Majesty's service for one battalion. In the king's army, the complement of officers to a battalion is about 45; in the Honourable Company's army it is exactly half; and of these not

half this number are present with their corps. This arises from the demand created by an extensive staff, which is supplied from the limited number of officers posted to these corps—the transference of others to irregular native corps, which are officered from the regular establishment, without filling up the vacancies occasioned by their removal—and the absence of a number of officers on furlough to Europe,—sickness, and other causes. At the period when I left India, there were not more than eight or nine officers present with each battalion, whilst a corps of the same strength in his Majesty's service, employed in India, could generally muster about thirty-five or forty officers. But that the arrangement adopted was an improvement will be shown hereafter. By the regulations of 1796 an officer rose in his corps to the rank of major; after which period his promotion went on in the general list of majors. This was visibly an improvement upon the former system, under which the promotion of the officers of the army was regulated by a general gradation list, without reference to any particular corps; and which necessarily occasioned such incessant removals as rendered it impossible that any durable connexion or confidence could exist between the officers and their men, of such essential consequence in a foreign army, where a knowledge of the habits and usages of the soldiery can only be gained by a long and intimate acquaintance with individuals. Under the present arrangement an officer remains in the corps which he first enters until he attains the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and is thus enabled to acquire every knowledge of the character of his men. By the regulations of 1796, the

number of European officers attached to a corps was considerably increased. Prior to this period each battalion was commanded by a captain, with 8 or 10 subalterns under him. Under the new arrangements the number of officers to a battalion was fixed at 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, 4 captains, 11 lieutenants, and 5 ensigns. This increase of officers rendered the native army much more efficient, and ameliorated the condition of the European portion of it by the sudden and extensive promotion which it created. But the most beneficial improvement consisted by far in the increased power and influence which was given to the officers commanding companies under the new arrangements. Prior to the introduction of this system, the entire management of their corps, in all that related to their pay, musters, promotion of the men, &c. rested entirely with the European commandant. Under this arrangement it is notorious that extensive abuses prevailed. The command of a corps was considered as a certain means of accumulating a fortune. This was principally accomplished by signing false musters: thus, if a corps was a thousand strong, perhaps not more than 800 men were kept up, and the pay of the remainder became the emolument of the commandant. Under the general prevalence of this practice, the actual strength of the army was much less than the number paid for by government. The inferior influence and authority which the subordinate European officers possessed, rendered it impossible for them to check these abuses.

By the regulations of 1796, an entire change was effected. Each officer commanding a company was

held responsible for its numbers, which he was obliged to certify upon honour: the distribution of its pay, and the power of nominating individuals for promotion, were further confided to him. In the exercise of these functions he was checked by the commandant of the corps. As this individual could no longer peculate, he felt no disposition to encourage others in this practice, and succeeded in effectually restraining it. The beneficial effects resulting from this innovation were quickly manifest. Since its introduction the Indian army has ever been kept complete in numbers, and its discipline greatly improved. Under the former system, the European officers attached to a corps were ciphers, unless on the parade, or in the field: all efficient power was lodged in the commandant, to whom every one looked up with awe. But it was impossible for this individual to attend to the complaints of a thousand men, or to exercise that minute control over their actions which is essential to the establishment of a good system of discipline. This constitutes the preëminent advantage of the present system, under which each officer commanding a company regulates its discipline, and over whom the commandant exercises a general superintendence. The chain of subordination is much more complete. The individual authority of an officer commanding a corps is less; but it is much more secure. Such appear to me to be the manifest advantages of the present regulations; but other officers of more enlarged experience entertain different opinions on this subject, and seem to think that the native army had attained to a greater efficiency under the ancient system than it has

yet done under the recent innovations. Sir John Malcolm, who has visibly a leaning to this opinion, and whose sentiments are entitled to the greatest regard, from his general talents and profound knowledge of human nature as modified by custom and prejudice in Asia, has exhibited the arguments in favour of this opinion in his political work on India. He states that the "officers who were nominated to the command of native battalions, were invariably selected from a regard to the superior knowledge which they had attained of the prejudices, habits, and characters of the men whom they were appointed to command."—"It was remarked under this system, that though many of the corps were brought to a great perfection in dress and discipline, there was hardly an instance in which this was done at the expense of the temper of the men; on the contrary, those corps which were most remarkable for their discipline, were almost uniformly most attached to their commanding officers, whom they found as liberal to their wants and attentive to their prejudices as they were anxious for that superiority and excellence in their appearance, discipline, and attachment, upon which they grounded all their hopes of reputation and preferment in the service to which they belonged."—*Political History, p.* 493. He further states, "that the number of European officers attached to a battalion was so small, that from necessity, if not from inclination, they acted as much upon principles of conciliation as of coercion; and their authority in their corps rested more on affection than fear. And that the commanding officer, from his superior rank and emoluments, enjoyed a

consideration and consequence which enabled him not only to confer distinction by his personal favour and regard, but to keep in complete check and control the younger officers of the service, and to direct their minds to a moderate and indulgent conduct towards all the natives."—*P.* 490–494.

In further illustrating his opinions on this subject, this distinguished officer states, that the general officers and commanders-in-chief, who have been sent out to India, have been brought up with a profound admiration of the German school of tactics, and have exerted themselves to introduce this system in all its perfection into our Indian armies; and that the European officers of the native infantry, eager to obtain their approbation, have directed all their attention to this object,—but that in doing so they have neglected more essential duties, and in some instances practised a severity and harshness altogether unsuited to the character of the men under their command. That in their laudable attempts to emulate his Majesty's troops in dress, discipline, and manœuvring, they have forgotten the higher and more distinguishing characteristics of seapoy officers, such as a knowledge of the languages and customs of the men under their command—a kindness of manner and solicitude for their comfort—and the habit of frequent and friendly intercourse with the native officers of the army. Such are the serious disadvantages which, in the opinion of this enlightened officer, have attended the introduction of the regulations of 1796. Bred up under this recent system, and perhaps biassed in its favour, I have been induced to come to a somewhat different conclu-

sion as to its merits, and shall endeavour to express the reasons which lead me to form this opinion. Admitting the distinguished qualifications of the officers who were selected for the command of native battalions under the former system, it does not appear to me that they possessed those facilities for attaining a minute knowledge of the character and habits of their men, which are afforded at present. According to Sir John Malcolm, these officers were captains selected from the European corps in the service of the Company, at which period there were five or six battalions attached to each presidency. Such being the case, it is obvious that they were placed in circumstances singularly unpropitious for acquiring a knowledge of the manners of the natives; and that, from their first entrance into the service, their minds must have been occupied with the study of the character of their countrymen and the system of discipline adapted to it. Removed to another sphere at an advanced period of life, they would be too apt to carry the habits and prejudices of their pristine service along with them. But, supposing that they felt a powerful inclination to study the genius and character of the natives, it is apparent that in this respect the seapoy officer of the present day possesses manifold advantages. Thrown into contact with them when a boy, he is compelled to learn their language. Remaining in the same corps for the greater part of his life, he becomes intimately acquainted with the character of the men. Unquestionably, a number of European officers were attached to the native battalions under the ancient organization; but as they were continually liable to

be removed, they could not take that strong personal interest in the character of the men of the corps which the present system inspires. But the principal defect of the former regulations consisted in the limited authority which the European officers possessed over their men.—The efficient power was lodged in the commandant; and if he was a man of enlarged benevolence, this afforded him a noble field for the exercise of power. But allowing him every inclination to indulge this, it appears to me much more likely that the officers commanding companies, who are intrusted with a more limited charge, would be able to attend more effectually to the welfare of their men. It is indubitably a better arrangement which intrusts the happiness of a thousand men to ten men instead of one.—If this single individual should prove negligent of his trust, of how much misery might it be productive: but where this authority is divided among many, the probability is, that several of these men will exercise it beneficially; and, under the existing system, the errors of the others can be checked by the superior power of the commandant. But, independent of all this, the officers who have been trained under the present system have enjoyed a decided advantage in the greater facility which they have possessed in attaining the language. At the present day, the admirable works of Gilchrist, which were unknown in former times, are extensively diffused throughout the armies; and the cadet institutions at the different presidencies (however pernicious in other respects), have afforded opportunities to many officers of acquiring a grammatical knowledge of the Hindoostanee language.

There are some of these individuals, whose taste for oriental literature was first excited at the cadet institution in Bengal, who have since risen to distinction as scholars, and who now fill the professorial chairs in the College of Fort William.—Witness Fell, Bryce, Ruddal, Ayton.

Throughout the Bengal presidency, it may be fairly said that at least one-third of the officers of the army have cultivated the Hindoostanee language with great attention; that two or three individuals in each regiment have either studied Persian, or Arabic, or Sanscrit; and that all the rest have acquired considerable knowledge of the vernacular language, in their daily intercourse with the natives. Sir John Malcolm has made the just and original remark, that he never knew an instance of unkind and gross behaviour to the natives of India in a person acquainted with their language and manners. Such being the case, no person can appreciate with more correctness the immense benefit which has resulted from this increased cultivation of the language, from its tendency to create kindlier feelings between the officers and men. Upon the harmonious union of these classes the safety of our Indian empire mainly depends; and this would have been still more effectually secured than at present, had those appointments which the court of directors created with the view of stimulating their officers to the acquisition of oriental literature, been generally bestowed upon those who had earned them by their superior skill in the languages. In the year 1814, an order came out from England directing that an interpreter should be appointed to each [illegible],

who should be selected from the subalterns of the corps, on account of his greater attainments as a linguist. This was followed up by the present commander-in-chief, who issued an excellent order directing that the commanding officer of each corps should send in the names of three individuals distinguished for their skill in the languages, from whom (although not distinctly specified), it was understood, from the general scope of the order, that the selection would be made. At the same time, if I recollect right, his excellency declared that he reposed every confidence in the honour and just sense of public duty which marked the character of officers commanding corps, which he was certain would restrain them from nominating improper persons; an effectual way of defeating the benefit which might be expected from this arrangement. The encouragement held out by this order excited a number of young men to apply themselves to study; but their hopes were not realized. In a short time it became manifest that these appointments, like every other, were generally given away to those who possessed the strongest interest; and that the recommendations of commanding officers in favour of skilful linguists were seldom attended to. The fact is so notorious, that Lieutenant M'Naughton, who has lately published a pamphlet in Calcutta, relating to the Bengal army, has publicly stated that not a tenth part of the interpreters are properly qualified for their situations. This is certainly a great exaggeration; but it may be doubted if more than a third are. This lamentable deviation from his own orders, on the part of the commander-in-chief, has neces-

sarily tended to diminish the number of skilful linguists; and, in its remote consequences, must ultimately prove extremely detrimental to the public service. In the general course of things, no man has a right to complain of any abuse of patronage: no prospect is held out to the cadet who embarks in this service, that merit will be rewarded; and he is well aware that the generality of appointments are to be obtained by interest alone. But this stands aloof from ordinary circumstances.—Here the aspiring soldier is called upon by the head of the army to exert every energy in the attainment of excellence, and is then doomed to experience the rejection of his claims from the same authority. It is extreme cruelty to seduce men into these pursuits, and then deprive them of the reward. There are some fine things in the Persian and Hindoostanee poets; but there are equally so in those of the classical and modern languages, which may be acquired with greater facility; and certainly there are many employments much more interesting than the study of Arabic, Persian, or Hindee. If men are encouraged by superior authority to engage in these difficult studies, it ought certainly to fulfil its promises to them. Unquestionably some few of these appointments have been bestowed upon subalterns of the army who have had opportunities of eminently distinguishing themselves at college; but, generally speaking, the recommendations of the commanding officers have been entirely neglected—and thus the liberal intentions of the Court of Directors have been completely frustrated.

Some military men have been nominated to the vacant professorships in the College of Fort William,

who have risen to notice by their talents alone. But the cause of their success is obvious: These appointments are not lucrative enough to induce any civilian to desert the ordinary line of the service, and in these circumstances the government is necessitated to employ officers of the army—there being few individuals unconnected with these branches of the service who have devoted themselves to the study of languages. These observations are not made with a view to depreciate the general conduct of Lord Hastings in the administration of his patronage. In its disposal, this nobleman has perhaps evinced more disinterestedness than any of his predecessors, and has conferred some substantial benefits upon the service, for which the officers of the army have reason to be grateful; but he would have been still more respected if he had refrained from issuing orders which circumstances prevented his acting up to.* In this respect, it would have been much

* Lord Hastings evinced great consideration for the interests of the army in the year 1816, in delaying and ultimately preventing the execution of an order of the Court of Directors depriving the captains and subalterns of the trifling emolument which they derived from the command of companies. The saving in question would not be more than 30 or 40,000 pounds to the government; but, in its operation, would have deprived every subaltern of a 12th part of his pay. This would have been severely felt by the captains and subalterns, and would have created a formidable mass of discontent. It is well known that the pay of these classes affords nothing more than a genteel livelihood. Men who have left their native country on the faith of receiving this, cannot easily submit to any diminution of their means of subsistence, unless the necessity for this sacrifice is clearly made out. If retrenchment is at all necessary, it should be directed to the reduction of useless appointments and departments, and ought, if possible, to fall equally on every branch

better if things had gone on in the usual manner, which would have created no disappointment.

But, to return to Sir John Malcolm's observations after this unpleasant digression. There is perhaps too much truth in his remark, that perfection in the German system of tactics has only been attained by a harshness and severity which has tended to alienate the affections of the soldiery; and it is to be hoped that the expression of his opinions on this subject has induced the officers of the army to revert, in some degree, to their former system of discipline. In Bengal, the Prussian field-exercise was introduced by the late Sir James Craig. Under his superintendence the army improved in manœuvring; but this was not attained without some disadvantages. Unquestionably the officers of the army rivalled that prince of tacticians, the great Frederic, in the exactness with which they formed their squares and echelons; but they were equally successful in copying the defects of their illustrious prototype. Like him, they came to consider the soldier as a machine, who could only be brought to perform the part required of him by the discipline of the cane, which was liberally applied in practice. But I believe this can only be said of a part of the officers of the army, and never prevailed to the extent which it has done on the coast establishment.

of the Indian service—civil, clerical, medical, and military. For so trifling an object, it was impolitic to irritate so powerful a body. Frederic the great has said that his captains and subalterns were the pillars of his army. In a country like India, where the stability of the government depends upon the support of the military power, they may be justly denominated those of the state.

In the course of time better feelings returned; and, in the year 1807 or 8, the practice of caning soldiers on the parade was prohibited by the highest authority. There are still some few of the pupils of this school who persist in this discipline: how they can reconcile this conduct to themselves I am at a loss to conceive. As servants of the government, how can they presume to violate its orders? No doubt their motives are good: they wish to bring their corps to a high state of discipline; but the government has plainly told them that it will not allow its soldiers to be maltreated, and this ought to be quite sufficient for them. Let them consider, for a moment, what the feelings of a high-spirited soldier must be, who is subjected to this humiliating punishment for the commission of some trifling fault in his exercise. Is it at all necessary? Surely extra duty or drill is a sufficient punishment for any negligence of this kind. At the present day, in some of the finest battalions of the army, it has never prevailed, except during the short period in which the soldier was learning his exercise. The veteran officers of the army who have served under Coote, Goddard, or Abercromby, have never countenanced this German innovation. It does not exist in the British army, nor yet in the French. With a people so susceptible of praise as the soldiers of the Bengal army, a trifling commendation bestowed on those who excel in their exercise will always excite the rest to perform their duty on the parade. The personal interest which they take in the character of the corps will assuredly prevent their disgracing their commanding officer at a review or inspection.

But, independent of this, I never can admit the argument which is urged in justification of this practice, that it is productive of a better state of discipline. This practice produces a lifeless mechanical discharge of duty. Under its debasing influence, the energy of the soldier is repressed. The dread of punishment compels him to go through his task in a tolerable manner; but he is rarely stimulated to excellence, in the hope of obtaining the approbation of his superiors. I speak from experience on this subject, having daily witnessed its effects on the discipline of a corps in which it prevailed to a great extent, as compared with that of another battalion, in which it was not sanctioned by the commanding officer. Both these corps were brigaded together, and reviewed at the same time, by the present commander-in-chief; but I am not aware that any preference was given to the performance of the corps in which the discipline of the cane was established, although its previous reputation had been very high. At present, corporal punishment with the lash is, perhaps, too frequently inflicted in the Indian army, by sentence of court-martial. At most of the stations in the army (where a European regiment is not cantoned), there is no building for the reception of individuals sentenced to solitary imprisonment, which compels the members of a court-martial to resort to this dreadful punishment. It is true, from the superior character of the men, these inflictions rarely occur, when compared with their frequency in the British service; but the arguments which have been so forcibly urged against this punishment in a European army apply still more strongly to

that of India. Elevated in rank amidst his countrymen, the soldier of this army must feel still more acutely the ignominy of the lash.—Exposed to the scorn of men of inferior tribes, this embitters his degradation; and, where there is so little variety in the scale of punishments, he is too often subjected to this dreadful humiliation in circumstances where he has committed no flagrant offence. It is to be hoped that some remedy will be applied to this, by introducing a wider range of punishments. Whoever has served in this army, must have known respectable soldiers who have been sentenced to this infliction, on account of some breach of duty for which a milder punishment would have been amply sufficient, but which is not provided under the existing system. In beholding the body of a man of this stamp imprinted with the furrows of a lash, the heart of the spectator sinks within him: he is irresistibly forced to contrast this humiliating exhibition of punishment, with the sublime law of antiquity, which said, "Thou shalt not inflict stripes upon the body of a Roman." In the existing state of society, perhaps corporal punishment cannot be altogether abolished; but it would be a vast improvement in the administration of penal justice in the army, if a greater variety of punishments could be devised, which would enable the members of a court-martial to award a sentence more nicely adapted to the offence and moral estimation of the prisoner. The generally mild character of the soldiers of the Indian army renders corporal punishment seldom necessary; but, in certain circumstances, its infliction is almost unavoidable. If a battalion is marching

through a country, it sometimes happens that the soldiers commit outrages upon the unoffending peasantry; in these circumstances, an immediate example must be made upon the spot. The villager cannot quit his home to witness the slow effect of solitary imprisonment; nor can the soldier be confined where the battalion resumes its march daily. In enlarging the scale of punishments, solitary imprisonment might be fully authorized, and proper buildings constructed at every station of the army. By a recent innovation, the members of a court-martial on a European officer of the army, are allowed, as a punishment, to award a sentence which subjects this individual to the loss of rank and place in his regiment, and consequently injures his promotion. By this act of Parliament, an individual may lose three, four, or ten steps, or he may be put down as lowest in the rank in which he serves. In a service of pure seniority, like that of India, this is obviously a very severe punishment. At present this enactment does not extend to the native officers and soldiers of the army; but, as their promotion is in a great measure influenced by seniority, it might be applied to them with nearly equal effect. Perhaps a small forfeiture of pay might be authorized as a punishment, which could be appropriated to some public purpose for the special benefit of the men of the corps—the maintenance of a school, charitable institution, or some other useful undertaking. As the soldiers of this army are, generally speaking, men of penurious habits, this punishment would be sensibly felt. With the European officers of the Bengal army it has been no unusual punishment to se-

pend them from rank and pay for six or twelve months, which, if they had no resources, left them to the chance of starvation. Such being the case, the soldiers of this army could have no reason to complain, if the same punishment was applied in a lesser degree to them. The certainty of losing one or two months' pay, in the event of conviction, would inevitably operate towards the repression of offences. At present this punishment is sanctioned in the case of non-commissioned officers reduced to the ranks for a temporary period, during which they only receive the pay of a private. Thus established in the native army, if it has been found efficacious as a measure of punishment, there seems no good reason why it should not be extended to the privates. There is nothing which the native soldier looks forward to with greater delight, than the prospect of revisiting his family after a long absence; to accomplish which he makes incredible bodily exertions. The sentiment so powerfully expressed by the national poet of Scotland is felt by him in all its force :—

> "Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
> Who never to himself hath said,
> This is my own, my native land;
> Whose heart within him hath not burned,
> As homeward on his path he trode,
> From visiting a foreign strand."

This is no exaggeration. I have known several of the men of the corps to which I belonged, who marched from Cuttack to Oude, Rohilcund and the Doab, and returned in four months and a half, the time allowed them. The distance is not less than 2000 miles; and this was accomplished in the midst

of the rains. It is perhaps cruel to deprive the soldier of this cherished hope; but better to do this than to subject him to the ignominy of the lash. Under the existing arrangements, every soldier proceeds on leave of absence in rotation. In the event of misconduct, it would be easy to deprive him of this privilege, when it came to his turn. This, of course, would not cut him off from the chance of ever seeing his friends; it would only do it for a season. For the punishment of smaller offences I have understood that the simple expedient of turning the coats of the men has succeeded admirably in one or two corps of the Bengal army. These innovations are suggested with a view to diminish the evils arising from a too limited scale of punishment. The object in view is a greater variety, which may enable the members of a court-martial to pay some regard to the moral character and peculiar circumstances of the offender, in awarding their sentence. In the British army, courts-martial are restricted from awarding a sentence which subjects a prisoner to receive more than 3 or 400 lashes. In the Indian army this regulation has not been introduced. At the present day it is not unusual to sentence a prisoner to receive 999 lashes; but I believe this punishment has hardly ever been inflicted. This severity of punishment appears glaringly unjust, when compared with the more lenient infliction which is authorized with regard to camp-followers, or the inhabitants of military cantonments. By a regulation enacted by the Governor-general in council, a military court-martial is prohibited from sentencing a bazar, or camp follower, to receive more than 30

lashes, and is restricted in fining him more than 100 rupees. This is the utmost extent of punishment which can be inflicted; and has perhaps been introduced with the view of encouraging individuals to resort to the civil courts, where a much severer punishment is bestowed. But no prosecutor, who resides in a military cantonment, will resort to these courts, as he is aware that, if the offender possesses money, there is a considerable chance of his escaping, by bribing the native law-officers. Independent of this, the distance of the zillah or district court deters him; and the delay in bringing on the trial operates still more disadvantageously. The example, too, is altogether lost; as, if convicted, the individual is punished at the capital of the district, perhaps 50 or 60 miles distant. In these circumstances, if a robbery is committed in a military cantonment, the aggrieved party finds it more advantageous to resort to a military tribunal, although he is well aware that it cannot sentence the offender to receive more than 50 lashes. But the grievous inequality and absurdity consists in this, that, if a native soldier is tried by a military tribunal, for a theft or robbery, he may be sentenced to receive 6 or 700 or 1000 lashes; whilst the same court is restricted from awarding a greater punishment than 50 lashes to be inflicted on a camp follower who has committed the very same offence. The folly of the bazar regulations is still more glaringly exemplified in the event of a corps being stationed without the Company's dominions, which is generally the case with at least one-third of the army. In these circumstances, there is no civil court to which offenders can be transferred; and

thus, if a European officer is robbed to the greatest extent by his servant, the utmost severity of punishment which can be inflicted is 50 lashes, or a fine to the amount of 100 rupees. The inefficacy of the bazar regulations in repressing crime amongst the camp-followers, is acknowledged by every officer of the army; but no amendment has taken place. In the present state of the press in India this is not to to be wondered at. Truth can only be spoken in praise of the government, and the intellectual portion of the community are restrained from animadverting upon its defects. In the existing state of things, it is too much the interest of every individual to recommend himself to the ruling power by eulogizing its institutions, which operates in practice as a bar to improvement. If the camp-followers and inhabitants of military cantonments are still to remain subject to military law, it is obvious that a scale of punishment should be introduced better adapted to the variety and magnitude of the crimes which may arise in such a state of society. If corporal punishment is still considered efficacious as a measure of coercion, justice requires that the camp-follower and the native soldier should be placed exactly upon the same level. Where serious thefts or robberies were committed, a bazar court-martial might be empowered to sentence the offender to imprisonment for six months, a year, or more, as the nature of the case required, with or without hard labour. After conviction, the prisoner might be transferred to the civil jail, to undergo the punishment awarded.

The revision of the bazar code would form an in-

teresting subject for the military lawyers who have lately edified the Indian public with their discussions. The greater scope which is afforded to inquiry on military subjects, under Lord Hastings's administration, may enable those who employ themselves in this way to effect something in the shape of improvement, if they can descend to this useful object, from the more lofty occupation of new-modelling the army,—the discussion of the comparative advantages of promotion by brevet or by seniority,—or the still more captivating topics of new regiments and prize-money, which come home to the bosom of every one, from the general to the ensign. A favourite speculation with these writers is a new organization of the army, by which it would be divided into large and unwieldy battalions, 12, 14, or 1600 strong. What possible advantage the state could derive from this arrangement it is difficult to conjecture; but there is one thing very clear,—that the European officers would benefit by it, which throws great light upon the subject. In their haste to accomplish this object, these innovators have altogether overlooked the limited physical powers of man. Unless endowed with the lungs of a giant, it would be utterly impossible for an individual to command one of these unmanageable battalions. Every officer, who is at all acquainted with the manœuvring of troops, knows that a corps which is more than 7 or 800 strong, cannot be exercised with advantage, from the inability of the men to hear the word of command. The organization of every European army is founded upon this. The strength of battalions varies from 600 to 1000 men, but has hardly ever

exceeded that number. The projected arrangement was still more objectionable, from its glaring injustice to the native officers of the army, whose interests were to give way to those of the European portion of it. Unquestionably the arrangement of 1796, which fixed the strength of a battalion at 800 privates, is much preferable to any of the suggested improvements. The increase of 100 men, which has taken place since, has rendered a corps on the present establishment rather unwieldy, when complete. It now remains to bestow a few words on the defects of the Indian army.

The most prominent of these consists in the glaring deficiency of European officers. According to the regulation of 1796, the number of European officers attached to the 31 regiments or 62 battalions of infantry, on the Bengal establishment, ought to be 1395. By a calculation made in August 1820, it appears that there were not more than 620 actually present with their corps. The deficiency is equally great at Madras and Bombay. The cause of this is to be sought in the extensive draughts which are made from the officers of these corps with a view to supply the staff, irregular corps officered from the line, &c. This extreme paucity of officers has unquestionably impaired the discipline of the army, and tended to render it less efficient. The beneficial consequences which were expected from the increased establishment of 1796 have not been entirely realized. The moving spirit which animates this vast machine is wanting. The powerful impulse which is communicated to the native character, by the superior energy of the European, is

not sufficiently felt; and a vigorous system of control cannot be established throughout the entire mass. From the year 1814 to 1820, the Indian army at the three presidencies has been kept at least 500 officers short in its complement. It is difficult to divine the cause of this: perhaps a laudable regard to economy may have dictated this arrangement; if so, the Court of Directors are entitled to the praise of a rare disinterestedness, in refraining from exercising that patronage to which they were legally entitled. But, allowing them every credit for their motives, if they look to the security of those rich dividends which the proprietors of East India stock derive from our Eastern empire, they ought to make every exertion to keep their army complete.

During the two last seasons a considerable number of cadets have been sent out; but at present the Indian army is at least 300 short of its complement of officers. The Court of Directors ought to exert themselves to send out this number; but even this increase will not be sufficient to place the corps of native infantry on the same efficient footing with regard to European officers, as was contemplated by the regulations of 1796. To effect this, an additional field officer, 2 captains, and 2 subalterns should be given to each regiment of native infantry. Even this will scarcely afford the requisite number of officers: with every battalion of native infantry, there ought to be present at least 2 field officers, 10 captains or subalterns to command companies, 2 subalterns to fill the staff appointments of adjutant and quartermaster, and 3 subalterns to fill the posts of others incapacitated by sickness, leave of absence, or

other causes, from discharging their duty. There should never be less than 16 or 17 officers present with a battalion. The proportion of officers allowed by the regulations of 1796 would be more than sufficient if actually present with their corps; but it has been already shown, that, from unavoidable causes, more than half of their number are absent, and thus a necessity exists for an increased establishment to maintain the army in the same degree of efficiency which was contemplated by these arrangements.

This small increase is still further desirable with a view to satisfy the just claims of the Indian army. The officers of this force have never attained that rank which is allowed to others exercising the same degree of command in the British or any European army. In this service every lieutenant generally commands a company, but is only paid according to the rank which he holds in the army. A captain discharges the functions of major, and the same may be said of the higher ranks. It is not unusual to see a lieutenant-colonel in the Indian army commanding a force of 7 or 8000 men, which, in Europe, is exercised by a lieutenant-general. The large divisions of the army which are stationed within the dominions of the king of Oude, the Nizam, Malwa, Rajpootana, and the other protected states, are generally commanded by lieutenant-colonels: the strength of these divisions varies from 4 to 7000 men. To this immense army of 230,000 men only 16 general officers are allowed, independent of the three commanders-in-chief at the different presidencies. Of these five are taken from his Majesty's service;—a large proportion, considering that the ge-

merical strength of that portion of the army stationed in India is so small. By the regulations of 1796, 16 general officers were to be employed on the staff. Since that period the strength of the army has been doubled and nearly trebled; but no corresponding increase has taken place in the number of general officers. Such being the case, it is not surprising that the veteran officers of the army should feel that their interests were neglected, and that their exertions have not been rewarded, by conferring upon them a rank and emolument commensurate with that of their fellow-soldiers in his Majesty's service. The ruling powers have endeavoured to rectify this, by granting brevet rank to the officers of the Indian army; but as this has been unattended with the slight increase of pay which this rank is entitled to in every other service, it has conferred no substantial benefit. Men who volunteer to serve in an ungenial climate for the greatest part of their lives, are not likely to be satisfied with barren honours. By the regulations of 1796, a subaltern who had attained the brevet rank of captain, after 15 years' service, was entitled to a trifling increase of pay; but this is not allowed at present—and the possessor of this rank derives no pecuniary advantage from it. In this respect the practice of his Majesty's service is widely different: after six or seven years' service a lieutenant is entitled to a considerable increase of pay. But still brevet rank has conferred some advantage in relieving individuals from the mortifying humiliation of supercession by officers of his Majesty's service—and for this the officers of the Indian army have reason to be grateful to their employers. In the

existing state of the finances, it is perhaps impossible that all these claims could be acceded to; that a captain could be given to each company; an additional field-officer to each battalion; and that a suitable proportion of general officers could be employed on the staff.—But any arrangement which led to this in a small degree, would not only gratify the rational hopes of the army, but strengthen the security of the government, by rendering its military force more efficient—the necessary consequence resulting from an increased establishment of officers. The prospect of rising to the command of the army at each presidency ought to be equally open to the general officers of the Honourable Company's service as those of his Majesty's forces. Whether any restriction exists which operates against the nomination of the former to this important trust, I am ignorant—but the fact is certain, that no officer of the Indian army has attained this distinction of late years. In a rational point of view, it appears obvious that an officer who is thoroughly acquainted with the temper, character, and spirit of this army from his boyhood, is by far the fittest person to command it. But whether this is confided to an officer of his Majesty's or the Honourable Company's forces, is a matter of trifling importance, provided the road is open to all, and a proper selection is made for the discharge of this important trust. The salutary prejudices of birth and rank unquestionably operate in favour of the officers of his Majesty's service, especially if this eminent station is bestowed upon a nobleman, which induces men to reconcile themselves more easily to his authority. But the

ought not to be opposed as a bar to the rise of an officer of distinguished talents in the Honourable Company's army.

This noble command ought only to be bestowed on men of real talents and experience, who have been accustomed to take a large and comprehensive view of human affairs, and to look beyond the narrow interests of the peculiar service to which they belong. An improper nomination has, at times, been productive of the most serious evils. From an entire ignorance of the regulations of the force which he commanded, the commander-in-chief of the Indian army, in 1809, committed a cruel outrage upon the rights, and causelessly insulted the entire body of the Company's officers, by nominating five officers of his Majesty's service to command an equal number of native light infantry battalions on the Bengal establishment. The glaring absurdity and injustice of this consisted in their being selected for the command of soldiers, of whose language, manners, and customs they were entirely ignorant—and this to the exclusion of men who had devoted themselves from their youth to this service; who had exerted every intellectual energy in endeavouring to qualify themselves for it; and who aspired to command these corps as their only professional reward. The pretext of superior qualifications was altogether futile, as it was perfectly well known that these officers had never commanded light infantry battalions in his Majesty's service; but, allowing it to exist, was this to warrant the subversion of the established rights of nearly 4,000 officers? Could not proper persons have been selected from this numerous body? Had

the rights of the officers in his Majesty's service been invaded in this manner, by nominating those of the Indian army to command their battalions, would not the whole of that force have been thrown into a state of disaffection, and the safety of our empire endangered? Such are the mischievous consequences resulting from nominating an officer to this command, who cannot rise above the natural partiality which he feels for the officers of his own service. It is fortunate for the interests of the Indian army that a better selection has been since made. Sir George Nugent and Lord Hastings have evinced themselves every way superior to these illiberal prepossessions. If the offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief of the forces in India are united in one person, it is certainly desirable that the command of the Bengal army should be intrusted to a distinct person, as it it scarcely possible for one individual to discharge the numerous duties of these important stations.

It now remains to consider another defect in the Indian army, namely, the slowness of promotion. This necessarily arises from the gradual rise by seniority, which renders it almost impossible to attain the rank of general officer, except in the decline of life, when the mental and physical powers are greatly impaired. Where this system is established in a service, it must succeed in inducing men of some character and education to embark in it, from the certain prospect which it holds out of attaining rank and emolument in regular rotation, and the happy exemption which it affords from that humiliating supersession to which military men are subject in the British army.

This arrangement is well calculated to promote the general interests of an army in regard to personal advantages; but is eminently unfavourable to the rise of merit. Under this system the spirit of military enterprise is chilled: the most brilliant display of courage and skill will never enable a junior officer of the army to attain the command of his corps except in rotation—and still less to indulge the ambitious hope of rising to the command of an army in the prime of life. In this career his views are bounded; and the aspiring soldier must look to other rewards than those of his profession. This service is not calculated for such heroic spirits, as Wolfe, Nelson, or Moore, whose thirst of honours and distinctions rendered them superior to every ordinary motive, and whose regard to self was swallowed up in their greater love of renown; but it holds forth a powerful incentive to others, by the ample power which the government possesses of rewarding its officers by granting them lucrative staff appointments. With the generality of men this motive operates more strongly than any other; and, if sufficient encouragement is held out in this way, there will never be any want of exertion in the junior officers of the army. In an army where one individual out of six holds a staff appointment, it is inexcusable if the government does not afford this stimulus to exertion. But, as a season of war rarely occurs, and but few individuals find opportunities of distinguishing themselves, the depressing influence of the rise by seniority is sensibly felt throughout the whole army. In a service where the adventurer is doomed to remain 25 years in the capacity of a subaltern; where

he is certain of attaining the next promotion independent of his superiors; and where the most exemplary conduct may have failed in attracting distinction and reward,—the spirit of the soldier must languish. A sense of honour and duty, and the very excitement of the scene will always stimulate the officers of this army to good conduct in the field; but, in peace, it is difficult to resist that apathy and indifference which the slow rise by seniority inevitably creates. This is certainly visible in the conduct of the officers of this army. Amongst persons of this class, who possess any ability, it is rare to meet with one who exercises it in the study of his profession. The discouragement to this under the existing system compels him to apply to other pursuits. The demands of the public service necessitate the government to employ a number of its officers in occupations altogether foreign to their military functions. Throughout the vast continent of India, there are no professional men to be found except in the vicinity of the capital of each presidency, which compels the government to employ military officers as architects, surveyors, mechanics, and commissariat agents. Some of these individuals, by their eminent skill in the languages, have been enabled to figure as ambassadors, political agents, or professors, and have been temporarily employed as judges and collectors; others have attained equal renown as admirable judges of horses, elephants, and bullocks. There are a few excellent army clothiers and gunpowder manufacturers, and a great many adepts in all that relates to brick and mortar. The study of Arabic and Persian literature, or that of the best treatises on architec-

ture, surveying, or mechanics, is much more fashionable than that of Polybius on the Greek and Roman tactics—the elaborate dissertations of the Chevalier Folard or Guibert on the advantages of the close column, or the line, in the field of action—and the theory of the attack and defence of fortified towns, by these masters of the science, Vauban and Cohorn. These varied and far more useful pursuits, to which the officers of the army now addict themselves, are beneficial in counteracting the depressing effects of the rise by seniority, from the interesting occupation which they afford. But the evils arising from this system are not so much felt in the inferior ranks of an army, the duties of which can be performed by men of very moderate capacity, as in the higher grades which involve the command of a very large force. The Indian army has been trebled within the last 40 years, which has consequently quickened the promotion of the officers in the same proportion;—and yet it is rare to meet with a general officer who has attained that rank under 60 years of age. The causes which have accelerated the rise of the general officers of the present day cannot be expected to operate in future. In India, there is nothing left for us to conquer, consequently promotion must stagnate, unless the Emperor Alexander threatens us, which, of course, will lead to our taking Persia and Afghanistan into our protection. Such being the case, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the rank of general officer will not be attained, in future, at an earlier age than 70 or 80 years. The evil effects of seniority are here strikingly manifest, in depriving the state of efficient leaders to guide its

armies. At the advanced age of 60 or 70 years in the climate of India, that energy of body and mind, so essential to success in warfare, must be somewhat abated; and those habits and studies which qualify men for the command of armies, are not likely to have been acquired from the remote chance which these individuals could have ever possessed of attaining this elevated rank by the slow rise of seniority. No man, who enters the Indian army, can ever reasonably look forward, in his youth, to become a general, or will give himself much trouble to qualify himself to discharge the important functions of this rank. At the breaking out of the Nepaul war, the disadvantages of the established system of promotion in the Indian army were sensibly felt. At this period there were not more than six or eight general officers in Bengal, and the range of selection was consequently limited. But none was exercised. The general officers who had attained the command of districts, in the regular routine of the service, were directed to lead their divisions against the enemy. In acting thus, the commander-in-chief evinced the feeling of a soldier in regard to these officers, and a just regard to the force of public opinion in the Indian army, which operates so much in favour of seniority. But perhaps this deference was carried too far. In carrying on war against an adventurous enemy, the safety of the state may be endangered by the imbecility of those who direct its operations. Where the national honour and interests, and the lives of thousands, are intrusted to a few men, it is obvious that every exertion should be made to secure efficient leaders to our armies. If these cannot

be selected from the general officers in India, the executive ought to descend lower, and nominate these individuals from the colonels and lieutenant-colonels of the army. It is easy to make a few removals, to enable junior officers to command divisions; or, if necessary, brevet rank could be granted for a temporary period, to cease instantly after the termination of hostilities. This would be no innovation. The power of a brevet commission elevated Clive to command, and enabled him, by his victories, to conquer British India for his country. In the eventful days of Hastings, the rank of brigadier-general was conferred upon Colonel Goddard, which led to the astonishing march which he performed from Calpee to Surat, and his subsequent services in the west of India. The heroic defence of Wandewash by Flint was rewarded by granting him superior rank; and the distinguished conduct of Colonel Hartley was recognized by the Bombay government in a similar manner. In recent times, the rank of brigadier-general has been conferred upon Sir John Malcolm, when only a lieutenant-colonel. There is nothing in the regulations of the service to warrant the nomination of officers to the command of armies who have no other claim than seniority. Even in peace the government is empowered to select general officers for the staff: no individual can claim this station as a matter of right, on the ground of seniority. The regulations even go a great deal further, and direct—in *Henley*, *p.* 116—that whenever the lieutenant-colonel, or any number of lieutenant-colonels, appear, to government, either upon the commander-in-chief's representations or by any other means, to

be unfit for the command of regiments, they are to be passed over, and junior officers promoted. This invidious power has never been exercised; and may it never be so. Let every officer succeed, as a matter of right, to the command of a regiment, and even in time of peace to that of a district, as a general officer on the staff, if no stain attaches to his character; but in the perilous season of war it should be far otherwise. Mediocrity has no place at the head of an army or division, and ought to give way to superior talent and energy. The events of the last war have created a great deal of discussion in India respecting the most appropriate mode of rewarding military merit. This originated on the supposition that the introduction of brevet rank into the Indian army had been recommended by the commander-in-chief to the Court of Directors, on the same principle as it is applied in his Majesty's service. In the Indian army, at the present day, brevet rank prevails, but it does not elevate its possessor above his fellow-soldiers. It is only given with a view to prevent supersession by the officers of his Majesty's service, and extends to every officer in the army; consequently cannot be regarded as an honour or distinction; and is pregnant with no advantage beyond that above-mentioned. The introduction of brevet rank, on the same footing as is customary in the European armies, was contemplated with a view to stimulate military enterprise, by elevating individuals, who had distinguished themselves, to superior rank. Thus, a captain or major who had manifested superior courage or military skill, would be rewarded by promotion to the

rank of major or lieutenant-colonel, after which period their rise would go on regularly in the line; and thus these fortunate individuals would be able to attain the rank of general officer some 10 or 15 years earlier than they otherwise would have done. The most important advantages were anticipated from this arrangement taking place, from its tendency to make known the individual merits of the officers of the army, which would enable the government, in a period of war, to nominate efficient leaders to the command of its armies. The advocates of this innovation contend, that a service of pure and unmingled seniority is detrimental to the state—that the great spring of military enterprise, promotion, is wanting—and that some arrangement should be introduced which may enable superior talent to overleap the boundaries which are opposed to its rise under the existing system. They assert, that the present mode of rewarding merit, by conferring lucrative appointments on those who distinguish themselves in the field, is pernicious, by removing them from active service in the army to the civil occupations connected with it, such as a barrackmastership, a paymastership, or the commissariat department, for which the previous habits of these men have altogether disqualified them. Were brevet rank introduced, it is urged that these enterprising spirits would remain in their natural sphere, from the greater opportunity which it afforded them of rising to distinction, and the prospect which it laid open to them of attaining the command of an army, in the full exercise of all their faculties. They assert that distinction is the

object of the high-minded soldier, to which pecuniary rewards must be altogether subordinate; and, in exemplification of this assertion, carry us back to the heroic ages of Greece, Rome, or the reign of chivalry, in which a triumph, or a simple wreath of laurel, marked out the hero to his fellow-soldiers, and excited the whole army to emulate the example of the individual who was thus preëminently distinguished. They triumphantly contend that if an officer of merit is promoted by brevet, it is only to enable him to perform still greater services to the state, which he is utterly debarred from accomplishing by the present system, which removes him to another sphere. In modern times the powerful impulse which was given to the French army by the institution of the Legion of Honour, and the rapid promotion conferred by Napoleon on those who distinguished themselves, are referred to as affording practical exemplifications of the efficacy of the system recommended. It is difficult for a soldier of fortune to tear himself away from the fine prospect which is held out by those who advocate this innovation; but it is time to hear what can be said upon the other side of the question. Those who defend the existing system maintain, that the most mischievous consequences would result from the introduction of brevet rank; that it would be conferred on those whom circumstances and connexions afforded opportunities of ingratiating themselves with the superior authorities; and that thus the soldier of interest would be rewarded at the expense of his deserving brother officers. Reasoning from the certain experience of human nature, they infer that wherever a

probability of a successful military operation (which would lead to brevet rank) occurred, a commander-in-chief, or a general officer of a division, would nominate his connexion or favourite to this command; and that thus the feelings of every officer in the force would be revolted by his elevation, whilst no public advantage could be derived from it, from the profligate disregard of merit evinced by this promotion. Viewing the practical exercise of this power of bestowing brevet rank in his Majesty's service, they remark that it is generally conferred on those whom fortune and family interest have placed around the person of the commander-in-chief; and that the meritorious officer is rarely selected for the purpose of carrying home dispatches which might afford him an opportunity of acquiring it. At the same time, as regards the application of brevet rank to themselves, they conceive it grievously unjust that an officer should be elevated among his contemporaries merely for the doing that service which his fellow-soldiers would have been equally ready to perform, if similar opportunities had been afforded them. But, above all, they cannot brook that they should be superseded in this service by their juniors, the security against which formed the principal inducement to embark in it; and with this feeling they protest against any infringement of their established rights. Such are the reasonings which are urged for and against the introduction of brevet rank. If any judgment can be formed from the number of individuals who have expressed their opinions upon this subject in the public journals, the general feeling of the army in Bengal appears

decidedly adverse to this innovation. They are not insensible to the advantages which the state would derive from it; nor would they envy the individual who had attained this rank by superior desert;—but their habitual experience of human nature teaches them to place little reliance on the public virtue of statesmen, commanders-in-chief, or generals of divisions, in the disposal of their patronage; and with this feeling they resolutely oppose the introduction of this rank into the army, unless their rights can be secured by regulations which may protect them against the perversion of this power of granting superior rank, to the purposes of favouritism or influence. With this marked disinclination to it, it may be unwise to force this innovation against the declared sense of the army. These officers have been encouraged to enter this service on the faith of an act of parliament, which secured to them a certain rise by seniority; and who will embark in a distant service without this assurance? Unless a strong case can be made out, it would be unjust to these soldiers to abrogate this act.

As far as regards the lieutenant-colonels, majors, captains, and subalterns of this army, it does not appear to me that the powerful stimulus of brevet rank is much required: the duties of these ranks are perhaps as creditably performed in this, as in any other service. With the higher grades it is otherwise: from physical causes, which attach no demerit to individuals, the general officers of this army cannot be so efficient as those of other services in which they attain this station in the prime of life. Such being the case, it appears to me that the government ought to possess the power, in

time of war, of conferring brevet rank on colonels and lieutenant-colonels for a temporary period, to enable it to secure skilful and energetic leaders for the guidance of our armies. It has been already shown that this power has been sometimes exercised, and therefore cannot be regarded as an invasion of the established rights of the senior officers of the army; but, at the present day, the recollection of this is somewhat effaced from their minds, and might be re-impressed by a regulation. The personal interest of a governor-general or commander-in-chief, being so much identified with the success of an army or division, must be regarded as an almost certain security against any improper selection. The rich fund of patronage which the government of India possesses will always enable it to stimulate the exertions of the junior officers of the army, by conferring staff-appointments on those who distinguish themselves. There will be no chance of these officers forgetting their military duties, if they are nominated to the command of irregular or local corps, which, with the present large establishment, can be done with ease, if the government disinterestedly exercise their patronage for the good of the state. What nobler reward could an aspiring soldier desire than the command of a corps in the prime of life. At its head, he would have an opportunity of still further distinguishing himself. At the present day, interest enables many subalterns to obtain the command of these corps. Were they conferred upon distinguished officers, the objection which is urged against the pernicious effects of employing these men in the civil appointments connected with the army would be effectually remov-

ed. After all, pecuniary motives operate more strongly with most men than any other; and with them brevet rank would become valuable, not for the superior rank and command which it conferred, but for the greater emoluments which accompanied it. There are soldiers in every army who regard honours and distinctions as far superior to all this; and it is certainly a defect in the constitution of the Indian army, that the spirit of men of this stamp cannot be gratified. But this could easily be rectified by instituting an order of merit. If bestowed on officers who really deserved it, it would be regarded as a distinction which would gratify the pride of those who had attained it, without irritating others by that supersession which brevet rank would create, and which, if similar opportunities had been afforded them, they might have equally obtained. At present, the captains and subalterns of the Indian army are excluded from all national honours; and the same remark applies to the similar grades in the British army. There is something very absurd in this. Is merit only confined to a particular class of men; or does it extend throughout the varied mass of society? The practice of the French has been very different: the prospect of attaining the distinctions of the Legion of Honour was laid open to every individual in the army, from the private to the commander-in-chief. In India, a strange inconsistency prevails: medals are awarded to the native soldiers who have proceeded on any distant expedition; but they are never granted to the European officer who has accompanied them and shared its dangers. Indeed, the whole system is fundamentally erroneous; those

medals are granted to every soldier who has embarked on the expedition, and consequently they become no distinction. Surely common sense would point out that they should only be awarded to a few, who had distinguished themselves by their superior gallantry or good conduct, the selection of whom might be left to the commander of the corps. In discussing the subject of military rewards, it is impossible to avoid remarking the neglect with which the distinguished services of Captain Fitzgerald of the Bengal cavalry have been regarded both in England and India. The noble defence of his post, which was made by Captain Staunton of the Bombay army during the last campaign, was recognized by the Court of Directors, who evinced their admiration of his conduct by voting him a sword, with a handsome donation in money. In India his services were still more splendidly rewarded; the government of the celebrated fortress of Ahmedabad was conferred upon him, with a liberal salary. In England the heroic achievement of Fitzgerald was unnoticed by the Court of Directors; and in India it was rewarded with a paymastership.

The staff-appointments at each presidency are almost exclusively held by the officers in the Honourable Company's service. The cause of this is obvious. The duties of these offices require a considerable knowledge of the language, manners, and customs of the natives, and an intimate acquaintance with the multifarious regulations of the Indian army, which the officers of his Majesty's service (who, in all probability, have passed the earliest and greatest part of their lives in Europe) cannot be sup-

posed to have attained in an equal degree. Every intellectual energy has been necessarily directed to the study of the regulations of their own service; and, imbued with their spirit from their earliest youth, it is difficult to adapt themselves to any other. Thus, there appear just reasons for this preference. But, notwithstanding this, there are some of the officers of his Majesty's service who appear to have felt this exclusion as an injury. There is a passage in Major Thorne's excellent memoir on the war in India, which is understood to refer to this feeling. He says—"Every invidious distinction in the appropriation of rewards and benefits, should be removed. Union alone can preserve a state, which, in regard to numerical strength, compared to the population over which it rules, is no more than as a drop in the waters of the ocean. Professional honours are the objects of the soldier's loftiest ambition; but if he is debarred of them by local restrictions, the prime motive to exertion is taken away, and his zeal is cooled, when he finds neither labour nor talent will procure him those benefits or distinctions to which he has a fair pretension, but which he sees exclusively appropriated to one description of his brethren." That officers of his Majesty's army, who had distinguished themselves by meritorious service in India, should fail in obtaining the rewards of their good conduct, is infinitely to be regretted; but surely Major Thorne suffers the warm interest which he takes in the cause of his fellow-soldiers to carry him too far, in wishing that those appointments should be conferred upon them, which have formed the exclusive recompense of the officers

of the Indian army; and the certain prospect of attaining which has been the principal inducement to embark in this distant career. For this they have devoted themselves to this branch of the national service from their youth, and endeavoured to qualify themselves for a successful exercise of its duties, by obtaining a thorough knowledge of the native character, and of that language which forms the key to it. Until the officers of his Majesty's army have passed through a similar course of study and experience, their claims to these appointments must be considered as prodigiously inferior, however distinguished for their services in the field. These can always be appropriately rewarded by their sovereign. There are some distinctions and many staff-employments open to them in the home service and the colonies, from which the soldier of the Indian army is altogether debarred. How deeply would the gallant circle of general officers at Carlton Palace feel themselves injured, if the rich governments of the West India islands were bestowed upon the officers of the Indian army, which the former have been accustomed to regard as their exclusive reward. And would not this be equally felt in India, if a similar injustice was exercised? All professional honours are open to the officers of his Majesty's service in a still greater degree than those of the Indian army. Their services in India can be recompensed by brevet rank, which elevates them above their contemporaries in either service. As compared with their numbers, they have always possessed a greater portion of important and lucrative commands than the officers of the Indian army. And the preference shown to

them, in this respect, has been generally regarded as one of the principal causes of the unfortunate commotions in this army, in Bengal in 1794, and on the coast in 1809. They are only excluded from the staff-appointments connected with the general administration of the army—the civil occupations combined with it, such as paymasterships, barrackmasterships—the commissariat department—and the command of native corps; for all which important trusts their ignorance of the language and regulations of the service in a measure disqualifies them. Would it not be cruelly unjust if an officer of his Majesty's service, who had only served one or two years in India, was enabled, by the strength of his family-connexions, to obtain the richest of these appointments, to the prejudice of meritorious officers of the Indian army, who had spent the best portion of their lives in this distant country? The officers of the British army came out to India with the certain knowledge that these appointments are generally appropriated to a different class of men; and, consequently, can have no reason to consider this exclusion as an injury. If it is considered as such, the same is equally felt by the officers of the Indian army, in regard to the staff-appointments on the home establishment, which would be equally acceptable to them on retiring from the distant service of India. To soldiers of any family or respectability, the Indian service must have been equally open with that of his Majesty's. Such being the case, after deliberately preferring the latter with all its advantages or disadvantages, it is rather hard that they should claim those rewards which induce others to embark in a more distant

career. How would those individuals who are engaged in the Honourable Company's naval service be astonished, if a similar demand was made by the officers of his Majesty's navy? In truth, the service of his Majesty's officers in India is too short to entitle them to claim these advantages. But, supposing that these appointments were open to all, it does not appear to me that the distinguished and meritorious officers of his Majesty's service would be benefited by it. The dissipated soldier of family, who had squandered his fortune at Brookes's or White's, would be sent out to improve his finances, at the expense of the interests of his more deserving brethren. But, independent of all this, the officers of his Majesty's army employed in India enjoy substantial advantages as compared with those of the Company's forces. In the latter service, a lieutenant generally holds a company, and discharges the duty of a captain, and a captain that of a major; but their allowances are precisely the same as those of a lieutenant or captain of his Majesty's service employed in India, whose functions are limited to the rank which they bear—and thus it is evident, that the officers of the king's forces are infinitely better paid than those of the Indian army, in proportion to the command and authority which they exercise.

On reviewing all these circumstances, it appears to me manifest, that the existing rights of the officers of the Indian army should be protected instead of being invaded. The security of the national interests in India would be greatly advanced by an act of the legislature which prohibited the government in each presidency from granting appointments to

individuals who were utterly unqualified to discharge the functions of these offices, from their ignorance of the native language and regulations of the Indian service. The private interest of every governor-general and commander-in-chief perpetually urges him to infringe those regulations which the superior authorities in England have laid down for his guidance in the disposal of his patronage. The officers of the Indian army have reason to be grateful to the Court of Directors, for the uniform disposition which they have evinced to maintain the privileges of their military servants, by repressing these violations of their rights by the superior authorities in India.

As regards the defence of our Eastern empire, Major Thorne entertains the opinion that the mutinies at Vellore and Travancore, in 1807 and 1811, have shown that the fidelity of the native troops cannot be sufficiently relied upon, and therefore recommends that twice the number of European troops should be employed in India, a preponderating superiority of whom should be cavalry. Admitting that the security of these possessions would be increased by this measure, which I am not inclined to concede, the projected improvement would cost so much as to render them not worth the keeping. A regiment of European cavalry in India costs the state about 72,000 pounds per annum; the pay of 20 regiments would thus be 1,500,000 pounds: allow 500,000 pounds for horses, barracks, &c. and the expenses of our military forces would be increased two millions yearly. Our uniform experience of India affairs has shown us that no surplus revenue has ever been realized, and that this outcry

charge will ultimately fall upon the mother country. It is true, Mr Prinsep tells us that British India will be able to afford a noble tribute to the mother country in a short space of time; but the calculations of men in office can never be relied upon until they are realized. Major Thorne may contend that the increased charge will be counterbalanced by the savings arising from the reduction of native regiments. This cannot be the case: the greater number of European troops would scarcely enable the government to reduce a single man. Every one who has been in India knows that, from the heat of the climate, &c. European soldiers cannot be employed on the ordinary duties of troops in the time of peace; and that, except in the season of war, they have nothing to do but to protect their own barracks. Such being the case, it is obvious that the government would be compelled to maintain the same number of native troops, for the maintenance of the general police of the country, the defence of jails, the escort of treasure, &c. In truth, the European troops are only useful in a campaign; and thus 40,000 men would be maintained at an enormous expense, in the time of peace, when 20,000 have been found amply sufficient in all the hazards to which our eastern empire has been exposed in its most eventful wars. But if this increase is to be effected by the reduction of the native regiments, it seems evident that the stability of our power would be endangered by the alienation of the military class—the only efficient part of the vast population of India. Thus, a considerable number of that adventurous portion of them who serve in our armies, would be let loose

upon society, and a still greater European force would be required to overawe them. The expense created by this would, in a short time, be felt as a ruinous drain upon the resources of the mother country, and this noble empire would be speedily abandoned. It is utterly impossible that so extensive a state could ever be maintained by a handful of Europeans, without enlisting the energies of its military population in its defence; and such appears to have been the systematic policy of our government, and of all conquerors from Alexander to Buonaparte. A statesman, for whom Major Thorne professes to entertain the most profound respect, has expressed this opinion very powerfully. The Marquis of Hastings, in an address to the students of the College of Fort William, in 1819, says thus:—"Our domination is altogether unprecedented in its nature. History records nothing parallel to it. Britain holds here an immense empire, not by national force, but by the confidence which the most energetic and intelligent portion of the native population reposes in us. We have attained this height of power, not through plan, not through forecast, but from the result of various unprovoked and unexpected contests, the issue of every one of which was rendered favourable to us by the fidelity of natives in our employ, and the advantageous prepossession which the inhabitants in general entertained respecting us."—The temptations which the native troops have withstood at Poonah and Nagpoor have proved that the apprehensions which were entertained of their swerving from their fidelity were altogether unfounded. They are remnant in their

loyalty by the strongest of all bonds—their interest; and, as long as the state holds out the same inducements, it may confidently rely upon their services. At the present day immense provinces are held by these battalions, with no European troops at a nearer distance than 3 or 400 miles.

An anonymous author, who has written a summary of the campaign in 1817–18, has proposed a still further innovation in respect to the defence of our Asiatic possessions. He is dissatisfied with the exertions of the native soldiers of the Indian army, and proposes that their place should be supplied by Arabs, who should be disciplined by the officers of his Majesty's service. It is difficult to imagine what can have induced this writer to come to this conclusion. Is it the notorious fact that these native troops, in combination with a few European corps, have rendered the English government the entire masters of the vast continent of India? When were their services more distinguished than at present? In the Nepaul war, did not the divisions of General Ochterlony and Colonel Nicholl, in the first campaign, achieve the most important successes, unsupported by any European corps? In the war which ensued in 1817–18, have not the native cavalry of the different presidencies swept the Pindarees from the face of the land, unaided by any other force? At Poonah, Nagpoor, or Betool, were the native infantry ever fairly beaten by an equal number of Arabs in the field? No! they have often been repulsed in the assault of fortified posts by Arabs and Hindoos; but this has equally happened to the best European troops in India. Does the sig-

nal gallantry and fortitude displayed by the Bombay native infantry in the defence of Corygaum against an overwhelming superiority of Arabs, evince any degeneracy in the character of our soldiery? But, admitting that the Arabs are a finer race of soldiers, there can exist no good reasons for introducing these men into the Indian army. To induce these adventurers to leave their native country, very high pay must be given; and their turbulent character would require for its control at least double the number of European officers that are necessary with a seapoy corps of the same strength. Thus the military expenses of the state would be doubled; and for what useful purpose it is difficult to divine. Our present army has carried every thing before it in India, and what more is desired? Would not the necesssary consequence of this measure be, that the energetic portion of the Indian community who were thrown out of employ, would be arrayed against the government? Is it at all likely that the proud moslems of Arabia would easily reconcile themselves to European superiority? The slightest disgust or ill usage would throw them into the arms of their Mahomedan brethren of India, who still feel acutely their depression under the present system; and would embrace any fair opportunity of regaining their lost ascendancy. It is singular that this writer should recommend that these Arabs should be exclusively trained by the officers of his Majesty's service. Do they enjoy a monopoly of professional talents? The distinguished names of Ochterlony, Malcolm, Monro, Doveton, and Adams, sufficiently prove the contrary. The education of

the officers in either service, and their birth and rank in society (at least of such of them as proceed to India), is nearly similar. Such being the case, the probability is almost certain that either system will produce an equal number of meritorious officers who should be equally skilled in training troops. The high state of perfection to which the Indian army has been brought fully illustrates this opinion. With this spectacle before them, it would be strange if the Indian government employed the officers of another service for the purpose of disciplining any new description of troops who might be introduced into their armies. Every rational principle ought to induce them to intrust the command of these soldiers to their own servants, whose previous habits had led them to study the character of foreign troops, and to conciliate their prejudices; and whose knowledge of the Mahomedan soldiers in the native army of India would enable them more easily to govern these turbulent adventurers from Arabia. It now remains to bestow a few words on the prospects of individuals adventuring to India in the military service of the Honourable Company.

The promotion in the Indian army has been entirely regulated by the extension of our dominion and influence. Any increase of territory necessarily led to an augmentation of the military force, which accelerated the rise of the officers of the army. From the year 1780 to 1794 there was little extension of dominion: those who entered the service between these periods rarely attained the rank of captain in less than 20 or 22 years, and the rank of major in 30 or 35 years. Between the years 1794 and 1805,

there was a prodigious expansion of territory; and the "conquering branch of industry" succeeded amazingly;—the benevolent designs of Lord Wellesley induced him to extend the protection of the British arms to the greater part of India, and the army was doubled. Those who entered the service during this period have generally attained the rank of captain in 10 years, and that of major in 20 or 22 years. Some fortunate individuals have even obtained this rank in 12 or 14 years. It is natural for men to love whatever promotes their interest: With the officers of the Indian army, Lord Wellesley has ever been regarded as the first of statemen, and his system of subsidiary alliances a masterly refinement in policy. Since then adventurers in the Indian army have not done quite so well. It is true there has been a convenient arondissement of territory during Lord Hastings's administration, and the protecting system has been still further extended, which has led to some trifling increase of the army; but, as compared with former times, this has been nothing. Those who have entered this service between the years 1806 and 1814 have no chance of attaining the rank of captain in less than 20 or 25 years. This is no exaggeration: there are a number of officers in the Bengal cavalry who remained 11 or 12 years in the rank of cornet before their promotion to a lieutenancy. Those who entered this army in 1808, after a period of 14 years' service, have in general not risen more than half-way up the list of lieutenants; and, consequently, may reasonably expect to serve nearly as many more years before they attain the rank of captain. At present, the pros-

pects of the military adventurer are still worse. We have conquered the entire continent of India, and promotion must stagnate.

It may be useful to enter into some detail on this subject, for the information of those interested. The cadet who enters this service at present may expect to remain six or seven years in the rank of ensign, upon an allowance of 200 rupees per month, or 300 pounds per annum. Upon his promotion to a lieutenancy he receives 250 rupees per month, or rather, as he generally commands a company, 300 rupees per month, or 450 pounds per annum. Remaining from 18 to 20 years in this grade, he will attain the rank of captain with a monthly pay of 450 rupees, or 670 pounds per annum. After 10 or 14 years' service in this capacity, he may become a major with an allowance of 750 rupees per mensem, or 1200 pounds per annum. In six or seven years more he will rise to the rank of lieutenant-colonel with 1200 rupees monthly pay, or 1800 pounds per annum. And in 10 or 12 years afterwards he will attain the rank of colonel and general officer, and may retire to England with the noble pension of 1200 pounds per annum. In the cavalry, the allowances of officers are much better. The pay of a cornet is 300 rupees per month, or 450 pounds per annum---of a lieutenant 360 rupees; but, as he generally commands a troop, this gives him an additional 200 rupees, in all 560 rupees per month, or about 800 pounds per annum. The pay of a captain of cavalry is 760 rupees per month, or about 1100 pounds per annum; and that of the higher ranks in the same proportion. The officers of this

army (with the exception of the colonels and lieutenant-colonels commanding regiments and battalions, who derive some advantage from the clothing of their corps) possess no source of emolument independent of their pay. Thus it is evident, that, if the cadet enters the service at the age of 16, he will not attain the rank of captain until he is 40 years of age; that of lieutenant-colonel at the age of 60; and the elevated station of major-general at 70 or 75 years of age. Such are the prospects which are at present held out to the youthful adventurer in the Indian service, unless a further extension of territory should take place, which of course will accelerate his promotion. The cause of this slow rise is principally to be sought in the fact, that the adventurers who embark in this service seldom leave it: if dissatisfied with their prospects, there are few openings presented which may enable them to enter into any other line of life; and no man wishes to return to Europe to render himself a burthen to those who conceive that they have made an ample provision for him. The consent of the Court of Directors and Board of Control is likewise necessary to enable an officer who resigns the service, to remain in India. In his Majesty's service, if an officer gets tired of the army, he can easily enter into some other occupation; and this quickens the rise of others who succeed by purchase, influence, or seniority. The Indian climate, too, is much more favourable to health than is generally imagined. In the Bengal army, the casualties do not exceed 8¼ or 3½ per cent annually. Such I believe is the calculation in the life insurance office

in Calcutta, which includes officers killed in action. This, of course, refers to ordinary years.

The scale of allowances to the officers of the Indian army appears high as compared with that of European armies; but, when narrowly examined, reduces itself to nearly the same thing. The Indian governments oblige the officers of the army to find their quarters, camp-equipage, &c. from their allowances, which takes up a considerable portion of their pay. In Europe these accommodations are furnished by the state; and every officer is allowed a servant from his regiment, on consideration of granting him some trifling remuneration. In India, about a fourth of an officer's allowances is swallowed up in servants' wages. An ensign in the Bengal army has rarely less than 10 servants, whose wages average about five rupees each, or 12s. 6d. per month. Independent of this, he is required, in many circumstances, to keep up camels for the carriage of his tent, baggage, &c. and in that oppressive climate a horse is indispensable to existence. These expenses in regard to servants are not incurred from any love of show; but are unavoidable from the habits and manners of the country.

The cheapness of all kinds of rude produce enables the Indian officer to enjoy a more sumptuous table than his brethren in Europe; but the saving in this respect is counterbalanced by the dearness of European articles, such as wines, spirits, malt liquor, &c. Upon the whole, the style of living is more expensive than in England; but no doubt the Indian officer generally lives better. The officers of this

army are famed for indulging in copious potations of Hodgson's beer, which they generally prefer to choice Madeira; but the expense of this delightful beverage is severely felt in India. It can rarely be conveyed to the upper stations at a less expense, including the original cost, than half-a-crown a bottle, which increases the expense of living. Upon the most economical scale, in the article of living, the mess expenses of a subaltern officer are seldom less than 80 rupees, or £10 monthly. Thus, it appears that, from the heavy expense of servants' living, the keeping of a horse, camels, house-rent, clothes, &c. the monthly allowance of the subaltern is entirely swallowed up; and he is much in the same way with his pennyless brethren in the European armies. Three hundred pounds per annum, the pay of an ensign in Bengal, must appear a liberal allowance in England, from which something can be saved; but, in reality, it only affords the necessaries of life in India, or at least what is deemed such by the respectable classes of Europeans. The allowances of the subalterns of the army are less than those of most of the European clerks employed in the mercantile houses of Calcutta. In the Indian army, it reflects great credit upon a young man if he can pass through the rank of ensign without incurring debt. After attaining a lieutenantcy, he may live with considerable comfort; but it is rare to find one of this class who has saved money after a residence of 12 or 15 years in the country. There are a few captains who lay by something from their allowances; but it is only the rank of field-officer which will enable an adventurer in the Indian army to do this

to any considerable amount; and, in the present state of promotion, this will not be attained in less than 40 years. So far from accumulating money, it is well known that at least one-fourth of the officers of this army are in debt. Of the adventurers in this service, nine-tenths of them cannot have the most distant probability of retiring with a competence; and, of the subalterns of the present day, many of whom have served upwards of 15 years, there are very few indeed who have been fortunate enough to save a little money, which might enable them to visit their friends in Europe for a short period. Generally speaking, the individual who embarks in this service, ought to make up his mind to remaining in the country for life. Very few persons can ever hope to attain the advanced age of 60 or 70, which may enable them to retire with the pension of a colonel; and, at that period of life, it would perhaps be wiser if they remained in India: Accustomed to a different state of manners and society, it must be difficult to adapt their habits to those of a new community.

An individual who lives long enough to attain the rank of general officer, is enabled to make a liberal provision for his family. If employed on the staff, which almost every officer has a right to expect, by rotation, for four years, he receives upwards of 3000 rupees per month staff pay; after serving the prescribed period upon this liberal allowance, he returns, when unemployed, to his usual pay of 15 or 1600 rupees per month. The prospects which are here exhibited apply to the general state of the army, and are certainly not calculated to induce individuals

to embark in it; but it is but just to mention, that there are a number of staff appointments connected with the army, which render the service more lucrative. About a fifth or sixth part of the officers of the Indian army hold staff appointments, which generally double or treble their ordinary allowances; and thus economical individuals, possessing these situations, who live at the same expense as their brother officers, are enabled to save the extra allowances which they receive, which gradually become a small fortune. But many of these individuals do not retire from the service. Instead of accumulating a fortune, they employ their extra allowances in the maintenance of a family. Without the assistance of a staff appointment, a subaltern of this army cannot marry, or educate his children in a respectable manner. Out of 1600 officers of the Bengal establishment I should doubt if more than 10 returned annually to England for the purpose of retiring, with fortunes varying from 10 to £40,000, independent of their retiring pension. Their period of service extends from 25 years to 45, and cannot average less than 35 years. But, after all, the Indian service must be regarded as a handsome livelihood; and in these days, when a soldier of fortune cannot carve out a principality for himself by his sword, it must be considered as a respectable provision. If an officer in this army can reconcile himself to the climate and manners of the natives, he will unquestionably be able to command more enjoyments than an individual of similar rank in the European armies; but it may fairly be doubted if an individual would desert his native country merely to attain a livelihood

without a prospect of ever revisiting it. Some degree of delusion prevails in this respect in England: it is generally imagined, that, after a certain period of service, every Indian officer retires with very handsome allowances. If he received the pay of his rank in India this would be the case; but, instead of Indian, he receives only English allowances. Thus after 22 years' service in India, a lieutenant retires with £90 per annum, a captain with £180, a major with £250, a lieutenant-colonel with £365, and a colonel and general officer with £1200 per annum. The retiring pension of a major, lieutenant-colonel, and general officer is liberal; but it is obvious, that, from the slowness of promotion, more than three-fourths of the officers of the army must die before they can attain these ranks; and that the expensive style of living which prevails in India renders it impossible that an officer who had been accustomed to it, should return to England with a family upon 90, or even 180, or 250 pounds per annum. Thus, it is only the fortunate individual who has been enabled to accumulate money in a staff appointment, that can retire upon this pension. The generality of the officers of the army cannot avail themselves of it. The scale of allowances in the Bengal and Bombay establishments is nearly similar: at Madras the pay of the army is greater when employed in the field, but less in cantonments; upon the whole, it is somewhat inferior to that of the other presidencies. It is infinitely to be desired that this could be rectified, by placing this establishment upon the same footing with the others. It appears to me to be a matter of indifference to which presidency an

adventurer proceeds: the promotion has been rather more rapid on the Bombay and Madras establishments than in Bengal; but, upon general principles, it ought to be much the same throughout the entire Indian army. In regard to the comforts of life, every Anglo-Indian prefers his own establishment. The Bengal officer is apt to boast of his good living, and expatiate with delight upon the exquisite flavour of his fat mutton, tender beef-steaks, and rich curries; but the gourmands of the sister presidencies will not admit of this haughty assumption of superiority: the Madras officer talks, with as much relish as Sir John Falstaff, about his well-fed capons, fine fish, and highly-seasoned mulikitaunies; whilst the Bombay soldier is loud in the praises of his pampered and juicy ducks, fragrant pillaus, delicious mangoes, and far-famed pudding. The cadetcies in the different branches of the Indian military service vary in value. The infantry and artillery are nearly upon a par; but perhaps the former is better to the individual who possesses interest. The cavalry is preferable to either; and the engineers is better than all.

It is not unusual to meet with brothers, one of whom is in the army, and the other in the civil service; but this is not doing equal justice to the young men. A writership is ten times more valuable than a cadetship. The number of cadets sent out annually seldom exceeds 150. There may be about 30 or 40 writers, and a like number of assistant-surgeons nominated for the civil and medical branches of the service. Thus the vent which India affords to the higher and middle classes of our

population is but limited. The medical branch of the service holds out a better prospect than the army of acquiring a small fortune. An assistant-surgeon, from his first entrance into the service, is pretty certain of holding medical charge of a corps, which affords him about 500 rupees per mensem. If he lives at the same expense as his brother officers, he is enabled to save half his allowances—about 3000 rupees per annum. In the course of 15 years this will amount to a considerable sum: he may then expect to become a full surgeon, with a salary of 7 or 800 rupees per mensem. After 12 or 14 years' service in this rank, he is likely to attain the appointment of superintending surgeon, with allowances varying from 12 to 1500 rupees per month. And in 10 years more he may become a member of the medical board, with a salary of 2 or 3000 rupees per month. Almost every individual is certain of rising to this station by virtue of seniority. Independent of this, there are a few situations connected with the lower ranks of the medical service, which afford better allowances than those which the generality of this body receive, but these can only be attained by interest. A few individuals succeed in medical practice at the capital of each presidency, and are enabled to accumulate a considerable fortune; but this can only be attained by great labour.

APPENDIX.

Speech of the MARQUIS *of* HASTINGS, *explanatory of the Operations and Results of the War against the Mahrattah and Pindaree States, in Reply to a Congratulatory Address of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta.*—July, 1818.

GENTLEMEN,

THE compliment with which you honour me is truly gratifying. Were I to consider you merely as men of worth and talent, desirous of marking your friendship towards me by a flattering civility, the distinction conferred upon me by the favour from persons of such stamp would demand the warmest return from my heart. I intreat you to believe that you do meet that return; but with much, very much superadded to it. In the satisfaction I am enjoying, there is something far beyond individual vanity. The sentiments which you have been pleased this day to express are not uttered to me alone. They are vouchers tendered to our countrymen at home. I am not alluding to the pride I must naturally feel in having such a testimony borne respecting me to our native land: the sensation which you have awakened in me is of a higher quality. A wider scope is inseparable from your treatment of the subject than what applies to me personally. You are pronouncing whether they who may be said to have represented the British character on the occasion did faithfully and becomingly fulfil that exalted trust: and your proximity, your stations, your excited vigilance, eminently

qualify you for returning a verdict, while your manhood would make you spurn at giving, through courtesy, an opinion which your judgment belied. Many of you have had to contemplate your most important private interests as staked in the transactions to which you refer; but all of you have felt that the national honour in which you were severally sharers was involved in the purpose and tenour of the measures I had the lot to guide. Under such an impression, you have stood forward to attest that the dignity of British justice has not been sullied. It is a declaration superiorly grateful; for my portion in the aggregate of British fame is more touching to me than a separate and selfish reputation. Your generous partiality towards me has not betrayed you into an indiscreet averment on that point. When we went forth to punish wrong, we were aware how much it behoved us to watch over ourselves, that strength and success might not seduce us into any act of oppression. I venture to believe that violence or wanton exaction cannot, with the faintest colour of truth, be imputed to our procedures. This, however, shall not rest on general assertions. You shall be minutely satisfied. Though, from the distinct feature of occurrences, you have with a gallant confidence maintained our equity, it will be pleasing for each of you to learn details which will enable you respectively to say, 'I was not carried away by the kind warmth of my feeling; here are circumstances which to my deliberate reflection irrefragably confirm the conclusions I drew from a less particular statement of the case.' The field of our operations was so vast that you often did not in Calcutta learn events which took place in remoter parts, till after you had been apprized of others considerably posterior which occurred in nearer quarters; so that you did not see how one transaction rose out of another. You will understand them better when they are presented to you in a regular chain. In laying them before you, I cannot make any inconsiderate disclosure. I am acting in the spirit of our Honourable Employers, who would challenge investigation and encourage exposition. Either for them or for us there is not a passage to be slurred over or glossed.

In our original plan there was not the expectation or the wish of adding a rood to the dominions of the Honourable Company. Our knowledge of the decided repugnance with which any notions of extending our territorial possessions is always viewed at home, would have forbidden such a project. Territory indeed was to be wrest-

ed from none but the Pindarees: And you will readily comprehend the policy which dictated that such conquests should be divided between the Nabob of Bopaul, Scindia and Holkar. It was useful to strengthen the former, who had attached himself devotedly: And it was desirable that the two Mahrattah sovereigns should perceive a degree of advantage for themselves to compensate for the unavoidable dissatisfaction they were to suffer from the completion of our enterprize. The suppression of the Pindarees was our single object. You have unequivocally proclaimed the absolute necessity of that object: and I cannot imagine the man exists, who would represent it as one of speculative expediency. Even in that light, the extirpation of the Pindarees would have been a justifiable and a wise undertaking. An association, whose undesigned principle is to subsist by plundering all around it, is a body placed by its own act in a state of war with every regular government. To crush such a confederacy before it should further increase that strength which every year obviously augmented, would have been a legitimate and a prudent cause of exertion. But such considerations were long gone by. We were called upon, by the most imperious duty attaching upon a government—that of protecting its subjects from desolation—to prevent the repetition (confessedly preparing) of invasions, which had for two years consecutively ravaged the Madras dependencies with circumstances of unexampled horror: On that principle, we resolved to take the field. To have limited our purpose to the expulsion of the Pindarees from the districts which they had hitherto occupied, would have been worse than childishness. Too numerous and powerful to be resisted by any of the smaller states, they would, in receding from us, forcibly occupy some other territory, equally convenient for annoying us, whence their expeditions would have issued with the improved intelligence acquired, by their having learned to measure our movements. It was indispensable to extinguish them wholly. We were not blind to the difficulties of the task.—The interception and dispersion of between five-and-twenty and thirty thousand horsemen, lightly equipped and singularly inured to fatigue, on the immense field over which they had the power of moving in any direction, was an operation that required no ordinary effort. Much more however was to be taken into calculation than the agility of our enemies. It was certain that their peril would be regarded with the

greatest anxiety by Scindia and by Ameer Khan. I leave Holkar out of the question, though he was interested in the result for a reason which I will hereafter explain. The Pindarees were an integral, though an unavowed, and sometimes hardly manageable part of the army of Scindia. They were always the ready auxiliaries of Ameer Khan, with whom community of object, *rapine*, gave them community of feeling. It was, therefore, sure that those two chiefs would be strenuous in counteracting our attempts to destroy the Pindarees—underhand as long as their practice could be concealed—in arms, when disguise would no longer avail. We had consequently to aim at incapacitating Scindia and Ameer Khan from taking the part they meditated. Enough was gained from Scindia, could we place him under an inability of moving; but much more was requisite in respect to Ameer Khan. Though his large army was better fashioned and more systematically organized than the Pindaree force, still he was essentially nothing but a leader of freebooters. It was of fundamental urgency that his army should be disbanded. Though it consisted of fifty-two battalions with above one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon and a powerful cavalry, it was luckily dispersed in small corps, either for the occupation of the widely-separated patches of territory which he had won from different chiefs, or for the extortion of means of subsistence from weaker states. My hope from rendering Scindia and Ameer Khan unable to struggle rested on this, that I should assemble my force before they suspected my attention, to push it forward with a rapidity which should make any concentration of their troops impracticable. The mere immobility of Scindia would not have answered my purpose. The Pindarees, if pressed by me, would have traversed his dominions and gained the western states, whither I should be precluded from following by a bar insuperable as long as existed. We were bound, by treaty with Scindia, to have no communication whatever with those states, so that the Pindarees would, in the disunited Rajpoot territories, have found not only shelter, but the facility of combining their force with that of Ameer Khan. I am showing to you that even here the bonds of public faith were, in my contemplation, less surmountable than physical obstacles. Do you think that I solved this embarrassment by an illicit use of the advantage which I succeeded in gaining over Scindia, by planting myself in the midst of his divisions, and prohibiting any attempt at

their junction? You do not believe it; yet you will like to hear it explained on what title I required from him the abrogation of that interdict which forbad our intercourse with the western states. No treaty, in truth, was existing between us and Scindia. He had dissolved it; first by exciting the Pindarees to invade our territories, that he might see how a desultory mode of war might affect our power; secondly, by lending himself, the year before, to the profligate intrigues of the Peishwa for the subversion of British preponderancy; thirdly, by specific promises given to the Pindarees of making common cause with them, should they be driven to exigency. Will it be said that this was possibly the construction which we put on doubtful information? Though the Pindaree chiefs, now prisoners with me, have since borne evidence to the truth of all those facts, my vindication shall not repose itself there. Just as I was taking the field, I caused to be delivered to Scindia, in open durbar, his own letters, signed with his own hand, and sealed with his own private seal, addressed to a foreign government, and evincing the most hostile machinations already matured against us. Nothing was said to him on the delivery of those letters other than the Governor-general had not wished to peruse them, and that his Highness would perceive the seals were unbroken. I had no need to peruse them, because their contents were displayed by the letters of inferior agents, referring to and illustrating the expressions of the Maharajah. These particulars are communicated to you, that you may see how steadily, notwithstanding the laxity of the other party, our plan of upholding the existing native governments of India was maintained. Did Scindia dispute the verity of the proofs brought against him? No such thing. He sunk under the confusion of the unexpected detection. There was no denial, no attempt at explanation, no endeavour to excuse the quality of the secret correspondence. On our part, the sole advantage drawn from the circumstance was additional security for the accomplishment of our measures against the Pindarees. The Maharajah was told, in mild and conciliatory terms, that the British government would give way to no vindictive impulse on account of what had passed, but would regard his Highness's aberrations as an indiscretion arising from his not having sufficiently considered the ties of amity subsisting between us. But it was added that, as those ties had not appeared firm enough to secure our just interests, a new treaty should be proposed, which,

while it preserved to the Maharajah all the solid benefits enjoyed by him under the former one, would give us the certainty of annihilating the Pindarees. Scindia gladly agreed to the terms, which pledged him to active coöperation against the freebooters, and set us at liberty to make those engagements with the Rajpoot states which alone could induce them to combine and oppose any attempt of the Pindarees to find refuge in the western country. A provisional agreement was settled with those states instantly, on our obtaining the right to take them under our protection.

A more decisive conduct was requisite towards Ameer Khan. As his hand was professedly against every man who had any thing to lose, the hand of every man might justly be raised against him. There were no engagements, express or implied, between him and us. He was, therefore, distinctly told of our resolution not to suffer the continuance of a predatory system in Central India. An option was on this principle offered, that he should subscribe to the disbanding of his army, or witness the attack of it in its separated condition. Should he choose the former course, he would be guaranteed in the possession of the territories he had won from states whose injuries we had no obligation to redress; should he risk the latter, he would be followed up as a freebooter with the keenest pursuit that could be instituted against a criminal disturber of the public peace. He had sagacity enough to comprehend that any procedure but submission was hopeless. The positions gained by us, through celerity at the outset, rendered the situation of those with whom we had to deal, defenceless. Scindia was closely penned between the centre division on the banks of the Sinde and Major-general Donkin's division on the banks of the Chumbul. The latter corps menaced Ameer Khan on one side, while Sir David Ochterlony's overhung that chief on the other, and the division under Sir William Kier prevented his escaping southward. In this extremity, Ameer Khan took the wise step of throwing himself on our liberal justice. His artillery was surrendered to us; his army was disbanded; and the British government stood free from embarrassment in that quarter. At that period, which was early in November, I had to consider the objects of the campaign as completely gained: for the Pindarees, sensible of the impracticability of maintaining themselves in their own territories, had begun their march to fall back on supports of which they did not then know I

had deprived them, and were surrounded by our divisions which were closing in upon them from every side. An apparently well-grounded hope was thence entertained that the extensive revolution which importantly changed the fortunes of so many states, would be perfected without the effusion of other blood than what might be shed in the dispersion of the Pindarees.

That expectation was not realized; but its failure arose from causes altogether unconnected with the plan of our undertaking or with any steps used by us in the prosecution of it. I mentioned to you that I reserved an explanation respecting Holkar. Though some of the chiefs of the Pindarees held large jagheers from Holkar's government, they had acted so independently of it that they were considered as having divorced themselves entirely from it; and that government, on my notifying to them the determination to suppress the Pindarees, reprobated the lawless ferocity of the free-booters, applauded the justice of my purpose to chastise them, and closed the letter with expressions of every wish for my success. The sincerity of those wishes might have been questionable, though no apprehension of obstruction to our policy would have attended the doubt, had not other and more particular correspondence been at that time in process between Holkar's government and ours. Toolsie Bhye, the widow of the late Maharajah, was, as you know, regent of the state, during the minority of young Holkar. Finding herself unable to control the insolence of the sirdars, and to preserve the interests of the family, she had sent a vakeel to solicit, privately, that Holkar and the state might be taken under the British government. The overture was met with the kindest encouragement. No burdensome condition was indicated, no subsidy required, no stationing of a British force in Holkar's territories proposed; the only outline of terms was reciprocal support, in case either state were attacked, and the zealous coöperation of Holkar's government in preventing the assemblage of predatory associations. While such frank cordiality reigned between the parties, nothing could seem more out of the chances than a rupture; yet upon a sudden the vakeel was recalled, the different sirdars with their respective troops were summoned to repair with the utmost speed to the sovereign's person, and the determination of marching to aid the Peishwa was proclaimed by the regent. What ensued is fresh in your recollection. The Mahrattah army found itself surrounded

Earnest representations of the inevitable ruin they were calling on themselves were made on our part to the government, and many times repeated. The sirdars could not imagine such a feeling as the moderation whence these friendly expostulations flowed. Our assurances that their ebullition should be forgotten, and that we would remain on the same amicable footing as before, if they abandoned their extravagant purpose, were supposed to arise from our consciousness of incompetency to coerce them, and that persuasion increased their temerity to the extent of actual attacks on our outposts.

The regent alone perceived the precipice; wished to withdraw from it; and was publicly put to death by the sirdars for doubting the certainty of victory the evening before that battle which reduced Holkar to a destitute fugitive.

A similary unprovoked defection was exhibited by the Rajah of Nagpoor. If his inimical disposition was not marked with the same insolent vaunt, it was only because he thought the basest insidiousness would give him an advantage in the attempt which he meditated against the life of our accredited minister residing, under the public faith of a treaty, at his Highness's court. He kept up his solemn protestation of devoted friendship till the very hour of the attack on the residency. His villanous efforts failed, his courage deserted him, he threw himself on our mercy, he was continued on the musnud, and every reverence was paid to him, till we detected him in a new conspiracy. Then the simplest principles of self-preservation demanded his removal from the throne.

I have stated these two cases before I touched upon that of the Peishwa, because they will strongly elucidate the necessity of the conduct held towards that prince, if prince be not a title unfitly applied to an individual so filthily stored with perfidy. Our endeavour to screen his reputation by throwing the whole guilt of the Guyckwar minister's murder on Trimbuckjee Dainglica, when the Peishwa himself was not less actively implicated in it, was so perversely met by him, that, throughout the year 1815, we discovered the intrigues of his Highness at almost every court in India, to stimulate combinations against us in revenge for our austerity towards his despicable minion. These were thought to be the effects of an acrimony which should soon subside, and much importance was not attached to them. On finding, however, that they were

continued, I judged it right to apprize the Peishwa that I was acquainted with the transactions. This was done in the gentlest manner; and the intimation was coupled with a profession that I ascribed those practices to the indulgence of an inconsiderate spleen, which he would chasten in himself the moment he reflected on its real nature. It was added that, in the confidence of his being solicitous to retrace his steps, I was ready, on the profession of such a disposition on his part, to obliterate the remembrance of all that had passed, and to invite his fullest reliance on my personal efforts to maintain his welfare and dignity. His answer was a protestation of never-ending gratitude for the gentle tone in which I had roused him to a sense of the track into which he had unintentionally slidden, and which could have led only to his ruin. He charged his agents with having exceeded his instructions, which, nevertheless, he admitted to have been indefensible, but which he would expiate by a strict fidelity to the engagements existing between us, now confirmed anew by his most solemn asseverations. Very shortly after we detected him in the endeavour to collect an army under the pretence of quelling a rebellion, headed by Trimbuckjee, to whom a constant remittance of treasure was made from the Peishwa's coffers; as we knew, by the most accurate information, of every issue. We were then constrained to anticipate this incorrigible plotter. We surrounded him in his capital, and obliged him to submit to terms which preserved the ancient appearances of connexion, but deprived him of much strength, should he hazard future machinations. At the same time, what we imposed was only a fulfilment of an article in the treaty of Bassein, by which he was obliged to keep up for us an auxiliary force of 6000 horse. Not one of them had ever been retained for us; and the money which should have furnished them went into his Highness's private treasury. But we now required that districts yielding revenue to the requisite amount should be put into our hands for the levy and maintenance of the cavalry in question, according to the usual custom in the Mahrattah states of assigning lands to sirdars for the subsistence of a specified number of troops. This force, though it would be the Peishwa's for every purpose of service while friendship existed between us, would go into our scale (since we were the paymasters) should his Highness venture to break with us. He did, you are aware, venture to break with us; but you possibly may not have

suspected how beneficial that precipitated step was for us. Had he not done so, the conspiracy to which he had given a substance and shape much beyond what we had conceived, might have burst forth upon us at an unprovided moment with mischievous concurrence of exertion. The Peishwa trusted to wide coöperation. His sanguinary desire of massacreing Mr Elphinstone made him over hasty in breaking forth, though he had no doubt but that Scindia and Ameer Khan were already in the field against us. The pledges of reciprocal support, settled in 1815, are what I have stated against Scindia in the earlier part of the recapitulation. The Peishwa, when he resorted to arms, was not informed that Scindia and Ameer Khan had already been reduced to nullity. They had been put out of the question. But Holkar and the Rajah of Nagpoor had yet the power of moving. When, after their defeat, they were asked what could lead them to the extravagant act of attacking us, with whom they were in bonds of plighted amity, each pleaded the order of the Peishwa as not to be contested. Holkar's ministers acknowledged their spontaneous petition to be taken under the wing of the British government; but urged, 'the Peishwa is our master, and what he commands we must obey.' The Rajah of Nagpoor being, after his last seizure, charged to his face by one of his former ministers with ingratitude in making those attempts against which he (the minister) had used absolute supplications, answered that the conduct of the British government towards him had been an unvaried stream of benefits conferred; that there never had been a transient dissatisfaction; but that it was his duty to fulfil every direction from his superior the Peishwa. After declarations like these; after such proof that not only the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, which annulled the authority of the Peishwa, but that the most pointed oaths and the strongest obligations for benefits received, could not counterbalance the influence inherent in the name of Peishwa,—you will not be surprised at our feeling it irrational to think of reëstablishing that title. When the Peishwa, seduced by the invitation of the Rajah of Nagpoor, then at liberty and filling the musnud, advanced with his army to the Warda, but, on his arrival there, instead of finding the Nagpoor army ready to join him, learned that the plot had been discovered and that Appa Saheb was a prisoner, the impossibility of getting back to his own dominions was apparent. The disposal of them was then to

be considered. I have shown that there could not be a Peishwa admitted. To raise any of Bajee Row's family to the throne with another appellation, would have been a delusion. The indefeasible character of Peishwa, and chief of the Mahrattah armies, would have been ascribed to the individual, in despite of any barriers of form which we could establish. On that principle we could assign to the Rajah of Satarah only a limited territory, and by no means invest him with the sovereignty of the Poonah dominions. On the other hand, should we set up any one of a family without pretension, whether Hindoo or Mussulman, we bound ourselves to uphold, against all the distaste and prejudices of the inhabitants, the idol which we had elevated. What was worse, we should have to support, against the just indignation of the country, that misrule, perhaps that brutal tyranny, which we must expect would take place under any native so called to the throne. It was thence matter of positive moral necessity that we should (for the present at least) keep the territories of Bajee Row, the late Peishwa, in our own hands. A corresponding embarrassment hangs upon us with regard to Holkar, and the state of Nagpoor. The exertion made by Holkar showed to us the dangerous impolicy of leaving that state in a condition to be ever again troublesome. It has on that account been dismembered of two-thirds of its territory. The greater proportion of those lands have been transferred to the Rajahs of Kotah, Boondee, and other Rajpoot chiefs, whom we wished to strengthen. Part has been kept in our hands, to pay the expense of the troops which the unforeseen change of circumstances requires our keeping advanced in that quarter. With regard to Nagpoor, we have taken territory instead of the subsidy payable in money by the original treaty. There are two motives for this: one, that we thereby narrow the power of that state; the other, that the tract connects itself with other possessions of ours and completes the frontier. You are aware that Saugor, which is the possession alluded to by me, is not an acquisition from the late campaign. It was ceded to us by the Peishwa by the treaty of Poonah. The manager of it, having given shelter to the Pindarees, and having suffered levies to be made openly in his town for the Rajah of Nagpoor, when that prince was in arms against us, has been removed from his superintendence. By taking it into our own hands, we not only consult our own security, but we are enabled to pay from

it, to the jageer dar (Nanna Govind Row who resides at Talooni) three times the amount of the sum ever before received by him from the rents. If I talk of narrowing the means of Holkar and of the Nagpoor Rajah, I do so on the clear principle of right to dispose of territory won in war. Each of those princes had lost all. Whatsoever they now possess is restored to them by us as a gratuitous boon; and the fact will serve to evince the leading inclination with which we set out, of preserving the then existing governments of India. Though this has not been digression, the explanation of the unexpected manner in which we find our territories increased, has put out of sight, for the moment, the direct object of our appearance in the field. The dreadful pestilence which made such havoc in the division under my immediate command forced me to quit the banks of the Sinde, and to seek a more favourable country for the recovery of my numerous sick. I did not find this until I was fifty miles from the river which I quitted. Fortunately the change of air was rapidly beneficial; for a very short time had passed when I received intelligence of an invitation said to have been given by Scindia to the Pindarees. He was reported to have promised them that, if they would come so near to Gwalior as to make his getting to them easy, he would break his treaty and join them with the force which he had at his capital. The Pindarees were in full march for Gwalior, without meeting even a show of impediment from the troops of Scindia stationed in their route; though the coöperation of his army for the extinction of the Pindarees was an article of the treaty. We hurried back to the Sinde; but this time we chose a position nearer to Gwalior than what we had before occupied. We were within thirty miles of the city, and our advanced guard was sent to occupy the passes through the hills which run at some distance south of Gwalior from the Sinde to the Chumbul. These passes were the only route by which communication could take place between the Pindarees and Scindia: And I was nearer to support my advanced guard than the Maharajah was to attack it, could he bring his mind to so desperate a stake. With all the suspicious circumstances attending the state of things, our forbearance was not wearied. No unpleasant hints were thrown out. Scindia was told that, as I had learned the approach of the Pindarees, I had thought it an attention due to my ally to place myself between him and a set of lawless plunderers, who would put

him into great embarrassment could they get into his presence, and throw themselves on his protection. Civility was answered by civility. The Pindarees, finding their hopes baffled and the passage stopped, attempted to retire; but they had been followed close by our divisions, were surprised, dispersed, and slaughtered in a number of small actions. In short they disappeared. And thus our objects were completed.

It remains now to be seen, what is the change effected in our situation.

In England, there are continual declamations against the propensity of the Honourable Company's government here to add to territorial possessions already too large. It is forgotten that a tendency to expansion, amounting almost to direct necessity, is the inherent and inseparable drawback on the advantages of a power established so anomalously as that of the British in India. It would be a visionary confidence to suppose, that your strength would not excite jealousy, that your riches would not stimulate cupidity, and that your humiliation of those native families which held sovereignty when you first got footing in the country, would not be brooded over with a deep spirit of revenge. Yet a belief in the non-existence of those impulses is the ground on which they must stand, who insist on the progressive increase of our sway as a proof of constant ambition in the Honourable Company's local representatives. There may have been cases, though I might find it difficult to indicate them, where prospects of gaining political ascendancy, or too hasty apprehensions of meditated attack, have misled us into hostilities otherwise capable of being avoided: But the general history of our Indian Empire is, that we have been wantonly assailed, that we have conquered the unprovoked enemy, and that we have retained the possessions wrested from him, not simply as a legitimate compensation for the peril and expense forced upon us, but on considerations of self-defence, brought home to our conviction by the nature of the violence just offered to us. What recently befel myself, as I have explained it to you, must be the strongest illustration of this eventful exigency. 'Recover your strength and try the contest with us again,' would be deemed a rather absurd address to a treacherous foe whom you had vanquished; but you would as effectively put it on that footing by the restoration of all his means, as if you had given him the advice in

terms. Still it may be said, though the augmentation of territory may not involve any thing reprehensible, it is not the less to be lamented; since the extension of frontier brings you in contact with new enemies, reduces your strength by widening the circle on the circumferences of which it is to act, leaves advanced stations dangerously unsupported, and, above all, wider occupation of territory exacts formidable addition to your military charges.

The argument would be good were the assumptions admitted. Examine whether they ought. Undoubtedly, your sway has been prodigiously extended by the late operations. The Indus is now in fact your frontier; and, on the conditions of the arrangement, I thank Heaven that it is so. What is there between Calcutta and that boundary? Nothing but states bound by the sense of common interest with you, or a comparatively small proportion of ill-disposed population, rendered incapable of rearing a standard against you. The Mahrattah power is wholly and irretrievably broken. Scindia, by having been kept in port while the barks of his neighbours provoked the tempest and perished in it, presents no exhibition of shattered fortunes: But he stands insulated and precluded from any extraneous assistance. I am satisfied of his conviction that his existence depends on his being in amity with the British government, and of his consequent resolution to cultivate our good will. That inclination in him has been, and will continue to be unfeignedly encouraged by us. Were his disposition different, it would be matter of no concern to us.—He is now girded round by states which we have raised to the power of resisting him, even without our aid, by our having allotted to them most of the territory taken from Holkar; and their political views never can coalesce. You will not forget the direct and heavy defalcation from Scindia's strength in the extinction of the Pindarees. Where is that host, the half of which was to wear us out in fruitless pursuit, while the other half was to get behind us and lay waste our provinces? Gone, vanished—multitudes of them slain in a number of desultory actions, still more of them massacred by the peasantry, as (after abandoning their horses and arms to escape from us through the jungles) they endeavoured to make their way through the country in small parties as travellers. There then remain only states which have spontaneously and earnestly prayed to be received as feudatories under the British banner. It is not conquest that has extended our

rule; we have beaten down nothing but the lawless violence which had for so many years made those regions a scene of unparalleled wretchedness. It is not the awe of our power which has made all the Rajpoot states solicit to be united with us.* A distinct perception that the misery which they had so long suffered could not be prevented but by their identifying themselves with us, was the sole motive for the anxiety with which they sought the connexion. In the terms of it there is nothing to affect pride or wound convenience, so that the confederation carries within it no natural seeds of dissolution. With their internal government we profess to have no right of interference. Mutual support in the field is of course plighted; but the price of our superior contribution to that contingency is an engagement that the feudal states shall not disturb the general tranquillity by attacking each other. Their differences or claims are to be submitted to the arbitration of the British government; and this provision, which extinguishes the necessity for their resorting to the sword on petty points of honour, heretofore enforced by the prejudices of the country, is hailed by them with a just conception of its utility. Thus your enlarged sway is nothing but the influence arising from the reliance of the several states on your moderation, your good faith, and your honest desire to promote their welfare. Should it be said, that, to counterbalance this obvious political gain, we must take into account the disadvantages of extended positions and the charges attendant on increased establishments, I answer that, when the multiplication of points of defence is urged, the diminished means of annoying us are also to be contemplated. I have shown to you that scarcely any continue to exist. Our new situation has not brought us into contact with

* This may be the truth with some of these states, as his Lordship represents; but, as regards Jeypoor, Mr Prinsep positively states that the determination of the Rajah was quickened by the advance of Sir David Ochterlony, and the show of making terms with his feudatories. There is some reason to suppose that the lower orders of the people rejoiced at the approach of the British armies. But, unless the Rajah of Jeypoor, and his adviters the aristocracy of these realms, participated in this sentiment, there existed no just cause for the introduction of this force. His Lordship speaks with exultation of the mighty benefit which was conferred upon Rajpootana, by rescuing it from the brutal oppressions of Ameer Khan and the Mahrattahs. But he omits to inform the Calcutta public that the contributions to be paid by the Rajpoot states to the British government, were fixed at precisely the same amount which had been exacted by these freebooters.

any thing that can have the wish—or, had it the wish, could have the power—of giving us trouble. All within the Indus is attached to you. The Indus would be a barrier against contact, were there any state on the other side of it adverse to you in its interests. Should any such hereafter appear, it is not your influencing the governments in the vicinity of the Indus that would be the cause of quarrel; and I cannot conceive any stronger dissuasive to enterprizes against us from beyond the river, than the knowledge that all within it are linked with us in the bonds of cordial union. In this view, I deceive myself egregiously if any augmented military charges will not be light indeed in comparison with the large additional resources secured to meet such eventual demands. This is our benefit in the arrangement. What is that of the Rajpoot states? Deliverance from an oppression more systematic, more unremitting, more brutal, than perhaps ever before trampled on humanity—security and comfort established where nothing but terror and misery before existed. Nor is this within a narrow sphere. It is a proud phrase to use, but it is a true one, that we have bestowed blessings upon millions. Nothing can be more delightful than the reports I receive of the keen sensibility manifested by the inhabitants to this change in their circumstances. The smallest detachment of our troops cannot pass through that country, without meeting everywhere eager and exulting gratulations, the tone of which proves them to come from glowing hearts. Multitudes of people have even, in this short interval, come from the hills and fastnesses in which they had sought refuge for years, and have re-occupied their ancient deserted villages. The ploughshare is again in every quarter, turning up a soil which had for very many seasons never been stirred, except by the hoofs of predatory cavalry.

Here then is a display of general advantage on an exhilarating promise of public quiet. Every one of the facts on which I have founded this representation, is capable of being disproved by each of you, with little trouble of inquiry, if I have advanced them incorrectly. I have strangely hazarded my character, if they are liable to refutation: If they are not, what we have done is befitting the policy, the equity, the benignity of our country.

You justly appreciate the admirable energy of the officers commanding the divisions to which the more active part of the service fell: And the zeal of the chiefs of the troops, with the splendid

g. ... ry of those who were on any occasion engaged, merits all the praise which you have offered.

I concur ardently with you in the sentiment you express, of our obligation to aim at rendering what we have done, still more beneficial to the inhabitants of India. The main obstacles to our infusing improvement are removed; and we may certainly disseminate useful instruction, without in the slightest degree risking dissatisfaction, by meddling with the religious opinions of the natives. Information on practical points is what is wanting to the people; for, from the long course of anarchy in those parts, all relations of the community are confused. This government will not lose sight of the object. We may surely succeed in inculcating principles of mild and equitable rule, distinct notions of social observances, and a just sense of moral duties, leading perhaps, in God's good time, to a purer conception of the more sublime claims on the humane. At least, let us do what is in our power.—Let us put the seed into the ground, and Providence will determine on its growth. Should it be the will of the Almighty that the tree should rise and flourish, and that the inhabitants of those extensive regions should enjoy security and comfort under its shade, we shall have done much for many of our fellow-creatures; but we shall have done well also for that in which our liveliest interest is fixed. The cherished memory of our forecasting beneficence will remain to future times in India the noblest monument of the British name.

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